Community Economic Development Center of Southeastern Massachusetts et al v. Bessent et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CENTER OF
SOUTHEASTERN MASSACHUSETTS;
NATIONAL PARENTS UNION;
NATIONAL KOREAN AMERICAN
SERVICE AND EDUCATION
CONSORTIUM; UNDOCUBLACK
NETWORK, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
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Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-12822-IT
v. 	*
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SCOTT BESSENT, Acting Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service and Secretary
of the Treasury; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE; FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration; SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION; TODD M. LYONS,
Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; KRISTI L. NOEM,
Secretary of Homeland Security;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
February 5, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
This litigation concerns the sharing of taxpayer addresses by Defendants Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and Social Security Administration (“SSA”) with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Plaintiffs,
four community organizations with members based in Massachusetts and across the country,
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contend that Defendants have entered and implemented data sharing agreements that violate the
privacy protections of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, specifically 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and that this
agency action, inter alia, is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, et seq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 182–198 [Doc. No. 73].
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief under 5 U.S.C. §§ 705, 706 or, in the alternative, for
Preliminary Injunction [Doc. No. 27] seeks a stay or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction,
as to all Defendants. On January 27, 2026, the court denied the motion without prejudice as to
Defendants IRS, Department of Treasury, and Treasury Secretary Bessent (the “IRS
Defendants”), where a preliminary injunction limiting the IRS Defendants’ implementation of
data sharing agreements is in place through other litigation. Elec. Order [Doc. No. 72]; Ctr. for
Taxpayer Rights v. Internal Revenue Serv., 2025 WL 3257096, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2025);
see also Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights v. Internal Revenue Serv., 2025 WL 3251044, at *43 (D.D.C.
Nov. 21, 2025).1 The court also denied the motion without prejudice as to Defendants SSA and
SSA Commissioner Frank Bisignano, where the record before the court was not sufficient to
make a finding that sharing of tax information between SSA and ICE has or is likely to occur.
Elec. Order [Doc. No. 72].
The court now turns to Plaintiffs’ motion as to Defendants ICE, DHS, Secretary of DHS
Kristi Noem, and Acting Director of ICE Todd M. Lyons (the “ICE Defendants”) and, in
1 Pursuant to the D.C. district court’s Order, the IRS Defendants are now preliminarily enjoined
“from disclosing any return information, including taxpayer return information, to [DHS] or any
of its component agencies pursuant to [26 U.S.C.] Section 6103(i)(2), except in strict compliance
with the requirements of that Section, including that the recipients of the information be “officers
and employees of [the receiving] agency who are personally and directly engaged in” a relevant
nontax criminal investigation or proceeding and that the recipients will use the information
“solely for” that criminal investigation or proceeding. Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL
3257096, at *1 (alteration in original).
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particular, to Plaintiffs’ request for an order not only staying information sharing between the
agencies, but also enjoining the ICE Defendants and their agents “from inspecting, viewing,
using, copying, distributing, relying on or otherwise acting upon any return information”
obtained from the IRS, including “relying on such information in any way for the purposes of
identifying, locating, arresting, detaining, or deporting any person.” See Proposed Order 1–2
[Doc. No. 35-1]. For the reasons that follow, as to the ICE Defendants, Plaintiffs’ Motion [Doc.
No. 27] is GRANTED.
I. 	Background
All U.S. income-earners must report and pay taxes on their income, regardless of
citizenship status. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2(d), 871. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.,
sets forth the tax-filing process.
A. 	Section 6103
1. 	Overview
The Internal Revenue Code provides strong privacy protections for information submitted
by taxpayers and/or obtained by the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103. In response to prior uses of
taxpayer information for improper purposes, Congress amended Section 6103 through the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, “to protect the privacy of tax return information and to regulate in minute
detail the disclosure of this material.” Lake v. Rubin, 162 F.3d 113, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see
Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *3 (describing the history of the Tax Reform
Act, “passed in the wake of Watergate[.]”) (quoting Tax Analysts v. I.R.S., 117 F.3d 607, 611
(D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Church of Scientology of California v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987)
(“One of the major purposes in revising § 6103 was to tighten the restrictions on the use of return
information by entities other than [the IRS].”).
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As a general rule, “[r]eturn and return information shall be confidential[.]” 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103(a). As the accompanying Senate Report noted, “returns and return information should
generally be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited
situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103.” S. R EP . NO. 94–938, at 318 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3747.
Congress defined “return” and “return information” subject to the confidentiality
restrictions very broadly. A “return” is “any tax or information return, declaration of estimated
tax, or claim for refund . . . filed with the [IRS] by, or on behalf of, or with respect to any
person[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1). The statute defines “return information” as “a taxpayer’s
identity, the nature, source, or amount of [] income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions,
credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or
tax payments,” and “any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or
collected by the [IRS]” with respect to a return or the determination of a tax, penalty or fine; as
well as any written determinations, background documents, and agreements with the taxpayer.
Id. § 6103(b)(2). “Taxpayer identity” is defined, in turn, as “the name of a person with respect to
whom a return is filed, his mailing address, his taxpayer identifying number (as described in
[S]ection 6109), or a combination thereof.” Id. § 6103(b)(6). The “taxpayer identifying number”
is the taxpayer’s Social Security Number (“SSN”), id. § 6109(a), or for taxpayers without an
SSN, the Individual Tax Identification Number (“ITIN”) assigned by the IRS, id. §§ 6109(d), (i).
Congress carefully delineated certain exceptions to Section 6103’s general rule of
confidentiality. Exceptions set forth in Section 6103(i) providing for limited disclosure by the
IRS in connection with non-tax criminal matters are at issue here. Also at issue are restrictions
on the use by the recipients of the disclosed information found in Sections 6103(i) and (p).
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2. 	Section 6103(i) – IRS Disclosure of Records in Non-Tax Criminal Matters
Section 6103(i) allows for limited disclosure of confidential tax information in
connection with federal non-tax criminal matters. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i). Reflecting Congress’
policy objective of confidentiality, Section 6103(i) provides for disclosure of returns and return
information in connection with non-tax criminal matters only when constrained by significant
procedural safeguards. As explained in the IRS’ Internal Revenue Manual, in enacting Section
6103(i), “Congress decided that federal law enforcement officials should not have easier access
to information about a taxpayer maintained by the IRS than they would have if they sought to
compel the production of that information from the taxpayer themselves.” IRM § 11.3.28.1.1(1)
(Apr. 17, 2025).
The different subsections of Section 6103(i) provide different schemes, with varying
procedures required for disclosure, depending on the type and source of information sought, the
purpose for which federal employees and officers intend to use the information, and the stage of
the criminal proceeding.
Three subsections of Section 6103(i) are relevant here. The first two subsections address
obtaining information in connection with “criminal investigations.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(i)(1), (2).
Under both subsections (i)(1) and (i)(2), if other requirements are met, the IRS may disclose
certain information to federal officers and employees “personally and directly engaged in” (1)
preparing for a judicial or administrative criminal, but non-tax related, proceeding; (2) an
investigation that may result in such a proceeding; or (3) a grand jury proceeding regarding a
criminal, but non-tax, violation. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(i)(1)(A), (2)(A). Under both subsections, the
information sought must be “solely for the use of such officers and employees in such
preparation, investigation, or grand jury proceeding.” Id. §§ 6103(i)(1)(A), (2)(A). These two
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subsections differ significantly based on the source of the return information: more stringent
protections apply to information that includes “taxpayer return information[,]” that is, “return
information” filed by or on behalf of the taxpayer to whom the return information relates, 26
U.S.C. § 6103(b)(3), than to return information created by the IRS2 or sourced from a third-
party.3 See IRM § 11.3.28.1.1(3) (“IRC [§] 6103(i) is the only code section where it may be
necessary to distinguish between taxpayer return information and return information (other than
taxpayer return information).”).
Under the first subsection, if the information sought by the federal officers and
employees personally involved in the criminal investigation includes taxpayer return
information, a court order is required to permit the IRS to disclose the information. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103(i)(1)(A); see IRM § 11.3.28.1.1(1) (in general, “a federal agency enforcing a non-tax
criminal law must obtain court approval to obtain a return or return information submitted by the
taxpayer or their representative.”). The court may only authorize the IRS’ disclosure of taxpayer
return information if: (1) “there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon information believed
to be reliable, that a specific criminal act has been committed,” (2) “there is reasonable cause to
believe that the return or return information is or may be relevant to a matter relating to the
commission” of the criminal act, and (3) “the return or return information is sought exclusively
for use in a criminal investigation or proceeding . . . and the information sought to be disclosed
cannot reasonably be obtained . . . from another source.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i)–(iii)
(emphasis added).
