Teo-Tenas v. Hyde et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
JAIME TEO-TENAS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
) 	Civil Action No.
v. 	) 	26-10334-FDS
)
PATRICIA HYDE, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SAYLOR, J.
This is a habeas petition that concerns the government’s authority to hold a non-citizen
pending removal proceedings. Petitioner Jaime Estuardo Teo-Tenas is a Guatemalan national
who entered the United States in 2005.
On January 21, 2026, petitioner was arrested and taken into ICE custody, apparently
pursuant to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). He contends that his
continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his procedural due-process
right and is not authorized by statute.
To be clear, this Court is without the authority to determine whether petitioner should be
removed from the United States; that is a matter for the immigration courts. Nonetheless, and for
the reasons that follow, the Court agrees that petitioner is being detained without lawful
authority, and therefore will order that he be granted a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.
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I. 	Background
Jaime Estuardo Teo-Tenas, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States in 2005, and
has resided in the United States since that time. (Pet. ¶ 1).
ICE took Teo-Tenas into custody on January 21, 2026. (Id. ¶ 2). He filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on January 24, 2026. (Id.). At the time he filed the petition, he was
detained at the ICE Field Office in Burlington, Massachusetts. (Id.).
The respondents are Patricia Hyde, Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
Kristi Noem, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9).
On January 25, 2026, Teo-Tenas moved for a temporary restraining order, asserting that,
after he had filed his petition on January 24, ICE transferred him out of the District of
Massachusetts to the Alexandria Staging Facility in Louisiana. (TRO Mot. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 2).
Also on January 25, 2026, Judge Joun ordered that “[r]espondents shall immediately return Mr.
Teo-Tenas to the District of Massachusetts,” and that they “shall not remove [Teo-Tenas] from
the jurisdiction of the United States or transfer [him] to a judicial district outside that of
Massachusetts for a period of at least 72 hours from the time this Order is docketed.” (Dkt. No.
3).
On January 26, 2026, Teo-Tenas filed an “Emergency Motion to Enforce the Court’s
1/25/2026 Order,” contending that, despite the Court’s earlier order that he be returned to the
District of Massachusetts, he was scheduled to be removed from the United States at
approximately 3:00 a.m. in the morning of January 27. (Emergency Mot. 1-2, Dkt. No. 7). Also
on January 26, 2026, Judge Joun ordered that “[r]espondents are ENJOINED from removing
[Teo-Tenas] from the United States and are ORDERED to immediately comply with the
previous order entered on 1/25/26. Further, [r]espondents shall file forthwith a sworn declaration
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from a responsible ICE official identifying (a) [Teo-Tenas’s] current physical location, (b) his
immediate custodian, (c) his A-Number and any changes thereto, (d) whether removal has been
scheduled, initiated, or is imminent, and (e) the concrete steps taken to comply with the Courts
1/25/26 Order.” (Dkt. No. 8).
On January 27, 2026, respondents responded to the court’s order. (Resp. 3-4, Dkt No.
10). They represented that they intended to return Teo-Tenas to the District of Massachusetts
immediately, but that travel disruptions related to a winter storm had caused delays. (Id. at 3-4).
After several additional delays, Teo-Tenas was finally returned to this District on February 4,
2026. (Status Report, Dkt. No. 14).
On February 11, 2026, respondents answered the petition. (Resp’ts’ Resp., Dkt. No. 16).
Respondents conceded that “the legal issues presented in this Petition are similar to those
recently addressed by this Court in De Andrade v. Moniz,” and that “[s]hould the Court follow its
reasoning in De Andrade . . . , it would reach the same result here.” (Id. at 1).
II. 	Analysis
For the reasons discussed in the Court’s decision in De Andrade v. Moniz, 2025 WL
2841844 (D. Mass. Oct. 7, 2025), and those of many other courts across the country, see
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (collecting
cases), non-citizens who initially entered the United States without inspection but have resided in
the country for a substantial period of time are subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a),
not mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Because petitioner has already entered and resides in
the United States, he is not an “applicant seeking admission” under § 1225, and his detention
under that provision is therefore “in violation of the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
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Petitioner is a member of the class certified in Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, because he is
detained in Massachusetts; was not placed in expedited removal proceedings; was neither
admitted nor paroled into the United States; is not subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c); is not subject to post-final order detention under § 1231; and his most recent arrest did
not occur at the border when he was arriving in the United States. See Guerrero Orellana v.
Moniz, 2025 WL 3687757, at *10 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025). It is unclear what precise effect the
declaratory judgment in that case has on this action; respondent Moniz was also a respondent in
Guerrero Orellana, so the judgment in that case very likely has collateral-estoppel effect here.
But the Court need not resolve that question for these purposes because it independently
determines that petitioner’s detention violates the INA.
Because petitioner can be held, if at all, only under § 1226(a), he is entitled to a hearing
at which the government must “either (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the
detainee] poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
[he] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021); see also
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (explaining that federal regulation requires that
§ 1226(a) detainees “receive bond hearings at the outset of detention” (citing 8 C.F.R.
§§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))). Therefore, and because respondents have not offered another
authority for petitioner’s detention, the Court will grant the petition and order respondents to
promptly provide petitioner with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons.
III. 	Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 is GRANTED. Respondents are hereby ORDERED to either release petitioner
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or provide him a constitutionally-adequate bond hearing pursuant to Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021) no later than February 25, 2026.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
F. Dennis Saylor IV
Dated: February 18, 2026 	United States District Judge
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