USA v. Carlos Gonzalez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *
*
v. *
* Criminal Action No. 22-30027-MGM
CARLOS GONZALEZ, *
*
Defendant. *
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
MOTION FOR FRANKS HEARING
(Dkt. No. 183)
January 8, 2026
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Carlos Gonzalez (“Defendant”) filed a motion to suppress on August 29, 2023—pursuing a
“four-corners” probable cause challenge to the search warrant for 8 Mereline Avenue, East
Longmeadow—which this court granted on December 18, 2023. See United States v. Gonzalez, 707 F.
Supp. 3d 37 (D. Mass. 2023). On appeal, the First Circuit reversed based on the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule but noted that Defendant could pursue a challenge pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), on remand. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th 140 (1st
Cir. 2024). Although Defendant raised no specific Franks issue before the four-corners hearing,
defense counsel had repeatedly indicated he was pursuing development of a Franks challenge.
Defendant now seeks an evidentiary hearing under Franks following the late disclosure of
discovery from the government less than two months before the scheduled trial date. Defendant
asserts two separate intentional or reckless omissions from the search warrant affidavit undermine
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 20

2
probable cause: (1) information regarding surveillance conducted on a related Springfield property
(49 Norman Street) on November 23, 2021; and (2) information regarding a pole camera directed at
8 Mereline Avenue, in January of 2022. The court finds Defendant has made the requisite showing
to obtain a Franks hearing as to the omission regarding the surveillance conducted on 49 Norman
Street but not as to the pole camera at 8 Mereline Avenue.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 10, 2021, Special Agent Scott Smith of the DEA submitted an application for
a warrant to search 8 Mereline Avenue, supported by a 64-page affidavit, which was authorized by
Magistrate Judge Katherine Robertson. (See Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 138; Case Number 21-MJ-3205-KAR
(Dkt. No. 4).) The affidavit covered events occurring from February of 2018 to November 3, 2021.
(Id.) However, “[f]or reasons related to the investigation,” the warrant was “not executed within the
authorized 14-day period.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 138; Case Number 21-MJ-32050-KAR (Dkt. No. 7).)1
On January 20, 2022, Smith submitted search warrant applications for those same two
addresses, supported by an affidavit “largely identical” to the one submitted on December 10, 2021,
except for seven new paragraphs describing events on January 6 and 7, 2022. (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶¶ 73-
79, 138.) Judge Robertson authorized the search warrant for 8 Mereline Avenue (and one for 9 N.
Ramah Circle) that same day. (Case Number 22-MJ-3006-KAR (Dkt. No. 6.)
The affidavit described the multi-year investigation into an operation which manufactured
and distributed counterfeit oxycodone pills containing heroin and fentanyl led by Michael Matos.
Smith explained that his affidavit was filed in support of search warrant applications directed at two
“Target Location[s]”: 8 Mereline Avenue, and Hector Ramos’s auto-repair shop at 9 N. Ramah
1 On December 10, 2021, Smith also filed a search warrant application for another address, 9 N. Ramah Circle, Agawam,
an auto-repair shop operated by Hector Ramos, supported by the same affidavit, and that warrant was not executed
within the 14-day period either. (See Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 138; Case Number 21-MJ-3204-KAR (Dkt. Nos. 4, 7).)
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 2 of 20

3
Circle, Agawam. (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 2.) As to 8 Mereline Avenue, Matos and his wife Neysha
purchased the two-family residence in January of 2018 and lived in the second-floor apartment until
September of 2021, when they moved to a home in Somers, Connecticut. Defendant and Kiara
Rodriguez-Santiago lived in the first-floor apartment at 8 Mereline Avenue. The property included a
basement that Smith believed could only be accessed through a bulkhead door located in the back of
the residence.
In February of 2018, pills containing heroin, but with markings made to look like they were
oxycodone, were discovered in a toolbox repossessed from Matos and reported to the Southwick
Police Department. In July and August of 2018, officers of the East Longmeadow Police
Department conducted two traffic stops near 8 Mereline Avenue, recovering counterfeit oxycodone
pills and approximately twelve grams of heroin. The operator of the vehicle that was stopped in
August of 2018—Luis Rivera of 50 Forest Street, Springfield—had ties to Matos and Neysha and 8
Mereline Avenue.
In February of 2019, the FDA began investigating Matos after learning that he had been
purchasing online numerous items commonly used to manufacture counterfeit controlled
substances. A search warrant for an email address used by Matos was authorized, which resulted in
obtaining unspecified “valuable information” regarding Matos’ operation, but “the investigation did
not result in any further court authorized search and seizure warrants.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 24.)
In April of 2021, two individuals were arrested after the discovery of a large-scale fentanyl
pill processing operation in a residence in Springfield. They both agreed to cooperate as confidential
informants (“CIs”) and explained that they learned how to manufacture counterfeit oxycodone pills,
in part, from an individual matching the description and residence of Matos. One of the CIs met
Matos at Ramos’s Agawam auto-repair shop, where Matos showed him how to use a tableting
machine. Matos carried the tableting machine in a large suitcase wrapped inside a comforter and also
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 3 of 20

