Doe v. Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
JANE DOE (J.R.L.), an individual, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	Civil Action
v. 	) 	No. 24-cv-13227-PBS
)
HILTON DOMESTIC OPERATING COMPANY 	)
INC. and CROSSTOWN CENTER HOTEL 	)
LLC d/b/a HAMPTON INN & SUITES, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
November 18, 2025
Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff 	Jane 	Doe 	(J.R.L.) 	brings 	this 	lawsuit 	under 	the
Trafficking 	Victims 	Protection 	Reauthorization 	Act 	(“TVPRA”), 	18
U.S.C. § 1581 et seq., against Defendants Hilton Domestic Operating
Company 	Inc. 	(“Hilton”) 	and 	Crosstown 	Center 	Hotel 	LLC 	d/b/a
Hampton 	Inn 	& 	Suites 	(“Crosstown” 	and, 	together 	with 	Hilton,
“Defendants”).1 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	sex 	trafficked
between 2010 and 2014 at a Hampton Inn & Suites (“Hampton Inn”) in
Boston, Massachusetts, that was owned and operated by Crosstown as
a 	Hilton-branded 	franchise. 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	hold 	Defendants
1 Plaintiff named Hilton Domestic Management LLC as an additional
defendant in her complaint but has voluntarily dismissed that party
from this suit.
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civilly liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) for financially benefiting
from participation in a venture that they knew or should have known
was 	engaged 	in 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	sex 	trafficking 	statute.
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6), 	arguing 	that 	her 	suit 	is 	time-
barred 	and 	that 	she 	has 	failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	a 	claim 	under
the TVPRA.
After 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Hilton’s 	and 	Crosstown’s
motions to dismiss (Dkts. 16, 21).
BACKGROUND
The 	Court 	draws 	the 	following 	background 	from 	the 	well-
pleaded 	facts 	in 	the 	complaint. 	See 	Burt v. 	Bd. 	of 	Trs. 	of 	the
Univ. of R.I., 84 F.4th 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2023).
I. 	Plaintiff’s Sex Trafficking
Plaintiff met her trafficker in 2010. Starting that May, the
trafficker 	forced 	Plaintiff 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	acts
numerous times a day. The trafficker used physical and mental abuse
and financial dependence to coerce Plaintiff into performing these
acts. 	Some 	of 	these 	forced 	commercial 	sex 	acts 	occurred 	in 	hotel
rooms at a Hampton Inn located in Boston, Massachusetts. That hotel
was 	owned 	and 	operated 	by 	Crosstown 	as 	a 	Hilton 	franchise. 	Both
Crosstown 	and 	Hilton 	received 	revenue 	from 	the 	rental 	of 	hotel
rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked. Plaintiff was trafficked
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at the Hampton Inn from May 2010 through December 2014. Plaintiff’s
trafficker trafficked other victims at the Hampton Inn as well.
Plaintiff alleges that there were obvious signs she was being
trafficked at the Hampton Inn and that these “red flags” were well
known 	in 	the 	hotel 	industry, 	including 	by 	Crosstown 	and 	Hilton.
The 	hotel 	rooms 	in 	which 	she 	was 	trafficked 	were 	often 	paid 	for
with cash or prepaid cards. The “Do Not Disturb” door hanger stayed
up 	for 	consecutive 	days, 	and 	housekeeping 	was 	prevented 	from
entering the room for regular cleaning. Plaintiff’s trafficker was
frequently present with her at check-in and lingered in the hotel
or 	parking 	lot 	when 	she 	was 	with 	a 	john. 	Plaintiff 	had 	at 	least
five 	johns 	each 	day, 	and 	those 	men 	visited 	for 	brief 	periods 	of
time at unusual hours. Hotel management and staff “knew [Plaintiff]
as 	a 	regular 	and 	allowed 	her 	and/or 	her 	trafficker 	to 	have 	any
room 	they 	wanted.” 	Dkt. 	1 	¶ 	77(g). 	The 	staff 	also 	provided 	extra
towels 	and 	housekeeping 	services 	once 	the 	trafficker 	vacated 	the
rooms.
Other victims were trafficked at the Hampton Inn both before
and at the same time as Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that some of
these 	victims 	also 	exhibited 	obvious 	indications 	of 	trafficking,
such 	as 	large 	numbers 	of 	men 	entering 	and 	leaving 	their 	rooms,
frequent 	requests 	for 	clean 	towels 	and 	sheets, 	and 	signs 	of 	drug
use. 	Online 	reviews 	of 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	between 	2010 	and 	2018
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described homelessness and drug dealing in the area and prostitutes
at the hotel bar.
