Smith v. Bentley University

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
JOHN SMITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 25-CV-12317-AK
v. )
)
BENTLEY UNIVERSITY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTIONS TO PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY AND TO SEAL
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed under a pseudonym in a challenge to Bentley University’s
(the “University”) disciplinary decision expelling him and moves to file under seal an affidavit
identifying his true name and a list of other students allegedly involved in the underlying events.
[Dkts. 2, 11]. Plaintiff contends that anonymity and sealing are warranted to protect student
privacy interests and to avoid chilling similarly situated students from bringing claims. [Id.].
Plaintiff has provided his identity and the list of students to University counsel. [Dkt. 11]. For
the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously [Dkt. 2] and Motion to File
Affidavit of Identity and List of Students Under Seal [Dkt. 11] are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a student and a member of the University’s athletics program. The
Complaint alleges that a peer‑to‑peer payment scheme circulated among students, including
student athletes, and that Plaintiff was investigated and disciplined in connection with that
scheme. Plaintiff was summoned for questioning, placed on interim suspension, and required to
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vacate campus pending resolution.
Plaintiff was charged under the Student Handbook with multiple violations. He met with
the student conduct office, submitted a written statement, and alleges that the statement was not
included in the hearing materials until after the hearing. The hearing was not recorded. Plaintiff
alleges that the absence of his written statement affected the hearing body’s assessment of his
credibility. Plaintiff further alleges that multiple students received discipline in connection with
the scheme, but that he alone was expelled while others received lesser sanctions. He appealed
administratively and was denied relief.
Plaintiff filed this action asserting breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, alleging among other things that the University failed to provide
his written statement to the hearing body, imposed an interim suspension without adequate
investigation, failed to give adequate notice of the harassment charge, did not record the hearing,
and imposed a disproportionate sanction. [Dkt. 2]. Plaintiff alleges resulting emotional,
reputational, and economic harms, including loss of educational opportunities. Id. The
University opposes the request to proceed pseudonymously and has filed a motion to
dismiss. [Dkts. 12, 15].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that the title of a complaint name all
parties, reflecting the presumption of public access to judicial proceedings. The First Circuit
recognizes a strong presumption against pseudonymous litigation and permits anonymity only in
“exceptional cases,” requiring a clear, case specific justification before departing from Rule
10(a). Doe v. Mass. Inst. of Tech. (“MIT”), 46 F.4th 61, 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2022). Courts evaluate
requests to proceed under a pseudonym by balancing the public’s right of access against the
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movant’s privacy or safety interests and consider the totality of the circumstances. See
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980); see also Doe v. Town of
Lisbon, 78 F.4th 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2023); Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418,
420 (D. Mass. 1995)); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 n.5 (1985)). In MIT, the First Circuit
identified four illustrative paradigms in which anonymity ordinarily will be warranted: (1)
identification would cause unusually severe physical or psychological harm; (2) identification
would harm innocent nonparties; (3) identification would chill similarly situated litigants; and (4)
the suit is bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law. 46 F.4th at 71. If
anonymity is permitted, any order must be narrowly tailored in scope and duration, with
on‑the‑record findings explaining the basis for the decision. Id. at 71–72.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court evaluates Plaintiff’s request under the First Circuit’s framework and the
totality of the circumstances. Two of the MIT paradigms are implicated and, on balance, limited
pseudonymous treatment is appropriate at this early stage. See MIT, 46 F.4th 61, 72 (1st Cir.
2022) (noting that anonymity may be appropriate when multiple paradigms are implicated even
if each, standing alone, is not dispositive).
A. Severe Harm
The first MIT paradigm applies where a would‑be Doe “reasonably fears that coming out
of the shadows will cause him unusually severe harm.” 46 F.4th at 71. Ordinary reputational
injury, embarrassment, or economic loss do not meet that standard. See Doe v. Word of Life
Fellowship, Inc., No. 11‑40077‑TSH, 2011 WL 2968912, at *2 (D. Mass. July 18, 2011); Doe v.
Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995). The First Circuit has
recognized that this paradigm is satisfied where disclosure would expose a litigant to a
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particularized risk of extreme physical danger, deportation, criminal exposure, or debilitating
psychological injury distinct from ordinary litigation stress. See MIT, 46 F.4th at 71–72.
Plaintiff asserts reputational injury, diminished employment and educational prospects,
psychological distress, if identified. The University correctly notes that ordinary reputational
injury and economic loss do not meet the “unusually severe” threshold. See Word of Life
Fellowship, 2011 WL 2968912, at *2; Bell Atl., 162 F.R.D. at 420. On the present record, given
Plaintiff’s admitted participation in the transactions at issue and the absence of evidence of a
particularized risk of physical danger or debilitating psychological injury, the first MIT paradigm
is not satisfied.