4
used a second suitcase to carry the other drug-processing equipment. The same CI also visited 8
Mereline Avenue on three occasions “while Matos mixed and processed the heroin into counterfeit
oxycodone tablets utilizing a pill press machine” in the basement. (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 42.) The last
time the CI visited 8 Mereline Avenue was in April or May of 2020.
In December of 2020, Customs and Border Patrol officers seized a package with a pill-press
machine shipped to Neysha at 8 Mereline Avenue. Records also revealed Kiara Rodriguez was the
listed recipient of other packages with similar machines in June of 2020 at the same address. In
February of 2021, Kiara Rodriguez-Santiago ordered a pill-press punch set to be shipped to 8
Mereline Avenue. In May of 2021, Defendant ordered two pill-press punch sets to be shipped to the
same address.2
In July of 2021, a confidential informant told agents a 2006 Acura MDX owned by Matos
and operated by Neysha was involved in a traffic accident, was towed to CJ’s Towing Lot in
Springfield, and was believed to have a hidden compartment with a large amount of fentanyl.
Neysha signed ownership of the vehicle over to CJ’s Towing because it was a complete loss from
the accident. A subsequent search of the vehicle at Leveille’s Auto Salvage in Somers, Connecticut
disclosed a black bag containing 25 rounds of 9mm ammunition and a large aftermarket hidden
compartment under the floor, which contained two clear bags with a small number of green pills
with the markings “A” and “214.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 49.) The Massachusetts Registry Database
revealed the vehicle was registered to Keanu Vega of 830 Chicopee St., Chicopee, Massachusetts,
and a search of Vega’s name in a commercial database also lists Kiana L. Rodriguez at that same
2 The pill-press punch sets created pills containing certain markings, including “M,” “15, and “A|215.” (Dkt. No. 185-1
¶ 110.) In July, August, and September of 2021, investigators used a different confidential informant for controlled
purchases of blue counterfeit OxyContin pills stamped with “A|215” from Ramos’s auto-repair shop. The same
confidential information also purchased blue counterfeit OxyContin pills stamped with “M” on one side and “30” on
the other from Ramos’s auto-repair shop during the week of December 6, 2021.
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 4 of 20

5
address in Chicopee. The affiant was familiar with Kiana’s name3 because he had observed a vehicle
registered to her parked at 8 Mereline Avenue on May 24, 2021.
Matos and Neysha purchased a home at 80 Pond Circle, Somers, Connecticut on July 1,
2021. On September 6, 2021, they moved from 8 Mereline Avenue to the Somers residence. On
September 13, 2021, agents surveilled Matos and Defendant leaving 8 Mereline Avenue in a Chevy
pickup truck registered to Defendant and then travel to Ramos’s Agawam auto-repair shop. Matos
and Defendant met with Ramos inside the office, and then Defendant traveled with an unidentified
man back to 8 Mereline Avenue in a Ford F-150 pickup truck registered to Neysha. On that same
date, agents observed at 8 Mereline Avenue a gray 2009 Acura TL sedan (license plate 1BDY82)
registered to Nilda Gonzalez of 8 Mereline Avenue.
On September 16, 2021,4 Defendant and three others drove in the F-150 pickup truck from
Ramos’s auto-repair shop to Walmart in Westfield. Defendant paid $461.45 in cash “for a number
of items which are commonly utilized for processing narcotics.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 66.) Defendant
and the others loaded the purchased items into the bed of the F-150. Agents then followed the F-
150 to a residence at 49 Norman Street in Springfield, where the truck backed into the driveway of a
two-car garage and parked the rear bed “very close to the open garage door.” (Id. ¶ 65.) All of the
occupants exited the truck and then re-entered it three minutes later and drove to 8 Mereline
Avenue.
3 It appears that Kiara Rodriguez (sometimes referred to as Kiara Rodriguez-Santiago) and Kiana L. Rodriguez are
different people, although it is not entirely clear from the affidavit. Whether they are the same or different individuals
does not affect the substantive Franks analysis.
4 Earlier in the day on September 16, 2021, an agent observed Matos drive a gray GMC pickup truck to a gas station in
East Longmeadow, where (after vacuuming and re-fueling the GMC) he entered the passenger seat of a Lexus sedan and
then exited and returned to the GMC a few moments later. The affiant stated: “Based on my training and experience, I
believe that this behavior, Matos entering a vehicle for a short period of time in a public parking lot, is indicative of a
potential narcotics transaction taking place.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 61.)
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 5 of 20

