Greenfeld, Trustee v. Parker

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
at Greenbelt
In Re: 	Case No. 06-13476PM
James Ghiselin Sasscer, Jr., 	Chapter 7
Debtor.
Steven H. Greenfeld, Trustee, 	AP No. 07-00375PM
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
v.
Francis H. Parker,
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before the court is the Defendant/Counter-Claimant’s Motion to Reconsider Order
Quieting Title Entered on July, 2007, and the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s Opposition. The
Motion will be denied.
James Ghiselin Sasscer, Jr. (“the Debtor”) filed a case under chapter 13 on June 16, 2006.
Included on his Schedule A, Real Property, were two parcels – one in Bowie, Maryland, that is
not at issue in this adversary proceeding, and another listed as 14806 Pratt Street, Upper
Marlboro, Maryland 20772 (“the Pratt Street Property”). The case was converted to one under
chapter 7 upon the request of the Chapter 13 Trustee on September 18, 2006. The appointment
of Steven H. Greenfeld (“Trustee Greenfeld”) as the Chapter 7 Trustee followed. Trustee
Greenfeld designated the case an asset case. On November 14, 2006, this court passed an Order
Date signed October 17, 2007
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Confirming Termination of the Automatic Stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(j). That order,
entered at the request of Francis H. Parker (“Mr. Parker”), provided that the automatic stay of 11
U.S.C. §362(a) was deemed not applicable to him and that he may pursue any state court
remedies that may be available to obtain possession of the real property located at 5700 Old
Crain Highway, Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 (“the Crain Highway Property”).
By an amended Schedule C filed by the Debtor on January 5, 2007, the Crain Highway
Property was added. No property was claimed as exempt on the original Schedule C. The
objection by Trustee Greenfeld to the amended Schedule C was sustained. In March 2007,
Trustee Greenfeld moved to sell, free and clear of encumbrances (excluding the Bowie,
Maryland property), the Pratt Street Property and land described as “Parcel 228, Grid E2, Tax
Map 101, Upper Marlboro, Maryland” (“the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot”). The motion
raised objections from both the Internal Revenue Service and Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker asserted
that he, rather than the Debtor, owned both the Pratt Street Property and the Undeveloped Croom
Station Lot. After a hearing held on April 18, 2007, the court denied Trustee Greenfeld’s motion
without prejudice to the filing of an adversary proceeding. On April 23, 2007, this court issued
an Order to Show Cause Why Expert Witness Should Not Be Appointed, finding that the unique
circumstances of the case required that the court appoint its own expert under FED . R. EVID .
706(a). No responses being filed, the court appointed Carlton M. Green (“Mr. Green”) as the
court’s expert witness. Mr. Green filed his “Report of Carlton M. Green as to Ownership of
14800 Pratt Street and Parcel 228, Grid E-2, Tax Map 101, Upper Marlboro, Maryland,” on June
19, 2007 (“the Green Report”). The Green Report appears in the record at Docket No. 97 in the
case file. The court found the Green Report persuasive and comprehensive.
Trustee Greenfeld filed the subject adversary proceeding on May 14, 2007, by a
Complaint to Quiet Title. In answering the Complaint, Mr. Parker admitted all of the factual
allegations contained therein but disputed that the Debtor owned the parcels at issue and asserted
a Counterclaim. Neither party averred nor disputed this court’s jurisdiction. Relying upon the
Green Report and after a trial held on June 28, 2007, this court found that the parcels at issue
were indeed property of the bankruptcy estate. The Order Quieting Title, awarding judgment in
favor of Trustee Greenfeld and against Mr. Parker as to the Pratt Street Property and the
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Undeveloped Croom Station Lot, was entered on July 11, 2007. An order authorizing the sale of
the two parcels was entered in the case file on July 23, 2007, at Docket Entry No. 113.
The undisputed factual record reflects that Rosalie Gill Sasscer and B. Beale Sasscer took
title to three parcels of land identified in a deed dated August 20, 1962, and recorded on the
Public Records of Prince George’s County, Maryland, at Liber 2718, at Page 246 (“the 1962
Deed”). These parcels were identified as parcels (1), (2) and (3) – Parcel (1) being the Pratt
Street Property; Parcel (2) being the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot; and Parcel (3) being the
Crain Highway Property. Title to the Crain Highway Property is not disputed, and the parcel is
not property of the bankruptcy estate.