II. 	Relationship Between Crosstown and Hilton
As 	franchisor, 	Hilton 	established 	standards, 	policies, 	and
systems 	for 	Crosstown’s 	operation 	of 	the 	Hampton 	Inn. 	Hilton
enforced 	standards 	for 	employee 	hiring 	and 	training, 	staffing
levels, 	guest 	verification 	and 	check-in, 	insurance 	coverage,
reporting 	and 	recordkeeping, 	and 	building 	maintenance. 	Hilton
participated 	in 	employment 	decisions 	for 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	and 	set
employee 	wages. 	Hilton 	established 	prices 	for 	room 	rentals;
required 	Crosstown 	to 	use 	centralized 	platforms 	for 	room
reservations, payments, property management, and guest complaints;
and 	mandated 	that 	Crosstown 	purchase 	goods 	and 	supplies 	from
approved vendors. Hilton signed off on any marketing undertaken by
Crosstown 	and 	had 	the 	right 	to 	inspect 	the 	Hampton 	Inn. 	Hilton
also 	had 	access 	to 	surveillance 	cameras 	and 	security 	systems 	at
the Hampton Inn.
Starting 	in 	2010, 	Hilton 	publicly 	committed 	to 	efforts 	to
stop sex trafficking at its hotels. Hilton instituted centralized
policies regarding training, reporting, and monitoring in order to
combat 	sex 	trafficking. 	Hilton 	monitored 	news 	stories 	and 	online
reviews 	for 	indicia 	of 	criminal 	activity 	at 	its 	hotels, 	some 	of
which described sex trafficking and prostitution between 2007 and
2014.
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Hilton 	required 	Crosstown 	to 	report 	any 	suspected 	criminal
activity at the Hampton Inn. Hilton received reports from Crosstown
and others of crime at the Hampton Inn, including sex trafficking.
Hilton 	regularly 	inspected 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	and 	monitored 	guest
surveys, 	online 	reviews, 	customer 	complaints, 	and 	data 	on 	the
Hampton Inn’s operations and its customers.
LEGAL STANDARD
To 	survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim
under 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	a 	complaint 	must 	allege 	“a 	plausible
entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
559 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to 	dismiss 	does 	not 	need 	detailed 	factual 	allegations, 	a
plaintiff’s 	obligation 	to 	provide 	the 	grounds 	of 	his 	entitlement
to 	relief 	requires 	more 	than 	labels 	and 	conclusions, 	and 	a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. 	at 	555 	(cleaned 	up). 	This 	standard 	requires 	a 	court 	to
“separate 	the 	complaint’s 	factual 	allegations 	(which 	must 	be
accepted 	as 	true) 	from 	its 	conclusory 	legal 	allegations 	(which
need not be credited).” Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880
F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R.,
676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). The court must then determine
whether the factual allegations permit it “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Germanowski v. 	Harris, 	854 	F.3d 	68, 	72 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The court may grant
a motion to dismiss premised on an affirmative defense if “(i) the
facts establishing the defense are definitively ascertainable from
the complaint and the other allowable sources of information, and
(ii) those facts suffice to establish the affirmative defense with
certitude.” 	Burt, 	84 	F.4th 	at 	50 	(quoting 	Nisselson v. 	Lernout,
469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Statute of Limitations
Defendants 	first 	argue 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	TVPRA 	claims 	should
be dismissed because they are barred by the statute of limitations.
As 	relevant 	here, 	the 	TVPRA 	requires 	that 	any 	civil 	action 	be
brought 	“not 	later 	than . . . 	10 	years 	after 	the 	cause 	of 	action
arose.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1595(c)(1). 	Plaintiff 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	on
December 	31, 	2024, 	so 	her 	claims 	are 	timely 	if 	they 	arose 	no
earlier 	than 	December 	31, 	2014. 	Defendants 	assert, 	and 	Plaintiff
does not dispute, that Plaintiff’s claims arose no later than the
last 	day 	she 	was 	trafficked 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn. 	The 	complaint
alleges that Plaintiff was trafficked at the Hampton Inn “between
May 2010 to December 2014.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 25.
Defendants stress that Plaintiff does not specifically allege
that 	she 	was 	trafficked 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	on 	December 	31, 	2014.
But 	because 	a 	statute 	of 	limitations 	is 	an 	affirmative 	defense,
see 	Martínez-Rivera v. 	Puerto 	Rico, 	812 	F.3d 	69, 	73 	(1st 	Cir.
