USA v. Hobbs

1:18-cr-00322Mdd05.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
v. 	: 	Criminal No. DKC 18-322
Rel. Civil Action DKC 22-1881
:
ERICK RAHUMID HOBBS
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Erick 	Rahumid 	Hobbs 	(“Mr. 	Hobbs” 	or 	“Petitioner”) 	filed 	a
motion 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	to 	vacate, 	set 	aside, 	or 	correct
sentence (“§ 2255 motion” or “motion to vacate”) on July 22, 2022.1
(ECF No. 95).2 	After having been granted an extension of time to
file a response, (ECF No. 99), the Government filed a response in
opposition, 	(ECF 	No. 	101), 	and 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	filed 	a 	reply, 	(ECF 	No.
102). 	Mr. Hobbs also filed a motion for grand jury transcripts at
no 	cost, 	(ECF 	No. 	97), 	a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment, 	(ECF 	No.
1 	Mr. Hobbs submitted the motion to prison officials on July 22,
2022, the motion was mailed by prison officials on July 25, 2022,
was 	received 	by 	the 	court 	on 	July 	28, 	2022, 	and 	was 	docketed 	by
the 	Clerk 	on 	July 	29, 	2022. 	Under 	the 	“mailbox 	rule,” 	a 	pro 	se
litigant who is incarcerated is deemed to have filed a pleading or
motion 	with 	the 	court 	upon 	delivery 	of 	the 	motion 	to 	prison
officials. 	See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275–76 (1988); Lewis
v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733, 734-35 (4 th Cir. 1991)
(extending 	Lack 	to 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	claims); 	United 	States 	v.
Dorsey, 	988 	F.Supp. 	917, 	919-20 	(D.Md. 	1998) 	(extending 	Lack 	and
Lewis 	to 	§ 	2255 	petitions). 	Thus, 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	filed 	his 	motion 	on
July 22, 2022. 	(ECF No. 95).
2 	All references to the record pertain to the criminal case.
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100), 	a 	letter 	requesting 	the 	court 	to 	modify 	his 	presentence
report, 	(ECF 	No. 	103), 	a 	motion 	for 	a 	transcript 	of 	the 	oral
argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, 	(ECF 	No. 	104), 	a 	motion 	for 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	status,
(ECF No. 105), and a motion to supplement his § 2255 motion, (ECF
No. 	107). 	The 	Government 	filed 	a 	Response 	to 	the 	motion 	to
supplement, 	(ECF 	No. 	110), 	and 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	filed 	a 	reply, 	(ECF 	No.
111). 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	below, 	the 	court 	will 	deny 	Mr.
Hobbs’ motions.
I. 	Background
Erick Rahumid Hobbs was convicted of possession of a firearm
and ammunition by a prohibited person after a jury trial. 	He was
sentenced 	to 	198 	months 	in 	prison, 	followed 	by 	five 	years 	of
supervised 	release. 	The 	judgment 	was 	affirmed 	by 	the 	Fourth
Circuit. 	That opinion dealt primarily with a pre-trial suppression
issue 	and 	the 	facts 	developed 	at 	the 	suppression 	hearing 	were
recounted, 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	Government, 	as
follows:
This 	case 	arose 	from 	allegations 	of
domestic violence reported to Baltimore County
police 	by 	Hobbs’ 	former 	girlfriend, 	Jaquanna
Foreman, 	shortly 	after 	7:00 	p.m. 	on 	February
3, 	2018. 	At 	the 	time, 	Foreman 	was 	home 	with
her seven-year-old daughter. 	Foreman told the
responding officers that Hobbs had come to the
back of her home, brandished a semi-automatic
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handgun, and used the gun to break a window in
the 	home. 	He 	then 	forcibly 	entered 	the 	home
and 	removed 	a 	television 	[he 	had 	given 	to
Foreman’s daughter]. 	Before leaving the home
with the television, Hobbs threatened to kill
Foreman, 	her 	daughter, 	and 	other 	family
members, and stated that if she contacted the
police, 	he 	also 	would 	kill 	any 	responding
officers.
The 	officers 	escorted 	Foreman 	and 	her
daughter to the police station, where Foreman
provided 	additional 	details 	about 	Hobbs,
including aliases, dates of birth, information
about his vehicle and his social media usage,
and a cell phone number. 	She also stated that
Hobbs had a criminal record. 	Foreman informed
Detective Michael Nesbitt that, in addition to
the 	handgun 	Hobbs 	displayed 	that 	night, 	she
previously 	had 	seen 	him 	armed 	with 	assault
rifles 	and 	that 	he 	was 	“obsessed 	with
firearms.” 	Nesbitt verified that Hobbs had a
violent 	criminal 	history, 	including
convictions for robbery and attempted murder.
United 	States 	v. 	Hobbs, 	24 	F.4th 	965, 	967–68 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2022)
(footnote 	omitted). 	After 	obtaining 	information 	on 	an 	exigent
basis 	from 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	cell 	phone 	provider, 	police 	located 	him 	in
his vehicle:
About 	six 	hours 	after 	the 	domestic
incident, 	a 	team 	of 	officers 	attempted 	to
effect 	a 	traffic 	stop 	of 	Hobbs’ 	vehicle.
Hobbs 	tried 	to 	flee 	from 	the 	officers 	until
his 	car 	eventually 	collided 	with 	a 	parked
vehicle. 	The 	officers 	placed 	Hobbs 	under
arrest and recovered a loaded [Ruger P89 9 mm
caliber 	pistol] 	on 	the 	ground 	between 	the
driver-side 	door 	of 	his 	car 	and 	the 	curb.
Later that night, Detective Nesbitt secured a
search 	warrant 	for 	Hobbs’ 	car, 	and 	two 	days
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later 	obtained 	a 	search 	warrant 	for 	the 	same
cell 	phone 	information 	obtained 	earlier
pursuant 	to 	the 	“exigent 	form.” 	The 	police
also 	executed 	a 	separate 	search 	warrant 	for
Hobbs’ 	residence 	and 	seized 	65 	rounds 	of
ammunition from his home.
Id. 	at 	968. 	Trial 	testimony 	largely 	mirrored 	that 	presented 	at
the motions hearing.
On recorded jail calls after his arrest, Mr. Hobbs requested
that his son and roommate communicate with Ms. Foreman in an effort
to get her not to pursue charges and suggested Facebook as a means
by which to contact her. 	After Ms. Foreman received a message via
Facebook 	from 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	roommate, 	law 	enforcement 	relocated 	Ms.
Foreman and her daughter for their safety.
Mr. 	Hobbs 	was 	convicted 	of 	violating 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	924(e) 	and
found 	to 	be 	an 	Armed 	Career 	Criminal 	based 	on 	a 	conviction 	for
attempted second-degree murder and two convictions for armed bank
robbery. 	He was sentenced on May 30, 2019, to 198 months in prison
followed 	by 	five 	years’ 	supervised 	release. 	(ECF 	No. 	71). 	He
noted 	an 	appeal 	to 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	challenging 	the 	denial 	of
his suppression motion and, in a supplement, asserting that he was
entitled 	to 	relief 	under 	Rehaif 	v. 	United 	States, 	588 	U.S. 	225
(2019). 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit 	affirmed 	his 	conviction. 	(ECF 	No.
90). 	The mandate issued March 10, 2022. 	(ECF No. 94).
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Mr. 	Hobbs 	filed 	this 	§ 	2255 	motion 	on 	July 	22, 	2022. 	(ECF
No. 95). 	The court ordered the Government to respond within sixty
days of the Order and allowed Mr. Hobbs twenty-eight days from the
date of the Government’s response to file a reply. 	(ECF No. 96).
The 	Government 	requested, 	and 	received, 	permission 	to 	file 	its
response 	on 	or 	before 	October 	28, 	2022. 	(ECF 	No. 	99). 	The
Government 	filed 	its 	response 	in 	opposition 	on 	October 	31, 	2022.
