Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
PARUS HOLDINGS, INC.,
Plaintiff
v.
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.,
MICHAEL T. RENAUD,
MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA,
Defendants
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No. 1:25-CV-01722-ADA
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: 	THE HONORABLE ALAN D. ALBRIGHT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo,
P.C. 	(“Mintz”), 	Michael 	T. 	Renaud, 	and 	Michael 	J. 	McNamara’s 	(together,
“Defendants”) motion to transfer, Dkt. 18, and all related briefing. After considering
these filings and the relevant law, the undersigned will recommend that the District
Judge grant Defendants’ motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This 	is 	a 	legal-malpractice 	suit. 	Defendants 	represented 	Plaintiff 	Parus
Holdings, Inc. (“Parus”) in several patent infringement lawsuits in this District and
related 	inter 	partes 	review 	proceedings. 	Dkt. 	1, 	at 	3. 	In 	connection 	with 	its
representation during inter partes review, Defendants prepared a Patent Owners
Response (“POR”) arguing that the claims in one of Parus’s patents, the ’431 patent,
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“antedated petitioners’ alleged prior art such that it was not prior art at all.” Id. at 3-
4. The United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(the “Board”) refused to consider this argument because the POR that Defendants
prepared violated the Board’s rules for the briefing. Id. at 4.1 According to Parus, the
Board then invalidated most of the claims of the ’431 patent based on the prior art.
Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision. Id. at 5.
Despite the POR mishap, according to Defendants, Parus obtained a total
recovery of $11.5 million in cases Defendants filed on Parus’s behalf and therefore
owed Defendants a “success fee” of over $2.15 million. Dkt. 18, at 10. Parus refused
to pay. Id. Defendants sued Parus in the District of Massachusetts to recover the
success fee. Id. at 12. Parus filed this malpractice suit one week later, contending
that the ’431 patent is now largely invalid as a result of Defendants’ negligence. Dkt.
1, at 5. Defendants moved to transfer this case to the District of Massachusetts under
the first-to-file rule or, alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Dkt. 18. Parus opposes the
motion. Dkt. 20.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have
1 Parus summarizes the Board’s decision as ruling “that because Defendants had violated 37
C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) by incorporating argument by reference and also had relied on evidence
without explanation or identification of the relevant portions of the evidence, the Board would
not consider Parus’s arguments or evidence antedating the purported prior art.” Dkt. 1, at 4.
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consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In considering a § 1404(a) motion, district courts
typically evaluate the convenience of transfer to the parties and other public-interest
considerations. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S.
49, 62-63 (2013). The private-interest factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical
problems 	that 	make 	trial 	of 	a 	case 	easy, 	expeditious 	and 	inexpensive.” In 	re
Volkswagen 	AG, 	371 	F.3d 	201, 	203 	(5th 	Cir. 	2004) [hereinafter Volkswagen 	I]
(citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1982)). The public-interest
factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
(2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity
of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.” Id.
The defendant must show there is “good cause” for transfer by “clearly
demonstrating that a transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice.” Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 433 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting 	In 	re 	Volkswagen 	of 	Am., 	Inc., 	545 	F.3d 	304, 	315 	(5th 	Cir. 	2008)
[hereinafter Volkswagen 	II]). 	“When 	the 	transferee 	venue 	is 	not 	clearly 	more
convenient than the venue chosen by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s choice should be
respected.” Id. The decision whether to transfer rests within the sound discretion of
the district court. See Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir.
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1989) (holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the
court).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Parus’s case should be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Initially, this
case could have been brought in the District of Massachusetts. Parus does not argue
otherwise. See Dkt. 20. Because each Defendant is a citizen of Massachusetts, the
District of Massachusetts could exercise personal jurisdiction over them. See Dkt. 1,
at 5, 7, 8; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (stating that a defendant entity resides in any
judicial district in which it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (establishing that a corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction where it is incorporated and maintains its principal place of
business). Additionally, venue would be proper in the District of Massachusetts under
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a civil action may be brought in (1) “a judicial
district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in
which the district is located” and (2) “a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred[.]”
Having determined that this preliminary inquiry is satisfied, the undersigned
next weighs the private- and public-interest factors.