6
On November 3, 2021, agents surveilled Matos at 8 Mereline Avenue, where he stayed for
several hours. Matos left the house with an unidentified male, each carrying a box that appeared to
be the same size as two Amazon boxes delivered earlier in the day. Approximately 40 minutes later,
a black 2004 Acura TL sedan parked in front of 8 Mereline Avenue. The Acura was registered to
Kassandra A. Rivera at 50 Forest Street, Springfield, which was the same address used by Luis
Rivera when he was stopped by the police near 8 Mereline Avenue with heroin in his possession in
August of 2018. An unidentified Hispanic man with glasses and a beard exited the Acura and walked
down the driveway of the residence.
On January 6, 2022, the affiant observed a black 2017 Tesla Model X (license plate 3DRL60)
parked in front of 8 Mereline Avenue and later saw Neysha leave the property briefly in the Tesla
before returning. Investigators learned the Tesla was purchased on December 23, 2021 by Felipe
Figueroa and Matos, using an address of 49 Norman Street—the home where Defendant and others
stopped directly after purchasing drug-processing supplies from Walmart on September 16, 2021.
The affiant also stated he had observed the Tesla at 8 Mereline Avenue “on several occasions over
the past several weeks.” (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 79.) The gray 2009 Acura TL sedan (license plate
1BDY82), registered to Nilda Gonzalez at 8 Mereline Avenue, was also observed near the residence.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following the search of 8 Mereline Avenue on January 25, 2022, a grand jury indicted
Defendant, charging him with possession with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). After some continuances, Defendant
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting a four-corners challenge
to the search warrant affidavit based on staleness and insufficient nexus between 8 Mereline Avenue
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 6 of 20

7
and evidence of drug activity. On the day of the hearing on the motion to suppress, Defendant’s
counsel filed another motion to continue and explained during the hearing that he wanted to pursue
a Franks challenge. Defense counsel was concerned that going forward with the four-corners
challenge first could foreclose a later Franks challenge. The court denied the motion to continue but,
with the government’s assent, made clear that Defendant was “not waiving [his] right to file a [later]
Franks . . . request.” (Dkt. No. 67 at 5.) At the end of the hearing, the court proposed that it delay
issuing a decision on the motion to suppress and schedule a status conference in 30 days to
determine if Defendant would also be filing a separate Franks motion. However, after the attorneys
conferred, the Assistant United States Attorney asked on behalf of both parties that the court rule
on the four-corners challenge first, explaining: “if you decide with the Defendant, for all intents and
purposes, short of an appeal, the case is over. And so developing . . . another reason to suppress,
and although work and time is going to go into that, you know, if I’m out of the box, I’m out of the
box.” (Id. at 32.) The court agreed with the parties’ proposal and stated: “If the ruling is in the
Government’s favor, then the door is still open for there to be a supplement, if there’s a showing for
a Franks issue to be raised.” (Id.)
On December 18, 2023, the court issued its decision on the four-corners challenge. See
Gonzalez, 707 F. Supp. 3d 37. The court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the
information in the affidavit connecting 8 Mereline Avenue to the drug activity was impermissibly
stale when the government applied for the search warrant in January of 2022. Id. at 46-50. The court
concluded the information regarding the Walmart purchases on September 16, 2021 did not refresh
the stale information or establish a sufficient connection to 8 Mereline Avenue because the items
were likely unloaded at 49 Norman Street after the pickup truck backed into the driveway and
parked “‘the rear of the truck . . . very close to the open garage door,’” directly after leaving
Walmart. Id. at 48 (quoting Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 65). The court also explained the affiant’s contrary
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 7 of 20

8
“opinion that the items purchased at Walmart were ‘likely’ unloaded at 8 Mereline Avenue . . . .
appears to be . . . conjecture and wishful thinking to fit the Mereline theme,” given that the affidavit
contained no specific information supporting the inference that the items were unloaded at 8
Mereline Avenue after the truck left 49 Norman Street. Id. at 49 (quoting Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶ 68).
Even after “considering the affiant’s described law enforcement experience,” the court declined to
accept his “unsupported and unexplained opinion in the face of reported facts which soundly
undermine that opinion.” Id. In addition, the court concluded that the government had not met its
burden of demonstrating that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, in light of
the weak probable cause showing and the government’s “generic” and “‘conclusory’” good-faith
argument in its briefing. Id. at 50-51 (quoting United States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2023)).
The government appealed the court’s ruling. See Gonzalez, 113 F.4th 140. The First Circuit
explained that it viewed this court’s probable cause determination “as a close call.” Id. at 143. It
therefore decided to “bypass the probable-cause finding and proceed straight to the . . . good-faith
issue” and “assume[d] arguendo that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that the evidence
of the pill-making operation would be found at 8 Mereline Avenue in late January 2022.” Id. at 147.
The First Circuit held the good-faith exception applied, concluding “that it was objectively
reasonable for an officer to believe that Matos’s pill-making operation was still underway at its
longstanding home base in early 2022.” Id. at 148. The First Circuit based its conclusion on the
following “key facts” in the affidavit: “Matos still owned 8 Mereline Avenue and continued to live
nearby and visit; the remaining occupants of 8 Mereline Avenue were [Defendant] and his girlfriend,
who also appeared to be involved in the operation; and the pill-making operation had operated
successfully from 8 Mereline Avenue for years,” so “an objectively reasonable officer could have
concluded that Matos had little reason to move it.” Id.
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 8 of 20