(ECF 	No. 	101). 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment
before the Government filed its response,3 and then a reply. 	(ECF
Nos. 100, 102).
Mr. 	Hobbs 	also 	filed 	a 	letter 	in 	June 	2023, 	requesting 	that
the 	court 	modify 	his 	presentence 	report, 	(ECF 	No. 	103), 	a 	motion
for a transcript of the oral argument before the Fourth Circuit at
no 	charge, 	(ECF 	No. 	104), 	a 	motion 	for 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	status,
(ECF No. 105), and a motion to supplement his § 2255 motion, (ECF
No. 107).
3 	The Government filed a response, albeit late. 	The brief delay
is 	unlikely 	to 	have 	caused 	substantial 	prejudice, 	if 	any, 	to 	Mr.
Hobbs. 	Not 	only 	does 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	have 	a 	“strong 	policy”
that “defaults be avoided” and that cases “be disposed of on their
merits,” 	Colleton 	Preparatory 	Acad., 	Inc. 	v. 	Hoover 	Universal,
Inc., 	616 	F.3d 	413, 	417 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(citation 	modified), 	but
defaults 	against 	the 	Government 	are 	only 	proper 	“if 	the 	claimant
establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies
the 	court,” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	55(d). 	The 	motion 	for 	entry 	of 	default
will be denied.
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II. 	Standard of Review
To 	be 	eligible 	for 	relief 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255, 	Mr. 	Hobbs
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his “sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, 	or 	that 	the 	sentence 	was 	in 	excess 	of 	the 	maximum
authorized 	by 	law.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255(a). 	A 	pro 	se 	movant 	is
entitled 	to 	have 	his 	arguments 	reviewed 	with 	appropriate
consideration. 	See 	Gordon 	v. 	Leeke, 	574 	F.2d 	1147, 	1151–53 	(4 th
Cir. 	1978). 	But 	if 	the 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2255 	motion, 	along 	with 	the
files 	and 	records 	of 	the 	case, 	conclusively 	show 	that 	he 	is 	not
entitled to relief, a hearing on the motion is unnecessary and the
claims raised in the motion may be dismissed summarily. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(b).
An issue may only be raised in a motion to vacate pursuant to
28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	if 	it 	has 	not 	been 	procedurally 	defaulted. 	One
way 	a 	claim 	is 	procedurally 	defaulted 	is 	if 	it 	could 	have 	been
raised 	on 	direct 	appeal 	and 	was 	not. 	The 	general 	rule 	is 	that
“claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral
review.” 	Massaro 	v. 	United 	States, 	538 	U.S. 	500, 	504 	(2003)
(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Frady, 	456 	U.S. 	152, 	167–68 	(1982);
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621–22 (1998)). 	Claims of
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ineffective representation by counsel do not, ordinarily, have to
be brought on direct appeal and, thus, may be raised for the first
time 	on 	collateral 	review. 	Id. 	For 	those 	claims 	that 	are
defaulted, 	“[t]he 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	an 	equitable
exception to the bar . . . when a habeas applicant can demonstrate
cause 	and 	prejudice, 	or 	actual 	innocence.” 	United 	States 	v.
Pettiford, 	612 	F.3d 	270, 	280 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(citing 	Dretke 	v.
Haley, 	541 	U.S. 	386, 	393 	(2004)). 	To 	demonstrate 	cause, 	the
petitioner 	must 	show 	a 	reason 	for 	a 	procedural 	default 	based 	“on
something external to the defense, such as the novelty of the claim
or a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” 	United States v.
Mikalajunas, 	186 	F.3d 	490, 	493 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1999) 	(citing 	Murray 	v.
Carrier, 	477 	U.S. 	478, 	488 	(1986)). 	The 	petitioner 	must 	also
demonstrate that he will suffer “actual prejudice” if his claim is
not 	reviewed. 	Brown 	v. 	Lee, 	319 	F.3d 	162, 	169 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2003)
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
Pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255(b), 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	is
appropriate 	where 	a 	petitioner 	“has 	pled 	facts 	that, 	if
established, entitle him to relief, and there is a material dispute
regarding 	those 	facts.” 	Jones 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	14-cr-0176-
DKC, 	2018 	WL 	1069438, 	at 	*1 	(D.Md. 	Feb. 	27, 	2018) 	(quoting 	Higgs
v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	98-cr-3180-PJM, 	2010 	WL 	1875760, 	at 	*63
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(D.Md. Apr. 6, 2010)); accord United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d
6, 	7 	(4th 	Cir. 	1988), 	abrogated 	on 	other 	grounds 	by, 	Padilla 	v.
Kentucky, 	559 	U.S. 	356 	(2010). 	“To 	warrant 	a 	hearing 	on 	an
ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim, 	the 	[petitioner] 	need
establish 	only 	that 	he 	has 	a 	plausible 	claim 	of 	ineffective
assistance of counsel[.]” 	Jones, 2018 WL 1069438, at *3 (quoting
Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 213 (2 d Cir. 2009)). 	The
question 	of 	whether 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	is 	necessary 	is 	“left
to 	the 	common 	sense 	and 	sound 	discretion 	of 	the 	district 	judge.”
West 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	13-cr-0558-DKC, 	2018 	WL 	529619, 	at 	*4
(D.Md. 	Jan. 	24, 	2018) 	(quoting 	Raines 	v. 	United 	States, 	423 	F.2d
526, 531 (4 th Cir. 1970)). 	“A hearing is generally ‘required when
a 	movant 	presents 	a 	colorable 	Sixth 	Amendment 	claim 	showing
disputed 	material 	facts 	and 	a 	credibility 	determination 	is
necessary 	to 	resolve 	this 	issue.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Smith, 	No.
12-cr-0528-ELH, 	2015 	WL 	4509955, 	at 	*1 	(D.Md. 	July 	24, 	2015)
(quoting United States v. Robertson, 219 F.App’x 286, 286 (4 th Cir.
2007)); 	see 	United 	States 	v. 	Ray, 	547 	F.App’x 	343, 	345 	(4 th 	Cir.
2013) 	(“An 	evidentiary 	hearing 	in 	open 	court 	is 	required 	when 	a
movant presents a colorable Sixth Amendment claim showing disputed
facts 	beyond 	the 	record 	or 	when 	a 	credibility 	determination 	is
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necessary in order to resolve the issue.” (citing United States v.
Witherspoon, 231 F.3d 923, 926–27 (4 th Cir. 2000))).
III. 	Analysis
A. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. 	Standard of Review
To 	establish 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel, 	Mr. 	Hobbs
must show that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that he suffered actual prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 	Under the
performance 	prong, 	a 	petitioner 	“must 	show 	that 	counsel’s
performance 	was 	deficient.” 	Id. 	at 	687. 	“Judicial 	scrutiny 	of
counsel’s 	performance 	must 	be 	highly 	deferential.” 	Id. 	at 	689;
see also United States v. Terry, 366 F.3d 312, 317 (4 th Cir. 2004).
The alleged deficient performance must be objectively unreasonable
and 	“requires 	showing 	that 	counsel 	made 	errors 	so 	serious 	that
counsel 	was 	not 	functioning 	as 	the 	‘counsel’ 	guaranteed 	the
defendant 	by 	the 	Sixth 	Amendment.” 	Strickland, 	466 	U.S. 	at 	687.
The 	court 	must 	“evaluate 	the 	conduct 	[at 	issue] 	from 	counsel’s
perspective 	at 	the 	time” 	and 	“indulge 	a 	strong 	presumption 	that
counsel’s 	conduct 	falls 	within 	the 	wide 	range 	of 	reasonable
professional assistance.” 	Id. at 689. 	Under the prejudice prong,
a 	petitioner 	must 	show 	that 	the 	deficient 	performance 	prejudiced
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the defense and, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is
a 	reasonable 	probability 	that 	the 	result 	of 	the 	proceeding 	would
have 	been 	different. 	Id. 	at 	687, 	694. 	Finally, 	“there 	is 	no
reason 	for 	a 	court 	deciding 	an 	ineffective 	assistance 	claim 	to
approach 	the 	inquiry 	in 	the 	same 	order 	or 	even 	to 	address 	both
components of the inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient
showing on one.” 	Id. at 697.