A. 	The private-interest factors support transfer.
The private-interest factors counsel that transfer is appropriate. As stated
above, the private-interest factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
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witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen I,
371 F.3d at 203.
The relative ease of access to sources of proof favors transfer.
In considering the relative ease of access to sources of proof, courts look to
where 	documentary 	evidence 	is 	stored. 	See 	Volkswagen 	II, 	545 	F.3d 	at 	316.
Defendants point out that the relative ease of access to sources of proof favors transfer
because all of the documents relevant to this case are stored at Defendants’ Boston
office. Dkt. 18, at 18-19. Parus responds that it retains copies of Defendants’ files and
stores its own relevant records in Austin, and that regardless, the files are accessible
in any location. Dkt. 20, at 19-21.
This is a legal malpractice case based on Parus’s ’431 patent POR. While
Parus’s documents related to “design, development, and features of its own products
and patents” and certain documents held by underlying defendants may be somewhat
relevant to the Court’s understanding of the issues in the underlying litigation, see
id. at 20-21, the question in this case is whether Defendants were negligent in their
representation. Specifically, the issue is whether Defendants were negligent in
committing 	acts 	or 	failures 	to 	act 	including 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	briefing
requirements, failing to cite specific evidence, incorporating arguments by reference,
failing to cite certain evidence, and failing to supervise an associate attorney. See
Dkt. 1, at 29-31. Therefore, the documents most relevant to this case are the
attorneys’ work product itself as well as any communications regarding that work
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product. Given that Mintz is a Massachusetts law firm and Renaud and McNamara
are Massachusetts-based attorneys—regardless of their admission to practice in
Texas—the undersigned finds it is easier to access sources of proof relevant to the
legal-malpractice claim in Massachusetts than in Texas.
Parus cites Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 6:18-CV-00372-ADA, 2019 WL 4743678,
at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2019), for the proposition that “there is no difference in the
relative ease of access to sources of proof from the transferor district as compared to
the transferee district when the vast bulk of documents are electronic.” Dkt. 20, at
20. Yet even if most document production in the underlying cases was electronic,
much of that production is relevant only in a limited sense to the legal-malpractice
claim here. Further, in Fintiv, the court acknowledged despite its “hope that the Fifth
Circuit will consider … giv[ing] district courts the discretion to fully take into
consideration the ease of accessing electronic documents,” that “under Fifth Circuit
precedent, the physical location of electronic document[s] does affect the outcome of
this factor.” 2019 WL 4743678, at *4; see also LoganTree LP v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-
CV-00397-ADA, 2022 WL 1491097, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2022) (acknowledging
that “even in the context of electronic documents that can be accessed anywhere on
earth, this factor is not superfluous” (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316)). The
relative ease of access to sources of proof weighs in favor of transfer.
The availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
unwilling witnesses slightly favors transfer or is neutral.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, a subpoena may command a person
to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only “within 100 miles of where the person
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resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person” or “within the state
where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if
the person (i) is a party or a party’s officer; or (ii) is commanded to attend a trial and
would not incur substantial expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A), (B). The Court
focuses on non-party witnesses whose attendance may need to be secured by a court
order. See Fintiv, 2019 WL 4743678, at *5 (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316).
“The availability of compulsory process receives less weight when it has not been
alleged or shown that any witness would be unwilling to testify.” In re Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630-31 (5th Cir. 2022).
Defendants state that at least 28 attorneys, paralegals, and staff involved in
the underlying proceedings—but no longer employed by Mintz—are more likely to
fall within the District of Massachusetts’s subpoena power based on their last known
addresses, and that none of those witnesses reside in this District. Dkt. 18, at 20.
Parus asserts that Defendants identify no actual unwilling witnesses and, in any
event, the Court likely can exercise its subpoena power over witnesses from the
underlying cases. Dkt. 20, at 21-22. Parus also argues “alternatively” that third-party
witnesses are “likely to be beyond the radius of both this Court and the Massachusetts
court.” Id.
The 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	the 	availability 	of 	compulsory 	process 	in
Massachusetts favors transfer. As emphasized above, this is a legal-malpractice case.
