Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
KYRA I. NELSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 25-cv-12650-AK
v. )
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Plaintiff Kyra Nelson, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action seeking to preclude
defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) from foreclosing on her property at 65
Lovers Lane, Groton, Massachusetts (the “Property”). Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary
restraining order on September 18, 2025, requesting a stay of the foreclosure. For the reasons
below, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and her father, Bradley Nelson (“Mr. Nelson”), have spent more than a decade
attempting to stop Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property. This saga started in 2007 when
Mr. Nelson entered into two mortgage agreements with Wells Fargo’s predecessor-in-interest,
World Savings Bank, to purchase the Property. Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 621 B.R. 542,
545 (1st Cir. BAP 2020) (“BAP”) (discussing procedural history). Later in 2007, World Savings
Bank changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage, FSB and in 2009, Wachovia converted into a
national bank named Wells Fargo Bank Southwest, N.A., which merged into Wells Fargo Bank,
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 1 of 11

2
N.A. on the same date. Id. In 2012, Mr. Nelson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a
discharge that “eliminated [his] personal liability, but did not eliminate the in rem interest of the
lenders with respect to the [P]roperty.” BAP, 621 B.R. at 551. See In re Nelson, No. 12-16220-
JNF (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (Mr. Nelson’s bankruptcy proceeding); BAP, 621 B.R. at 545-46
(discussing procedural history of the prior litigation).
In September 2014, Mr. Nelson brought suit against Wells Fargo and World Savings Bank
to stop them foreclosing on the Property. In re Nelson, 621 B.R. at 546 (discussing procedural
history). Although initially filed in state court, Wells Fargo successfully removed to the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Id. At the outset, three of Mr. Nelson’s five claims were
dismissed, and the remaining two claims were dismissed at summary judgment. See Nelson v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 14-CV-14087-DJC, Doc. No. 63 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 2016) (order on
Motion to Dismiss); Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 14-CV-14087-DJC, Doc. No. 77 (D.
Mass. May 25, 2017) (order on Motion for Summary Judgment); In re Nelson, 621 B.R. at 546-
47 (discussing procedural history).
In May 2019, Mr. Nelson filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. BAP, 621 B.R. at 547-
58 (discussing procedural history). In the bankruptcy proceeding, Wells Fargo filed a proof of
claim that asserted their rights to collect on the Property and requested relief from the stay on
collection, which was automatically imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Id. Mr. Nelson
challenged Wells Fargo’s right to collect and request for relief from the stay alleging that Wells
Fargo was not the mortgage holder and all his debts were discharged in his prior bankruptcy
case. Id. Contrary to Mr. Nelson’s arguments, the bankruptcy court found that a “merger trail
[between Wachovia Mortgage, FSB and Wells Fargo] exists and gave judgment to Wells Fargo”
on their claim to the Property, Wells Fargo established their proof of claim, and Mr. Nelson’s
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 2 of 11

3
prior bankruptcy discharge did not eliminate Wells Fargo’s in rem interest in the Property. Id. at
550-51. The bankruptcy court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal. Id.
In June 2023, Mr. Nelson filed suit in Middlesex Superior Court again challenging Wells
Fargo’s authority to enforce the mortgage and requesting relief from his mortgage obligations. In
re Kyra Nelson, 24-41202-EDK, at *2 (Bankr. D. Mass Apr. 2, 2025) [Dkt. 16-2] (“Bankruptcy
Order II”) (discussing procedural history). The Middlesex Superior Court dismissed the suit
with prejudice holding that Mr. Nelson’s claims were blocked by res judicata. Nelson v. World
Savings Bank, FSB, 2381CV01919 (Middlesex Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2024). Mr. Nelson appealed,
and the Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court. Nelson v. World Savings
Bank, FSB, et al., 106 Mass. App. Ct. 1101, 2025 WL 2535808 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 4, 2025).
The Appeals Court additionally granted Wells Fargo’s request for attorney’s fees because Mr.
Nelson’s appeal was “frivolous.” Id. at *5.
In December 2023, while still litigating in Middlesex Superior Court, Mr. Nelson
transferred the Property to Plaintiff by warranty deed. In re Kyra Nelson, 24-41202-EDK, at *2
(Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 2, 2025) [Dkt. 16-9] (“Bankruptcy Order I”) (discussing procedural
history).
In August 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Worcester Superior Court against Wells
Fargo seeking an injunction precluding Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property.
Bankruptcy Order II, 24-41202-EDK, at *2 (discussing procedural history). The Worcester
Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s requested relief because the matter “has been fully addressed,
on multiple occasions by multiple courts” and warned Plaintiff that failure to obey “the ethical
rules in filing pleadings before [the] court . . . may result in sanctions.” Nelson v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 24-01000B, at *1 (Worcester Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2024).
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 3 of 11