The 	“right 	to 	effective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	extends 	to
require such assistance on direct appeal.” 	United States v. Mason,
774 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d
149, 	164 	(4th 	Cir. 	2000) 	(en 	banc)). 	“Effective 	assistance 	of
appellate counsel ‘does not require the presentation of all issues
on appeal that may have merit.’” 	Id. at 828–29 (quoting Lawrence
v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 709 (4 th Cir. 2008)). 	Instead, the court
presumes 	that 	appellate 	counsel 	“decided 	which 	issues 	were 	most
likely to afford relief on appeal.” 	Id. at 828 (quoting Pruett v.
Thompson, 	996 	F.2d 	1560, 	1568 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1993)). 	“[O]nly 	when
ignored 	issues 	are 	clearly 	stronger 	than 	those 	presented” 	should
the 	court 	find 	a 	petitioner’s 	appellate 	counsel 	ineffective 	for
failing 	to 	raise 	those 	claims. 	Id. 	at 	829 	(quoting 	Smith 	v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)).
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2. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Mr. Hobbs asserts that his attorney was ineffective by:
a. 	Failing to move for a “Franks hearing”4 because the
affidavits of Detective Michael Nesbitt and Officer
Bryan Dixon contained false statements;
b. 	Failing 	to 	confront 	Ms. 	Foreman 	with 	police
precinct 	interview 	evidence 	that 	contradicted 	her
trial testimony; and
c. 	Failing 	to 	object, 	challenge, 	or 	preserve 	the
argument 	of 	a 	duplicitous 	indictment 	at 	trial 	and
on appeal.
a. 	Affidavits of Detective Nesbitt and Officer Dixon
Mr. 	Hobbs 	states 	that 	he 	discussed 	and 	highlighted
discrepancies in the affidavit of Detective Nesbitt supporting the
search 	warrant 	for 	his 	home 	and 	the 	affidavit 	of 	Officer 	Dixon
supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant with retained trial
counsel 	and 	asked 	him 	to 	request 	a 	“Franks 	hearing” 	to 	address
those issues. 	However, his attorney declined.
Mr. Hobbs states that Officers Dixon and Flanary interviewed
the victim, Ms. Foreman, outside of her residence. 	Based on this
interview, 	Officer 	Dixon 	applied 	for, 	and 	obtained, 	an 	arrest
4 	Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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warrant 	for 	Mr. 	Hobbs. 	He 	asserts 	that 	the 	affidavit 	supporting
the 	request 	for 	the 	arrest 	warrant 	omitted 	Ms. 	Foreman’s 	claim
that 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	was 	in 	possession 	of 	an 	AK-47 	rifle, 	that 	the
television 	belonged 	to 	Mr. 	Hobbs, 	and 	misstated 	the 	way 	in 	which
Mr. 	Hobbs 	entered 	Ms. 	Foreman’s 	home. 	Additionally, 	the 	firearm
described 	in 	Officer 	Dixon’s 	affidavit 	does 	not 	match 	the
description of the firearm provided by Ms. Foreman in the 911 call.
Mr. Hobbs asserts that Ms. Foreman’s claim that he was armed with
a black handgun and that an AK-47 assault rifle may be in his car
was 	highly 	improbable 	and 	should 	cause 	a 	reasonable 	officer
suspicion and to question the inconsistency of her allegations and
credibility.
Mr. Hobbs contends that Detective Nesbitt’s affidavit for the
search warrant contains a deliberately false statement, i.e., that
Mr. 	Hobbs 	dropped 	the 	handgun. 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	notes 	that 	Detective
Nesbitt did not participate in his arrest and thus, could not make
this statement under oath. 	Further, he asserts that the statements
of 	the 	officers 	on 	the 	scene 	do 	not 	indicate 	that 	he 	dropped 	the
handgun 	and 	thus 	that 	Detective 	Nesbitt 	inferred 	that 	he 	dropped
the 	handgun. 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	also 	contends 	that 	it 	was 	never 	proven
that he was in possession of a handgun.
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Mr. 	Hobbs 	argues 	that 	the 	affidavits 	contain 	“omissions,
misrepresentations, 	and 	false 	statements” 	because 	some 	of 	Ms.
Foreman’s 	claims 	were 	omitted 	from 	Officer 	Dixon’s 	affidavit 	and
Detective Nesbitt was not present for his arrest and so could not
attest that he dropped the firearm. 	He also contends that had the
affidavits supporting the arrest warrant been accurate, the court
would 	not 	have 	authorized 	the 	search 	warrant 	and 	cell 	phone
location 	order. 	Additionally, 	had 	counsel 	moved 	for 	a 	Franks
hearing, as Mr. Hobbs requested his attorney to do, the court would
have agreed that an evidentiary hearing was warranted and the trial
would have produced a different outcome.
The 	Government 	argues 	that 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	cannot 	show 	any
actionable ineffective assistance for a variety of reasons. 	With
regard to the arrest warrant, it argues that the government gained
nothing of value by virtue of having the warrant. 	It asserts that
any Franks motion for the arrest warrant would have failed because
officers needed no warrant to make the arrest. 	In similar fashion,
the 	Government 	argues 	that 	Detective 	Nesbitt’s 	statement 	in 	his
request for a warrant to search Mr. Hobbs’ home, specifically that
Mr. 	Hobbs 	dropped 	the 	firearm 	when 	exiting 	his 	vehicle, 	was
unnecessary 	to 	secure 	the 	search 	warrant. 	Law 	enforcement 	had
ample support for the search warrant without that statement. 	Other
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key facts on the search warrant application included how Mr. Hobbs
had taken the television forcibly while armed with a handgun, the
jail 	call 	recording 	admitting 	he 	possessed 	the 	firearm 	and
confirming 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	address, 	and 	why 	they 	thought 	evidence 	may
be found at his home.
This claim of ineffective representation fails.
The Fourth Circuit has recently recapped the law in this area:
“[A]n 	accused 	is 	generally 	not 	entitled 	to
challenge 	the 	veracity 	of 	a 	facially 	valid
search 	warrant 	affidavit.” 	United 	States 	v.
Allen, 	631 	F.3d 	164, 	171 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2011). 	A
“narrow 	exception” 	is 	made, 	however, 	for
affidavits 	containing 	material 	mis-
information. 	Id. 	In 	this 	setting, 	we
suppress evidence obtained by a warrant if the
defendant 	establishes 	“by 	a 	preponderance 	of
the evidence” that, sans the “false material”
caused 	by 	the 	affiant’s 	“perjury 	or 	reckless
disregard,” 	the 	affidavit 	would 	have 	been
“insufficient 	to 	establish 	probable 	cause.”
Franks, 	438 	U.S. 	at 	156[].
United 	States 	v. 	Glass, 	No. 	24-4193, 	--- 	F.4th 	---, 	2025 	WL
3455396, at *4 (4 th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025). 	Furthermore:
This 	exception 	covers 	lies 	by 	omission,
too. That is, if an affiant “omitted material
facts 	that 	when 	included 	would 	defeat 	a
probable cause showing,” and if “the omission
was 	designed 	to 	mislead 	or 	was 	made 	with
reckless 	disregard 	of 	whether 	it 	would
mislead,” then the exclusionary rule applies.
United 	States 	v. 	Tate, 	524 	F.3d 	449, 	455 	(4 th
Cir. 	2008). 	At 	the 	same 	time, 	“[a]n 	affiant
cannot be expected to include in an affidavit
every 	piece 	of 	information 	gathered 	in 	the
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15
course of an investigation.” 	United States v.