The 	most 	important 	witnesses 	will 	be 	those 	who 	participated 	in 	Defendants’
rendering of legal services, including attorneys, paralegals, and staff involved in the
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underlying proceedings who may no longer be Mintz employees. Because these former
employees most likely worked with Renaud and McNamara in Massachusetts, where
Defendants are based, and are more likely to live within or near the District of
Massachusetts based on last-known addresses, see Dkt. 18, at 20, compulsory process
is more available there.2
Parus states this factor nonetheless weighs against transfer because four of its
former employees reside in Texas and are thus more likely to fall within the Court’s
subpoena power. Dkt. 20, at 22. Parus explains that these former employees will
“likely testify”3 regarding source-code operations, damages, and technical questions
about the products in the underlying suits. Id. Again, with the possible exception of
damages, it is unclear how that testimony is relevant to whether Defendants, at their
office in Boston, failed to comply with briefing requirements, failed to cite specific
evidence, incorporated arguments by reference, failed to cite certain evidence, and
failed to supervise an associate attorney working on the POR. See Dkt. 1, at 29-31.
Further, even if these four former employees’ testimony topics were relevant to the
malpractice claim, more witnesses with relevant information are likely to reside
2 	Parus’s 	argument 	that 	Defendants’ 	stated 	plan 	to 	call 	28 	former 	employees 	is
“disingenuous” because one of those employees did not enter an appearance on behalf of
Parus is not well-taken given that many of the possible witnesses are non-attorneys and
whether an attorney entered an official appearance in a case is not determinative of whether
the attorney worked on the case or otherwise possesses relevant information. See Dkt. 20, at
21-22.
3 Parus does not state whether these witnesses are willing or unwilling to testify. See Dkt.
20, at 22; Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630-31.
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within the District of Massachusetts’s subpoena power given that Defendants and
their staff are based in Massachusetts.
It is true that Defendants do not specifically identify unwilling witnesses, as
Parus points out. See Dkts. 18, at 20; 20, at 21-22. This factor should receive less
weight. Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630-31; cf. Bruck, 30 F.4th at 434 (noting it
was inappropriate to weigh this factor in favor of transfer where the movant did not
identify any witness who was subject to compulsory process in the transferee state
but not the transferor state). But because the remaining factors counsel transfer or
are neutral, assigning this factor less weight does not change the outcome of
Defendants’ motion. Nor would treating this factor as neutral. Cf. Bruck, 30 F.4th at
434.
The cost of attendance for willing witnesses favors transfer.
The convenience of willing witnesses is “often [] cited as the most significant
factor in determining whether a case should be transferred[.]” Noble v. Geo Grp., Inc.,
No. A-07-CA-968 LY, 2008 WL 2609208, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) (citing 15
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3851 (3d ed. 2008)), R. & R. adopted, 2008 WL 11417068 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
7, 2008). With respect to the third factor, Defendants assert the cost of attendance of
willing witnesses weighs in their favor given that Renaud, McNamara, and over 60
other attorneys, paralegals, and staff involved in the underlying case reside in the
District of Massachusetts; by contrast, according to Defendants, it is unclear that any
witness lives in this District. Dkt. 18, at 20-21. Parus responds that Renaud,
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McNamara, and other Mintz lawyers are admitted to practice in this District and
therefore may conveniently appear here, that Parus’s CEO regularly travels to Austin
for Parus business, and other out-of-state witnesses have agreed to travel to Texas.
Id. at 22-23.
The undersigned agrees with Defendants that given the nature of this case,
there are likely more willing witnesses in Massachusetts, where Defendants and
their staff are based, than in Texas. Accordingly, the cost of conducting trial in
Massachusetts for most relevant witnesses will likely be less. Whether Mintz
lawyers, Parus’s CEO, or other out-of-state witnesses could or would appear before
the Court given their prior travel to Austin, see Dkt. 20, at 22-23, does not change
this analysis, as their travel costs would remain high.4
Parus accuses Defendants of “gaming [] the system” based on their long list of
potential witnesses, pointing to the Court’s statement in Fintiv that it “rejected any
suggestion that the appropriate method would be to simply count the number of
identified (by name or by function) witnesses and compare the total numbers”
between districts. See Dkt. 20, at 23; 2019 WL 4743678, at *4. But the court in Fintiv
4 Parus also suggests the Court should decline to consider the cost to Defendants’ proposed
witnesses on the grounds that Defendants “do not provide names or suggestions of what
relevant testimony they have.” Dkt. 20, at 23; see Mateos v. Select Energy Servs., 919 F. Supp.