B. Harm to Innocent Nonparties
The second MIT paradigm encompasses cases “in which identifying the would‑be Doe
would harm ‘innocent non‑parties.’” 46 F.4th at 71. Nonparties often have a strong claim to
privacy, and courts should weigh the likelihood and severity of harm to identifiable nonparties
when considering pseudonymity. See Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 78–79 (1st Cir.
2018) (recognizing nonparty privacy interests in the student discipline context.
Here, disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity would materially narrow the universe of potential
participants in the alleged scheme because the relevant cohort is a discrete group associated with
campus athletics. That narrowing increases the risk that teammates or other students who did not
consent to litigation or who may have been victims would be identified or subjected to damaging
speculation. Balancing the competing interests and tailoring relief narrowly, the Court concludes
that disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity would pose a real and appreciable risk of harm to innocent
nonparties. The second MIT paradigm therefore supports pseudonymous treatment at this stage.
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C. Chilling Effect on Future Litigants
The third MIT paradigm asks whether compelled identification would “likely deter, to an
unacceptable degree, similarly situated individuals from litigating.” 46 F.4th at 71. Deterrence
concerns most commonly arise in cases involving intimate matters, criminal exposure, or where
disclosure itself would cause the injury at issue. Id.; see also Town of Lisbon, 78 F.4th at 46.
The record here centers on a peer‑to‑peer financial scheme and does not present the
intimate, stigmatizing, or criminal exposure contexts that most commonly justify anonymity on
deterrence grounds. Plaintiff has not identified a cognizable class of potential litigants who
would be uniquely deterred by disclosure. The third MIT paradigm is therefore not satisfied on
the present record.
D. Confidentiality of Prior Proceedings
The fourth MIT paradigm applies where a federal suit is “bound up with a prior
proceeding made confidential by law,” such that denying anonymity in the new suit would
“significantly impinge upon the interests served by keeping the prior proceeding confidential.”
46 F.4th at 72; see also Town of Lisbon, 78 F.4th at 46. The Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, generally restricts disclosure of education records
and student disciplinary records and reflects a congressional judgment that schools should not
unilaterally disclose certain student information. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. FERPA permits
limited disclosures in litigation contexts, for example, in response to a court order or subpoena
under specified conditions. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9)(iii)(B). The First Circuit has instructed
that courts must account for the “background confidentiality regime” when assessing requests for
pseudonymity, but that confidentiality is only one factor in the balancing test and does not
automatically require anonymity. MIT, 46 F.4th at 74, 76.
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Plaintiff invokes FERPA and the University’s Handbook confidentiality provisions,
arguing that this federal suit is bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law. The
University correctly observes that FERPA and institutional policies do not automatically entitle a
litigant to proceed anonymously. Confidentiality is a factor to be weighed, not a dispositive
rule. This litigation arises from a university disciplinary process and thus implicates the
background confidentiality regime. FERPA and the University handbook weigh in favor of
protecting privacy interests in the adjudicative record and counsel caution before exposing
student discipline materials to public view. At the same time, FERPA permits limited
disclosures in litigation and does not by itself mandate anonymity for a plaintiff who has chosen
to bring a public lawsuit. The fourth MIT paradigm is therefore implicated here but is not
independently dispositive.
E. Balancing and Scope of Relief
Weighing the public’s interest in open proceedings and the University’s interest in a fair
defense against the privacy interests at stake, the Court concludes that limited pseudonymous
treatment is appropriate at this early stage. The second MIT paradigm (risk of harm to innocent
nonparties) carries particular weight given the small, identifiable cohort implicated by the
Complaint. The fourth MIT paradigm (background confidentiality under FERPA and the
University Handbook) also favors protective measures. The first and third paradigms are not
satisfied on the present record. Accordingly, the Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed under a
pseudonym at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously [Dkt. 2] and
Motion to File Affidavit of Identity and List of Students Under Seal [Dkt. 11] are
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GRANTED. The affidavit identifying Plaintiff’s true name and the list of students shall remain
under seal and shall be accessible only to the Court and counsel of record until further order of
the Court. Public filings shall refer to Plaintiff only by pseudonym and shall omit any
information that would permit ready identification of Plaintiff or other students (including but
not limited to full names, student identification numbers, and social media handles). The parties
may move to modify or vacate this Order should change in circumstances warrant it.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 26, 2026 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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