Colkley, 	899 	F.2d 	297, 	300 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1990).
Consequently, 	omission-based 	attacks 	to
affidavits trigger “an even higher evidentiary
burden” 	than 	challenges 	based 	on 	false
disclosures. 	United States v. Moody, 931 F.3d
366, 374 (4 th Cir. 2019) (citing Tate, 524 F.3d
at 454–55).
Id.
A trial court is not required to hold a full-fledged hearing
every time material misinformation is alleged. 	Instead, to merit
the conduct of a Franks hearing, the defendant must show much more
than Petitioner attempts here:
To 	obtain 	a 	Franks 	hearing, 	a 	defendant
must make a “substantial preliminary showing”
to overcome the “presumption of validity with
respect to the affidavit supporting the search
warrant.” 	Moody, 	931 	F.3d 	at 	370 	(citations
and quotation marks omitted); see also Franks,
438 U.S. at 171[] (defendant’s “attack must be
more than conclusory and must be supported by
more 	than 	a 	mere 	desire 	to 	cross-examine”).
When 	a 	defendant 	relies 	on 	an 	omission, 	this
heavy 	burden 	is 	even 	harder 	to 	meet. 	Tate,
524 	F.3d 	at 	454–55. 	In 	that 	situation, 	a
defendant 	must 	provide 	a 	substantial
preliminary 	showing 	that 	(1) 	law 	enforcement
made an omission; (2) law enforcement made the
omission “knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth,” and (3) the
inclusion 	of 	the 	omitted 	evidence 	in 	the
affidavit 	would 	have 	defeated 	its 	probable
cause. 	Colkley, 	899 	F.2d 	at 	300–01. 	If 	the
district court finds that a defendant has made
this threshold showing, it must hold a Franks
hearing to develop evidence on the affidavit’s
veracity. 	Id. 	at 	301. 	If 	after 	the 	hearing
the defendant establishes “perjury or reckless
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16
disregard” by a preponderance of the evidence
and 	shows 	that 	the 	inclusion 	of 	the 	omitted
evidence 	would 	defeat 	the 	probable 	cause 	in
the 	affidavit, 	“the 	search 	warrant 	must 	be
voided and the fruits of the search excluded.”
Franks, 	438 	U.S. 	at 	156[]; 	see 	also 	Colkley,
899 F.2d at 300–01.
United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 474 (4 th Cir. 2021) (footnote
omitted).
The omission of some of Ms. Foreman’s allegations from Officer
Dixon’s 	affidavit 	and 	the 	fact 	that 	Detective 	Nesbitt 	was 	not 	on
scene when Mr. Hobbs was arrested and thereby could not personally
attest 	that 	he 	dropped 	the 	firearm 	after 	exiting 	his 	car 	do 	not
qualify. 	First, as noted by the Government, the officers did not
need 	the 	arrest 	warrant 	to 	arrest 	him 	in 	public 	and 	could 	have
arrested 	him 	without 	a 	warrant 	based 	on 	probable 	cause. 	The
Government 	would 	have 	argued 	inevitable 	discovery, 	in 	the 	event
there 	was 	a 	serious 	challenge 	to 	the 	warrant. 	Second, 	the 	items
that 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	sees 	as 	material 	omissions 	have 	not 	been 	shown 	to
be 	true 	or 	material. 	He 	claims 	that 	the 	affiant 	should 	have
included 	Ms. 	Foreman’s 	claim 	that 	he 	was 	in 	possession 	of 	an 	AK-
47 rifle. 	The somewhat convoluted logic is that, had the officer
pressed 	Ms. 	Foreman, 	he 	would 	have 	learned 	that 	she 	had 	not
actually seen him with a rifle that night or at any time. 	Instead,
she 	claimed 	that 	he 	told 	her 	that 	he 	had 	one 	and 	that 	she 	was
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17
sitting on it in the car at one point. 	This somehow would lead to
questioning the inconsistency and meant that her other statements
should 	be 	given 	less 	credence. 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	next 	claims 	that 	the
affidavit 	should 	have 	included 	the 	“fact” 	that 	the 	television
belonged 	to 	him 	rather 	than 	to 	Ms. 	Foreman. 	It 	remains 	far 	from
clear 	that 	it 	was 	still 	his 	television, 	and, 	regardless, 	to
retrieve 	it 	by 	force 	with 	the 	use 	of 	a 	firearm 	would 	still 	be
alarming. 	Mr. Hobbs also asserts that the affidavit misrepresented
the 	manner 	in 	which 	he 	entered 	Ms. 	Foreman’s 	residence, 	claiming
that Ms. Foreman opened the door and he did not force entry.
He 	then 	claims 	that 	the 	affidavit 	included 	information 	not
provided 	by 	Ms. 	Foreman, 	namely 	that 	the 	firearm 	was 	a 	“semi-
automatic.” 	He 	says 	that 	that 	term 	was 	not 	used 	by 	Ms. 	Foreman,
indicating that her description was too vague to be credited.
Including the other details of Ms. Foreman’s statements would
not 	have 	undermined 	the 	probable 	cause 	showing, 	and 	there 	is 	no
showing 	of 	any 	reckless 	or 	deliberate 	disregard 	for 	the 	truth.
Ms. 	Foreman 	reported 	a 	violent 	and 	alarming 	action 	by 	Mr. 	Hobbs,
who admits that he broke the kitchen window and demanded return of
the 	television. 	Thus, 	there 	was 	both 	no 	error 	by 	counsel 	in
failing 	to 	file 	a 	further 	suppression 	motion 	and 	there 	was 	no
prejudice.
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Similarly, 	the 	failure 	to 	challenge 	the 	affidavit 	for 	the
search warrant for the residence was neither error nor prejudicial.
The 	affidavit 	was 	not 	false 	simply 	because 	the 	affiant 	relied 	on
information 	obtained 	from 	others. 	It 	did 	describe 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	as
“dropping” 	the 	handgun 	when 	the 	evidence 	later 	showed 	that 	a 	gun
was 	recovered 	on 	the 	ground 	between 	the 	driver-side 	door 	and 	the
curb 	after 	he 	was 	arrested. 	Even 	if 	the 	statement 	that 	he
“dropped” 	the 	gun 	were 	replaced 	by 	a 	statement 	that 	the 	gun 	was
recovered on the ground where he had been, there was ample probable
cause 	for 	the 	warrant. 	Thus, 	the 	misstatement 	was 	immaterial.
Moreover, the only evidence introduced at trial from the execution
of 	that 	warrant 	was 	the 	box 	of 	ammunition 	of 	the 	same 	caliber 	as
that found in the handgun. 	There was other, more direct, evidence
of 	his 	handgun 	(loaded 	with 	ammunition) 	possession 	from 	the
testimony of the officers on the scene of his arrest, corroborated
by his recorded jail call. 	Again, there was no error by counsel,
and no prejudice.
b. 	Ms. Foreman’s police precinct interview evidence
Mr. Hobbs asserts that trial counsel failed to contradict Ms.
Foreman’s 	testimony 	with 	police 	precinct 	video 	footage 	during
trial 	to 	weaken 	her 	credibility 	with 	the 	jury. 	Rather, 	he
presented 	evidence 	that 	“missed 	its 	mark.” 	In 	addition, 	trial
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counsel failed to call two government witnesses, Officers Nesbitt
and 	Flanary, 	who, 	purportedly, 	would 	have 	contradicted 	Ms.
Foreman’s testimony.
Mr. 	Hobbs 	asked 	his 	attorney 	to 	play 	for 	the 	jury 	the
recordings 	of 	law 	enforcement’s 	interviews 	of 	Ms. 	Foreman 	in 	an
effort 	to 	refute 	her 	trial 	testimony 	that 	she 	never 	stated 	to
police 	that 	she 	saw 	AK-47s 	at 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	home 	or 	in 	his 	vehicle.