2 E.g., an agreement to finalize taxpayer liability. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(D).
3 E.g., financial documents seized from a taxpayer during a raid and sent by the police to the IRS.
IRM § 11.3.28.1.5.2(3) (Apr. 17, 2025).
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Under the second subsection, the IRS may “disclose return information (other than
taxpayer return information)” to the federal officers and employees personally involved in the
criminal investigation without a court order. Id. § 6103(i)(2). For the IRS to disclose return
information under this provision, either the head or inspector general of an agency (or certain
other enumerated officers) must submit a written request to the IRS for “return information other
than taxpayer return information.” Id. § 6103(i)(2)(A) (parentheses omitted). The request must
meet specific requirements. Id.
First, the written request must identify the agency employee who is “personally and
directly engaged in” the criminal investigation described in subsection 6103(i)(1)(A). Id.
Second, the written request must include:
(i) 	the name and address of the taxpayer with respect to whom the requested
information relates;
(ii) the taxable period or periods to which return information relates;
(iii) the statutory authority under which the proceeding or investigation . . . is being
conducted; and
(iv) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to
such proceeding or investigation.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B).
Subsection 6103(i)(2) provides that “[f]or purposes of this paragraph, a taxpayer’s
identity shall not be treated as taxpayer return information.” Id. § 6103(i)(2)(C). The “taxpayer’s
identity,” including the taxpayer’s address, is still protected, however, as “return information.”
Id. § 6103(b)(2).
The third relevant subsection of Section 6103(i) allows for disclosure following a
criminal investigation resulting in an arrest warrant where the return or return information is
sought to “locate fugitives from justice.” Id. § 6103(i)(5). Under this subsection, an application
must be made to the court, to allow disclosure to federal officers and employees “exclusively for
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use in locating such individuals,” id. § 6103(i)(5)(A). The court may grant the application if the
applicant can show that:
(i) 	a Federal arrest warrant relating to the commission of a Federal felony offense
has been issued for an individual who is a fugitive from justice,
(ii) the return of such individual or return information with respect to such
individual is sought exclusively for use in locating such individual, and
(iii) there is reasonable cause to believe that such return or return information may
be relevant in determining the location of such individual.
Id. § 6103(i)(5)(B).
3. Section 6103 – Use and Protection of Tax Information Disclosed by the IRS
Section 6103 provides that “no officer or employee of the United States” may disclose
“return or return information obtained by him” except as authorized under the Internal Revenue
Code. Id. § 6103(a)(1). The statute does not merely apply to IRS employees, instead, it forbids
any officers and employees of the United States who obtain this information from making an
impermissible disclosure. Id. § 6109(a)(1). As noted above, under both subsections 6103(i)(1)
and (2), the information sought for preparing for a judicial or administrative criminal proceeding;
an investigation that may result in a criminal proceeding; or a grand jury proceeding regarding a
non-tax criminal violation, must be “solely for the use of such officers and employees in such
preparation, investigation, or grand jury proceeding.” Id. §§ 6103(i)(1)(A), (2)(A). Subsection
6103(i)(5), which provides for disclosure for the purpose of locating an individual, is similarly
limited to federal officers and employees’ use for that specified purpose.4
4 None of the three subsections discussed permits further disclosure to State and local law
enforcement agencies. In contrast, subsection 6103(i)(3)(B)(i), which deals with emergency
circumstances involving an imminent danger of death or physical injury; subsection
6103(i)(1)(C), which deals with missing children; and subsection 6103(i)(7), which deals with
terrorist activities, include provisions for disclosure to state or local enforcement officers and
employees personally and directly engaged in the investigation as part of a team with federal law
enforcement. Subsections 6103(a)(2) and (3) provide further that officers and employees of any
state or local law enforcement agency who have access to returns or return information under
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Section 6103(p), in turn, provides that any federal agency obtaining records under these
three (and other provisions) must, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, (1) maintain a permanent
system of standardized records, including any disclosures of return or return information made
by the agency; (2) establish a secure area or place in which such returns or return information is
stored; (3) “restrict . . . access to the returns or return information only to persons whose duties
or responsibilities require access and to whom disclosure may be made under the provisions of
this title[;]” (4) provide other safeguards as necessary to protect the confidentiality of the returns
or return information; and (5) and upon completion of the use of the returns or return
information, return them (and all copies) to the Secretary or otherwise make the records
undisclosable. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(p)(4).
B. 	IRS Policy Regarding Disclosure of Addresses Prior to the Events at Issue here
Prior to the events at issue here, the IRS’s stated policy was to reject address-only
requests for confidential tax information pursuant to Section 6103(i)(2). IRM § 11.3.28
(“Material Changes”) (2025), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part11/irm_11-003-028 (last visited Feb.
4, 2026) (Prior to April 17, 2025, the Manual stated “requests for addresses only cannot be
honored because IRC § 6103(i)(2) requires that the requester provide an address.”).
The IRS’s construction was consistent with the White House Office of General Counsel’s
statement at the time of the 1982 amendment, which had added the provision “[f]or purposes of
this paragraph, a taxpayer’s identity shall not be treated as taxpayer return information” to
subsection 6103(i)(2). 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(C). In explaining this amendment, the White
House Office of General Counsel noted that Congress had:
specific subsections of Section 6103 are also prohibited from disclosing such information. See
id. §§ 6103(i)(3)(B)(i), 6103(i)(1)(C)(i), 6103(i)(7)(A)(ii).
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recognized that if [the IRS] was to respond to a written request for information
which was not furnished by or on behalf of the taxpayer, it could not as a practical
matter transmit the information without providing the name and address of the
requested individual. Since the ultimate source of the name and address would have
been the taxpayer’s return, a technical argument existed that [the IRS] could not
provide the information without an ex parte court order. This would, of course,
have completely negated the purpose and operation of the written request provision.
As a result, section 6103(i)(2) was amended so that if [the IRS] received a proper
written request, it could disclose name and address information under the same
circumstances that it could disclose other information which was not received from
or on behalf of the taxpayer.
See Mem. from Fred F. Fielding, Couns. to the President, for Craig L. Fuller, White House
Cabinet Sec’y (Aug. 6, 1982), at 1 (emphasis added). In other words, the purpose of the
language, as stated by then-White House Counsel, was to ensure that, if an agency submitted a
proper request for information not furnished by or on behalf of the taxpayer under Section
6103(i)(2), the information that was not furnished by or on behalf of the taxpayer could be
disclosed even though it contained the taxpayer’s name and address. By this reading, an address-
only request falls outside the ambit of subsection 6103(i)(2) because it does not seek information
obtained from a non-taxpayer source that might also contain the taxpayer’s name and address.
The IRS’s stated policy that addresses alone would not be provided under Section
6103(i)(2) was also consistent with another subsection, which sets forth the requirement of a
court order for law enforcement agencies to obtain addresses when seeking to locate fugitives.
See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(5)(B).
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C. 	IRS Data-Sharing with ICE as Set Forth in the Administrative Record5
1. 	ICE’s Initial Request to Locate Noncitizen Taxpayers
As a component of President Trump’s immigration policy agenda,6 on February 18,
2025, ICE requested that the IRS “assist[] in an ICE led effort to locate approximately 700,000
individuals who are all under Final Orders of Removal.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. A, at TD_0000001
(“Admin. Record”) [Doc. 39-1]. As noted, at the time, the IRS’s stated policy was to reject
address-only requests under Section 6103(i)(2). See supra Section I.B.
2. 	IRS April 7, 2025 Memorandum of Understanding
Following negotiation between the agencies (and the departure of some IRS employees),
see Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *3–6 (describing interactions between
officials at the IRS and ICE during Spring 2025), on April 7, 2025, the IRS and ICE entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding (the “IRS-ICE MOU”) regarding the sharing of tax
information across agencies to implement President Trump’s direction that DHS “take
immediate steps to identify, exclude, or remove aliens illegally present in the United States.”
Am. Compl., Ex. A, at ECF 3 (“IRS-ICE MOU”) [Doc. No. 73-1]. The IRS-ICE MOU explained
that DHS “has identified numerous aliens illegally present in the United States . . . under final
orders to remove them from the United States[.]” Id.
Further, DHS asserted that “each of the above-referenced individuals is under criminal
investigation for violations of one or more” federal criminal statutes, “including 8 U.S.C.
5 Defendants state that “Plaintiffs import limited portions of the Administrative Record [“AR”]
in Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 1:25-cv-00457-CKK (D.D.C. 2025), into this case[,]”
and that “[f]or completeness, Defendants [have] provide[d] more of that AR (i.e., all but the
‘authorities’ portion thereof) as Exhibit A [Doc. No. 39-1].” See Defs.’ Opp’n 3 n.1 [Doc. 39].