9
The First Circuit also held that any “lurking Franks problems” should be addressed by this
court “in the first instance” on remand. Id. at 152. After noting that this court made clear Defendant
was not waiving his right to pursue a Franks request, the First Circuit explained that it did “not pass
on any potential argument by [Defendant] that, under Franks, the warrant is nevertheless invalid and
the evidence should be suppressed because the affidavit contains intentional or reckless material
misrepresentations or omissions.” Id. at 153. Because the First Circuit vacated this court’s
suppression order and remanded for further proceedings, it explained, “[Defendant] can make such
an argument and challenge statements in the affidavit on remand.” Id.
After remand, Defendant filed an initial motion for a Franks hearing, pointing to two alleged
omissions from the affidavit: failing to provide sufficient updated information tying drug activity to
8 Mereline Avenue after the initial December 10, 2021 search warrant went unexecuted; and failing
to include information regarding a prior case, United States v. Roman, 311 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D. Mass.
2018), in which this court found the same affiant (and other agents) violated Franks by including
false information and omitting truthful information in that search warrant affidavit. (See Dkt. No.
132 at 17, 35.) The court rejected Defendant’s arguments and denied a motion for reconsideration as
well. (See Dkt. Nos. 124, 138.)
At the end of the hearing on Defendant’s initial Franks request, Defendant’s counsel raised
the possibility that some discovery was missing:
So the other thing that I want to know, the only investigative report we’ve ever gotten
was the one for the day that the warrant was executed. There’s nothing before that
and nothing after that. Just the day the warrant was executed. For a long investigation
like what happened between December 10th and the 20th of January, you would think
there would be a report on that.
(Dkt. No. 132 at 44.) The court inquired with the Assistant United States Attorney whether there
was any additional discovery the government was “obligated under the rules to produce.” (Id. at 44-
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 9 of 20

10
45.) In response, the Assistant United States Attorney stated he believed everything had been turned
over but stated that he would “check again.” (Id. at 45.)
Thereafter, the court scheduled and then continued the trial date once. (Dkt. Nos. 128, 142.)
On August 21, 2025, the Assistant United States Attorney filed a discovery letter stating that he was
providing Defendant’s counsel additional information and materials “[i]n accordance with the
government’s discovery obligations pursuant to Local Rule 116.1(c) and 116.2(b), Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 3500.” (Dkt. No. 150 at 1.) The materials included DEA-6 investigative
reports regarding: surveillance at the Westfield Walmart on September 16, 2021; surveillance at 49
Norman Street on November 23, 2021; surveillance at 8 Mereline Avenue on January 6, 2022; an
interview of Filipe Figueroa on January 27, 2022; and Defendant’s arrest on August 23, 2022. The
discovery letter also stated that the Assistant United States Attorney has “recently been informed
there was a pole camera operating in front of 8 Mereline Avenue, East Longmeadow, MA between
January 13, 2022 and February 2, 2022,” and offered to make the video available to defense counsel.
(Id. at 2.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed another motion to continue the trial based on the late
discovery, which the court granted. (Dkt. No. 161.) The court then set a briefing schedule, and
Defendant filed a motion to reopen the suppression litigation, seeking an evidentiary hearing under
Franks. (Dkt. Nos. 161, 183, 186.)
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Under Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, a defendant may request an evidentiary hearing to challenge
the truthfulness of statements made by law enforcement agents in a search warrant affidavit.” United
States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2009). To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make
“a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the affidavit contains an intentional or reckless false
statement or omission, and (2) the false statement or omission was necessary to the finding of
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 10 of 20