4
On November 14, 2024, 8 days before a scheduled foreclosure sale of the Property,
Plaintiff filed a complaint in Middlesex Superior Court again seeking injunctive relief against
Wells Fargo’s foreclosure of the Property. Bankruptcy Order II, 24-41202-EDK, at *3
(discussing procedural history). The Middlesex Superior Court denied the request for injunctive
relief finding that Plaintiff did not have a “likelihood of success on the merits.” Nelson v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2481CV03000 (Middlesex Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2024). The court later granted
Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, finding that “Wells Fargo is the successor-in-interest on the
mortgages and is entitled to enforce the liens.” Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
2481CV03000, at *5 (Middlesex Super. Ct. July 21, 2024) (“Middlesex Dismissal”).
On November 21, 2024, one day before a scheduled foreclosure sale, Plaintiff filed a
voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in which Wells Fargo filed a proof of claim. Bankruptcy
Order II, 24-41202-EDK, at *3 (discussing procedural history). Again, the bankruptcy court
rejected Plaintiff’s challenge to Wells Fargo’s proof of claim and her arguments that (a) her debt
was discharged, (b) she did not owe Wells Fargo any debt, and (c) that Wells Fargo does not have
a perfected lien. Bankruptcy Order I, 24-41202-EDK, at *2-4. In a separate order the court
granted Wells Fargo relief from a stay and found that “the filing of the petition was part of a
scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud Wells Fargo,” and that Plaintiff “acted in bad faith.”
Bankruptcy Order II, 24-41202-EDK, at *4-5, 7. Both orders have been appealed and are
pending before this court.
On September 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit and requested, ex parte,
emergency relief from Wells Fargo’s impending foreclosure. The Court held a hearing on the
matter on September 26, 2025.
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 4 of 11

5
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The “extraordinary and drastic” remedy of a preliminary injunction requires a showing of
four elements: (1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a high likelihood of
irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted; (3) a balance of equities tips in the movant’s
favor; and (4) the injunctive relief is in the public interest. See Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v.
MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “The sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of
success on the merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his
quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” New Comm. Wireless Servs., Inc.
v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). Courts may accept as true well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint and uncontroverted affidavits. See Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials,
LLC v. Elec. Circuits Supplies, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 n.2 (D. Mass. 2010) (quoting
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 n.1 (1976)). Courts may also rely upon otherwise
inadmissible evidence in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction. Howe v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n as Tr. for RMAC Tr. Series 2016-CTT, 440 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 (D. Mass. 2020) (citing
Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits because her claims are barred
by res judicata. Res judicata “comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of
prior litigation” – issue and claim preclusion. See Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel
Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 411 (2020). Issue preclusion “precludes a party from
relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment.” Id. Claim
preclusion “prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 5 of 11