The court cites to the AR, as submitted by the Defendants.
6 See Exec. Order No. 14,161, Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other
National Security and Public Safety Threats, 90 Fed. Reg. 8451 (Jan. 20, 2025).
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§ 1253(a)(1)[.]” Id. The cited immigration statute subjects a noncitizen who “willfully fails or
refuses to depart from the United States within a period of 90 days from the date of the final
order of removal under administrative processes, or if judicial review is had, then from the date
of the final order of the court” to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The MOU described its purpose “to establish the procedures and requirements for ICE’s
submission of valid IRC § 6103(i)(2) requests for addresses of persons subject to criminal
investigation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) or other specifically designated nontax Federal
criminal statutes.” IRS-ICE MOU, at ECF 4 [Doc. No. 73-1] (emphasis added).
The IRS-ICE MOU provided an overview for the “duties and responsibilities” of both the
IRS and ICE. Id. at ECF 4–5. Under the MOU, ICE stated its intent to “[s]end requests [7] for
address information for specifically identified individuals . . . consistent with IRC [26 U.S.C.
§] 6103(i)(2)(A).” Id. at ECF 5. As specified by the MOU, the requests must include:
1. The name and address of the taxpayer.
2. The taxable period or periods as to which the return information (address) they
are seeking relates.
3. The specifically designated nontax Federal criminal statute (i.e., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(a)(1) or other specifically designated nontax Federal criminal statute)
under which an investigation or proceeding regarding the individual is being
conducted.
4. The date of the final order of removal and the related case number assigned to
each such order.
5. The specific reason or reasons why disclosure is, or may be, relevant to the
nontax criminal investigation or proceeding. Any other information ICE can
provide to help the IRS identify each individual, such as SSNs, ITINs, etc.
6. Identity information for the ICE officers and employees personally and directly
engaged in the nontax criminal investigation that may result in criminal charges
7 ICE committed in the MOU to sending as part of ICE’s request the following identification
information: “CVID [e.g., SSN or ITIN]; [Alien Registration] Number; First, Middle and Last
Name; Address Information; Date of Birth; Country of Citizenship; FBI Numbers; and
Fingerprint Identification Number[.]” IRS-ICE MOU, at ECF 7 [Doc. No. 73-1].
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against the individual under the specifically designated Federal criminal statute
ICE has identified.
Id. The IRS-ICE MOU specified that the request must attest that “the requested address
information will only be used by officers and employees of ICE solely for the preparation for
judicial or administrative proceedings, or investigation that may lead to such proceedings,
pertaining to the enforcement of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), other specifically designated Federal
criminal statute, or any subsequent criminal proceedings[,]” and that “[r]eturn information
disclosed . . . shall be open to inspection by or disclosure to ICE officers and employees
personally and directly engaged in, and for their necessary use in, proceedings and investigations
that may result in such proceedings, pertaining to the enforcement of a specifically designated
nontax Federal criminal statute.” Id.
Under the IRS-ICE MOU, the IRS agreed to screen ICE’s request for “completeness and
validity[,] and return to ICE any requests” not compliant with subsection 6103(i)(2). Id. at ECF
4. Should the IRS find a request to be legally sufficient, the IRS committed to “[s]earch for the
last known address for each individual in each request.” Id. Further, for “each individual the IRS
is able to identify from the information provided by ICE, [the IRS agreed to] provide the IRS last
known address for that individual [to ICE].” Id. If the IRS is unable to identify an individual
based on the information ICE provided in its legally sufficient request, the IRS agreed to
communicate to ICE that the IRS was unable to “identify [a taxpayer] from the information
provided by ICE.” Id.
On April 17, 2025, the IRS removed from its Manual its former policy to reject address-
only requests for confidential tax information pursuant to § 6103(i)(2). IRM § 11.3.28 (2025)
(“Material Changes”), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part11/irm_11-003-028 (last visited Feb. 4,
2026).
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3. ICE and IRS Implementing Agreement
On April 18, 2025, the IRS and ICE entered into an Implementing Agreement for the
IRS-ICE MOU. See Am. Compl. Ex. B (“ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement”) [Doc. No. 73-2].
Pursuant to the Agreement, the IRS agreed to disclose information requested from six Systems of
Records to ICE: Treasury/IRS 22.060 Automated Non-Master File, 80 FR 54064 (Sept. 8, 2015);
Treasury/IRS 34.037 IRS Audit Trail and Security Records System, 80 FR 54064 (Sept. 8,
2015); Treasury/IRS 24.030 Customer Account Data Engine Individual Master File, 80 FR
54064 (Sept. 8, 2015); Treasury/IRS 24.046 Customer Account Data Engine Business Master
File, 80 FR 54064 (Sept. 8, 2015); Treasury/IRS 22.061 Individual Return Master File, 80 FR
54064 (Sept. 8, 2015); and Treasury/IRS 42.008 Audit Information Management System, 80 FR
54064 (Sept. 8, 2015). ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement, at ECF 3 [Doc. No. 73-2].
The Implementing Agreement states further that the information provided by the IRS
would be maintained by ICE in the following Systems of Records: Alien File, Index, and
National File Tracking, 82 F.R. 43556, (Sep. 18, 2017); External Investigations, 85 F.R. 74362
(Nov. 20, 2020); and Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records
(CARIER), 89 F.R. 55638 (Jul. 5, 2024). ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement, at ECF 4 [Doc. No.
73-2].
4. ICE and IRS Implementation of the IRS-ICE MOU
On June 5, 2025, ICE sent a request to the IRS for address information for “the full alien
population” of 7,615,279 individuals. See Admin. Record, at TD_0000086 [Doc. No. 39-1]. ICE
explained that a name was associated with each request “but there may not always be an address
available[.]” Id. at TD-0000084. ICE stated that it did not indicate a taxable period because ICE
did “not specifically know the tax filing status of any of these individuals.” Id. ICE further
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explained that “[t]he request is to enrich the data with relevant address data so the most recent
address that IRS can identify associated with any of the individuals would be the primary goal.”
Id. As to the nontax criminal statute relevant to an active investigation or proceeding, ICE wrote
“8 USC [§] 1325 – Improper entry by alien[.]” This request was rejected by the IRS on June 7,
2025. Id. at TD_0000083.
On June 24, 2025, ICE sent a second request for approximately 7.3 million records. Id. at
TD–0000093. This request was also found “deficient” by IRS personnel, where it excluded four
significant components, namely: “[a] written request from the head of Federal agency”; “[t]he
specific reason or reasons why disclosure is, or may be, relevant to the nontax criminal
investigation or proceeding”; “[i]dentity information for the ICE officers and employees
personally and directly engaged in the nontax criminal investigation that may result in criminal
charges against the individual under the specifically designated Federal criminal statute ICE has
identified”; and “[a]ttestation for each request - stating the requested address information will
only be used by officers and employees of ICE solely for the preparation for judicial or
administrative proceedings, or investigation that may lead to such proceedings.” Id. IRS
personnel explained that the requirements set forth in the IRS-ICE MOU were “derived from
[S]ection 6103(i)(2)[].” Id.
On June 27, 2025, ICE sent a third request for approximately 1.2 million individuals to
the IRS. Id. at TD_0000107–108, 112. This second submission was reviewed by the IRS and
determined to substantially comply with the requirements laid out in 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2), id.
at TD_0000108, despite various deficiencies discussed below. After screening out those
taxpayers who had not overstayed a Final Order of Removal by over ninety days, and, therefore,
could not have violated 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), the IRS identified “match[ing]” records for
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roughly 47,000 noncitizen taxpayers and disclosed those individuals’ address information to ICE
on August 7, 2025. Id. at TD_0000143–146.
D. 	Litigation in the D.C. District Court
Following the implementation of the IRS-ICE MOU, a different group of plaintiffs
moved for injunctive relief against the IRS, Department of Treasury, and Secretary Bessent in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025
WL 3251044.