11
probable cause.” Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 153 n.3; see also United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st
Cir. 2015) (explaining that, as to material omissions, “first, the omission must have been either
intentional or reckless; and second, the omitted information, if incorporated into the affidavit, must
be sufficient to vitiate probable cause.”). “Recklessness may be inferred from circumstances evincing
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations.” United States v. Arias, 848 F.3d 504, 511 (1st
Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[i]n the case
of allegedly material omissions, recklessness may be inferred where the omitted information was
critical to the probable cause determination.” United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98-99 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2005)).
“A warrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been
committed—the ‘commission’ element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at
the place searched—the so-called ‘nexus’ element.” United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir.
2015) (quoting United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999)). As to the nexus element, the
question is “whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , there exists a ‘fair
probability’ evidence will be found in the place to be searched.” United States v. Roman, 942 F.3d 43,
50 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) (“The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the
owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”).
Moreover, the home in particular is entitled to “the highest level of Fourth Amendment protection,”
Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 633 (1st
Cir. 2015)), as “the ‘very core’ of the Fourth Amendment is to be ‘free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion’ into one’s home,” Roman, 942 F.3d at 50 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.
1, 6 (2013)).
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 11 of 20

12
In addition, “[t]he ‘commission’ and ‘nexus’ elements in the ‘probable cause’ analysis each
include a temporal component.” United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 1996). That is,
[t]he issuing magistrate must not only consider the accuracy and reliability of the
historical facts related in the affidavit[], but must determine, inter alia, whether the
totality of the circumstances reasonably inferable from the affidavit[] demonstrates a
“fair probability” that evidence material to the “commission” of the probable crime
will be disclosed at the search premises at about the time the search warrant would
issue, rather than at some remote time.
Id.; see also United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[A]n affidavit supporting a search
warrant must contain timely information or else it will fail.” (quoting United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d
562, 568 (1st Cir. 1996))).
V. ANALYSIS
In light of the late discovery, which prevented Defendant from raising these arguments
earlier, Defendant seeks a Franks hearing based on two alleged omissions from the search warrant
affidavit: (1) information regarding the surveillance conducted on 49 Norman Street on November
23, 2021; and (2) information regarding the pole camera directed at 8 Mereline Avenue, in January of
2022.5
5 Defendant also references other late-disclosed discovery, including the surveillance at the Westfield Walmart on
September 16, 2021, the surveillance at 8 Mereline Avenue on January 6, 2022, and the interview with Felipe Figueroa on
January 27, 2022. However, Defendant only develops Franks arguments with regard to the 49 Norman Street
surveillance and the pole camera near 8 Mereline Avenue. Accordingly, the court confines its analysis to those two
alleged omissions. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (“‘[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. . . . It is not enough merely to
mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the
argument, and put flesh on its bones.’ . . . Instead, ‘a litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and
distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.’” (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990)).
In addition, Defendant argues the warrant fails for lack of particularity, and the affidavit improperly omitted information
regarding the Franks adjudication in the Roman case. As to the particularity argument, the court finds Defendant waived
this argument by failing to raise it in conjunction with the four-corners challenge. Defendant also failed to raise the
particularity argument along with his initial Franks request and, unlike the present Franks challenges, there is no
argument that the government’s late disclosure of discovery prevented him from raising the particularity argument
earlier. (See Dkt. Nos. 103, 138.) As to the omission of the Roman information, the court has already addressed and
rejected that argument. (Dkt. Nos. 124, 138.) Therefore, the court will not address these two arguments either.
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 12 of 20

13
As to the pole camera directed at 8 Mereline Avenue, even assuming the omission of this
information from the affidavit was intentional or reckless, the court concludes its inclusion would
not have undermined probable cause. Rather, in the court’s view, adding this information to the
affidavit would have strengthened, somewhat, the probable cause showing. The pole camera
footage, which has been provided to the court, shows vehicles (some apparently associated with
Matos, Defendant, and the pill-making operation) parked in front of 8 Mereline Avenue during the
relevant timeframe between January 13, 2022 and January 25, 2022, and unidentified individuals
exiting and entering the vehicles, sometimes carrying items to or from the vehicles.6 This
information is consistent with the conclusion that individuals associated with the pill-making
operation continued to use the property in the days preceding the search, thereby supporting the
inference that the property itself may have continued to be used in relation to the pill-making
operation. While this inference, in the court’s view, is not particularly strong, nothing in the pole
camera footage materially detracts from the probable cause showing as to 8 Mereline Avenue.
The court, however, reaches a different conclusion as to the November 23, 2021 surveillance
of 49 Norman Street. As identified in the four-corners motion to suppress decision, 49 Norman
Street is a key address, since Defendant and three other men drove there directly from Walmart after
purchasing pill-processing equipment on September 16, 2021. The truck backed up into the
driveway of the garage at 49 Norman Street “very close to the open garage door,” the four
occupants exited the vehicle, and three minutes later they re-entered it and drove away from the
property. Despite the obvious inference that the Walmart purchases were dropped off there, the
6 One vehicle, a BMW with license plate 2HYW65, appears on at least two occasions during this time. This vehicle is
discussed in the search warrant affidavit as having been purchased on August 20, 2020 by Neysha Matos and registered
to 8 Mereline Avenue. (Dkt. No. 185-1 ¶¶ 114-15; see also id. ¶ 37.) Other vehicles shown in the pole camera footage
appear to match the descriptions of different vehicles referenced in the search warrant affidavit as well, but the pole
camera footage generally does not show the license plate numbers of the vehicles (with the exception of the BMW). The
pole camera footage also appears to show some packages being delivered to 8 Mereline Avenue during this time.
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 13 of 20

