Rafi v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-11276-RGS
SYED K. RAFI, PhD.
v.
NOVARTIS INSTITUTES OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
January 29, 2026
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiff Syed Rafi instituted this litigation in April of 2025, suing
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation under the ADEA, Title VII, and New
York law because his seven job applications submitted to Novartis Institutes
of Biomedical Research (Novartis IBR) between 2011 and 2024 produced no
interviews with the company. The court dismissed all claims (see Dkt #20),
finding Rafi’s job applications with the defendant discrete hiring decisions
and not eligible for a “continuing violation” theory. 	See National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Discrete acts such as
termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy
to identify.”); Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
However, the court permitted Rafi to replead his ADEA claim arising from a
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March of 2024 application (within the statute of limitations) for a Senior
Scientist position against the proper entity. 	The invitation was based on
whether Rafi has plausible allegations to support “NIBR’s knowledge of his
2004 EEOC complaint and the nexus between their knowledge and their
decision not to hire him for the Senior Scientist position.” Dkt #20 (Sept. 5,
2025 Order).
Rafi filed an Amended Complaint on October 6, 	2025, 	naming
Novartis IBR (proper party) as defendant. 	Despite the court’s previous
dismissal of his claims based on the statute of limitations, Rafi invokes all
seven 	applications 	to 	Novartis 	IBR 	dating 	back 	to 	2011, 	realleging 	a
“continuing pattern of age discrimination” in support of his only timely
claim. 	Am. Compl. at 2-3. 	Rafi also renews his claim that Novartis IBR
retaliated against him (by not hiring him) because of an EEOC charge he filed
against Yale University in 2004. Without support, Rafi asserts that because
he 	“authorized 	Novartis 	in 	his 	application 	to 	verify 	the 	information”
presumably it “contacted Yale and was informed of not only his 2004 EEOC
complaint, but also his ensuing civil suits against Yale.” Am. Compl. at 15.
The 	Amended 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	add 	facts 	regarding 	Novartis 	IBR’s
knowledge of Rafi’s protected activity or his “civil suits against Yale”, any
age-related comments, statements, or conduct. 	While recognizing that the
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chosen candidate is over forty, Rafi asserts that her degrees and publications
leave him far more fit for the position. Id. at 5-9; Opp’n at 4-5. Rafi proceeds
to contrast the selected candidate’s qualifications with what he sees as his
superior training and peer-reviewed publications as the key/critical evidence
of Novartis IBR’s discrimination. 	Undermining his arguments, Rafi even
goes on to assert that “[i]t is obvious that the ethnic Chinese selecting official
for this position favorably selected this Chinese ethnic candidate . . . .” Opp’n
at 5. Rafi also assumes that in performing a background check, Novartis “is
obligated to contact [his] professional ABMGG training program director,
Dr. Allen Bale at YSM, whose contact information is readily available at the
ABMGG 	website 	to 	affirm 	Rafi’s 	claim 	of 	having 	accomplished 	the
professional training which specifically makes him an exemplary candidate
for the position.” Id. at 8. Rafi’s support for his claims of age discrimination
and retaliation is an assumed chain of events and his opinion that he is the
far better candidate for the position than the female, over-40, non-white
woman selected by Novartis.
DISCUSSION
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009),
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quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	Two basic
principles guide the court’s analysis. 	“First, the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Second, only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. A
claim is facially plausible if its factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. 	If the allegations in the complaint are “too meager, vague, or
conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere
conjecture,” the complaint will be dismissed. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436,
442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc).
In a failure-to-hire age discrimination suit, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case by alleging facts supporting: (1) membership in a protected
class, (2) application and qualification for the position, (3) rejection despite
qualifications, and (4) that after rejection, the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of the plaintiff’s qualifications. 	See Woods v.
Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1994). Once Rafi makes
that showing, the burden shifts to defendant to provide a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for their decision not to hire him for the March 20,
2024 Senior Scientist position. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
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U.S. 	792 	(1973). 	Even 	if 	the 	court 	considers 	Rafi’s 	facts 	adequately
establishing a prima facie case, in its motion to dismiss, Novartis IBR points
to the fact that the candidate they hired is a woman over 40 years of age.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or the
ADEA, Rafi must plead facts that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2)
he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal nexus exists
between the protected conduct and the adverse action. See Soto-Feliciano v.
Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (ADEA); Velez v.
Janssen Ortho, LLC, 467 F.3d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 2006) (same). 	Causal
connection, in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, requires but-for
causation. 	See Anderson v. Brennan, 911 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2018). Rafi must
make factual allegations which support his assertions that but-for his filing
of an EEOC claim, he would have been offered the position.
However, Rafi’s allegations that NIBR retaliated against him (decided
not to hire him) based on an EEOC complaint that he had filed against a
university twenty years prior are supposition and far-too attenuated. 	Rafi
further speculates that when verifying his medical training there, NIBR was
told about Rafi’s EEOC complaint against Yale, and because of his complaint,
declined to hire him. 	This is insufficient pleading under Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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678-679, see also Univ. of Texas Sw Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362-
363 (2013).
While the court is sympathetic to Mr. Rafi regarding his inability to
obtain a position with defendant, there is not enough in Rafi’s allegations to
permit his lawsuit to proceed, nor to permit him to obtain the successful
candidate’s personnel file. “Put simply, the complaint has to allege a
plausible basis for a claim of discrimination, not just [what the plaintiff
consider to be] unfair treatment.” Alicea v. N. Am. Cent. Sch. Bus, LLC, 232
F. Supp. 3d 213, 215 (D. Mass. 2017).
ORDER
For 	the 	reasons 	stated, 	defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the
Amended Complaint is ALLOWED.
/s/Richard G. Stearns___________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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