In a detailed opinion, the Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights court found that the implementation of
the IRS-ICE MOU, i.e. IRS’ disclosure of 47,000 taxpayer addresses to ICE, constituted
arbitrary and capricious final agency action. Id. at *29. The D.C. district court found that the IRS
violated the Internal Revenue Code’s requirement that confidential taxpayer information be
disclosed only to Federal agency officers and employees “personally and directly engaged in” in
a criminal investigation. Id. at *22, 29 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A)). The court found a
further violation in IRS’ disclosure of taxpayer addresses to ICE “[w]ithout first confirming that
an address provided by ICE matched an address the IRS had in its system.” Id. at *26 (citing 26
U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(i)). The court also found that IRS’ implementation of the IRS-ICE MOU
failed to comport with Congress’ purpose in enacting Section 6103(i)(2), i.e. to permit federal
employees, engaged in the non-tax criminal investigations or proceedings, to have access to
“return information other than taxpayer return information” for the limited purpose of assisting
in those criminal investigations or proceedings. Id. at *28–29. The court pointed out that ICE’s
third amended request to the IRS on June 27, 2025, failed to adequately set forth the “specific,
individualized reason” for which the taxpayer address information was relevant. Id. at *28 (citing
26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv)). Finally, the court determined that ICE’s June 27, 2025 request
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failed to include “the taxable period or periods” to which the requested taxpayer information
related. Id. at *29 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii)). The court found that the IRS’ disclosure,
despite these enumerated violations of Section 6103(i)(2), violated the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044 at *29. Additionally, the court
determined that the IRS’ disclosure of taxpayer addresses to ICE was a significant policy change,
for which the agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation, and was therefore arbitrary and
capricious. Id. at *30–31.
The Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights court granted Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary relief and
(1) stayed IRS’ policy to disclose address information pursuant to the terms of the IRS-ICE
MOU; and (2) preliminarily enjoined the IRS from disclosing “any return information, including
taxpayer information” to DHS and ICE, “except in strict compliance” with Section 6103(i)(2).
See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3257096, at *1. The court ordered further that
on or before November 24, 2025, Defendant Bessent, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Treasury, or his designee, shall notify Secretary Kristi Noem, in
her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and Todd M. Lyons, in his
official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE,
that, consistent with Section 6103(p)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, Defendant
Bessent or his designee, in furtherance of his responsibilities under the Internal
Revenue Code, shall require that ICE will:
1. “restrict . . . access to the returns or return information” disclosed on August
7, 2025, “only to persons whose duties and responsibilities require access and
to whom disclosure may be made” consistent with the requirements of Section
6103(i)(2), including the requirement that such persons be “personally and
directly engaged” in a relevant nontax criminal investigation or proceeding and
that the information be used “solely for” such investigation or proceeding, see
26 U.S.C. § 6103(p)(4)(C); (i)(2)(A); and
2. “upon completion of use of” the confidential return information received
from the IRS on August 7, 2025, cause that information to be “return[ed] to the
Secretary” or his designee or otherwise made “undisclosable,” see id.
§ 6103(p)(4)(F).
Id. at *2.
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On January 5, 2026, the government appealed the D.C. district court’s order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights v. Internal Revenue
Serv., No. 26-05006 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2026). The D.C. district court subsequently stayed
proceedings, but the injunction remains in effect pending the outcome of the D.C. Circuit’s
decision. See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, No. 1:25-cv-00457-CKK, ECF No. 65 (Jan. 21, 2026).
E. 	Further Information as to ICE’s Use of Return Information
In addition to the Administrative Record produced in the Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights
litigation, Defendants here have provided two declarations from ICE regarding ICE’s operations
generally and its use of the return information. First, Brian McShane, the Acting Assistant
Director of the Enforcement Division within ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations
(“ERO”) component, describes various functions performed by units within ERO to “identif[y],
investigate[], and arrest[] aliens subject to removal from the United States.” Opp’n, Ex. C ¶ 2
(“McShane Decl.”) [Doc. No. 39-3]. According to the McShane Declaration, within ERO, “[t]he
Criminal Alien Program focuses on strategic planning and policy development to enhance ICE’s
ability to apprehend and remove criminal aliens and supports ERO field offices in enforcing
violations of the United States Criminal Code against criminal offenders, in conjunction with the
United States Attorney’s Office.” Id.
The Declaration states that “ERO’s focus on criminal prosecutions . . . is typically
performed by a specialized unit called ERO Criminal Prosecution (ECP) team,” and asserts that
“[t]hese teams initiate prosecution of crimes under Title 8 and Title 18 of the United States Code
and execute criminal arrest warrants.” Id. The Declaration describes further how the “Targeting
Operations” component consists of three centers that “leverage technical capabilities, analytical
tools, and law enforcement expertise to produce intelligence-driven leads on aliens subject to
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removal.” Id. The Declaration also describes how individual investigating officers collect
information for 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (willful overstay of a final order of removal) investigations and
that the officers will only present the case to a United States Attorney’s Office for a
determination of whether the case would be accepted or declined for prosecution after
establishing that sufficient evidence exists to establish the elements of the criminal offence being
charged. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. If insufficient for a criminal prosecution, the officers will bring civil
enforcement actions, e.g. detention and removal. Id. ¶ 8.
In a second declaration,8 Richard Fitzgerald, the Assistant Director for Cyber and
Operational Technology for Homeland Security Investigations in DHS, states that the
information received from the IRS was compared against “the list of 1.2 million individuals with
final removal orders[.]” Defs.’ Notice, Ex. B ¶ 5 (“Fitzgerald Decl.”) [Doc. No. 51-2]. According
to the Fitzgerald Declaration, ICE “identified approximately 33,000 updated addresses” and on
August 7, 2025, “made the data available to the Enforcement Removal Operations, Law
Enforcement Systems and Analysis Team.” Id.9 The Declaration states further that the IRS data
“has not been populated into any database covered by the Systems of Records” identified in the
Implementation Agreement. Id. ¶ 6; see supra Section I.C.3. Instead, “[t]he IRS data is currently
residing on the [Homeland Security Investigations] lead architect’s government-issued
8 In response to concerns raised by the court during the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, Defendants submitted the Fitzgerald Declaration and a declaration on
behalf of SSA regarding the sourcing, storage, use, and access of confidential taxpayer
information by ICE and SSA, respectively. See Defs.’ Notice [Doc. No. 51].
9 Defendants have not explained how the Enforcement Removal Operations, Law Enforcement
Systems and Analysis Team fits within the units and support centers detailed in the first
declaration. See McShane Decl. ¶ 2 [Doc. No. 39-3]. However, no ERO component described by
the McShane Declaration as conducting a criminal investigation is titled the “Law Enforcement
Systems and Analysis Team.” Id.
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computer.” Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 6 [Doc. No. 51-2]. The Declaration states that “[a]t this juncture,
only the lead architect [10] has access to the IRS data.” Id.
The Declaration provides further that “[t]he lead architect is responsible for transferring
data between the operators and other stakeholders[,] and that “when the IRS data is to be
integrated into databases covered by the Systems of Records, ICE will collaborate closely with
the developers to ensure that the IRS data is properly tagged and identified as IRS data, marked
restricted, and designated for use in criminal investigations.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
F. 	The Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs are four community organizations that “advocate for immigrants’ rights and
support members with tax, legal, and community-based services.” Pls.’ Mem. ISO Mot. for
Prelim Inj. 4 (“Pls.’ Mem.”) [Doc No. 35]. Community Economic Development Corp. (“CEDC”)
is a community-development organization based in New Bedford, Massachusetts, that works
with residents and businesses to develop and improve the local economy. Decl. of Corinn
Williams Executive Director, CEDC ¶¶ 2–3 (“CEDC Decl.”) [Doc. No. 31]. CEDC also provides
general community support to immigrant communities in New Bedford. Id. ¶¶ 10–18. Since
2004, CEDC has served as a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance site under the IRS’s Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance program, assisting its low- and moderate-income members, both citizens
and noncitizens, with tax filing. Id. ¶¶ 19-21. CEDC has assisted its noncitizen members with
filing their taxes in association with an ITIN. Id. ¶¶ 26–31.
The National Parents Union (“NPU”) is a nationwide organization advocating “to
improve K-12 education” and for the “equitable treatment of all families,” including advocating
10 The Fitzgerald Declaration [Doc. No. 51-2] does not provide the name or title of the “lead
architect” on whose computer the data resides and does not specify whether the lead architect is
an employee or officer of DHS or an outside contractor.
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for expanding the Child Tax Credit to immigrant families. Pls.’ Notice, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 4, 11 (“NPU
Decl.”) [Doc. No. 37]. NPU has multiple members who file their taxes, with assistance from
NPU, in association with an ITIN. Id. ¶¶ 14–18. The National Korean American Service and
Education Consortium (“NAKASEC”) is a national organization that advocates for Korean and
Asian Americans and immigrants. Decl. of Rebecca Belcore Co-Executive Director, National
Korean American Service & Education Consortium ¶ 1 (“NAKASEC Decl.”) [Doc. No. 33]. The
UndocuBlack Network (“UBN”) advances the rights and well-being of Black immigrant
communities. Decl. of Patrice Lawrence Executive Director, UndocuBlack Network ¶¶ 1-3
(“UBN Decl.”) [Doc. No. 34].