6
prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Id. at 412. “The preclusive effect of a
state-court judgment is governed by state law, and the preclusive effect of a federal-court
judgment is governed by federal law.” McLarnon v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 14–13233–
FDS, 2014 WL 5317813, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2014) (citing Cohen v. Shea, 788 F. Supp. 66
(D. Mass. 1992)).
These doctrines are critical to the effective administration of justice because they “relieve
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” U.S. v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 158 (1984) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
A. Issue Preclusion
A party asserting issue preclusion under federal and Massachusetts law must show (1)
both proceedings involve the same issue of law or fact, (2) the parties actually litigated that issue
in the prior proceeding, (3) the prior court decided that issue in a final judgment, and (4)
resolution of the issue was essential to judgment on the merits. Robb Evans & Assocs. LLC v.
United States, 850 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2017). See Mullins v. Corcoran, 172 N.E.3d 759, 767
(Mass. 2021).
The preclusive effect of previously litigated issues also applies to parties in privity with
the prior litigants. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“Nonparty preclusion may
be justified based on a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person
to be bound and a party to the judgments.”) (citation modified); Mullins, 172 N.E.3d at 772. A
grantee of a deed is considered in privity with the grantor for the purposes of issue preclusion.
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (listing “preceding and succeeding owners of property” as “[q]ualifying
relationships” for issue preclusion).
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 6 of 11

7
Wells Fargo meets all four elements. First, the issues in the present case are identical to
those in prior litigation. Plaintiff argues that Wells Fargo does not have a perfected lien on the
property. Both Plaintiff and Mr. Nelson previously argued this issue and courts have
unanimously rejected it. See Nelson, 2381CV01919, at *6 (“[T]he [United States] District Court
. . . specifically found that Wells Fargo was in fact the holder of the Note and First Mortgage.
This finding was an essential part of its judgment.”); Bankruptcy Order I, 24-41202-EDK, at *3
(the question whether “Wells Fargo has no perfected lien” was “already litigated in the District
Court.”); BAP, 621 B.R. at 556 (“The record reflects that Wells Fargo presented documents to
the bankruptcy court illustrating that Wells Fargo was the current holder of [the First
Mortgage].).
Prior courts have similarly rejected Plaintiff’s claims that the note on the Property did not
transfer when World Savings Bank merged into Wells Fargo. See Id. at 551 (“The findings
include that . . . the merger trail exists and gave judgment to Wells Fargo on a number of
claims”); Middlesex Dismissal, 2481CV03000, at *5 (“[T]he courts have also concluded that
Wells Fargo is the successor-in-interest on the mortgages and is entitled to enforce the liens.”);
Nelson, 2381CV01919, at *8 (“Bradley Nelson . . . continues to maintain that no court has ever
entered a binding decision that World Savings Bank FSB is Wells Fargo. That is inaccurate.”).
Same with Plaintiff’s claim that the debt was discharged in her father’s bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
Order I, 24-41202-EDK, at *3 ([T]o the extent that Wells Fargo held (and holds) a valid
mortgage on the Property, that mortgage survived [Mr. Nelson’s] bankruptcy discharge.”).
Plaintiff’s argument that she is not in default was, likewise, rejected. Id. (“[T]he transfer of the
Property from Bradley to the Debtor had no effect on any existing lien on the Property held by
Wells Fargo.”).
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 7 of 11

8
Finally, Plaintiff’s challenges to the legitimacy of the affidavit of Wells Fargo’s attorney
has also been dismissed. Id. at *5 (rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that “the Claim was not
properly filed because it was filed by an attorney who does not have ‘personal knowledge’ of the
operative facts.”).1
Second, each of these issues were fully litigated on the merits as reflected in the
respective courts’ orders and decisions. Third, each of these issues were decided in final
decisions. See Nelson, 2025 WL 2535808, at *4 (Bankruptcy court’s rejection of Mr. Nelson’s
objections to Wells Fargo’s claim and grant of relief from stay was a final judgment on the
merits); Airframe v. Raytheon, 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing AVX Corp. v. Cabot Corp.,
424 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2005)) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is “plainly a final judgment
on the merits”). Fourth, in each of the prior cases the issues were essential to the outcome of the
case. But for the rejection of Mr. Nelson and Plaintiff’s claims, the courts would not have
permitted Wells Fargo to move to effectuate foreclosure.
Most of Plaintiff’s issues arose in cases to which she was a party. The remaining claims
were litigated by her father. Although Plaintiff was not party to all the prior litigation, she is still
bound by those rulings because she is a “succeeding owner[] of the property.” Taylor, 553 U.S.
at 894.
Because Plaintiff is relitigating issues which have already been argued and decided, her
claims are barred by issue preclusion, and she does not have a likelihood of success on the
merits.
1 Plaintiff also argues that the affidavit is in violation of “§25B and 35C.” [Dkt. 2 ¶ 17.] It is not apparent which
statutes Plaintiff is referring to. As the Court does not know what laws Defendant allegedly violated, Plaintiff
certainly does not have a likelihood of success on the merits.
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 8 of 11