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2016), 	it 	“is 	‘not 	something 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	anticipate 	and
negate 	in 	her 	pleading,’” 	Cunningham v. 	Cornell 	Univ., 	604 	U.S.
693, 	702 	(2025) 	(quoting 	Perry v. 	Merit 	Sys. 	Prot. 	Bd., 	582 	U.S.
420, 	435 	n.9 	(2017)). 	Rather, 	a 	dismissal 	based 	on 	a 	statute 	of
limitations 	is 	proper 	only 	if 	the 	facts 	alleged 	in 	the 	complaint
“establish . . . 	with 	certitude” 	that 	the 	claim 	is 	time-barred.
Burt, 	84 	F.4th 	at 	50 	(quoting 	Nisselson, 	469 	F.3d 	at 	150).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	trafficked 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn
through December 2014, which may include the last day of the month.
It 	is 	therefore 	not 	certain 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	TVPRA 	claims 	are
entirely time-barred.
The parties also dispute whether Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims are
subject 	to 	the 	continuing 	violation 	doctrine 	such 	that 	“redress
may 	be 	available 	for 	injuries 	caused 	by 	actions 	that 	would
otherwise have been barred by the statute of limitations” because
they 	occurred 	more 	than 	ten 	years 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the
complaint. Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 961 F.3d 22, 30 n.9 (1st
Cir. 	2020). 	Most 	courts 	have 	held 	that 	TVPRA 	claims 	fall 	within
this doctrine. See, e.g., Le v. New Eng. Swimming, __ F. Supp. 3d
__, __ (D. Mass. 2025) [2025 WL 2323563, at *3]; Doe 1 v. Gov’t of
the U.S. V.I., 771 F. Supp. 3d 379, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Levin v.
Sarah 	Lawrence 	Coll., 	747 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	645, 	670 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2024);
Ali 	v. 	Khan, 	336 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	901, 	910 	(N.D. 	Ill. 	2018). 	But 	see
Christina T. v. Bellagio LLC, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (D. Nev. 2025)
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[2025 WL 2962780, at *3] (holding that TVPRA claims are not subject
to 	the 	continuing 	violation 	doctrine). 	Given 	the 	weight 	of
authority, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are subject
to 	the 	continuing 	violation 	doctrine. 	Dismissal 	of 	the 	complaint
based on the statute of limitations is not warranted.2
II. 	Plausibility of TVPRA Claims
The 	Court 	now 	turns 	to 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	regarding 	the
plausibility 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	TVPRA 	claims. 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1591
criminalizes the sex trafficking of an individual via force, fraud,
or 	coercion. 	See 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 1591(a). 	The 	TVPRA 	provides 	a 	civil
cause of action to “[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation
of [§ 1591].” Id. § 1595(a). Under this provision, the victim may
sue 	“the 	perpetrator” 	or, 	as 	relevant 	here, 	“whoever 	knowingly
benefits . . . financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation 	in 	a 	venture 	which 	that 	person 	knew 	or 	should 	have
known has engaged in an act in violation of [§ 1591].” Id. A claim
of beneficiary liability under the TVPRA has four elements: “(1) a
venture 	has 	engaged 	in 	an 	act 	in 	violation 	of [§] 1591, 	(2) 	the
defendant knew or should have known that the venture had violated
[§] 1591, 	(3) 	the 	defendant 	participated 	in 	that 	venture, 	and
(4) the 	defendant 	knowingly 	benefited 	from 	its 	participation.”
2 Because the complaint does not make clear that Plaintiff’s claims
are 	time-barred, 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	resolve 	the 	parties’ 	dispute
as 	to 	whether 	Plaintiff 	is 	entitled 	to 	equitable 	tolling 	of 	the
limitations period.
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G.G. v. 	Salesforce.com, 	Inc., 	76 	F.4th 	544, 	553 	(7th 	Cir. 	2023);
see Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1175 (9th Cir.
2022) 	(listing 	similar 	elements); 	Doe 	#1 v. 	Red 	Roof 	Inns, 	Inc.,
21 F.4th 714, 723 (11th Cir. 2021) (same).
Plaintiff brings TVPRA beneficiary liability claims under two
theories. 	First, 	she 	alleges 	that 	Defendants 	are 	each 	directly
liable as beneficiaries of her sex trafficking (Count I). Second,
she 	contends 	that 	Hilton 	is 	vicariously 	liable 	for 	Crosstown’s
beneficiary 	liability 	because 	Crosstown 	acted 	as 	Hilton’s 	agent
(Count II).