Plaintiffs assert that interagency sharing of tax information harms their immigrant
members, many of whom file their taxes because of or through the guidance of Plaintiffs. See
CEDC Decl. ¶¶ 26–31 [Doc. 31]; NAKASEC Decl. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 33] (To assist its members
with complying with tax-filing obligations, NAKASEC “created a bilingual English-[Korean]
guide” regarding ITINs, available on its website until the organization removed it recently);
UBN Decl. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 34]. One Plaintiff describes many of its members living in households
with family members of “mixed-[immigration] status.” NPU Decl. ¶ 6 [Doc. No. 37]. Further,
Plaintiffs explain that some members have SSNs as a component of their “deferred action”
status, under programs like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). NAKASEC
Decl. ¶¶ 7–8 [Doc. No. 33]; UBN Decl. ¶ 7 [Doc. No. 34]. When a noncitizen has “deferred
action status,” DHS may have issued an administratively final order of removal, however, that
removal is “deferred” indefinitely and the noncitizen is eligible for an employment authorization
document or work permit and social security card, through which they can file income taxes. See
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Decl. of Bill Ong Hing ¶¶ 9, 33, 46 (“Ong Hing Decl.”) [Doc. No. 29]; 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.21–36.25
(implementing the DACA policy).
Finally, Plaintiffs explain that for many immigrant communities, including their
members, specific surnames are common. See NAKASEC Decl. ¶ 16 [Doc. 33] (nearly half the
Korean American population shares one of three surnames and almost one quarter of Korean
Americans share surname “Kim”). Additionally, family and community members often share
home addresses and/or post office boxes or live in the same apartment complexes. See Pls.’
Mem. 11 n.8 [Doc. 35]; NAKASEC Decl. ¶¶ 16–17 [Doc. No. 33].
II. 	Standing
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Defs.’ Opp’n 5–6. [Doc. No.
39]. Defendants argue that Plaintiff CEDC lacks organizational standing because CEDC’s injury
is causally disconnected from the agency action at issue and that all four Plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries are either too generalized or too remote to provide Plaintiffs with standing. Id.
To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, an injury must be “concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). “At the preliminary injunction stage . . . the
plaintiff must make a clear showing that she is likely to establish each element of standing.”
Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024) (quotations omitted). To establish injury in fact, a
plaintiff must demonstrate “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quotations omitted). “The particularization element of the
injury-in-fact inquiry reflects the commonsense notion that the party asserting standing must not
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only allege injurious conduct attributable to the defendant but also must allege that he, himself, is
among the persons injured by that conduct.” Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724,
731–32 (1st Cir. 2016).
Regarding CEDC, Defendants first contend that “nothing about inter-agency data-sharing
remotely interferes with CEDC’s ability to conduct its operations, build trust, or associate with
its members.” Defs.’ Opp’n 5 [Doc. No. 39]. However, CEDC has alleged that the IRS’ abrupt
change in policy directly impacts CEDC’s ability to appropriately counsel its members regarding
their tax filing obligations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 149–58 [Doc. No. 73]. Previously, CEDC could
assure its citizen and noncitizen members that the confidentiality of their filings was protected by
law and policy. The IRS’s change in policy directly undermines CEDC’s credibility and
activities. CEDC not only cannot advise its members not to file tax returns (which would be
unlawful, contrary to CEDC’s purposes of providing tax filing assistance, and may undermine
noncitizen members’ opportunity to secure their immigration status) but also cannot encourage
the filing of tax returns that may result in ICE arresting and detaining them or their household
members. Id. ¶¶ 151–52. CEDC also has reported a decrease in membership and attendance
based on the chilling effect caused by IRS’ policy change. Id. ¶ 158. Finally, CEDC’s decreased
revenue, attributable to reduced tax return filings, comprises sufficient pecuniary injury, caused
by agency action to share taxpayer identity information with ICE, and potentially redressable by
this court’s order to cease such sharing. Id. ¶ 161.Regarding the four Plaintiffs’ associational
standing based on their members’ injuries, Defendants characterize these injuries as “hesitancy
to comply with the law [i.e. file a tax return].” Defs.’ Opp’n 6 [Doc. No. 39]. But the injuries
complained of differ significantly from the mere “[f]ulfill[ment] of a legal obligation.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ members—citizens and noncitizens—allege that they are at risk of arrest and detention
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due to administrative errors tied to similarities between names, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 162 [Doc. No.
73], and noncitizen members are at risk of arrest, detention, and even deportation, due to legal
error where ICE treats noncitizens as subject to criminal prosecution based on an
administratively final order of removal that is either still pending judicial review or subject to
deferred action, see Ong Hing Decl. ¶¶ 9, 46 [Doc. 29]; id. Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 29-1] (case involving
removal due to administrative error).
Further, given the breadth of ICE’s requests for taxpayer information, the likelihood that
noncitizen members’ information will be shared is high and the concomitant injury of that
disclosure is “particularized” to those members. Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir.
2020) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006)); see CEDC Decl.
¶¶ 48–50 [Doc. No. 31]; NPU Decl. ¶¶ 14–17 [Doc. No. 37]; NAKASEC Decl. ¶¶ 12–15 [Doc.
No. 33]; UBN Decl. ¶¶ 18–22 [Doc. No. 34]. Further, the IRS has already disclosed taxpayer
information to ICE and has committed to disclosing more information on a monthly or regular
basis. See Admin. Record, at TD_0000143 [Doc No. 39-1]. Significantly, ICE has already used
the information to identify “updated addresses” and intends to integrate the IRS data into its
various databases, albeit with a limiting designation. Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 5 [Doc. No. 51-2]. The
court finds the Plaintiffs’ injury is either likely to have already occurred or about to occur
“imminent[ly.]” See Lyman, 954 F.3d at 360 (quotations omitted); IRS-ICE MOU [Doc. No. 73-
1]; ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement [Doc. No. 73-2]. Therefore, CEDC has established
organizational standing, and all Plaintiffs have established associational standing, sufficient for
Article III and justiciability purposes. Accord Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at
*8–17 (finding both organizational and associational standing satisfied for plaintiffs with similar
missions and services).
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III. 	Preliminary Injunction
The issuance of a preliminary injunction before a trial on the merits can be held is an
“extraordinary remedy” that shall enter only if a plaintiff makes a clear showing of entitlement to
such relief. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The purpose of a
preliminary injunction is “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on
the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (quoting Univ.
of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). In evaluating a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court considers four factors:
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm [to
the movants] if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e.,
the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the
movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court's ruling on the
public interest.
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Bl(a)ck
Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004)). The balancing of hardships and the
analysis of the public interest merge when, as here, the government is the opposing party. Does
1–6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 37 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
The court addresses each of the factors in turn.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor is the most important: if the moving party cannot demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits, “the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” New Comm
Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Weaver v.
Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)). “To demonstrate likelihood of success on the
merits, plaintiffs must show ‘more than mere possibility’ of success—rather, they must establish
a ‘strong likelihood’ that they will ultimately prevail.” Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores
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v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13,
15 (1st Cir. 2010)).
1. 	Final Agency Action
The parties dispute whether the interagency data-sharing constitutes final agency action
ripe for judicial review. See Pls.’ Mem. 7 [Doc. No. 35]; Defs.’ Opp’n 7–8 [Doc. No. 39]. The
APA limits judicial review to “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in
a court[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 704. An agency action is “final” if: (1) it marks the “‘consummation’ of
the agency’s decision-making process,” and (2) the action has determined rights or obligations or
will create legal consequences. Harper v. Werfel, 118 F.4th 100, 116 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997)).
First, the administrative record submitted by Defendants demonstrates that the IRS-ICE
MOU and ICE-IRS Implementation Agreement have already resulted in substantial data-sharing
between the two agencies. See Admin. Record, at TD_0000143–146 [Doc. No. 39-1] (IRS
employees noting that they had shared roughly 47,000 addresses of noncitizens with ICE). The
court finds that the IRS-ICE MOU, Implementation Agreement, and the data-sharing already
effectuated are the “consummation” of the IRS and ICE decision-making processes. Akebia
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2020). Neither the agreements nor the
agencies’ operationalization was in any way “tentative or interlocutory[.]” Bennett, 520 U.S. at
178.
Further, the IRS-ICE Memo and the ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement clearly spell out
the agencies’ respective “rights or obligations” under the terms of the agreements. Id. Both
agreements require the IRS to provide ICE with noncitizens’ address information, something the
IRS had not done prior or, minimally, had never done at the scale and breadth requested by ICE.
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See IRS-ICE MOU [Doc. No. 73-1]; ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement, [Doc. No. 73-2]. If the
interagency data-sharing was merely a recitation or affirmation of the agencies “obligations,” no
official memorandum or letter would be necessary. See Defs.’ Opp’n 8 [Doc. No. 39].