Trial 	counsel 	was 	permitted 	to 	play 	a 	snippet 	of 	the 	interview
with 	Ms. 	Foreman 	during 	the 	trial 	but, 	according 	to 	Mr. 	Hobbs,
played 	an 	interview 	that 	did 	not 	discredit 	her 	testimony. 	Mr.
Hobbs asserts that Ms. Foreman was the only witness who testified
that she had seen him in possession of a firearm and if his trial
attorney had discredited her as he had requested, the trial would
have had a different outcome.
Mr. 	Hobbs 	was 	found 	guilty 	of 	possession 	of 	a 	firearm 	and
ammunition based on the loaded firearm found when he was arrested.
At 	his 	arrest, 	multiple 	officers 	saw 	the 	loaded 	firearm 	in 	the
area 	where 	he 	was 	standing, 	and 	he 	admitted 	to 	possessing 	the
firearm during a recorded jail call on February 16, 2018. 	Even if
trial 	counsel 	were 	able 	to 	play 	more 	portions 	of 	Ms. 	Foreman’s
interview 	that 	showed 	some 	inconsistency, 	the 	verdict 	would 	have
been unaffected.
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c. 	Failure 	to 	challenge 	constructive 	amendment 	of 	the
Indictment at trial and during appellate review
Mr. 	Hobbs 	states 	that 	the 	Indictment 	charged 	him 	with
possession 	of 	a 	firearm 	and 	ammunition 	by 	a 	prohibited 	person 	in
violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	922(g)(1) 	based 	on 	the 	recovery 	of 	the
Ruger 	P89 	9mm 	caliber 	pistol 	loaded 	with 	ammunition. 	At 	trial,
the 	government 	introduced 	testimony 	that 	a 	box 	of 	9mm 	ammunition
was recovered from his home. 	Mr. Hobbs asserts that reference to
this 	box 	of 	ammunition 	amounts 	to 	an 	amendment 	of 	the 	Indictment
and his attorney offered no challenge either at trial or on appeal.5
Mr. 	Hobbs 	contends 	that 	his 	attorney 	should 	have 	objected 	that
either 	the 	charge 	was 	duplicitous 	or 	that 	there 	had 	been 	an
impermissible constructive amendment. 	This contention also fails.
The Indictment read:
On or about February 3, 2018, in the District
of 	Maryland, 	the 	defendant, 	ERICK 	RAHUMID
HOBBS 	a/k/a 	ERIC 	MUHAMMAD, 	having 	been
convicted 	of 	a 	crime 	punishable 	by
imprisonment 	for 	a 	term 	exceeding 	one 	year,
did 	knowingly 	possess 	a 	firearm, 	to 	wit: 	a
Ruger 	P89 	9mm 	caliber 	pistol 	with 	serial
number 	304-24692, 	and 	ammunition, 	in 	and
affecting interstate commerce.
(ECF No. 1, at 1).
5 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	retained 	the 	services 	of 	his 	trial 	attorney, 	Mr.
Hoffman, to represent him on his appeal before the Fourth Circuit.
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“An 	indictment 	is 	duplicitous 	if 	it 	charges 	two 	offenses 	in
one count.” 	United States v. Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 270 (4 th Cir.
2017). 	Possession 	of 	multiple 	firearms 	or 	a 	firearm 	loaded 	with
ammunition 	at 	one 	time 	constitutes 	a 	single 	possession: 	“[A]
defendant violates § 922(g) once when he possesses at one time and
place ‘any firearm or ammunition,’ 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); it does not
matter if he has one, two, three, or more firearms.” 	United States
v. 	Faison, 	840 	F.App’x 	736, 	739 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2021). 	A 	constructive
amendment, 	on 	the 	other 	hand, 	is 	when 	the 	basis 	for 	a 	charge 	is
broadened during trial:
The 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	Grand 	Jury 	Clause
“guarantees that a criminal defendant will be
tried 	only 	on 	the 	charges 	in 	a 	grand 	jury
indictment,” 	so 	“only 	the 	grand 	jury 	may
broaden 	or 	alter 	the 	charges 	in 	the
indictment.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Randall, 	171
F.3d 	195, 	203 	(4th 	Cir. 	1999) 	(citation 	and
internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	“A
constructive amendment to an indictment occurs
when 	either 	the 	[G]overnment 	(usually 	during
its 	presentation 	of 	evidence 	and/or 	its
argument), 	the 	court 	(usually 	through 	its
instructions 	to 	the 	jury), 	or 	both, 	broadens
the possible bases for conviction beyond those
presented by the grand jury.” 	[United States
v.] 	Floresca, 	38 	F.3d 	[706,] 	710 	[(4 th 	Cir.
1994)] (emphasis added). 	As the Supreme Court
has 	explained: 	“court[s] 	cannot 	permit 	a
defendant to be tried on charges that are not
made in the indictment against him.” 	Stirone
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217[] (1960).
Thus, 	the 	resulting 	incongruity 	between 	the
indictment 	and 	the 	conviction 	that 	a
constructive amendment causes “destroy[s] the
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defendant's substantial right to be tried only
on 	charges 	presented 	in 	[the] 	indictment.”
Id.
United States v. Simmons, 11 F.4th 239, 268 (4 th Cir. 2021).
Neither circumstance occurred here. 	Throughout trial, it was
clear 	that 	the 	ammunition 	included 	in 	the 	possession 	charge 	was
that 	inside 	the 	loaded 	firearm, 	and 	not 	that 	found 	days 	later 	in
a box in the dresser drawer. 	Although the concept of constructive
possession was discussed regarding the instructions, it was solely
in 	the 	context 	of 	defining 	possession 	with 	regard 	to 	the 	loaded
firearm. 	(ECF No. 83, at 2-8). 	The date alleged for the possession
was 	February 	3, 	2018, 	and 	not 	the 	later 	date 	when 	the 	residence
was searched. 	Government counsel argued that the box of ammunition
was 	corroborative 	evidence 	that 	the 	loaded 	firearm 	found 	days
earlier 	had 	been 	possessed 	by 	Mr. 	Hobbs. 	(Id. 	at 	43, 	68, 	70).
During deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking “whether the
prosecution 	needs 	to 	prove 	possession 	of 	both 	the 	firearm 	and
ammunition or just one of the firearm or ammunition.” 	(Id. at 76–
77). 	With 	agreement 	from 	the 	parties, 	the 	court 	told 	the 	jury
that 	the 	answer 	was 	“or” 	as 	explained 	in 	the 	jury 	instructions.
(Id. at 75, 76-77). 	Thus, the indictment was neither duplicitous
nor constructively amended during trial, and trial counsel did not
err by failing to object.