Defendants 	do 	not 	contest 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	plausibly
alleged 	that 	she 	was 	a 	victim 	of 	a 	criminal 	sex 	trafficking
violation 	committed 	by 	her 	trafficker. 	See 	G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	552
(asking 	as 	a 	threshold 	question 	whether 	the 	plaintiff 	“plausibly
alleged 	that 	[she] 	was 	a 	victim 	of 	violations 	of 	[§] 	1591”). 	Nor
do 	Defendants 	dispute 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	allegation 	that 	they
received 	revenue 	from 	renting 	rooms 	to 	her 	trafficker 	satisfies
the requirement that they knowingly benefitted from participation
in 	a 	venture. 	See 	Ricchio 	v. 	McLean, 	853 	F.3d 	553, 	556-57 	(1st
Cir. 2017) (Souter, J.) (holding that payment for motel rooms used
to 	traffic 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	a 	knowing 	benefit). 	Instead,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not adequately pled her direct
liability 	claims 	because 	the 	complaint 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege
that 	they 	1) participated 	in 	a 	qualifying 	venture 	and 	2) 	knew 	or
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should 	have 	known 	that 	the 	venture 	engaged 	in 	a 	criminal 	sex
trafficking violation. Hilton also contends that Plaintiff has not
plausibly alleged the agency relationship necessary to support her
claim of vicarious liability.
A. 	Crosstown
The 	Court 	begins 	by 	addressing 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	against
Crosstown, 	the 	franchisee 	of 	the 	Hampton 	Inn. 	Plaintiff 	alleges
two 	theories 	of 	the 	qualifying 	“venture” 	in 	which 	Crosstown
participated: 1) a venture with her sex trafficker for the ongoing
rental 	of 	hotel 	rooms 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	and 	2) a 	venture 	with
Hilton 	to 	operate 	the 	Hampton 	Inn. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons,
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a TVPRA beneficiary claim against
Crosstown under the first venture theory. The Court therefore need
not address the second theory.
Based 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	trafficker’s 	use 	of 	force 	and 	coercion
to cause Plaintiff to engage in commercial sex acts in the Hampton
Inn 	hotel 	rooms, 	Crosstown’s 	alleged 	venture 	with 	the 	trafficker
“engaged in an act in violation of [§ 1591].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a);
see Doe (K.E.C.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 719, 736 (E.D.
Tex. 2024); C.B. v. Naseeb Invs., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1352-
53 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	2024). 	The 	dispositive 	questions 	are 	whether
Crosstown’s 	relationship 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	trafficker 	amounted 	to
“participation in a venture” and whether Crosstown knew or should
have known about the criminal sex trafficking.
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1. 	Participation in a Venture
Crosstown 	raises 	two 	main 	challenges 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	theory
that 	it 	participated 	in 	a 	venture 	with 	her 	sex 	trafficker.
Emphasizing that the focus of this venture was the rental of hotel
rooms, 	Crosstown 	faults 	Plaintiff 	for 	failing 	to 	allege 	that 	it
participated 	in 	a 	primarily 	sex 	trafficking 	venture 	or 	shared 	a
common purpose with the trafficker of forcing Plaintiff to engage
in 	commercial 	sex 	acts. 	Crosstown 	also 	argues 	that 	it 	merely
engaged 	in 	ordinary 	buyer-seller 	transactions 	with 	Plaintiff’s
trafficker and that such conduct does not amount to “participation
in a venture” under the TVPRA.
The 	Court 	rejects 	Crosstown’s 	argument 	that 	the 	TVPRA
requires 	that 	the 	venture 	be 	a 	primarily 	sex-trafficking 	venture
and 	that 	the 	defendant 	act 	with 	a 	purpose 	of 	facilitating 	sex
trafficking. A few courts have held that a plaintiff must establish
the existence of a primarily sex trafficking venture to succeed on
a TVPRA claim. See, e.g., Powell v. W. Express, Inc., __ F. Supp.
3d 	__, 	__ 	(M.D. 	Tenn. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	2306949, 	at 	*4-6]; 	Geiss v.
Weinstein 	Co. 	Holdings 	LLC, 	383 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	156, 	169 	(S.D.N.Y.