Accordingly, the inter-agency data-sharing between the IRS and ICE is final agency action and
ripe for judicial review. Accord Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *18–19 (“[T]he
IRS has made a final decision to adopt and implement a policy of disclosing the confidential
address information of tens of thousands of taxpayers to ICE[.]”).
2. 	Alternative Remedy
Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs claims are not reviewable by this court because
“Congress has created a different, comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of” 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103. Defs.’ Opp’n 8 [Doc. No. 39]. Plaintiffs contend that a suit under the APA is
appropriate, given Plaintiffs’ need for forward looking injunctive relief. Pls.’ Reply 15–16 [Doc.
No. 43]. The court finds Congress’ civil damages and criminal penalties provisions, see 26
U.S.C. §§ 7213, 7431, to provide inadequate remedial mechanisms for the scope and breadth of
ongoing identity and location disclosures involved in this case. See IRS-ICE MOU [Doc. No. 73-
1]. While the court agrees that Congress recognized the severity of an impermissible disclosure
of confidential tax information and accordingly created a responsive retrospective penalty,
neither provision referenced by Defendants encompasses the prospective relief required to enjoin
IRS and SSA’s disclosures. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967)
(explaining strong presumption of judicial review of agency action); accord Ctr. for Taxpayer
Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *20 (“ex post penalties are [not] an adequate alternative to ex ante
prohibitions.”). Therefore, judicial review is available for Plaintiffs’ claims, given that “no other
adequate remedy” is available for the interagency data-sharing across IRS, SSA, and ICE. 5
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U.S.C. § 704; see Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140, abrogated on other grounds by Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
3. 	APA Claims
Plaintiffs allege that the inter-agency data sharing of confidential tax information
between the IRS and ICE violates Section 6103 and is therefore agency action both contrary to
law and arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 182–198 [Doc.
No. 73].
As previously discussed, Section 6103 represents Congress’ efforts to balance important
privacy considerations of taxpayers against other governmental priorities.11 In the example of
subsection 6103(i)(2), Congress weighed privacy against assisting law enforcement with
criminal investigations and added substantial procedural protections in working out the balance.
The parties do not dispute that ICE now possesses tax return data, and that Section 6103 governs
the agencies’ treatment of that data. See Pls.’ Mem. 10 (Doc. No. 35); Defs.’ Opp’n 12–13 [Doc.
No. 39]; Pls.’ Reply 9 [Doc. No. 43]. The court considers Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the
IRS and ICE, separately.
11 In amending the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to rework some of the exceptions to the general rule
of confidentiality, the Conference Committee explained:
The purpose of these modifications to the disclosure law is to facilitate the
disclosure of tax information for legitimate law enforcement needs while, at the
same time, preserving the basic principle that a taxpayer’s return should generally
be treated as confidential and should be disclosed, in only a limited number of
circumstances, where those law enforcement needs outweigh the needs to preserve
taxpayer confidentiality. In agreeing to these provisions, the conferees have
fulfilled a commitment made by the conferees on the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 to take appropriate legislative action in this area.
H.R. R EP . No. 97-760, at 677 (1982) (Conf. Rep.).
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a) 	IRS
As previously discussed, a D.C. district court has enjoined the IRS from sharing taxpayer
addresses with ICE, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2). See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025
WL 3257096, at *1–3. That court found that IRS’ implementation of the IRS-ICE MOU
constituted a significant change in IRS policy, for which the agency was unable to provide a
reasonable explanation. See Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *30–31. Further,
that court found that this unexplained policy change, set against the substantial reliance interests
at stake, was arbitrary and capricious. Id. This court agrees. See FCC v. Prometheus Radio
Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009). Taxpayers have long been counseled that their data is confidential and will not be shared
or used for immigration enforcement. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 30,211, 30,213 (June 8, 1995) (in
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking relating to ITINs, the IRS stated ITINs “are intended for tax use
only. For example, the numbers will create no inference regarding the immigration status of a
foreign person or the right of that person to be legally employed in the United States. The [ITIN]
and the information obtained by the IRS as a result of issuing numbers constitute confidential
taxpayer information. Section 6103 strictly prohibits the disclosure of this information to other
government agencies, private entities, or citizens.”). Millions of noncitizen taxpayers file under
an ITIN or SSN in reliance on this assurance and thereby generate tens of billions of dollars for
federal tax revenue. See Lam Decl., Ex. 2, at 3 (“Tax Payments by Undocumented Immigrants
News Article”) [Doc. 28-2]. Further, the record is replete with evidence that the IRS’ policy did
not permit usage of subsection 6103(i)(2)’s process to permit disclosure of taxpayer’s address
information alone. See IRM § 11.3.28 (2025) (“Material Changes”),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part11/irm_11-003-028 (last visited February 4, 2026).
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Therefore, given the federal government’s prior protective policy and the “serious
reliance interests” of taxpayers, it was incumbent upon the IRS to carry out a reasoned decision-
making process before changing its policy to provide for and enable disclosure of previously
considered confidential information. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 515. The IRS’
lack of explanation for such a substantial change in policy falls outside any “zone of
reasonableness” and reflects arbitrary and capricious agency action. Prometheus Radio Project,
592 U.S. at 423; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Additionally, like the Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights court, this court finds that the IRS’
disclosure to ICE violated Section 6103 in multiple ways even if the requested addresses are
treated only as “return information” under subsection 6103(i)(2), with its less onerous
requirements, rather than “taxpayer return information,” for which a court order would have been
required under subsection 6103(i)(1). See 2025 WL 3251044, at *22–29.
First, when ICE requested address information for 1.2 million individuals from the IRS in
June 2025, the request included one person as the recipient of such information: the Assistant
Director of the ICE ERO, Enforcement Division. See Admin. Record, at TD_0000077,
TD_0000084, TD_0000088 [Doc. 39-1]. However, the statutory provision requires that the
request identify the officers and employees “personally and directly” with the criminal
investigation and proceedings, and that the information be provided only to them. The assertion
that one individual could be “personally and directly” involved with the investigation and
prosecution of 1.3 million people ignores the plain meaning of those words, which convey direct
involvement in those criminal proceedings. See Fleischaker Decl. ¶¶ 28–31 [Doc. No. 30]
(describing that, in her experience as a long-time career employee and political appointee at DHS
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and ICE, the ERO Assistant Director “generally would not make decisions about individual
cases.”).
Defendants contend that the Assistant Director of the ICE ERO, Enforcement Division is
“personally engaged in overseeing and managing the enforcement initiatives related to, and
components involved in, carrying out” by ERO officers. McShane Decl. ¶ 8[Doc. No. 39-3].
Neither “overseeing” nor “managing” others would fall within the narrow strictures of the
statutory language. Accord Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *24 (“[A]n officer or
employee ‘personally and directly engaged’ in a criminal matter under Section 6103(i)(2) is
someone working on the substance of the relevant criminal matter who will be able to apply to
the criminal matter the information obtained through the IRS’s disclosure.”).
Assistant Director McShane describes the investigatory process of the ERO Officers he
oversees. McShane Decl. ¶¶ 5–8 [Doc. No. 39-3] (describing evidence-gathering in DHS
databases, establishing identity and location information, and reviewing court information). But
those ERO Officers were not identified in the June 2025 request. See Admin. Record, at
TD_0000107–108 [Doc. No. 39-1]. Assistant Director McShane, the substituted-recipient
designated on ICE’s request, as a practical matter is unable to do more than “oversee[] and
manage[]” a criminal investigation by sheer limitation of volume, and is therefore an
impermissible recipient of confidential tax return information for purposes of a criminal
investigation. McShane Decl. ¶ 8 [Doc. No. 39-3].
In addition to the “personally and directly engaged” recipient violation, the Ctr. for
Taxpayer Rights court found that the contents of ICE’s request further violated subsection
6103(i)(2). 2025 WL 3251044, at *25–29. The subsection requires that the request include “a
‘specific reason’ that justifies the agency’s entitlement to taxpayer information.” Id. at *28
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(citing 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv)). This court makes a similar and slightly broader finding.
Not only did ICE’s June 2025 address request exclude a “specific reason” for the disclosure, but
the record lacks sufficient information to demonstrate that ICE is seeking the addresses to assist
with criminal investigations or proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).
To the extent that ICE seeks addresses not as part of a criminal investigation but to locate
taxpayers so that they may be civilly arrested, that purpose would grossly misread the statute.