2d 817, 823 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (stating a movant must specifically identify the key witnesses
and their testimony). Yet Defendants do explain that the attorneys and staff will provide
testimony regarding the legal services they rendered. Dkt. 18, at 21. And though Defendants
do not list each of the 60 witnesses by name, they do identify two key witnesses: former Mintz
partners Jinnie Reed and Drew DeVoogd. Id. at 20; see Noble, 2008 WL 2609208, at *6 (noting
that while both parties should have provided more detail concerning the specific testimony
they expected to obtain, the identification of witnesses combined with the factual allegations
in the complaint demonstrated the likely residence of the majority of important non-party
witnesses).
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made this statement in the context of the first factor, where the court weighed the
relative ease of access to sources of proof. See 2019 WL 4743678, at *4. Further, in
concluding that the cost-of-attendance factor favors transfer, the undersigned does
not merely count the number of witnesses on either side, but concludes that declining
to transfer this action would cause a greater number of relevant witnesses to travel
an unacceptably long distance to testify. Cf. Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 204-205
(noting that “[w]hen the distance between an existing venue for trial of a matter and
a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience
to 	witnesses 	increases 	in 	direct 	relationship 	to 	the 	additional distance 	to 	be
traveled”). Of course, the Court is unable to conduct trial in a place convenient to all
witnesses. As such, this factor must weigh in favor of transfer. See SQIP, LLC v.
Cambria Co., LLC, 728 F. Supp. 3d 447, 455 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (concluding the cost for
willing witnesses favored transfer where the transferee district was “clearly more
convenient for the majority of expected witnesses”).
All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive favor transfer.
Fourth, Defendants argue that all other practical problems favor transfer
because trying this case in Austin will result in “wasted judicial resources, piecemeal
litigation, and potentially conflicting judgments.” Dkt. 18, at 22. Parus states only
that all other practical problems weigh against transfer because its malpractice claim
is not duplicative of Defendants’ Massachusetts fee claim. Id. at 24.
While 	the 	undersigned 	agrees 	that 	this 	malpractice 	case 	is 	not 	simply
“duplicative” of Defendants’ Massachusetts fee claim, the cases nonetheless both
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center the parties’ obligations under their contract. Declining to transfer would
therefore result in piecemeal litigation regarding those obligations. This case is also
in its early stages, and the Court has not entered a scheduling order. This factor
supports transfer.
B. 	The public-interest factors favor transfer.
The public-interest factors likewise weigh in favor of transfer. Again, the
public-interest factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance
of 	unnecessary 	problems 	of 	conflict 	of 	laws 	of 	the 	application 	of 	foreign
law.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 203.
The administrative-difficulties factor weighs slightly in favor of
transfer.
The District of Massachusetts resolves cases 3.8 months faster than this
District. See Dkts. 18, at 23; 20, at 24; 23, at 12 n.7. This relatively small difference
weighs slightly in favor of transfer. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. LG Elecs. USA, No. 4:17-
cv-0825-O, 2018 WL 3419175, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2018) (concluding a four-
month difference weighed slightly in favor of transfer).
The local interest in having localized interests decided at home
favors transfer.
The 	local-interest 	factor 	“most 	notably 	regards 	not 	merely 	the 	parties’
significant 	connections 	to 	each 	forum 	writ 	large, 	but 	rather 	the 	significant
connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit.”
Bruck, 30 F.4th at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Important considerations
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include the location of the injury, witnesses, and the Plaintiff’s residence.” Id. But the
“place 	of 	the 	alleged 	wrong 	is 	one 	of 	the 	most 	important 	factors 	in 	venue
determinations.” Id.
