Shiheed v. Medical Nurse Ernest et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
YAHYI ABDUL SHIHEED,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERNEST MASSALLA, RN, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: SAG-22-1950
MEMORANDUM
Self-represented Plaintiff Yahyi Abdul Shiheed, an inmate presently incarcerated at
Western Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, filed this civil action against Ernest
Massalla, R.N. and Corizon Medical Center.1 ECF No. 1. Defendant Massalla, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 13. Shiheed was informed by the Court, pursuant to Roseboro
v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that his failure to file a response in opposition to
Defendant’s Motion could result in dismissal of the Complaint. 	ECF No. 59. 	To date, despite
requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond (ECF No. 60 and 61), Shiheed has not
done so. 	A hearing is not necessary. 	See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	For the reasons
explained below, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	Background
Shiheed alleges that on April 10, 2022, after he was stabbed multiple times, Defendant
Massalla refused to treat him stating that Shiheed “was ok and …didn’t need treatment.” ECF No.
at 1. Shiheed states that he was in severe pain and suffered several puncture wounds and facial
wounds which Defendant Massalla refused to clean or otherwise treat. Id. Several hours later
1 The case is stayed as to Corizon due to its bankruptcy. ECF No. 25.
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Shiheed showed his wounds to another nurse making rounds who immediately treated his wounds.
Id. Shiheed states that Massalla knew of his injuries but failed to take any action. Id. He claims
that Massalla’s conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical needs and negligence.
Id.
II. 	Standard of Review
Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that Shiheed’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 	ECF No. 58. 	To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the factual allegations of a complaint “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’
evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. 	However, the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to establish those elements.” 	Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from
those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637
F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that Shiheed is not entitled to “desired treatment” (ECF No. 58 at 1) and
that “[n]o 1983 actions can be brought against privately employed individuals working at a prison.”
Id. at 2.
As to Defendant Massalla’s claim that he cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action because
he is a contracted medical provider, he is mistaken. It is well settled that a private contractor may,
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in certain cases, act under color of law within the meaning of §1983. See Conner v. Donnelly, 42
F.3d 220, 223-24 (4th Cir. 1994). One way in which a private contractor acts under color of law is
when it “exercise[s] powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.’” Id. at
224 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982)); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access
Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 810 n.1 (2019) (“[T]his Court has recognized that a private entity
may, under certain circumstances, be deemed a state actor when the government has outsourced
one of its constitutional obligations to a private entity.”). The Fourth Circuit has made clear that
“the provision of medical services to prison inmates” is such a circumstance. Conner, 42 F.3d at
224; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (stating that a state has a “constitutional duty
to 	provide 	adequate medical treatment 	to 	those 	in 	its 	custody”); 	Ancata 	v. Prison Health
Services, 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985) (“As physicians under contract with the state, the
psychiatrists were state actors subject to liability under § 1983.”) In support of his argument,
Defendant Massalla relies on Correctional Services, Inc., v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). But
Malesko involved Bivens2 claims asserted against federal, not state, contractors and is therefore
inapposite.
As to the sufficiency of Shiheed’s denial of medical care claim, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue of its guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016); King v. Rubenstein,
825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016).
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens is a judicially-
created monetary remedy designed to vindicate violations of constitutional rights committed by federal actors in
their individual capacity.
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To state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the actions of the defendant, or their failure to act, amounted to deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also
Anderson, 877 F.3d at 543.
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the
prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff
were aware of the need for medical attention but failed to either provide it or ensure it was
available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1994); see also Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2017); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir.
2016); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Shiheed alleges that Defendant Massalla
knew and acknowledged he had been stabbed multiple times but refused to render any medical
care: medical care that was provided to Shiheed several hours later by a different nurse. The Court
does not understand Shiheed to complain that a specific medical treatment was not provided but
rather that no medical treatment was provided by Defendant Massalla despite the obvious need for
same. Thus, the Court finds that Shiheed has stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 	A separate Order
shall issue.
_____________________________
Date 	Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
January 15, 2026	/s/
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