Brunelle v. Massachusetts Department of Children and Families et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUSAN C. BRUNELLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 1:25-cv-13465-JEK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KOBICK, J.
Plaintiff Susan Brunelle, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint alleging that the
defendants violated certain of her constitutional rights and those of her two minor children. Her
complaint includes requests for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
Brunelle also filed motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, for leave to file electronically,
to appoint counsel, and to waive the requirement of a security bond. For the reasons that follow,
the Court will deny these motions and dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), as required by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
BACKGROUND
The following facts, which are presumed true at this stage, are based on the allegations in
the complaint and exhibits attached to it, including documents from Brunelle’s state court
proceedings.1 See Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 126 F.4th 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2025).
1 This includes the: (1) Memorandum of Decision Re: Respondent Mother’s Motion for a New
Trial, Dec. 19, 2025, ECF 1-6 at 4-13; (2) Notice of Denial of Application for Further Appellate
Review, Apr. 17, 2025, id. at 15; (3) Juvenile Court Docket Report printed on Oct. 20, 2025
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I. 	Procedural History.
After a trial in October 2022, the Middlesex County Juvenile Court entered judgment
granting permanent custody of Brunelle’s two minor children to the Massachusetts Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”). ECF 1, at 2. On December 19, 2023, the court denied Brunelle’s
motion for a new trial. ECF 1-6, at 4-13. In June and July 2024, Brunelle and DCF, respectively,
filed motions for review and redetermination, which were granted. Id. at 44.
On February 13, 2025, the Appeals Court issued a decision upholding the Juvenile Court’s
judgment terminating Brunell’s parental rights. See Care & Prot. of Ravenna, 105 Mass. App. Ct.
1114 (2025) (Rule 23 decision); ECF 1-6, at 15 (referencing the Appeals Court decision). The
Appeals Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that sufficient evidence existed that Brunelle
was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in her children’s best interests, and it
rejected her assertion that her trial counsel was ineffective. See id. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme
Judicial Court denied Brunelle’s application for further appellate review. ECF 1-6, at 15.
Brunelle’s review and redetermination trial commenced on March 27, 2025. Id. at 44. The
trial lasted for six non-consecutive days and ended on April 25, 2025. Id. Brunelle acted as her
own attorney, with the assistance of standby counsel. Id. On May 2, 2025, the Juvenile Court
issued a decision committing both of Brunelle’s children to the custody of DCF until they reached
the age of 18, “or until in the option of [DCF], the goal of [their] commitment has been
accomplished.” Id. at 45. The court also found that “the best interest of [one child] would be best
served by the termination of parental rights of Susan Brunelle and [the child’s father],” and that
showing docket activity from Aug. 12, 2025 to Oct. 10, 2025, id. at 42; (4) Termination of Parental
Rights Decree, May 2, 2025, id. at 43; (5) Order and Decision on Motions for Review and
Redetermination, May 2, 2025, id. at 44-45; and (6) Juvenile Court Docket Report printed on Aug.
12, 2025 showing docket activity from Mar. 26, 2025 to Apr. 8, 2025, id. at 46.
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“the adoption plan prepared and propounded by [DCF] is in the best interest of [that child].” Id.
That same day, the court issued a decree terminating Brunelle’s parental rights for that child. Id.
at 43.
Brunelle did not timely appeal that decision. See id. at 52. On August 26, 2025, the Juvenile
Court denied Brunelle’s motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. at 42.
II. 	Factual Background.
In November 2025, Brunelle filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DCF, the
Massachusetts 	Juvenile 	Court 	Department, 	the 	Office 	of 	the 	Child 	Advocate, 	“Clerk
Magistrate/Clerk Staff” of the Lowell Juvenile Court, and other individuals. ECF 1, at 1. She
alleges that their misconduct resulted in court orders that placed her two minor children in the
permanent custody of DCF and terminated her parental rights to one of those children. Id. at 2-4.
The complaint asserts four claims. In Count I, which asserts a procedural due process claim,
Brunelle alleges that the judgment of the Juvenile Court “was procured through extrinsic fraud and
structural failure.” ECF 1, at 2. She further alleges that the “judgment was based on a two-pronged,
fabricated narrative,” consisting of the “willful suppression” of an exculpatory report regarding
her substance abuse and “reliance on insinuated physical abuse that was never legally substantiated
in the record.” Id. In Count II, Brunelle alleges that “[t]he state system actively worked to prevent
any legal remedy, culminating in an irrevocable deadlock.” Id. at 3. In Count III, which seeks
injunctive relief, Brunelle claims that DCF failed to inform her of harms inflicted on her children
while in DCF custody. Id. She further asserts that these harms were caused by the children’s
separation from her and by DCF’s deliberate indifference to the children’s placement with their
aunt, who was their kinship caregiver. Id. In Count IV, Brunelle alleges that the Juvenile Court has
a “custom of bias” and DCF has a “custom of retaliation.” Id. at 4.
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DISCUSSION
“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). A federal court’s “‘obligation
to inquire sua sponte into [its] jurisdiction over the matter’ exists in every case.” Fideicomiso De
La Tierra Del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Doyle v.