9
Plaintiff also raises a series of under-developed issues, including that Defendant’s actions
violated the Due Process Clause and the foreclosure is barred by an unspecified statute of
limitations. The Court has attempted in good faith to discern Plaintiff’s arguments. However,
because these issues are “adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation,” they are deemed waived. Glob. NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England,
Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2013).
B. Claim Preclusion
Plaintiff’s case is also barred by claim preclusion. To establish claim preclusion under
federal and Massachusetts law a party must establish that there is “(1) a final judgment on the
merits in an earlier suit, (2) sufficient identicality between the causes of action asserted in the
earlier and later suits, and (3) sufficient identicality between the parties in the two suits.” Foss v.
E. States Exposition, 67 F.4th 462, 466 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover v.
Am. Bar Assoc., 142 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 1998)); Santos v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 54 N.E.3d
548, 554 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). In considering whether the causes of action in two suits are
sufficiently related to support claim preclusion, the First Circuit applies a “transactional
approach.” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, 142 F.3d at 38. The transactional approach considers
whether the underlying facts for the causes are “related in time, space, origin or motivation.”
Silva v. City of New Bedford, 660 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Airframe, 601 F.3d at 15).
The required relationship is present where both sets of claims “derive from a common nucleus of
operative facts.” Breneman v. U.S. ex rel. F.A.A., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 755 (1st Cir.1994)).
Massachusetts courts apply a substantively similar standard. See La Race v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 166 N.E.3d 1025, 1034 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021) (“Causes of action are the same for
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 9 of 11

10
the purposes of res judicata when they grow out of the same transaction, act or agreement, and
seek redress for the same wrong.”) (citation modified). As with issue preclusion, litigants may
be bound by the litigation decisions of those with whom they are in privity. See Kobrin v. Bd. of
Registration in Med., 832 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Mass. 2005); Emigrant Mortg. Co. Inc. v. Bourke,
626 F. Supp. 3d 223, 229 (D. Mass. 2022).
Again, Wells Fargo has established each element. First, as previously noted, the prior
actions were final judgments on the merits. Second, Plaintiff or Mr. Nelson, with whom she is in
privity, opposed Wells Fargo in all the prior litigation. Third, the causes of action are the same in
each case. Plaintiff’s actions in state and bankruptcy court involved the same property, the same
mortgages, and the same bankruptcy proceedings as this action. The proceedings aimed to stop
Wells Fargo from foreclosing on her property and centered actions taken in the same time period
as this case. These cases do not merely involve a common nucleus of operative facts—they are
identical.
As with Plaintiff’s prior proceedings, Mr. Nelson’s cases derive from the same common
nucleus of operative facts. Mr. Nelson’s cases involved the same property, the same mortgages,
and the same bankruptcy proceedings as this action. They aim to stop Wells Fargo from
foreclosing on the Property and focus on actions taken over the same duration. As Plaintiff is in
privity with Mr. Nelson, his prior cases bind her.
Even if Plaintiff and Mr. Nelson had not raised the precise issues before the Court in their
prior proceedings, they ought to have. For that reason, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under claim
preclusion and her case is not likely to succeed on the merits.
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 10 of 11

11
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 18, 2025 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-12650-AK Document 38 Filed 11/18/25 Page 11 of 11