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Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	appellate 	counsel 	challenged 	the 	trial 	court’s
denial 	of 	his 	motion 	to 	suppress 	evidence 	obtained 	after 	law
enforcement 	secured 	cell 	phone 	location 	data 	from 	his 	cell 	phone
provider. 	This was, in the words of the Fourth Circuit, “an issue
of first impression.” 	Hobbs, 24 F.4th at 970. 	Mr. Hobbs does not
show 	(and 	does 	not 	even 	contend) 	that 	the 	issues 	he 	alleges 	that
his 	appellate 	counsel 	failed 	to 	raise 	on 	appeal 	were 	“clearly
stronger” 	than 	the 	issues 	presented. 	Indeed, 	because 	the 	issues
had 	not 	been 	raised 	at 	trial, 	review 	would 	have 	been 	for 	plain
error, a very difficult standard. 	United States v. Banks, 29 F.4th
168, 178-81 (4th Cir. 2022). 	Thus, Mr. Hobbs fails to overcome the
“strong 	presumption 	that 	[his] 	counsel’s 	conduct 	was 	within 	the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance” when he selected
the 	issues 	to 	raise 	on 	appeal. 	United 	States 	v. 	Lomax, 	No. 	10-
cr-0145-WMN, 2014 WL 1340065, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2014) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
B. 	Motion for the disclosure of grand jury transcripts
Mr. 	Hobbs 	requests 	access 	to 	full 	or 	limited 	grand 	jury
transcripts at no cost. 	(ECF No. 97). 	He reiterates his argument
that 	the 	trial 	court 	constructively 	amended 	the 	Indictment 	to
include the box of ammunition seized from his home. 	A petitioner
must 	make 	a 	showing 	of 	particularized 	need 	in 	order 	to 	obtain
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24
disclosure. 	That showing requires demonstration of need, that the
need 	is 	greater 	than 	the 	secrecy 	interest, 	and 	the 	request 	is
narrowly 	structured. 	United 	States 	v. 	Moussaoui, 	483 	F.3d 	220,
235 	(4th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(citing 	Douglas 	Oil 	Co. 	v. 	Petrol 	Stops 	Nw.,
441 	U.S. 	211, 	222 	(1979)). 	There 	is 	no 	need 	here 	because 	the
indictment 	was 	not 	duplicitous 	and 	the 	issue 	of 	constructive
amendment, 	if 	the 	only 	charge 	were 	the 	loaded 	firearm, 	would 	not
turn 	on 	what 	was 	presented 	to 	the 	grand 	jury. 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	motion
for grand jury transcripts will be denied.
C. 	Motion to modify presentence report
Mr. Hobbs filed a letter in June 2023 requesting the court to
modify 	his 	presentence 	report 	to 	remove 	allegedly 	unfounded
allegations that he pointed a firearm and threatened a person with
it. 	(ECF 	No. 	103). 	He 	claims 	that 	counsel 	did 	not 	review 	the
report adequately prior to the sentencing hearings and that he did
not 	realize 	the 	impact 	this 	section 	of 	the 	report 	could 	have 	on
his security classification. 	Short of seeking to amend his § 2255
petition, 	he 	asks 	the 	court 	to 	direct 	an 	amendment, 	or 	addendum,
to the report.
Preparation 	of 	the 	presentence 	report 	followed 	normal
procedure, 	with 	a 	draft 	being 	provided 	to 	the 	parties 	in 	advance
of 	any 	filing 	with 	the 	court. 	Ultimately, 	three 	reports 	were
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prepared, 	the 	original 	on 	April 	12, 	2019, 	with 	revisions 	on 	May
14, 	May 	22, 	and 	May 	29, 	2019. 	(ECF 	No. 	67). 	No 	objections 	were
communicated 	to 	the 	probation 	officer 	by 	any 	party. 	The 	initial
sentencing hearing began on May 24, but was continued until May 30,
in 	order 	to 	clarify 	the 	status 	of 	a 	prior 	conviction. 	The 	final
revised report was filed in between those hearings. 	No transcript
of 	the 	first 	sentencing 	hearing 	has 	been 	made, 	but 	the 	court’s
normal 	practice 	is 	to 	ask 	whether 	counsel 	and 	the 	defendant 	have
reviewed 	the 	final 	presentence 	report. 	That 	inquiry 	likely
prompted 	the 	discussion 	of 	the 	expungement 	issue. 	Mr. 	Hobbs
obviously was well aware of the contents of the report by the time
of sentencing.
The 	section 	he 	objects 	to 	now 	is 	in 	the 	recitation 	of 	the
offense 	conduct, 	and 	he 	highlights 	remarks 	the 	court 	made 	at
sentencing. 	The 	offense 	conduct 	that 	was 	important 	to 	the 	court
was 	the 	possession 	of 	the 	loaded 	firearm, 	in 	a 	car, 	on 	a 	public
street. 	As 	stated, 	“[T]his 	was 	no 	simple 	felon 	in 	possession.
This 	was 	a 	dangerous 	felon 	in 	possession 	because 	of 	the 	mood 	and
the 	circumstances, 	the 	volatility 	of 	that 	situation, 	exacerbated
by the attempt to talk to the victim improperly afterwards.” 	(ECF
No. 	84, 	at 	38). 	It 	was 	only 	in 	that 	context 	that 	the 	court 	said
that, 	for 	sentencing 	purposes, 	the 	court 	did 	not 	need 	to 	resolve
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26
what exact words were spoken, or gestures exchanged. 	The firearm
was in his hand both to break the kitchen window and while he spoke
to the victim in the front of the house.
Had an objection been made, the court, in accord with normal
practice, 	would 	not 	have 	changed 	the 	report’s 	language 	regarding
offense conduct, but would have directed an addition: The defendant
disputes that he pointed the weapon at the victim.
Mr. 	Hobbs 	is 	advised 	that 	there 	is 	a 	formal 	process 	for
seeking 	relief 	through 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Prison’s 	administrative
process. 	As one court explained:
[Bureau 	of 	Prisons] 	Program 	Statement
5800.11(15)(c) 	provides 	that 	an 	inmate 	may
challenge 	the 	accuracy 	of 	information 	in 	his
central file. 	When such a challenge is made,
unit team staff must “take reasonable steps to
ensure the accuracy of challenged information,
particularly when that information is capable
of being verified.” 	P.S. 5800.11(15)(c). 	The
inmate 	is 	required 	to 	provide 	staff 	with
sufficient 	information 	to 	support 	his
challenge. 	Id. 	“When an inmate provides such
information, 	staff 	shall 	review 	the 	alleged
error(s) 	and 	take 	reasonable 	steps 	to 	ensure
the information is correct.” 	Id. 	The Program
Statement 	provides 	an 	example 	in 	the 	context
of a challenge to information in a PSI:
For 	example, 	if 	an 	inmate
challenges 	information 	in 	the
Presentence 	Investigation 	Report
(PSI), 	staff 	should 	inform 	the
appropriate 	U.S. 	Probation 	Office
(USPO) 	in 	writing 	of 	the 	disputed
information, 	and 	request 	that 	a
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27
written 	response 	also 	be 	provided.
USPO 	procedures, 	however, 	do 	not
allow for changes or addendums to be
made 	to 	the 	Presentence
Investigation 	Report 	after
sentencing 	since 	it 	is 	a 	court
document.
If 	the 	USPO 	subsequently
reports 	that 	the 	challenged
information, or some part thereof is
not accurate, staff shall attach the
Bureau’s 	inquiry 	and 	the 	USPO
response 	to 	the 	applicable 	section
of the Inmate Central file, and also
make 	a 	notation 	on 	the 	Inmate
Activity 	Record 	form 	(BP-381) 	to
ensure 	that 	future 	decisions
affecting 	the 	inmate 	are 	not 	based
on the discredited information.
When the USPO verifies that the
information 	in 	the 	PSI 	is 	indeed
inaccurate, 	as 	claimed 	by 	the
inmate, 	staff 	should 	subsequently
review, 	and 	where 	indicated,
correct Bureau generated reports or
data 	such 	as 	the 	Inmate 	Load 	and
Security Designation form (BP-337),
the 	Custody 	Classification 	form
(BP-338), 	Progress 	Report, 	and 	any
other 	reports 	that 	may 	have 	been
based 	on 	the 	PSI. 	Bureau 	reports,
data, or SENTRY transactions should
be 	corrected 	within 	a 	reasonable
period of time after identification
as being inaccurate.
If the information source will
provide 	a 	corrected 	document 	or
data, 	it 	should 	be 	immediately
inserted 	in 	the 	file 	or 	data 	base
and 	the 	inaccurate 	information 	or
document removed. 	A notation on the
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28
Inmate 	Activity 	Record 	form 	should
acknowledge 	the 	insertion 	of 	the
corrected information or document.
Kates 	v. 	King, 	No. 	11-cv-00951, 	2011 	WL 	6937553, 	at 	*4 	(M.D.Pa.