Huntress, Inc., 419 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Congress has given the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review “[f]inal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State” where the judgment in question
concerns federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). This jurisdiction is “exclusive” to the Supreme Court.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). “Accordingly, under what has come to be known as
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Id.; see D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). “The idea is that . . . the only federal
court with statutory jurisdiction to review a state court’s decision is the Supreme Court, and ‘an
aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do directly.’” Tyler
v. Supreme Jud. Ct. of Mass., 914 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction ‘only in the limited circumstances where the
losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining
of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that
judgment.’” Id. (quoting Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de
P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Brunelle’s
claims. The complaint, in effect, improperly asks this Court to review two final state court
judgments: (1) the first judgment terminating Brunelle’s parental rights, which was affirmed by
the Appeals Court in February 2025 decision and which the Supreme Judicial Court declined to
review, and (2) the Juvenile Court’s May 2025 decision after the review and redetermination trial,
which became final after Brunelle failed to timely appeal and that court denied her motion to
extend the appeal deadline. See Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d at 24 (for
purposes of applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “if a lower state court issues a judgment and
the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire, then the state proceedings have ended”). With
respect to the first judgment, Brunelle argues that the October 2022 trial record does not support
finding that she had substance use disorder and that her trial counsel withheld exculpatory
evidence. ECF 1, at 2-3. The Appeals Court rejected those arguments, holding that “the trial judge
properly found a nexus between [her] substance use and her parental unfitness” and that she “was
not prejudiced by her trial counsel’s performance.” Care & Prot. of Ravenna, 105 Mass. App. Ct.
1114. Brunelle similarly alleges that she was unable to “meaningful[ly] appeal” the second
judgment terminating her parental rights as to one of her children. ECF 1, at 3. But Brunelle was
provided an opportunity to appeal and declined to timely pursue it. Accordingly, Brunelle was
twice “the losing party in state court [and] filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended”; she is “complaining of . . . injur[ies] caused by the state-court judgment[s]”; and she is
“seeking review and rejection of th[ose] judgment[s].” Tyler, 914 F.3d at 50 (quotation marks
omitted). This case falls squarely into the category of cases that may not be heard by a federal
district court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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Brunelle protests that Rooker-Feldman does not bar this action because she asserts an
independent claim under Section 1983 “challenging the corruption of the state court process, not
the merits of the custody decision.” ECF 1-5, at 1. In her view, “[t]he constitutional injury is the
deliberate suppression of exculpatory” evidence by her “state actor” attorney in the October 2022
trial, “coupled with the subsequent ratification of that fraud” by the Juvenile Court. Id. This
argument is misplaced. As explained, the Appeals Court concluded that her attorney’s “decisions
were not manifestly unreasonable,” including the attorney’s “decision not to introduce a substance
use evaluation or to call for corresponding testimony” where, among other issues, “the evaluation
was stale by the time of trial” and “the evaluator did not consider extrinsic information or [her]
drug use.” Care & Prot. of Ravenna, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1114. It has therefore already adjudicated
that alleged injury.
Brunelle’s contention that she is simply challenging “the integrity of the process itself” is
also belied by her request for relief. ECF 1-5, at 1. Among other requests, Brunelle seeks “[a]n
immediate Order declaring the May 2, 2025 Termination of Parental Rights Order and all
subsequent [Termination of Parental Rights] decrees to be VOID ab initio (void from the
beginning) due to extrinsic fraud and structural due process failure.” Id. at 5. This request indicates
that she is improperly seeking to overturn a state court judgment. See Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d
53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Rooker-Feldman where plaintiffs, whose parental rights had been
terminated by a Maine court, sought a federal injunction preventing their child’s adoption); Mandel
v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 272 (1st Cir. 2003) (same where plaintiff raised a federal due
process challenge to state child custody enforcement proceedings because she “was formally a
party to the enforcement proceeding and was free to ask the state court to undo or revisit its
enforcement order” but not “to secure its effective invalidation by a federal judge”); Porter v.
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Maine Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 23-1908, 2024 WL 1953481, at *1 (1st Cir. Apr. 17,
2024) (same where plaintiff “sought reunification with her son after the Maine courts’ termination
of her parental rights”); Palange v. Forte, No. 21-1481, 2022 WL 2359627, at *1 (1st Cir. Apr. 7,
2022) (same where plaintiff “asserted various violations of his constitutional rights stemming from
a child custody and visitation case in Rhode Island Family Court”); Alwyn ex rel. Alwyn v. Duval,
26 F. App’x 17, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2001) (same where plaintiff sought to contradict a New Hampshire
court finding of parental neglect). Since this lawsuit effectively “seeks to invalidate [two]
antecedent state cour[t] judgments,” the Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2018).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	This action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).
2. 	The motions to appoint counsel, ECF 2, to waive the security bond, ECF 3, for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 5, and for leave to file electronically, ECF 6, are DENIED
as moot.
3. 	Because the complaint and all exhibits thereto contain the names of minor children,
unless otherwise ordered by the Court, remote electronic access to the complaint and all exhibits
shall be limited to court staff and the parties.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Julia E. Kobick
JULIA E. KOBICK
Dated: December 12, 2025 	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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