According to the Green Report, Rosalie Gill Sasscer, by her Last Will dated March 22,
1994, devised two parcels to the Debtor – “the Office Building I now own located on Pratt
Street, Upper Marlboro, Maryland and the unimproved property known as ‘Marlboro Field’
which property is opposite the property I now occupy as my home.” After her death in 1994,
Rosalie Gill Sasscer’s personal representatives executed a Personal Representative’s Deed dated
June 13, 1995, and recorded on June 15, 1995 (“the 1995 P.R. Deed”). The 1995 P.R. Deed
referenced the 1962 Deed, conveying the Pratt Street Property as “Parcel One” and the
Undeveloped Croom Station Lot as “Parcel Two.” Parcel Two was described as “[a]ll that
parcel assessed as 8.46 acres, more or less, in Acct No: 03-02353-82, . . . and being the residue
of that parcel described as Parcel 2 in a Deed dated August 20, 1962 [the 1962 Deed][.]”
On August 30, 1996, the personal representatives of Rosalie Gill Sasscer’s estate
executed another deed – this time conveying property to the Debtor and his spouse (“the 1996
P.R. Deed”). Unlike the 1995 P.R. Deed, the 1996 P.R. Deed stated that the conveyance was in
consideration of the sum of $375,000.00. The 1996 P.R. Deed made reference to the 1962 Deed
and specifically described the Crain Highway Property, including reference to 6.5 acres of land
conveyed to the State of Maryland for use by the State Roads Commission. An additional
sentence was included appearing after the legal description that stated: “Together with all right,
title and interest, if any, to the Land of Old Croom Station Road.” In his expert opinion, Alan
Grant explained the significance of this portion of the grant. The court found Mr. Grant’s
testimony persuasive. This expert witness was well-qualified to testify on the issues of the
Maryland law of land titles and ownership.
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1 Mr. Green noted that in February 2007, in Civil Case No. CAL 01-24362, the Sheriff
attempted another sale with respect to the Pratt Street Property and the Undeveloped Croom
Station Lot. The sale was neither ratified nor was a deed executed.
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In December 2003, a confessed judgment in connection with litigation with Mr. Parker
was entered against the Debtor and his wife resulting in the issuance of a Writ of Execution. The
Writ identified real property known as “14800 Pratt Street.” According to the Green Report, a
Sheriff’s sale was held in June 2004, and referenced parcels (1) and (2) of the 1962 Deed. 1 The
sale was ratified by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by order dated June 3, 2004.
That order refers to property known as “5700 Old Crain Highway, Upper Marlboro, Maryland.”
By a Sheriff’s Deed dated June 14, 2004, and recorded the following day, the Sheriff,
referencing a ratified sale order of June 3, 2004, conveyed the Debtor’s and his wife’s interest in
the property identified as “5700 Old Crain Highway, Upper Marlboro, MD 20772” to Mr.
Parker. The Sheriff’s Deed referenced “property recorded at Liber 2718, Folio 246, Parcels One
[being the Pratt Street Property] and Two [being the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot], with tax
account no. 03-02353-82 [being referenced in the 1995 P.R. Deed as the tax account number for
the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot but later being assigned to the Old Crain Highway
property].” Mr. Green concluded that the Pratt Street Property and the Undeveloped Croom
Station Lot were not conveyed to Mr. Parker by the Sheriff’s Deed.
On September 23, 2004, with respect to a Deed of Trust executed by the Debtor and his
wife, the Substitute Trustee, John S. Burson, sold at public auction the Crain Highway Property
to Mr. Parker, the successful bidder. Burson’s Trustee’s Deed was recorded on September 7,
2005, referencing the property sold by address and by Parcel ID No. 03-0235382 but describing
specifically property at 5700 Old Crain Highway Property. This sale was said to have been
ratified by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in Civil No. CAE04-16781, on March
21, 2005.
The Green Report and the court’s Memorandum of Decision and corresponding Order
Quieting Title addressed only the Sheriff’s Deed. Although not raised by Mr. Parker in his
Motion to Reconsider, this court recognizes its omission and supplements its finding pursuant to
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FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b), made applicable in adversary proceedings pursuant to F ED . R. BANKR .