2019); 	cf. 	Doe 	#1, 	21 	F.4th 	at 	726-27 	(asking 	whether 	the
plaintiffs 	plausibly 	alleged 	that 	hotel 	franchisors 	participated
in 	sex 	trafficking 	ventures, 	but 	clarifying 	that 	the 	plaintiffs
had 	framed 	the 	relevant 	ventures 	in 	that 	manner 	during 	the
litigation). 	Most 	courts 	have 	rejected 	such 	a 	rule. 	See 	G.G., 	76
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F.4th at 554 & n.8 (collecting cases). As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, the text of § 1595(a) does not limit the term “venture”
to specifically a sex trafficking venture; it merely requires that
the defendant participate “in a venture which . . . has engaged in
an 	act 	in 	violation 	of 	[§ 1591].” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 1595(a); 	see 	G.G.,
76 F.4th at 553-54. Requiring the defendant to act with a purpose
of 	facilitating 	sex 	trafficking 	would 	improperly 	negate 	§ 1595’s
imposition 	of 	civil 	liability 	on 	a 	defendant 	that 	merely 	“should
have 	known” 	that 	the 	venture 	in 	which 	it 	participated 	engaged 	in
a 	criminal 	sex 	trafficking 	violation. 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 1595(a); 	see
City 	of 	Providence 	v. 	Barr, 	954 	F.3d 	23, 	37 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020)
(“Courts 	generally 	ought 	not 	to 	interpret 	statutes 	in 	a 	way 	that
renders 	words 	or 	phrases 	either 	meaningless 	or 	superfluous.”).
Thus, 	the 	“venture” 	underlying 	a 	civil 	TVPRA 	claim 	may 	be 	a
commercial venture “whose primary focus is not on sex trafficking.”
G.G., 76 F.4th at 554.
As 	for 	whether 	Crosstown’s 	relationship 	with 	Plaintiff’s
trafficker 	amounted 	to 	“participation 	in 	a 	venture,” 	the 	parties
set 	forth 	different 	formulations 	of 	what 	this 	element 	requires.
Crosstown 	highlights 	that 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has 	defined 	the
phrase “participation in a venture” based on its plain and ordinary
meaning 	to 	refer 	to 	“t[aking] 	part 	in 	a 	common 	undertaking 	or
enterprise involving risk and potential profit.” Doe #1, 21 F.4th
at 725. The D.C. Circuit has defined the phrase similarly. See Doe
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1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2024). For her part,
Plaintiff cites the Seventh Circuit’s formulation, which requires
“‘a continuous business relationship’ between the participant and
the 	trafficker.” 	G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	559 	(quoting 	G.G. 	v.
Salesforce.com, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 3d 626, 644 (N.D. Ill. 2022)).3
Despite 	their 	varying 	glosses 	on 	the 	“participation 	in 	a
venture” 	element, 	courts 	largely 	agree 	on 	certain 	guiding
principles. This element “does not require direct participation in
sex trafficking.” G.G., 76 F.4th at 561; see Doe (K.E.C.), 750 F.
Supp. 3d at 731; J.L. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 1048,
1062 (D. Colo. 2021); A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	921, 	937 	(D. 	Or. 	2020); 	S.J. v. 	Choice 	Hotels 	Int’l,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). But a defendant’s
mere failure to detect and prevent trafficking does not constitute
“participation 	in 	a 	venture” 	with 	the 	trafficker. 	See 	F.C. v.
Jacobs Sols. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1190 (D. Colo. 2025); Doe
(K.E.C.), 	750 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	734; 	L.H. 	v. 	Marriott 	Int’l, 	Inc.,
604 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1346, 	1361 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	2022); 	A.B. v. 	Marriott
3 A neighboring statutory section defines “venture” as “any group
of 	two 	or 	more 	individuals 	associated 	in 	fact.” 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 1591(e)(6). The First Circuit has used this definition to analyze
a claim of civil liability under the TVPRA. See Ricchio, 853 F.3d
at 	556. 	Other 	circuits 	have 	declined 	to 	use 	§ 	1591(e)(6)’s
definition 	of 	“venture” 	when 	analyzing 	a 	civil 	claim 	under
§ 1595(a) because § 1591(e) states that its definitions apply only
“[i]n 	this 	section.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1591(e); 	see 	Doe 	1, 	96 	F.4th 	at
415 n.5; G.G., 76 F.4th at 554 n.7.
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Int’l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 171, 182 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Nor is this
element satisfied if the defendant only “engag[es] in an ordinary
buyer-seller 	transaction,” 	Doe 	1, 	96 	F.4th 	at 	415, 	or 	makes
“routine 	sales 	of 	off-the-shelf 	products 	or 	standard 	services,”
G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	563. 	A 	defendant’s 	provision 	of 	“customized 	or
personalized” 	products 	or 	services, 	however, 	may 	transform 	an
arms-length consumer transaction into “participation in a venture”
for purposes of a civil TVPRA claim. F.C., 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1188-
89 (collecting cases). Compare G.G., 76 F.4th at 562 (finding this
element met where a software company provided “targeted solutions
addressed 	to 	the 	needs 	of 	[a 	website]’s 	business, 	repeatedly
assessed 	[the 	website]’s 	operational 	needs, 	and 	provided 	active,
ongoing 	support 	that 	was 	tailored 	to 	those 	needs” 	(internal
quotation marks omitted)), with Doe 1, 96 F.4th at 416 (holding to
the contrary where the defendant only “purchas[ed] a commodity”).
