Robinhood Derivatives, LLC v. Campbell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-12578-RGS
ROBINHOOD DERIVATIVES, LLC
v.
ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
JORDAN MAYNARD, in his official capacity as
Chair of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission;
EILEEN O’BRIEN, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission;
BRADFORD R. HILL, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission;
NAKISHA SKINNER, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission; and
PAUL BRODEUR, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
November 13, 2025
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiff Robinhood Derivatives, LLC (Robinhood) filed this action
against defendants Andrea Joy Campbell, in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Jordan Maynard, in his
official capacity as Chair of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission; Eileen
O’Brien in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts
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Gaming 	Commission; 	Bradford 	R. 	Hill, 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission; Nakisha Skinner,
in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission; and Paul Brodeur, in his official capacity as Commissioner of
the Massachusetts Gaming Commission (collectively, the Commonwealth),
seeking to enjoin enforcement of state gambling laws which Robinhood
alleges are preempted by the Commodity Exchange Act. Robinhood moves
for a preliminary injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing
state 	gaming 	laws 	against 	its 	sports-event 	related 	contracts. 	The
Commonwealth cross-moves to dismiss the case. For the following reasons,
the court will allow the Commonwealth’s motion and deny Robinhood’s
motion as moot.
DISCUSSION
The court begins (and ends) its analysis with the issue of ripeness.1
Federal district courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. 	They are
constrained by Article III, which, among other things, imposes a case or
controversy 	requirement. 	The 	ripeness 	doctrine 	has 	its 	roots 	in 	this
requirement. 	See Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017). 	It
1 The Commonwealth alternatively moves to dismiss or stay under
various abstention doctrines. Given the court’s determination that the case
is not ripe for a decision, it need not address these arguments.
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“seeks to prevent the adjudication of claims relating to ‘contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”
Id., quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998).
A claim is ripe if “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant” judgment. 	Lab.
Rels. Div. of Constr. Indus. of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Healey, 844 F.3d 318,
326 (1st Cir. 2016), quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 127 (2007). There are two components to this analysis. First, the claim
must be “fit for judicial decision at the time the suit is filed,” Lab. Rels. Div.,
844 F.3d at 326, that is, there must be “a sufficiently live case or controversy,
at the time of the proceedings, to create jurisdiction in the federal courts,”
Reddy, 845 F.3d at 501, quoting Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v.
City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013). 	Second, there must be
some risk of “hardship if ‘court consideration’ is withheld.” Lab. Rels. Div.,
844 F.3d at 326, quoting McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63,
70 (1st Cir. 2003). Robinhood, as the party asserting jurisdiction, bears the
burden of alleging sufficient facts to satisfy each prong. Reddy, 845 F.3d at
501.
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Robinhood has not shown that its sole federal claim (under Ex Parte
Young) is ripe for judicial review. The Commonwealth has stipulated that it
will not file any enforcement action against Robinhood while its motion for
a preliminary injunction remains pending in the proceeding brought against
Kalshi 	in 	the 	Massachusetts 	courts. 	There 	thus 	is 	no 	risk 	that 	the
Commonwealth will engage in the conduct which Robinhood alleges to be
unlawful prior to a decision being issued by a state court of competent
jurisdiction. Whether there is a risk that the Commonwealth will engage in
that conduct after the state court rules on the motion depends entirely on
what 	that 	decision 	proves 	to 	be. 	If 	the 	state 	court 	denies 	the
Commonwealth’s motion as unlikely to succeed on the merits, for example,
it is unlikely that Robinhood – which currently offers sports-related event
contracts exclusively through Kalshi – would face any imminent risk of
enforcement. If the state court instead allows the Commonwealth’s motion
and 	enjoins 	Kalshi 	from 	conducting 	gaming-related 	business 	in 	the
Commonwealth, Robinhood would lose its existing Massachusetts sports
event platform. 	An inability to prospectively engage in the type of conduct
that allegedly puts Robinhood at risk of enforcement would render its Ex
Parte Young claim a nullity.
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Robinhood has similarly not shown that it will suffer any hardship if
adjudication of its claim is delayed until it ripens. 	The hardship prong
“focuses on ‘direct and immediate’ harm. It is unconcerned with wholly
contingent harm.” 	Lab. Rels. Div., 844 F.3d at 330, quoting McInnis-
Misenor, 319 F.3d at 73. Here, because the threat of enforcement is (for the
reasons 	discussed 	above) 	contingent, 	any 	hardship 	is 	also 	necessarily
contingent. 	See Lab. Rels. Div., 844 F.3d at 330 (finding a determination
under the first prong that a claim is contingent on future events to “also
dictat[e] the outcome as to the second prong” because “the harm to the
[plaintiffs] from any delay in having their case adjudicated is necessarily also
contingent”).
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is ALLOWED
and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED AS MOOT.
The case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of ripeness.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns____________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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