Robeson v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
MDD_DRMChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
(410) 962-7770
February 11, 2026
LETTER OPINION
Re: Robeson v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. 1:22-cv-02797-DRM
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Attorney Fees under the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42
U.S.C. § 406(b), in the amount of $27,262.00. ECF No. 23. The government has responded neither
supporting nor opposing the motion. ECF 24. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
Dec. 1, 2025). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED
IN PART.
This Court has awarded Plaintiff’s attorney, Arjun K. Murahari, Esq., $4,181.73 for a total
of 17.25 hours worked on Plaintiff’s case in federal court, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF 22. Plaintiff received an Award Notice, in which she was
awarded $109,048.00 in past due benefits. ECF 23-4. Subsequently, Mr. Murahari filed a Motion
in this Court, seeking $27,262.00 in attorney's fees. ECF 23. Mr. Murahari has agreed to reimburse
Plaintiff in the amount of fees previously received. ECF 23-1; see Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.
789, 796 (2002); Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2009).
The Act authorizes a reasonable fee for successful representation before this Court, not to
exceed twenty-five percent of a claimant’s total past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Although
contingent fee agreements are the “primary means by which fees are set” in Social Security cases,
a court must nevertheless perform an “independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In determining whether a request for
attorney’s fees under section 406(b) is reasonable, the Supreme Court has explained that a
reviewing court may properly consider the “character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved.” Id. at 808. Importantly, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
contingent fee agreement would not result in a reasonable fee if the fee constituted a “windfall” to
the attorney. Id. (quoting Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1989)). Courts may
require the attorney to provide a record of hours spent working on the case and the attorney’s
typical hourly billing charge. Id.
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Robeson v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. 1:22-cv-02797-DRM
Page 2
Here, Mr. Murahari and Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement, by which
Plaintiff agreed to pay Mr. Murahari twenty-five percent of all retroactive benefits to which she
might become entitled. ECF 20-5. In his previous motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA,
Mr. Murahari submitted itemized reports documenting 17.25 chargeable hours he expended before
this Court in Plaintiff’s case. See ECF 20-8. If Mr. Murahari receives the full amount of fees he
requests, his fee for representation before this Court will effectively total $1,580.41 per hour. Mr.
Murahari must therefore show that an effective rate of $1,580.41 per hour is reasonable for the
services he rendered. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.
Notably, Mr. Murahari’s typical hourly billing rate is $350, ECF 20-6 ¶ 6. Courts in the
Fourth Circuit have approved contingency fee agreements that produce much higher hourly rates
in successful Social Security appeals. See, e.g., Melvin v. Colvin, No. 5:10-CV-160-FL, 2013 WL
3340490 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2013) (approving contingency fee agreement with hourly rate of
$1,043.92); Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (approving
contingency fee agreement with hourly rate of $1,433.12); Lehman v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Civil No. SAG-10-2160 (D. Md. July 7, 2016) (unpublished) (approving contingency fee
agreement with hourly rate of $1,028.14). This Court has routinely approved a higher hourly rate
for Mr. Murahari. See Arvie W. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-17-1148, 2019 WL
3975187 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2019); Barbara F. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-17-2090,
2019 WL 3340738 (D. Md. July 25, 2019); Kimberly B v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-
16-2519, 2019 WL 1559426 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2019); Matthew C. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
No. JMC-20-3240, 2023 WL 3043906 (D. Md. Apr. 21, 2023); Gina S. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-2775-
MBAH, 2025 WL 2734092 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2025). However, the requested rate is significantly
higher than those awards. Instead, this Court concludes that an hourly rate of $1,400.00, four times
Mr. Murahari’s typical hourly billing rate, is a reasonable rate in this case. A rate of $1,400.00 for
17.25 hours of work would result in a fee of $24,150.00, which is reasonable and should be
approved.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion seeking
attorney’s fees, ECF 23. This Court will award Mr. Murahari attorney’s fees totaling $24,150.00.
Mr. Murahari is directed to reimburse to Plaintiff the fees he received pursuant to the EAJA.
Notwithstanding the informal nature of this letter, it should be docketed as an opinion.
A separate implementing order follows.
Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
District of Maryland
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