Defendants 	argue 	this 	case 	should 	be 	transferred 	because 	the 	alleged
malpractice occurred in Massachusetts, Mintz is headquartered in Massachusetts,
Mintz’s likely witnesses reside in Massachusetts, Massachusetts law will govern the
case, and Massachusetts has a greater interest in resolving allegations that its
attorneys committed malpractice. Dkt. 18, at 24-25. Parus counters that venue is
proper 	in 	this 	District 	because 	Parus 	is 	headquartered 	in 	Texas, 	Defendants
frequently 	practice 	in 	Texas, 	Defendants’ 	alleged 	malpractice 	impacted 	Texas
litigation, and the injury Defendants caused was felt in Texas. Dkt. 20, at 25.
The connections between the District of Massachusetts and the events giving
rise to this suit are strongest. See Bruck, 30 F.4th at 435. As discussed, while
Defendants may have filed suits on Parus’s behalf in Texas, this case raises a legal-
malpractice claim against Massachusetts-based attorneys relating to their work
during an inter partes review proceeding in Washington, D.C. See Dkt. 1. While Parus
may have felt the injury resulting from the alleged malpractice in Texas, where it is
headquartered, the alleged wrong occurred in Massachusetts. See Bruck, 30 F.4th at
435. Further, most relevant witnesses are located in or around Massachusetts. See
Dkt. 18, at 20. This factor is a closer call but ultimately weighs in favor of transfer.
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The familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
is neutral.
Defendants argue that because Massachusetts law will govern this case,5 the
District of Massachusetts is better able to handle it. Dkt. 18, at 27. The undersigned
disagrees. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the familiarity factor “does not weigh in
favor of transfer when both districts are equally capable of applying the relevant law.”
In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 365 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because federal judges “routinely apply the law of a State other than the
one in which they sit,” the Fifth Circuit has “hesitated to find that this factor weighs
in favor of transfer when there are no ‘exceptionally arcane’ features” of the applicable
law defying comprehension by a federal judge sitting in the transferor state. Id.
(quoting Bruck, 30 F.4th at 436).
Defendants identify no “exceptionally arcane” feature of Massachusetts law
defying comprehension by the Court. See Dkt. 20; id. Thus, this factor is neutral.
The conflict-of-laws factor is neutral.
As the parties agree, this factor is neutral because there is no question that
Massachusetts law applies to this dispute. See Dkts. 18, at 27; 20, at 26.
* 	* 	*
5 Parus does not seriously dispute that Massachusetts law applies. See Dkt. 20, at 26 (stating
that “[a]ssuming arguendo that Massachusetts substantive law governs Parus’s negligence
claims, this federal court sitting in diversity is certainly capable of applying Massachusetts
tort law”). Instead, it states that the Court is familiar with the law applying to the underlying
infringement cases. Id. Of course, patent-infringement standards do not apply to state
negligence claims. Absent any evidence or argument to the contrary, the undersigned treats
Parus’s argument as accepting that Massachusetts law applies.
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In sum, the undersigned finds (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof
favors transfer; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses slightly favors transfer; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses
favors transfer; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious 	and 	inexpensive 	favor 	transfer. 	Further, 	(1) 	the 	administrative
difficulties flowing from court congestion slightly favor transfer; (2) the local interest
in having localized interests decided at home favors transfer; (3) the familiarity of the
forum with the law that will govern the case is neutral; and (4) the avoidance of
unnecessary 	problems 	of 	conflict 	of 	laws 	of 	the 	application 	of 	foreign 	law 	is
neutral. Because all the factors favor or are neutral with respect to transfer, the
undersigned concludes Defendants have clearly demonstrated transfer is appropriate
here. Bruck, 30 F.4th at 433. Thus, the undersigned will recommend that the District
Judge grant Defendants’ motion.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the above discussion, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that the District Judge GRANT Defendants’ motion to transfer, Dkt. 18, and direct
the Clerk of the Court to transfer this case to the District of Massachusetts.
V. 	WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this report and recommendation. A party
filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to
which objections are being made. The District Judge need not consider frivolous,
conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d
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419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen days after the
party is served with a copy of the report shall bar that party from de novo review by
the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations in the report and,
except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of
unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District
Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985);
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED April 8, 2026.
DUSTIN M. HOWELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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