The Court need not decide among the different formulations of
the 	“participation 	in 	a 	venture” 	element 	in 	the 	caselaw 	because
Plaintiff has stated a claim against Crosstown under any of them.
The 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	trafficker 	repeatedly
trafficked her at the Hampton Inn over a period of four-and-a-half
years. The complaint further alleges that in addition to providing
Plaintiff and her trafficker with standard services such as wi-fi
and 	housekeeping, 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	management 	and 	staff 	“knew
[Plaintiff] 	as 	a 	regular” 	and 	allowed 	her 	and 	her 	trafficker 	“to
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have any room they wanted.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 77(g). Plaintiff’s claim thus
rests 	on 	more 	than 	Crosstown’s 	failure 	to 	detect 	and 	prevent 	sex
trafficking 	or 	an 	ordinary 	buyer-seller 	relationship 	between
Crosstown and Plaintiff’s trafficker. Instead, Plaintiff plausibly
alleges a continuous and recurring relationship between Crosstown
and her trafficker involving some custom services that facilitated
the sex trafficking. This type of continuous business relationship
between 	a 	defendant 	and 	a 	trafficker 	is 	sufficient 	to 	establish
the “participation in a venture” element under the TVPRA. See G.G.,
76 	F.4th 	at 	560; 	Doe 	(K.R.D.) v. 	Hilton 	Worldwide 	Holdings 	Inc.,
__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	__, 	__ 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	2539010, 	at 	*8-
9]; 	Doe 	(K.E.C.), 	750 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	734; 	K.O. v. 	G6 	Hosp., 	LLC,
728 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2024); cf. Doe 1, 96 F.4th at
416 	(recognizing 	that 	a 	“direct 	and 	continuous 	relationship”
beyond 	the 	mere 	purchasing 	of 	a 	commodity 	may 	amount 	to
“participation in a venture”).
2. 	Actual or Constructive Knowledge
Crosstown 	also 	challenges 	Plaintiff’s 	pleading 	of 	the
knowledge 	element 	of 	her 	TVPRA 	claim. 	To 	satisfy 	the 	TVPRA’s
knowledge element at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff must
plausibly 	allege 	that 	the 	defendant 	“knew 	or 	should 	have 	known”
that the venture engaged in a sex trafficking violation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a); 	see 	G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	555. 	While 	actual 	knowledge 	is
not 	required, 	the 	defendant 	“must 	have 	had 	at 	least 	constructive
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knowledge that the ‘venture’ in question has engaged in” criminal
sex 	trafficking. 	G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	555 	n.9; 	see 	Doe 	#1, 	21 	F.4th
at 	725. 	Knowledge 	of 	the 	prevalence 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	in 	hotels
in general is not enough by itself to establish this element. See
Doe 	(K.E.C.), 	750 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	731; 	Doe 	(L.M.) v. 	42 	Hotel
Raleigh, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 3d 464, 473 (E.D.N.C. 2024); S.J., 473
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	154, 	but 	such 	general 	awareness 	“‘often 	informs’
the 	knowledge 	analysis,” 	F.C., 	790 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1193 	(quoting
Doe (S.M.A.) v. Salesforce, Inc., No. 23-cv-0915, 2024 WL 1337370,
at 	*16 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	Mar. 	28, 	2024)); 	see 	Doe 	(K.R.D.), 	__ 	F. 	Supp.
3d at __ [2025 WL 2539010, at *10].
Moreover, the TVPRA requires the defendant to have actual or
constructive 	knowledge 	that 	the 	venture 	was 	“engaged 	in
trafficking, not just in any illegal activity.” Mueller v. Deutsche
Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 777 F. Supp. 3d 329, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2025),
appeal filed, No. 25-1162 (2d Cir. May 6, 2025). Thus, “it is not
enough for a complaint to establish that a defendant hotel operator
should 	have 	known 	of 	prostitution 	or 	general 	commercial 	sex
activity taking place at its property”; the plaintiff must instead
plausibly allege “that a defendant knew or should have known of a
venture involving sex trafficking by force, threat of force, fraud,
or 	coercion, 	or 	a 	combination 	thereof.” 	A.B. v. 	Interstate 	Mgmt.