14
affiant stated his belief that the materials “were likely brought to . . . 8 Mereline Avenue,” not 49
Norman Street. (Dkt. No .185-1 ¶ 68.) The affidavit, however, provided no information about the
truck’s positioning in connection with its subsequent stop at 8 Mereline Avenue or other details
suggesting the Walmart items were unloaded there. This court disagreed with the issuing Magistrate
Judge and rejected the affiant’s opinion in this regard as speculative and, as a result, found the nexus
to 8 Mereline Avenue was stale by January 20, 2022, given that Matos (the leader of the operation)
and Neysha moved in July of 2021 and “all of the evidence demonstrating a tangible link” between
the address and the drug operation pre-dated the move by months. Gonzalez, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 47-
49. The First Circuit, while reversing based on the good faith exception, did not overturn this court’s
lack of probable cause determination, which it described as a “close call.” Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 143,
47. As Defendant argues, adding the omitted November 23, 2021 surveillance information regarding
49 Norman Street to the picture weakens, in some respect, the affidavit’s probable cause showing as
to 8 Mereline Avenue by “shin[ing] the light” brighter on the Norman Street address “as the most
likely repository for the items purchased at Walmart on September 16, 2021.” (Dkt. No. 187 at 16.)7
The DEA-6 Investigative Report, describing the surveillance at 49 Norman Street on
November 23, 2021, begins by noting that this is the address where Defendant and three others
were observed after “picking up items related to a fentanyl pill press operation at Wal-Mart in
Westfield, MA on September 16, 2021.” (Dkt. No. 175-1 at 16.) It then discusses several vehicles
registered to Luis Rivera, Felipe Figueora, and Nilda Gonzalez parked near 49 Norman Street during
7 The court acknowledges the unusual posture of this case, following its initial four-corners decision and the First
Circuit’s reversal and remand on good faith. That is, normally “[i]n the case of an omission,” the defendant must
establish “that the inclusion of the omitted information would have led to a negative finding by the magistrate on
probable cause.” United States v. Magee, 834 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 208
(1st Cir. 2015)). Here, however, the case history invites considering whether adding the omitted information also would
have led to a negative probable cause finding by either this court or the First Circuit. Nevertheless, this Franks analysis as
to omissions is “wholly objective,” rather than focusing on the subjective analysis of a particular magistrate. See United
State v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359, 365-67, 369 (1st Cir. 2005) (favorably citing United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1316
(7th Cir. 1993) (“A rule focusing on the tainted information’s actual influence on a particular magistrate would be
inconsistent with Franks . . . .”)); see also United States v. Soto, 799 F.3d 68, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2015).
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 14 of 20

15
the surveillance operation. The 2009 gray Acura sedan, with license plate 1BDY82, registered to
Nilda Gonzalez, which was noted to have been observed at 8 Mereline Avenue “during previous
surveillance operations targeting Matos,” arrived approximately three hours after surveillance began.
(Id. at 17.) Shortly after the Acura arrived, an agent observed Figueroa exit the front door of 49
Norman Street and walk toward the Acura “while a younger Hispanic male exited the driver’s side of
the Acura and walked around the rear of the vehicle to the passenger’s side” and re-entered the
vehicle as Figueroa entered the driver’s side. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Figueroa exited the Acura and
returned to the residence, while the Hispanic male moved back into the driver’s seat of the Acura.
Then, a minute later, Figueroa exited the residence again carrying a lanyard with keys, walked toward
a white Chevy van, turned the van on, and walked to the rear cargo doors of the van before walking
over to the driver’s side window of the Acura. Figueroa had “a short conversation” with the
Hispanic male, then he walked back to the rear of the van, and the Acura drove away. (Id. at 18.)
Shortly after the Acura left, Figueroa locked the van while it was still running and went back inside
the residence; the van eventually stopped running and no one returned to it for the remainder of the
surveillance. Agents followed the Acura to a residence in Springfield, where the Hispanic male exited
the vehicle, walked behind the residence “for a short time,” and then returned to the vehicle (when
surveillance was terminated).
Another vehicle mentioned in the November 23, 2021 surveillance report was a gray Honda
Accord with license plate 3DRL60, registered to Figueroa using both Norman Street and Mereline
Avenue addresses. This same license plate number appeared in the January 20, 2022 affidavit in
connection with the black 2017 Tesla Model X purchased by Matos and Figueroa on December 23,
2021. The original December 10, 2021 affidavit included information ending on November 3, 2021,
whereas the second (January 20th) affidavit included additional paragraphs describing surveillance
on January 6 and 7, 2022 (as well as the information regarding the December 23, 2021 Tesla
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 15 of 20

