Weitz v. Massachusetts Department of Revenue et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
THEODORE I. WEITZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
26-14518-BEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, J.
On October 5, 2026, Plaintiff Theodore I. Weitz, domiciled in Thailand and proceeding
pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”)
and Michael F. Kitterick, a DOR problem resolution officer. Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).
Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 2 and a motion for
temporary restraining order, Dkt. 3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, deny as moot the motion for temporary restraining order, and dismiss this action
based on principles of abstention.
I. 	Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
concludes that he has shown he is unable to pay the $405 filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will
grant the motion.
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II. 	The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming a violation of his right to
due process based upon alleged arrears arising from a child support action in Norfolk Probate and
Family Court. 	See generally Compl. 	Defendants, as described in the Complaint, are (1) the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”) and Michael F. Kitterick, a problem resolution
officer employed by the DOR’s Child Support Services division. Id. at 3– 4. Plaintiff brings this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 	Id. at 3. 	He alleges that the Social
Security Administration has been garnishing funds from his social security benefits for child
support pursuant to court order. Id. at 4. He alleges that on April 4, 2025, the Norfolk Probate
and Family Court (Allen, J.) entered a Judgment of Modification setting [child support payments].”
Id. at 6. 	Plaintiff states that the “judgment is currently under appeal before the Massachusetts
Appeals Court, Docket No. 2026-P-0269.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that in addition to the social security garnishment, he has made
“voluntary child support payments directly to the custodial parent prior to any court order; that he
had overpaid the December 2019 payment by $1,971 (sending $4,281 when $770 x 3 weeks was
owed); and that he had established a fixed automatic weekly bank transfer of $770 through DOR
that executed without fail.” Id. at 5. 	Plaintiff alleges that the DOR failed “to accurately account
for Plaintiff’s payments” and that the “DOR’s system show a fictitious arrearage of $2,540,
negotiated under threat of contempt to $258.72, at a legal cost to Plaintiff of approximately $5,000
to $10,000.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that the DOR “records were never corrected” and that
“delinquency notices continued.” 	Id. at 6. 	Because of the alleged uncorrected delinquency,
Plaintiff states that the “DOR certified those same defective records to the State Department and
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revoked Plaintiff’s passport.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the “certified arrears figure that forms the
basis of the passport revocation does not account for [certain credits and payments].” Id. at 6– 7.
Plaintiff alleges that the “DOR never sent Plaintiff a pre-certification notice” as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 645(31)(a). Id. at 7. Plaintiff states that he “received notice that his passport had
been revoked on approximately July 1, 2026 – the day after [the revocation occurred].” Id. He
contends that “[t]here was no opportunity to contest before revocation.” Id. Plaintiff contacted
defendant Kitterick who advised that on October 31, 2025, the DOR sent an Annual Delinquency
Notice.” Id. at 8. Although the notice lists “passport denial as one of eight possible enforcement
consequences” the notice “does not state that certification is imminent.” Id. In addition, Plaintiff
alleges that he never received the notice because it was mailed to Plaintiff’s former address in New
York, despite Plaintiff previously providing DOR with his new address in Thailand. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 9, 2026, defendant Kitterick’s email stated that his passport
will not be released “until [Plaintiff] pay[s] down the arrears balance below the $2,500.00
threshold.” 	Id. at 10. 	Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Kitterick’s subsequent responses
failed to address a myriad of issues and failed to “escalate to the DOR Legal Division as
requested.” 	Id. at 10. 	Finally, Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kitterick failed to respond to
Plaintiff’s “second detailed written response [and neither did any DOR official].” Id.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court:
1. 	Enter a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction directing Defendants to
immediately withdraw the passport certification submitted to the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, pending resolution of this action;
2. 	Enter 	a 	Permanent 	Injunction 	directing 	Defendants 	to: 	(a) 	withdraw 	the 	passport
certification; (b) conduct a complete case accounting applying all mandatory Rosenberg
credits and all documented payments; and (c) hold any future certification in abeyance
pending resolution of Massachusetts Appeals Court Docket No. 2026-P-0269;
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3. 	Award compensatory damages against Defendant Kitterick in his individual capacity in an
amount to be proven at trial;
4. 	Award punitive damages against Defendant Kitterick in his individual capacity in the
amount of $500,000, for his reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiff’s federally
protected rights after actual notice of these violations alleged herein;
5. 	Award Plaintiff his costs of suit; and
6. 	Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Id. at 19.
III. 	Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may conduct a preliminary
review of his Complaint and dismiss any claim that is malicious or frivolous, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Additionally, the Court may consider jurisdictional matters sua sponte. See Riley v. Bondi,
606 U.S. 259, 273 (2025) (“A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction.”).
The Court may consider whether the exercise of its jurisdiction is appropriate when a related state
proceeding is pending. See Guillemard-Ginoria v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 517-18 (1st
Cir. 2009).
In conducting this review, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Complaint because he is
representing himself. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
IV. 	Discussion
Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s child support proceedings are pending in the Norfolk Probate and
Family Court and Massachusetts Appeals Court, this Court may not intervene in them. In Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court
may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances
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suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate, see
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (citing Younger, 404 U.S. 37). Application of
the Younger abstention doctrine has been extended to the following three categories of state court
proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to
criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the
orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc’n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72– 73 (2013)
(“Sprint”); see Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192– 93 (1st Cir. 2015) (outlining
three-step approach in determining whether Younger abstention applies). 	Courts have held that
pending state child support proceedings involve at least one of the circumstances mentioned in
Sprint in which the Younger abstention doctrine should be applied. See Francis v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 2023 WL 5096145, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (“The merits of that appeal – challenging
both the Family Court order and Francis’s need to exhaust administrative remedies through [the
Department of Social Services] – implicate New York’s state interest in managing and enforcing
child support payments.”).
Moreover, none of the exceptions to the Younger doctrine are applicable here. See Sirva,
794 F.3d at 192 (noting exceptions to Younger when “state proceeding is brought . . . for the
purpose of harassment, . . . if the state forum provides inadequate protection of federal rights, . . .
[or] when a state statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions”
(citation modified)); see also Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir.
2008) (discussing “[e]xtraordinary circumstances” where abstention would be inappropriate).
Although Plaintiff complains of the rulings and/or inaction of the defendants, the Family
and Probate Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court, the Court will not intervene in those
pending proceedings.
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Finally, although many federal statutory rights are enforceable under Section 1983, see
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–8 (1980), Plaintiff cannot enforce Title IV-D’s requirement that
Massachusetts operate its child support program in compliance with Title IV-D because the statute
does not give rise to a private right of action, see Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 at 346–49
(1997) (holding that plaintiffs could not, through a Section 1983 action, seek a declaratory
judgment that Arizona’s IV-D program violated the substantial compliance requirements under
Title IV–D, including that state agency failed to take adequate steps to obtain their child support
payments, because in that context Title IV-D “contains no private remedy”).
V. 	Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:
1) 	The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 2, is GRANTED.
2) 	This action is DISMISSED based on principles of abstention.
3) 	The motion for temporary restraining order, Dkt. 3, is DENIED as moot. The Clerk
shall enter a separate order of dismissal.
So Ordered.
/s/ Brian E. Murphy
Brian E. Murphy
DATED: October 8, 2026 	Judge, United States District Court
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