PROC . 9024.
By his counterclaim, in addition to reliance on the Sheriff’s Deed, Mr. Parker
alternatively asserted ownership of the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot by the Trustee’s Deed.
Essentially, the argument is that when the Debtor and his spouse purchased the Crain Highway
Property, they did so with borrowed funds resulting in encumbrances. The deeds of trust tracked
the legal description on the 1996 P.R. Deed, that included a recitation after the legal description
of the Crain Highway Property that the conveyance was “[t]ogether with all right, title and
interest, if any, to the Land of Old Croom Station.” Mr. Parker purchased at foreclosure the
secured property and the Trustee’s Deed completing the sale including the “[t]ogether with . . .”
language thereby allegedly conveying, in addition to the Crain Highway Property, the
Undeveloped Croom Station Lot. As additional support, Mr. Parker noted that the Trustee’s
Deed referenced tax account number 03-02353-82 – the number referenced in the 1995 P.R.
Deed as to Parcel Two, the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot.
This court finds that the Trustee’s Deed conveyed to Mr. Parker title to the Crain
Highway Property only. The court agrees with the opinion of Mr. Grant who opined that the
“[t]ogether with . . .” language was not uncommon, particularly where property abuts a public
street that had been dedicated for public use by pervious owners. The court is satisfied that the
reference in the Trustee’s Deed to the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot was merely for
identification of the land abutting or beneath the public road. Mr. Grant’s opinion is supported
by the fact that the 1996 P.R. Deed, the genesis of the Debtor’s title, specifically identified only
the Crain Highway Property. The 1962 Deed identified three distinct parcels. Had it been the
intention of the personal representatives to convey Parcel (2), the Undeveloped Croom Station
Lot, this court is confident that the personal representatives would have included the precise
legal description of same in the 1996 P.R. Deed rather than the mere reference. Accordingly, the
court’s Memorandum Decision is supplemented to include this finding.
In his Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Parker makes two alternative arguments. First, that this
court improperly set aside state court determinations and, second, that the court should have
abstained from rendering its decision. In opposition, Trustee Greenfeld argued that this court did
not set aside a judgment but rather clarified that the Sheriff’s Deed was not effective in
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transferring title of the Pratt Street Property or the Undeveloped Croom Station Lot to Mr.
Parker. Mr. Parker’s Motion to Reconsider the Order Quieting Title cited to F ED . R. CIV . P.
59(e), made applicable in adversary proceedings pursuant to F ED . R. BANKR . PROC . 9023, and
FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b), made applicable in adversary proceedings pursuant to F ED . R. BANKR .
PROC . 9024. The court reviews its decision in accordance with FED . R. CIV . P. 59(e) that allows
the alteration or amendment of a final judgment or order by a motion made within 10 days of the
entry of the order. Mr. Parker’s Motion to Reconsider was timely filed.
Mr. Parker, relying upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, urges that ratification by the state
court was a judicial determination of title that this court cannot upset. This doctrine has no
application here. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the losing party in a state
court proceeding files an action in a federal court seeking redress for injury allegedly caused by
the state court’s decision. Davani v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712 (CA4 2006)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp,
544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
Here, the record reflects that neither the Sheriff’s Deed nor the Trustee’s Deed conveyed
the subject properties as urged by Mr. Parker. His argument is a red herring. Ratification by the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of the two sales had little to do with the subsequent
execution of the deeds conveying legal title to Mr. Parker. This court did not revisit the
ratification of the sales by clarifying what property was conveyed by the deeds and it did not
decide an action brought by Trustee Greenfeld to redress injury caused by the ratifications.
Indeed, whatever rights Mr. Parker has in the property are subject to the Chapter 7 Trustee’s
strong-arm powers found in 11 U.C. S. § 544(a). As explained in D AVID G. EPSTEIN , STEVE H.
NICKLES & J AMES J. WHITE , BANKRUPTCY § 6-61 (1992), and RICHARD I. AARON , BANKRUPTCY
LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 10:6 (2007), these powers confer an ideal status upon the trustee, so as
to subordinate certain interests to the trustee who has the standing of a bona fide purchaser or
judicial lien creditor on all property to which a lien could attach.
The ratification process ensures that the forced sale was conducted properly. The state
court is responsible for ratifying the sale once satisfied that the sale was fair and properly made.