16
purchase). The January 20th affidavit at paragraph 73—similar to the late-disclosed DEA-6
Investigative Report—references 49 Norman Street as the same address where Defendant traveled
after leaving Walmart on September 16, 2021.
Despite the acknowledged importance of the 49 Norman Street address, however, neither
the original nor the updated search warrant affidavit included this information, contained in the
DEA-6 Investigative Report, showing further connections to 49 Norman Street and possible drug-
related activity on November 23, 2021. Defendant argues this newly disclosed information about 49
Norman Street was withheld from the affidavit strategically in order to promote the affiant’s opinion
focusing on 8 Mereline Avenue. At this preliminary Franks stage, the circumstances here support an
inference of intentional or reckless omission in order “to fit the Mereline [Avenue] theme.” Gonzalez,
707 F. Supp. 3d at 49; see also United States v. Francis, 132 F.4th 101, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2025) (“For a
challenge based on omissions, [the defendant] must show that the omission ‘[wa]s designed to
mislead, or . . . . made in reckless disregard of whether [it] would mislead, the magistrate in his
appraisal of the affidavit.’” (quoting Tanguay, 787 F.3d at 49)); Arias, 848 F.3d at 511 (“Recklessness
may be inferred from circumstances evincing obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
allegations.”). Moreover, in light of this court’s original conclusion that probable cause already was
lacking, the court finds that including this omitted information regarding 49 Norman Street in the
affidavit likely would have vitiated probable cause from the perspective of an issuing magistrate. See
United States v. Murray, 2020 WL 4904758 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2020) (“[T]he fact is that the affidavit as
submitted—without considering the alleged misrepresentations or omissions—did not make a
strong nexus showing to begin with.”).
The government argues “drug dealers frequently use multiple locations to stash and prepare
drugs” and the fact that probable cause may exist for one location does not mean it is lacking for a
different location. (Dkt. No. 185 at 13.) But even assuming drug traffickers often keep relevant
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 16 of 20

17
evidence at multiple locations, “this does not relieve the government of its burden to provide
specific evidence as to each ‘place [to be] searched.’” Roman, 942 F.3d at 54 (quoting United States v.
Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2015)). And, as explained, the affiant relied in large part on his
opinion as to the location where the Walmart purchases were brought to support the nexus showing
as to 8 Mereline Avenue. In fact, the government at oral argument before this court on the four-
corners challenge identified the September 16, 2021 Walmart trip as “some of the most recent
probable cause” with respect to 8 Mereline Avenue. (Dkt. No. 67 at 14.)8 In this court’s view, the
affiant’s opinion in this regard—already suspect based on the information contained in the
unreformed affidavit—is undermined even more by including the omitted information regarding the
November 23, 2021 surveillance of 49 Norman Street. In short, the omitted information, while not
groundbreaking, weakens the already-weak nexus showing as to 8 Mereline Avenue by suggesting
the movable pill-making operation was operating instead on Norman Street. See Roman, 942 F.3d at
53 (“We agree with the district court’s conclusion that ‘any inference that could permissibly be
drawn from [Defendant’s] status as a drug dealer regarding the location of evidence is significantly
weakened where, as here, it is more likely that such evidence would be found at the residence or
business of another individual.’” (quoting Roman, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 440)).
In opposing Defendant’s Franks request, the government argues the disclosure of the late
discovery was not even required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 or Local Rule 116 and, further, Defendant
has not been prejudiced. The discovery argument, however, is contradicted by the government’s
August 21, 2025 discovery letter, which stated that the additional information and materials were
being provided to defense counsel “[i]n accordance with the government’s discovery obligations
8 The government also argued at the hearing that the initial stop after Walmart was to “an unrelated address in
Springfield,” (id.), but that is not accurate, as demonstrated by the surveillance of that address on November 23, 2021
and the further connections of vehicles and individuals seemingly involved in the drug operation to 49 Norman Street.
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 17 of 20