Section 6103(i) does allow the IRS to disclose addresses to assist Federal officers and employees
to “locate fugitives from justice[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(5) (capitalization omitted). But this
subsection requires an application to a court and a court order to allow disclosure to federal
officers and employees of return information (including taxpayer furnished information)
“exclusively for use in locating such individuals.” Id. § 6103(i)(5)(A). The court may only grant
the application if (1) the applicant shows that a Federal arrest warrant relating to the commission
of a Federal felony offense has been issued for an individual who is a fugitive from justice; (2)
the return of such individual or return information with respect to such individual is sought
exclusively for use in locating such individual; and (3) there is reasonable cause to believe that
such return or return information may be relevant in determining the location of such individual.
Id. § 6103(i)(5)(B). No such showing has been made here.
b) 	ICE
Unlike the D.C. litigation, this case is also brought against the ICE Defendants. Because,
as explained above, ICE’s request failed to comply with even with the lesser requirements of
subsection 6103(i)(2), the confidential taxpayer information should not have been disclosed to
ICE.
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Moreover, whether the request was sufficient or not, the court must now address the
merits of Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to ICE’s use and protection of the confidential taxpayer
information disclosed by IRS. Whether confidential information is disclosed pursuant to
subsection 6103(i)(1) or (2), the information is still “return information,” and remains subject to
Section 6103’s proscriptions on use and storage. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(i), (p).
At the outset, the court notes an irreconcilable issue with Section 6103’s statutory
framework and the implementation of the IRS-ICE MOU. Both subsection 6103(i)(1) and
6103(i)(2)’s strictly confined processes require that, at a bare minimum, federal officials or
employees have commenced an investigation regarding specific non-tax criminal activity of a
taxpayer. Id. §§ 6103(i)(1), (2). Pursuant to those processes, disclosure of return information
(including taxpayer-furnished identity information) is limited to the agency officers and
employees who are investigating the taxpayer.
However, in this circumstance, IRS did not provide its disclosure to the ICE officers
personally and directly engaged in criminal investigations. See McShane Decl. ¶ 8 [Doc. No. 39-
3]. First, the scope and breadth of ICE’s request rendered it impossible for IRS, as a practical
matter, to disclose the 47,000 taxpayer addresses to investigatory officers without an
intermediary. Indeed, the Fitzgerald Declaration describes how, in August 2025, the IRS sent
taxpayer information to the ICE Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Cyber and
Operational Technology Division. Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 5 [Doc. No. 51-2]. That ICE component not
only viewed the confidential data but “use[d] the IRS data to compare it with the list of 1.2
million individuals with final removal orders and identified approximately 33,000 updated
addresses.” Id. The ICE component then sent the data to the ERO Law Enforcement Systems and
Analysis team. Id. Neither the ICE HSI Cyber and Operational Technology Division nor the
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ERO Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis team include the specific employees or officers
directly participating in the 8 U.S.C. § 1253 investigations and prosecutions of the taxpayers’
whose information was shared. McShane Decl. ¶ 8 [Doc. No. 39-3]; Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 5 [Doc.
No. 51-2]. Because the data transfer was so large (rather than being limited to specific
investigations, as contemplated by the statutory scheme), the data transfer necessitated two
intermediary ICE components not statutorily authorized to receive the information. McShane
Decl. ¶ 8 [Doc. No. 39-3]; Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 5 [Doc. No. 51-2].
Second, the ICE ERO Enforcement Division does not appear to be organizationally
capable of segregating the taxpayer addresses (which may only be used in association with a
criminal investigation) from use in potential civil enforcement matters. See McShane Decl. ¶¶ 2,
4 [Doc. No. 39-3]. The McShane Declaration explains that an investigating ERO officer “must
evaluate the evidence at hand and determine if it is sufficient to establish the elements of the
contemplated criminal charge.” Id. ¶ 8. “Once an ERO officer establishes that sufficient evidence
exists . . ., the ERO officer will present the case to the appropriate USAO[.]” Id. The United
States Attorney’s Office will then review the case worked up by the ERO officer and determine
whether to prosecute. Id. Throughout the initial investigatory process, the ERO officer
determines “whether administrative remedies can satisfactorily resolve a case, or whether . . .
criminal prosecution should be pursued.” Id. Accordingly, ERO officers use the initial
investigatory process to determine whether to pursue civil enforcement or recommend criminal
prosecution. Id. This process presents insurmountable challenges with respect to Section 6103.
The court fails to understand how an ERO officer could segregate the data and only use taxpayer
addresses for the latter.
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Third, there is nothing before the court to suggest that ERO officers are engaged in any
specific criminal investigations regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1253 violations. The McShane Declaration
details numerous preliminary steps, typically taken by ERO officers before even determining that
a crime has been committed. See id. ¶¶ 6, 8 (referencing “the initial investigation”); id. ¶ 6
(explaining that an “investigation” includes establishing a noncitizen’s identity, “all known
addresses,” and immigration status); id. ¶ 7 (describing that, for 8 U.S.C. § 1253 investigations,
“relevant database checks are . . . conducted to determine whether the alien has a final executable
order of removal and whether the alien has departed or has been removed from the United States
pursuant to the final order of removal” and appellate databases are reviewed to ensure that no
ongoing appeals might stay the proceedings); id. ¶ 8 (detailing steps taken by the ERO officer
before presenting the case to the appropriate United States Attorney’s Office, where the case will
be “accepted or declined for prosecution.”). The McShane Declaration demonstrates that the
decision to prosecute under 8 U.S.C. § 1253 is a deliberative one, arrived at some point “during
the initial investigation.” Id. ¶ 8. Therefore, ICE’s desired use of the taxpayer information belies
the purpose of Section 6103’s statutory scheme. Instead of initiating a criminal investigation,
determining that prosecution requires a taxpayer’s return information, and requesting such
information from the IRS, ICE requested taxpayer addresses and then attempted to ascertain
which of those taxpayers may have potentially violated a criminal statute.
In addition to these structural issues preventing compliance with Section 6103, the
Fitzgerald Declaration demonstrates that impermissible use of the addresses by ICE has already
occurred. After receiving the data from the IRS, ICE HSI “identified approximately 33,000
updated addresses.” Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 5 [Doc. No. 51-2]. The court understands this statement as
follows: ICE compared the IRS data to its own and noted that 33,000 out of the IRS-provided
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47,000 addresses were different than the addresses for people with the same or similar names in
its own records. Id. Even accepting that “nothing further was done with the data,” ICE’s cross-
reference of its records against the taxpayer addresses constitutes an impermissible use of
taxpayer addresses because it was conducted by employees not “personally and directly
engaged” in a criminal investigation or proceeding. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(i)(1)(A). Further, the
storage of the taxpayer addresses on the computer of the ICE HSI lead architect, an unnamed
individual, constitutes impermissible storage, in contravention of subsection 6103(p). Id.
§ 6103(p)(4)(C) (requiring, inter alia, that the recipient federal agency “restrict . . . access to the
returns or return information only to persons . . . to whom disclosure may be made under the
provisions of” Section 6103).
In sum, Plaintiffs have established a high likelihood that ICE’s handling, use, and storage
of taxpayer addresses violated and continues to violate Section 6103, and therefore, the APA.
B. 	Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs
“‘Irreparable injury’ in the preliminary injunction context means an injury that cannot
adequately be compensated for either by a later-issued permanent injunction, after a full
adjudication on the merits, or by a later-issued damages remedy.” Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr.,
Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 76 (1st Cir. 2005). “[T]he measure of irreparable harm is not a rigid
one; it has been referred to as a sliding scale, working in conjunction with a moving party's
likelihood of success on the merits.” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 485
(1st Cir. 2009). Further, “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion to evaluate the irreparability of
alleged harm and to make determinations regarding the propriety of injunctive relief.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). “[T]he issuance of a preliminary injunction requires a showing of
irreparable harm to the movant rather than to one or more third parties.” CMM Cable Rep., Inc.
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v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). Moreover,
“plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [are required] to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely
in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated irreparable harm to their members as well as to
CEDC as an organization. First, Plaintiffs describe members fearful of filing taxes due to the
likely consequence of their addresses being provided to ICE. See, e.g., CEDC Decl. ¶ 48 [Doc.
No. 31] (describing noncitizen member who consistently filed taxes with an ITIN or SSN from
2019–2024 who fears that IRS and SSA will share their information with ICE, deport them to
their country of origin, and separate them from their children). Many of Plaintiffs’ members are
not subject to criminal prosecution because of their deferred action status. Nonetheless, these
members too are fearful of filing taxes. See, e.g., UBN Decl. ¶¶ 21–22 [Doc. No. 34] (describing
DACA recipient who has filed taxes since 2021 through an SSN but is fearful that continued
filing will expose themself and their parents to arrest, detention, or removal). Because these
members have been chilled from filing taxes, they are deprived of necessary tax credits and
further complicate their immigration statuses. See NPU Decl. ¶ 25 [Doc. No. 37]; see also Ctr.
for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *38 (“Plaintiffs have shown that the imminent risk
that their members’ address information will be misused impedes [their members’] ability to
safely participate in the tax system[.]”) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in the original).