June 3, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by, 2012 WL 10667
(M.D.Pa. 	Jan. 	3, 	2012), 	aff’d, 	487 	F.App’x 	704 	(3 d 	Cir. 	2012).
This court will not direct any change in the report.
D. 	Motion for a transcript of the oral argument before the
Fourth Circuit
Mr. 	Hobbs 	requests 	a 	transcript 	of 	the 	oral 	argument 	before
the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	at 	no 	cost 	to 	support 	his 	contention 	that 	his
attorney admitted that he erred at trial “with regard to the ‘box
of 	ammunition’ 	introduced 	by 	the 	government 	and 	his 	failure 	to
challenge 	the 	constructive 	amendment 	and 	duplicitousness 	of 	the
Indictment.” 	(ECF No. 104). 	Because the court did not amend the
Indictment 	as 	discussed 	herein, 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	motion 	will 	be 	denied
as moot. 	In any event, oral argument audio is publicly available
for 	streaming 	and 	download 	at 	no 	cost 	from 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit
website.6
6 	See 	Listen 	to 	Oral 	Arguments, 	U.S. 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the
Fourth 	Circuit, 	https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/
listen-to-oral-arguments; 	https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/
mp3/19-4419-20211209.mp3.
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29
E. 	Motion for in forma pauperis status
Mr. Hobbs filed a motion requesting permission to proceed in
forma pauperis. 	(ECF No. 105). 	The government opposes the motion
arguing that there is no need for in forma pauperis status because
1) 	audio 	of 	oral 	argument 	before 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	is 	available
at 	no 	charge, 	and 	2) 	there 	are 	no 	costs 	associated 	with 	filing 	a
§ 	2255 	motion. 	(ECF 	No. 	106). 	The 	court 	agrees, 	and 	Mr. 	Hobbs’
motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be denied as moot.
F. 	Motion to supplement § 2255 motion
Mr. Hobbs filed a motion to supplement in June 2024 asserting
that he no longer qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal. 	(ECF No.
107). 	He 	states 	that 	his 	conviction 	for 	attempted 	second-degree
murder 	no 	longer 	qualifies 	as 	a 	violent 	felony 	under
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because the mens rea necessary is not more than
recklessness. 	In support, he cites to a series of cases beginning
with 	Borden 	v. 	United 	States, 	593 	U.S. 	420 	(2021), 	followed 	by
United 	States 	v. 	Jackson, 	32 	F.4th 	278 	(4th 	Cir. 	2022), 	United
States v. Gill, 652 F.Supp.3d 567 (D. Md. 2023), and United States
v. 	Ortiz-Orellana, 	90 	F.4th 	689 (4 th 	Cir. 	2024). 	He 	asserts 	that
the 	court 	must 	apply 	the 	modified 	categorical 	approach 	to 	assess
a 	divisible 	state 	crime. 	The 	Government 	does 	not 	oppose
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30
supplementation.7 	It argues, however, that Mr. Hobbs is wrong to
assert that his prior Maryland conviction for attempted murder no
longer qualifies as a crime of violence.
In 	Borden, 	the 	question 	was 	whether 	a 	criminal 	offense 	can
count 	as 	a 	“violent 	felony” 	under 	the 	Armed 	Career 	Criminal 	Act
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), so as to trigger a mandatory minimum,
if 	the 	underlying 	predicate 	offense 	on 	which 	that 	enhancement 	is
based requires only a mens rea of recklessness. 	Specifically, the
issue 	was 	whether 	a 	Tennessee 	conviction 	for 	aggravated 	assault,
which 	can 	be 	committed 	recklessly, 	has 	as 	an 	element 	the 	use 	of
physical force against the person of another.
The Court reversed the judgment but did not issue a majority
opinion. 	The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Kagan for the
four-Justice 	plurality, 	found 	that 	mere 	recklessness 	did 	not
suffice 	to 	constitute 	a 	“violent 	felony”8: 	“The 	phrase 	‘against
7 	Although 	the 	Government 	opposes 	the 	argument 	within 	the
supplement, it does not oppose the filing of the supplement. 	Thus,
permission to file the supplement will be granted.
8 	Justice 	Thomas 	wrote 	a 	sole 	concurrence 	that 	found 	that 	the
“particular 	provision 	at 	issue 	here 	does 	not 	encompass
petitioner’s 	conviction 	for 	reckless 	aggravated 	assault.” 	He
declared 	he 	was 	doing 	so, 	however, 	solely 	to 	avoid 	“committing 	a
new 	[error],” 	even 	though 	the 	“consequences” 	of 	the 	court’s
ultimate decision was “at odds with the larger statutory scheme.”
Borden, 593 U.S. at 445 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
He 	would 	focus 	on 	the 	“use 	of 	physical 	force” 	portion 	of 	the
statute, 	rather 	than 	the 	“against 	the 	person 	of 	another” 	phrase.
Case 1:18-cr-00322-DKC Document 113 Filed 12/05/25 Page 30 of 36
31
another,’ 	when 	modifying 	the 	‘use 	of 	force,’ 	demands 	that 	the
perpetrator 	direct 	his 	action 	at, 	or 	target, 	another 	individual.
Reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.” 	Borden,
593 U.S. at 429 (plurality opinion). 	Specifically, Justice Kagan
reasoned 	that 	modern 	criminal 	statutes 	require 	one 	of 	four 	basic
types 	of 	mental 	states 	“in 	descending 	order 	of 	culpability:
purpose, 	knowledge, 	recklessness, 	and 	negligence.” 	Id. 	at 	426.
In 	Leocal 	v. 	Ashcroft, 	543 	U.S. 	1 	(2004), 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	had
found 	that 	purely 	negligent 	conduct 	did 	not 	evince 	a 	culpable
enough 	state 	of 	mind 	to 	satisfy 	the 	definition 	of 	“crime 	of
violence” 	under 	18 U.S.C. 	§ 	16(a), 	“a 	statutory 	definition
relevantly identical to ACCA’s elements clause.” 	Id. at 427. 	The
plurality 	declared 	that 	it 	was 	expressly 	taking 	up 	the 	question
the 	Court 	had 	“reserved” 	in 	Leocal 	and 	Voisine 	v. 	United 	States,
579 	U.S. 	686 	(2016) 	(finding 	reckless 	domestic 	assault 	qualified
as 	a 	“misdemeanor 	crime 	of 	domestic 	violence” 	under 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9)). 	Id. at 429.
Acts done recklessly, Justice Kagan explained, are done when
a 	person 	“consciously 	disregards 	a 	substantial 	and 	unjustifiable
risk” associated with that conduct. 	Id. at 427 (citing Model Penal
Id. 	at 	446. 	Four 	dissenters 	would 	have 	ruled 	that 	the 	“ACCA’s
use-of-force 	clause 	encompasses 	reckless 	offenses.” 	Id. 	at 	485
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Case 1:18-cr-00322-DKC Document 113 Filed 12/05/25 Page 31 of 36
32
Code 	§ 	2.02(2)(c); 	Voisine, 	579 	U.S. 	at 	691). 	The 	ACCA, 	on 	the
other hand, “set[] out to identify . . . the sort of offender who,
when 	armed, 	‘might 	deliberately 	point 	the 	gun 	and 	pull 	the
trigger.’” 	Id. 	at 	438 	(quoting 	Begay 	v. 	United 	States, 	553 	U.S.
137, 145-46 (2008)). 	She subsequently identified other laws, such
as DUI offenses, that prohibit conduct demonstrating a “degree of
callousness 	toward 	risk,” 	but 	noted 	that 	“[h]owever 	blameworthy,
the 	reckless 	(or 	negligent) 	conduct 	involved 	in 	such 	a 	crime 	is
‘far 	removed’ 	from 	the 	‘deliberate 	kind 	of 	behavior 	associated
with 	violent 	criminal 	use 	of 	firearms.’” 	Id. 	at 	438–39 	(quoting
Begay, 	533 	U.S. 	at 	146-47). 	There 	was 	“no 	reason” 	therefore 	to
find that such “reckless offenses . . . precipitate the statute’s
enhanced sentences.” 	Id. at 439.