18
pursuant to Local Rule 116.1(c) and 116.2(b), Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 3500.” (Dkt.
No. 150 at 1.) In any event, the court does not agree with the government’s argument on the merits.9
Local Rule 116.2 broadly defines “[e]xculpatory information” as “information that is material
and favorable to the accused,” including “information that tends to . . . cast doubt on the
admissibility of evidence that the government anticipates using in its case-in-chief, that might be
subject to a motion to suppress or exclude, which would, if allowed, be appealable pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3731.” Local Rule 116.2(a)(2); see United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169-70 (D. Mass.
2009) (explaining that “[t]he revised Local Rules for Criminal Cases of the District of Massachusetts
have been widely viewed as valuable and, indeed, worthy of emulation,” in part, due to the broad
definition of exculpatory information). Accordingly, “to the extent that the government has
information tending to cast doubt on or contradict the information set forth in the search warrant
affidavit, that information must be produced pursuant to” the Local Rules. United States v. Monell,
2013 WL 12437912, at *3 n.4 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2013); see also United States v. Aboshady, 2017 WL
4540958, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct 11, 2017) (“Thus, in automatic discovery cases, the following is due
within 28 days of arraignment (or within 14 days of the government’s receipt of a written statement
that the defendant will not be waiving automatic discovery): . . . information that would provide a
basis for a motion to suppress . . . .”); United States v. Scott, 2013 WL 3105615, at *4 (D. Mass. June
17, 2013) (“Local Rule 116.2(a) defines ‘exculpatory information’ as information that is material and
favorable to the defendant ‘because it tends to . . . [c]ast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that
the government anticipates using in its case-in-chief’ or ‘that might be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude.’” (quoting Local Rule 116.2(a)(2))); United States v. Jordan, 2010 WL 625280, at
9 The government also, seemingly in an effort to address the discovery violation, cites a Tenth Circuit case, United States
v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558, 623 (10th Cir. 2021), which states “that ‘[w]hether Brady’s disclosure requirements even apply
at the motion to suppress stage is an open question.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee Vang Lor, 706 F.3d 1252, 1256 n.2
(10th Cir. 2013)). This argument lacks merit, as the Local Rules control here and clearly contemplate discovery in
advance of suppression hearings. See Local Rule 116.2(a)(2).
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 18 of 20

19
*3 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2010) (“Since establishing that that search warrant affidavit contains false
information is the first step in challenging the warrant, information that casts doubt on the accuracy
of the information in the search warrant affidavit may ‘cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence
the government anticipates offering in its case-in-chief, i.e., the fruits of the search. Such information
must be produced promptly in accordance with [the Local Rules].”).
For the reasons explained, the omitted information regarding the November 23, 2021
surveillance of 49 Norman Street tends to cast doubt on the affiant’s opinion in the search warrant
affidavit as to the location of the September 16, 2021 Walmart purchases and, relatedly, the probable
cause showing as to 8 Mereline Avenue in general. Therefore, the government was obligated under
the Local Rules to provide this information by September 20, 2022, following Defendant’s August
23, 2022 arraignment. (Dkt. No. 15.) Defendant, however, was significantly hindered in developing a
comprehensive challenge to the search warrant because he was not provided the DEA-6
Investigative Report until after this court’s four-corners ruling, the First Circuit’s decision on appeal,
and this court’s denial of a different Franks challenge.10 Since the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule is available in the face of a four-corners challenge to a search warrant affidavit, but
is not available if the defendant makes a successful Franks challenge, see United States v. Roman, 327 F.
Supp. 3d 312, 327-28 (D. Mass. 2018), Defendant was obviously prejudiced by the late disclosure
because the First Circuit reversed this court’s suppression order based entirely on good faith.11 If this
material had been disclosed in a timely manner, it is very likely that the travel of this case would have
10 Although Defendant filed multiple motions for continuances, it was clear that defense counsel was searching
(fruitlessly) for grounds to pursue a Franks challenge. Ultimately, the court decided to go forward with the four-corners
challenge first but did not foreclose a Franks challenge at a later time, if properly supported, and the First Circuit
remanded with this understanding as well.
11 In addition, “while reviewing courts generally afford substantial deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable
cause, where ‘[a]llegations of intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions’ are proven true, [courts] owe ‘no
deference to a magistrate’s decision’ because this ‘implicate[s] the very truthfulness, not just the sufficiency, of a warrant
application.’” Roman, 942 F.3d at 50 (quoting Burke, 405 F.3d at 82).
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 19 of 20

20
been vastly different and more favorable to Defendant. Accordingly, the court rejects the
government’s argument that the disclosure of the information regarding the surveillance of 49
Norman Street on September 23, 2021 was not required by the Local Rules and did not prejudice
Defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS that a Franks hearing be held consistent with
this decision. The parties shall confer and file a joint status report, by January 22, 2026, providing
the court with available dates in the following thirty days for the evidentiary Franks hearing.
_/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni________
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge
Case 3:22-cr-30027-MGM Document 194 Filed 01/08/26 Page 20 of 20