Second, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be harmed by the data-sharing due to
the erosion of trust between the organizations and their members. See UBN Decl. ¶ 17 [Doc. No.
34]. All four organizations previously advised their members to obtain an ITIN and file taxes,
regardless of immigration status, because of the IRS’ assurance and practice to keep tax
information confidential. See, e.g., NAKASEC Decl. ¶¶ 9–10 [Doc. 33]. Similarly, Plaintiff
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organizations encouraged its members to apply for programs like DACA and obtain SSNs, based
on the reasonable assumption, consistent with the DACA program, that no adverse immigration
consequences would flow from the application process. See, e.g., UBN Decl. ¶¶ 16–17 [Doc. No.
34]. Because of the interagency data-sharing, Plaintiffs’ trustworthiness and reputations are
being irreparably harmed as organizations, no matter how difficult that harm may be to measure.
See Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1996)
(Irreparable harm can occur when “the plaintiff suffers a substantial injury that cannot be
accurately measured or adequately compensated by money damages” or other legal remedies.);
see also Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *32 (As an organization, the D.C.
plaintiff’s “harm resulting from this loss of trust is irreparable because it is difficult to replace or
measure and one the [plaintiff] should not be expected to suffer.” (internal citations omitted)).
C. 	Balance of Hardships and Public Interest
The balance of hardships and public interest factors merge when the government is the
opposing party. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (stating factors merge in stay context); accord
Massachusetts v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, 770 F. Supp. 3d 277, 295 (D. Mass. 2025) (holding
factors merge in preliminary injunction context). Here, Plaintiffs argue that those factors favor
preliminary injunctive relief because of the “public’s strong ‘interest in preventing [noncitizens]
from being wrongfully removed[.]’” Pls.’ Mem. 18 [Doc. No. 35] (citing A.B.-B. v. Morgan, 548
F. Supp. 3d 209, 222 (D.D.C. 2020)). Defendants contend that the government’s ability to assist
“law-enforcement officers to perform” the task of “enforcing federal law” outweighs “‘the
interests of individuals who are illegally in the country in avoiding . . . law enforcement.’” Defs.’
Opp’n. 19 [Doc. No. 39] (citing Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, __ U.S. __, 2025 WL 2585637, at
*4 (Sept. 8, 2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)).
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In this instance, both the balance of the hardships and the public interest tilt heavily
towards enjoining the implementation of the interagency data-sharing agreements. First, the
federal tax system is built upon a foundation of the taxpayer’s systemic trust and confidence. See
IRS’ Taxpayer Bill of Rights, https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights (“Taxpayers have the
right to expect that any information they provide to the IRS will not be disclosed unless
authorized by the taxpayer or by law. Taxpayers have the right to expect appropriate action will
be taken against [those] who wrongfully use or disclose taxpayer return information.”) (last
visited February 4, 2026). The implementation of agreements contrary to law erodes that
foundation and undermines the public interest in a functioning tax system. Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 791 F.2d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The assurance of privacy
secured by § 6103 is fundamental to a tax system that relies upon self-reporting.”).
Second, there is significant hardship in the potential misidentification of noncitizens and
citizens alike that could lead to wrongful arrests, detention and even removal. See Nken, 556
U.S. at 435 (“Of course there is a public interest in preventing aliens from being wrongfully
removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm.”). Because the
information sought was not for any specific criminal investigation, the data-sharing will
necessarily include both the data of noncitizens subject to criminal prosecution and those who
are not subject to criminal prosecution because of their deferred action status. See IRS-ICE
MOU [Doc. No 73-1]; ICE-IRS Implementing Agreement [Doc. No. 73-2]. Further, Plaintiffs
have demonstrated that a significant portion of immigrant communities not only share common
last names, see NAKASEC Decl., at ¶ 16 [Doc. 33] (nearly half of the Korean-American
population share one of three surnames), but also live in shared homes or in the same apartment
complexes. See Pls.’ Mem. 11 n.8 [Doc. 35]. These factual circumstances significantly raise the
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risk of misidentification of taxpayers by IRS and ICE, and subsequent arrest by ICE. See, e.g.,
Maia Coleman, ICE Arrest of a Citizen, Barely Dressed, Sows Fear in Twin Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2026).
Misidentifications due to administrative error also present significant danger to citizens
and noncitizens alike given the DHS General Counsel’s opinion that “illegal aliens aren’t entitled
to the same Fourth Amendment protections as U.S. citizens.” Jimmy Percival, How the Deep
State Thwarted Ice Administrative Warrants, WALL S TREET J. (Jan. 22, 2026). The DHS General
Counsel described ICE’s practice to use administrative warrants (i.e. warrants signed by an
Immigration Judge rather than a federal magistrate or district judge) to enter noncitizens’ homes
and arrest them. Id. The DHS General Counsel claimed this practice is lawful because “[a]liens
in this context are fugitives from justice[.]” Id. Given the high potential for misidentification,
ICE’s arrests and detention practices (including, as affirmed by DHS counsel, the
misapprehension that homes of individuals suspected to be noncitizens may be searched without
a judicial warrant), and the absence of procedural safeguards, the court finds that the public
interest is not served by ICE’s use of the confidential taxpayer information provided despite
ICE’s failure to satisfy the statutorily required procedures for obtaining such information.
Third and finally, the government has failed to show that the provision of taxpayer
addresses is integral to law enforcement, let alone to the President’s promise to start enforcement
with the “worst of the worst.”12 As discussed above, Defendants failed to identify in their request
to the IRS, and have offered no further demonstration here, how the use of taxpayer addresses
12 See Department of Homeland Security, Arrested: Worst of the Worst,
https://www.dhs.gov/wow, (last visited Feb. 4, 2026) (“Under Secretary Noem's leadership, the
hardworking men and women of DHS and ICE are fulfilling President Trump's promise and
carrying out mass deportations - starting with the worst of the worst[.]”).
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serves ICE in its efforts to prosecute specific criminal offenders under 8 U.S.C. § 1253. The
court finds no basis to conclude that enjoining the data-sharing, until that sharing complies with
the law and includes statutorily-mandated procedural protections, will interfere with ICE’s
ability to enforce the law. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 594
U.S. 758, 766 (2021) (“[O]ur system does not permit agencies to act unlawfully even in pursuit
of desirable ends.”); see also Ctr. for Taxpayer Rights, 2025 WL 3251044, at *38 (describing the
likelihood that plaintiffs’ “members’ address information will be impermissibly used for civil
immigration enforcement” as an “imminent risk.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
After carefully considering Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their APA
claims,13 the threat of irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities and public interest, the
court finds that relief is warranted to preliminarily enjoin ICE’s use of taxpayer addresses
provided by IRS pursuant to the IRS-ICE MOU during the pendency of this litigation.14
Therefore, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction as to the ICE
Defendants as follows:
It is hereby ORDERED that:
13 Given that the court finds that Plaintiffs’ APA claims are likely to succeed on the merits, the
court need not analyze Plaintiffs’ remaining claims at this preliminary procedural juncture. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 199–222 (Counts 3–5) [Doc. No. 73].
14 Neither party addresses whether the court should impose bond on Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Given this omission, the court exercises its discretion to waive the
bond requirement. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that “a district court retains substantial discretion to
dictate the terms of an injunction bond.”); Liu v. Noem, 780 F. Supp. 3d 386, 405 (D.N.H. 2025)
(waiving bond requirement where defendants requested that plaintiff post bond but did not
“request a specific amount,” “explain any costs they will incur by complying with the
preliminary injunction,” or describe “any damages they will have sustained” if the preliminary
injunction was later found to be erroneous).
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1. 	The implementation and/or enforcement of the IRS-ICE MOU, the ICE-IRS
Implementing Agreement, as well as related agreements, policies, practices, and
procedures (together, the “information sharing arrangements”) are stayed and
preliminarily vacated, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705,
pending disposition of this litigation on the merits.
2. 	Defendants DHS, Secretary Noem, ICE, Acting Director Lyons, and their agents,
are enjoined from inspecting, viewing, using, copying, distributing, relying on, or
otherwise acting upon any return information that had been obtained from or disclosed by
the IRS Defendants pursuant to the information sharing arrangements, including the
information received August 7, 2025.
3. 	The ICE Defendants shall provide a copy of this Order to the individual whose
government-issued computer holds the information received from the IRS on August 7,
2026, and shall file confirmation that a copy of this Order has been provided to that
individual, no later than February 10, 2026. That individual, as a DHS agent, is bound by
this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 5, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
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