Co., 746 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1007 (D. Or. 2024); see Doe (L.M.), 717
F. Supp. 3d at 472.
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The parties disagree as to whether the TVPRA requires that a
defendant 	have 	actual 	or 	constructive 	knowledge 	that 	the 	venture
engaged 	in 	trafficking 	of 	the 	plaintiff 	specifically 	or 	whether
knowledge 	that 	the 	venture 	engaged 	in 	trafficking 	more 	generally
is sufficient. Courts are split on this question. Compare Doe #1,
21 	F.4th 	at 	725 	(holding 	that 	“the 	defendant 	must 	have 	either
actual 	or 	constructive 	knowledge 	that 	the 	venture . . . 	violated
the 	TVPRA 	as 	to 	the 	plaintiff”), 	with 	G.G., 	76 	F.4th 	at 	558
(rejecting this proposition and holding that the plaintiff “needs
to allege plausibly that the defendant had constructive knowledge
that a venture generally has violated [§] 1591”). The Court finds
the 	Seventh 	Circuit’s 	analysis 	persuasive 	on 	this 	question 	of
statutory construction. Regardless, the complaint meets the higher
bar 	of 	plausibly 	alleging 	Crosstown’s 	constructive 	knowledge 	of
Plaintiff’s trafficking in particular.
With 	regard 	to 	the 	knowledge 	element, 	Crosstown 	primarily
argues that Plaintiff’s factual allegations suggest that it should
have known only that Plaintiff was engaged in voluntary commercial
sex acts and not that she was being trafficked. While other courts
have come out differently on similar allegations, see, e.g., Doe v.
Hyatt Corp., No. 24-cv-01229, 2025 WL 1953857, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex.
July 	15, 	2025), 	this 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	pleaded
sufficient facts to nudge from possible to plausible the inference
that 	Crosstown 	had 	constructive 	knowledge 	of 	her 	trafficking.
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Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	trafficked 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn
repeatedly over the course of four-and-a-half years, that she and
her trafficker often paid for the hotel rooms with cash or prepaid
cards, that the “Do Not Disturb” door hanger stayed up for multiple
days in a row, that her trafficker was frequently present with her
at check-in and lingered in the hotel or parking lot when she was
with 	a 	john, 	and 	that 	she 	had 	at 	least 	five 	johns 	per 	day 	who
visited for brief periods of times. Viewed in the aggregate, these
facts 	-- 	especially 	the 	lengthy 	timeframe 	in 	which 	Plaintiff 	was
trafficked at the Hampton Inn, the trafficker’s monitoring of her,
and 	the 	number 	of 	johns 	who 	visited 	per 	day 	-- 	are 	sufficient 	to
plausibly allege that Crosstown’s employees should have known that
she 	was 	being 	trafficked 	and 	was 	not 	merely 	engaged 	in 	voluntary
commercial sex acts. See Doe (K.R.D.), __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025
WL 	2539010, 	at 	*10] 	(holding 	that 	similar 	allegations 	were
sufficient 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	a 	hotel 	franchisee’s 	constructive
knowledge 	of 	sex 	trafficking); 	see 	also 	C.B., 	748 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
1350, 	1362 	(emphasizing 	the 	“short 	timeframe” 	of 	around 	twenty-
four hours that the plaintiff was at the hotel in granting summary
judgment to the hotel operator on the issue of whether the operator
should 	have 	known 	about 	the 	sex 	trafficking); 	T.D.P. 	v. 	Choice
Hotels 	Int’l, 	Inc., 	725 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	784, 	798 	(S.D. 	Ohio 	2024)
(listing “excessive condoms, cash payments from [the plaintiff’s]
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traffickers, and frequent male guests” as facts that “should have
alerted [hotel] staff to her trafficking).
Crosstown 	faults 	Plaintiff 	for 	not 	alleging 	certain 	clear
indicia 	of 	sex 	trafficking, 	such 	as 	physical 	assaults 	or 	other
efforts 	to 	exert 	control 	in 	public 	areas, 	visible 	signs 	of 	abuse
or 	physical 	deterioration, 	or 	screaming 	from 	her 	hotel 	room. 	See
A.B., 	746 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1008. 	But 	“[a] 	sex 	trafficking 	victim
need 	not 	plead 	that 	she 	showed 	every 	possible 	[sign] 	of 	being
trafficked 	in 	order 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	that 	sufficient 	signs 	of
trafficking 	were 	present 	to 	make 	her 	trafficking 	obvious 	to
defendants.” Doe (K.R.D.), __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 2539010,
at *10]. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Crosstown was aware
that 	the 	circumstances 	of 	her 	stays 	at 	the 	Hampton 	Inn 	exhibited
red 	flags 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	and 	that 	other 	victims 	exhibiting
similar red flags were trafficked at the Hampton Inn before and at
the same time as she was. Thus, it is plausible at this early stage
that 	Crosstown 	should 	have 	known 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	being
trafficked.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a direct beneficiary claim
under the TVPRA against Crosstown.