Justice 	Kagan 	recognized 	that 	there 	may 	be 	laws 	whose 	mens
rea 	go 	beyond 	mere 	recklessness, 	by 	requiring 	a 	somewhat 	more
culpable 	state 	of 	mind, 	such 	as 	depraved 	heart 	or 	extreme
recklessness, a state of mind just short of, if not akin to, acting
knowingly. 	The 	plurality, 	however, 	left 	consideration 	of 	those
crimes 	for 	another 	day. 	Id. 	at 	429 	n.4.9 	She 	did, 	however,
9 	While 	the 	dissent 	vehemently 	disagreed 	with 	the 	outcome, 	it
seemed 	to 	agree 	that 	criminal 	statutes 	exist 	on 	a 	continuum 	of
culpability, 	as 	“the 	line 	between 	knowledge 	and 	recklessness 	can
be 	thin,” 	and 	one 	that 	criminal 	law 	“ordinarily 	does 	not 	draw” 	a
line between. 	Id. at 463 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Case 1:18-cr-00322-DKC Document 113 Filed 12/05/25 Page 32 of 36
33
highlight 	potential 	offenses 	she 	felt 	were 	clearly 	on 	the
“reckless” side of the line; for example, she asked the reader to
“[i]magine” 	a 	driver 	who 	is 	“late 	to 	work, 	decides 	to 	run 	a 	red
light, 	and 	hits 	a 	pedestrian 	whom 	he 	did 	not 	see.” 	That 	person
“has 	consciously 	disregarded 	a 	real 	risk, 	thus 	endangering
others,” 	but 	“has 	not 	used 	force 	‘against’ 	another 	person” 	to 	be
swept 	up 	in 	the 	definition 	of 	a 	violent 	felony 	under 	the 	ACCA.
Id. at 432.
Thus, 	after 	Borden, 	a 	crime 	requiring 	only 	recklessness
cannot be a predicate for the ACCA, although the precise reason is
not 	resolved. 	Mr. 	Hobbs 	contends 	that 	his 	prior 	conviction 	for
attempted 	second-degree 	murder 	no 	longer 	qualifies. 	The
subsequent 	cases 	he 	relies 	on 	concern 	the 	offense 	of 	murder, 	not
attempted murder. 	He argues specifically that “[a] cursory review
of 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	state 	charging 	documents 	or 	plea 	agreement 	will
confirm 	that 	unlike 	the 	defendants 	in 	Jackson, 	Gill, 	and 	Ortiz-
Orellana, 	Mr. 	Hobbs’ 	primary 	goal 	in 	that 	9/08/2000 	offense 	was
armed-robbery and not attempted 1 st or 2nd degree murder, which has
the 	element 	of 	recklessness.” 	(ECF 	No. 	107 	¶ 	19). 	He 	concludes
that 	attempted 	second-degree 	murder 	“cannot 	qualify 	as 	a 	violent
felony 	under 	§ 	924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s 	force 	(or 	elements) 	clause
because 	it 	‘requires 	only 	the 	mens 	rea 	necessary 	to 	attempt 	or
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34
complete the underlying felony [i.e., robbery, armed robbery)].’”
(Id. 	¶ 	20 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Jackson, 	32 	F.4th 	at
285)). 	Despite the rigor with which Mr. Hobbs pursues this claim,
it is misguided.
A court uses the “categorical approach” to determine whether
the 	elements 	of 	the 	offense 	require 	the 	requisite 	use 	of 	force,
looking 	only 	at 	the 	wording 	of 	the 	statute. 	At 	that 	stage, 	the
focus 	is 	on 	the 	elements 	of 	the 	offense 	and 	the 	minimum 	conduct
necessary 	to 	sustain 	a 	conviction. 	If 	that 	minimum 	conduct 	does
not 	rise 	to 	the 	appropriate 	level, 	the 	offense 	is 	not 	a 	crime 	of
violence.
Under 	Maryland 	law, 	“[t]he 	crime 	of 	attempt 	consists 	of 	a
specific 	intent 	to 	commit 	a 	particular 	offense 	coupled 	with 	some
overt 	act 	in 	furtherance 	of 	the 	intent 	that 	goes 	beyond 	mere
preparation.” 	State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 162 (1990) (collecting
cases). 	For 	attempted 	murder, 	one 	must 	have 	the 	specific 	intent
to 	murder, 	which 	is 	not 	the 	same 	as 	intent 	to 	kill. 	Id. 	at 	163.
In 	Earp, 	the 	court 	held 	that 	an 	intent 	to 	commit 	grievous 	bodily
harm 	will 	not 	suffice, 	nor 	does 	having 	a 	reckless 	disregard 	of
life. 	Id. at 164–65. 	That is so, even though those mental states
can suffice for a completed murder. 	A Maryland court shortly later
explicitly held: “By parity of reasoning, we have no difficulty in
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35
completing the matrix and holding squarely that the mens rea of a
wanton 	disregard 	for 	human 	life, 	which 	will 	support 	a 	conviction
for depraved-heart murder should death result, will not support a
conviction for antecedent attempted murder.” 	Abernathy v. State,
109 	Md.App. 	364, 	375–76 	(1996); 	see 	also 	Harrison 	v. 	State, 	382
Md. 	477, 	489 	(2004) 	(Under 	Maryland 	law, 	to 	be 	convicted 	of
attempted second-degree murder, a person must “harbor[] a specific
intent 	to 	kill 	the 	victim 	and 	[have] 	taken 	a 	substantial 	step
toward killing the victim.”). 	For Mr. Hobbs to have been convicted
of attempted second-degree murder in 2001, it was established that
he 	had 	the 	specific 	intent 	to 	murder 	and 	took 	a 	substantial 	step
in 	furtherance. 	That 	crime 	qualifies 	as 	a 	crime 	of 	violence 	and
as a predicate for the ACCA finding.
IV. 	Conclusion
Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	11(a) 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	Proceedings
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255, 	the 	court 	is 	also 	required 	to 	“issue 	or
deny 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	when 	it 	enters 	a 	final 	order
adverse 	to 	the 	applicant.” 	A 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	is 	a
“jurisdictional 	prerequisite” 	to 	an 	appeal 	from 	the 	court’s
earlier 	order. 	United 	States 	v. 	Hadden, 	475 	F.3d 	652, 	659 	(4 th
Cir. 	2007) 	(quoting 	Miller-El 	v. 	Cockrell, 	537 	U.S. 	322, 	336
(2003)). 	A 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	may 	issue 	“only 	if 	the
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applicant 	has 	made 	a 	substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional 	right.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2253(c)(2). 	Where 	the 	court
denies a petitioner’s motion on its merits, a petitioner satisfies
this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find
the court’s assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. 	Slack v.
McDaniel, 	529 	U.S. 	473, 	484 	(2000); 	see 	also 	Miller-El, 	537 	U.S.
at 	336–38. 	Where 	a 	motion 	is 	denied 	on 	a 	procedural 	ground, 	a
certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner
can 	“demonstrate 	both 	(1) that 	jurists 	of 	reason 	would 	find 	it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of 	a 	constitutional 	right 	and 	(2) 	that 	jurists 	of 	reason 	would
find 	it 	debatable 	whether 	the 	district 	court 	was 	correct 	in 	its
procedural ruling.” 	Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4 th Cir. 2001)
(citation modified).
Upon 	review 	of 	the 	record, 	the 	court 	finds 	that 	Mr. 	Hobbs
does not satisfy the above standard. 	Accordingly, the court will
decline to issue a certificate of appealability on the issues which
have been resolved against him. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 1:18-cr-00322-DKC Document 113 Filed 12/05/25 Page 36 of 36

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