M D . R. 14-305(e). A court’s ratification proceeding precedes the execution of the deed. White
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v. Simard, 831 A.2d 517, 524-5 (Md. App. 2003), aff’d, 859 A.2d 168 (Md. 2004). While the
sale is approved by ratification, the conveyance is accomplished by deed.
Trustee Greenfeld’s reliance upon the archaic case of Dorsey’s Lessee v. Dorsey, 28 Md.
388 (Md. 1868), is misplaced; yet, the court finds the decision supportive. The Maryland Court
of Appeals made a distinction between a constable’s sale and a sheriff’s sale. As to the
constable’s sale, the court stated that ratification cannot cure a defective legal description – the
proposition cited by Trustee Greenfeld. However, as to a sheriff’s sale, the court stated that a
purchaser may resort to the deed of the sheriff or any other part of the official proceeding to
identify the land actually seized. It is abundantly clear that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County’s ratification order ratified the sale to Mr. Parker of the Crain Highway Property only.
The Sheriff’s Deed that followed ratification was admittedly ambiguous; nonetheless, review of
the record and interpretation of the Sheriff’s Deed led this court to find that the Sheriff sold and
effectively transferred title to the Crain Highway Property only.
Having not disturbed the ratifications by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
but merely quantifying what parcels were conveyed by the deeds, this court finds that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable and Mr. Parker’s Motion to Reconsider is denied in this
regard.
Mr. Parker alternatively suggests that this court exercise its discretion to abstain from
asserting jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). The Motion to Reconsider
will be denied in this regard as well. The parties acknowledge that this is a core matter. Section
1334(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[N]othing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from
hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11.
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2 Factors to be considered by a court determining whether to permissively abstain, as
cited by Mr. Parker in his Motion to Reconsider (citations omitted), include:
(1) 	efficiency in the administration of the debtor’s estate;
(2) 	the extent to which state issues predominate over bankruptcy issues;
(3) 	whether the issues involve difficult or unsettled questions of state law that would
be better addressed by a state court;
(4) 	the presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court;
(5) 	the existence of a jurisdictional basis other than Section 1334;
(6) 	the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy
case;
(7) 	the substance rather than form of an asserted “core” proceeding;
(8) 	the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy matters to allow
judgments to be entered in state court;
(9) 	the burden of the federal court’s docket;
(10) 	the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in federal court involves
forum shopping by one of the parties;
(11) 	the existence of a right to a jury trial; and
(12) 	whether non-debtor parties are involved in the proceeding.
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Numerous factors have been considered by courts in determining whether permissive abstention
is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).2 These factors, however, are considerations to be
made before a matter is tried and a decision rendered.
While this court has no hesitation in granting motions for abstention in appropriate cases,
abstention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) requires the filing of a motion that is served upon
other parties to the matter in controversy. See FED . R. BANKR . PROC . 5011. LOCAL BANKR . R.
5011-1 fixes the time for filing such motions. In an adversary proceeding, the motion must be
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filed within the time prescribed for filing a response to the complaint. In a contested matter, the
motion must be filed within thirty days of the service of the pleading initiating the matter.
Trustee Greenfeld initiated a contested matter involving these parcels in March 2007.
Mr. Parker interposed an objection to that sale that resulted in a lengthy hearing on April 18,
2007. The court denied Trustee Greenfeld’s motion without prejudice to the filing of this
adversary proceeding. A complaint initiating this adversary proceeding was filed on May 14,
2007. Mr. Parker answered and asserted a Counterclaim. At no time in the papers was
abstention requested. It was not until after a trial and an adverse decision that Mr. Parker made
his untimely invitation to this court to abstain from hearing this matter.
An appropriate order denying Mr. Parker’s Motion to Reconsider will be entered.
cc: 	Frances H Parker
c/o Jonathan P. Morgan
50 W. Edmonston Dr., Ste. 600
Rockville, MD 20852
James M. Hoffman
11921 Rockville Pike
Suite 300
Rockville, MD 20852
Jonathan P. Morgan
50 W. Edmonston Drive
Suite 600
Rockville, MD 20852
Steven H. Greenfeld, Trustee
7910 Woodmont Avenue
Suite 760
Bethesda, MD 20814
End of Memorandum of Decision
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