B. 	Hilton
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s claim against Hilton, the
franchisor. The complaint asserts two TVPRA counts against Hilton,
one 	for 	direct 	liability 	and 	the 	other 	for 	vicarious 	liability
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based 	on 	Crosstown’s 	underlying 	TVPRA 	violation. 	“Vicarious
liability 	is 	not 	an 	independent 	cause 	of 	action, 	but 	rather 	is 	a
legal 	concept 	used 	to 	transfer 	liability 	from 	an 	agent 	to 	a
principal.” 	Gaston v. 	Ghosh, 	920 	F.3d 	493, 	497 	(7th 	Cir. 	2019)
(quoting 	Crawford 	v. 	Signet 	Bank, 	179 	F.3d 	926, 	929 	(D.C. 	Cir.
1999)); see Mercurio v. Town of Sherborn, 287 F. Supp. 3d 109, 125
(D. Mass. 2017) (“[V]icarious liability is a theory of liability;
it is not in and of itself an independent cause of action.”). The
Court 	therefore 	construes 	the 	complaint’s 	two 	counts 	as
alternative 	theories 	for 	Hilton’s 	liability 	under 	the 	TVPRA. 	And
because, 	for 	the 	following 	reasons, 	Plaintiff 	has 	plausibly
alleged 	a 	TVPRA 	violation 	by 	Hilton 	under 	a 	vicarious 	liability
theory, 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	address 	Plaintiff’s 	theory 	of 	direct
liability against Hilton at this stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)
(“A 	party 	may 	set 	out 	2 	or 	more 	statements 	of 	a 	claim 	or 	defense
alternatively 	or 	hypothetically, 	either 	in 	a 	single 	count 	or
defense 	or 	in 	separate 	ones. 	If 	a 	party 	makes 	alternative
statements, 	the 	pleading 	is 	sufficient 	if 	any 	one 	of 	them 	is
sufficient.”); 	Elena 	v. 	Municipality 	of 	San 	Juan, 	677 	F.3d 	1, 	8
(1st 	Cir. 	2012) 	(declining 	to 	assess 	the 	sufficiency 	of 	the
plaintiffs’ multiple theories of a property interest in support of
their 	procedural 	due 	process 	claim 	where 	at 	least 	one 	theory 	was
plausible).
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The TVPRA permits vicarious liability under an agency theory.
See, e.g., Doe (K.E.C.), 750 F. Supp. 3d at 731-32; G.M. v. Choice
Hotels Int’l, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 3d 766, 781-82 (S.D. Ohio 2024);
Treminio v. 	Crowley 	Mar. 	Corp., 	649 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1223, 	1232 	(M.D.
Fla. 2023); J.L., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. As previously discussed,
Plaintiff 	has 	stated 	an 	underlying 	claim 	for 	direct 	beneficiary
liability 	against 	Crosstown. 	Hilton 	contends 	that 	Plaintiff 	has
not 	plausibly 	pled 	a 	principal-agent 	relationship 	between 	it 	and
Crosstown 	such 	that 	it 	can 	be 	held 	vicariously 	liable 	for
Crosstown’s violation.
Some 	district 	courts 	apply 	the 	federal 	common 	law 	of 	agency
to assess if an agency relationship exists for purposes of a claim
of 	vicarious 	liability 	under 	the 	TVPRA, 	see, 	e.g., 	Doe 	(K.R.D.),
__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	2539010, 	at 	*4]; 	Doe 	(K.E.C.), 	750
F. Supp. 3d at 738, while others apply state law, see, e.g., K.O.,
728 F. Supp. 3d at 649; A.B., 455 F. Supp. 3d at 195. In this case,
Plaintiff asserts that federal law governs this issue, and Hilton
does 	not 	argue 	otherwise. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	assumes 	without
deciding that federal law applies. The federal common law of agency
incorporates 	principles 	from 	the 	Restatement 	of 	Agency. 	See
Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 F.4th 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2022);
In 	re 	Sterling, 	933 	F.3d 	828, 	835 	(7th 	Cir. 	2019); 	Salyers 	v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 871 F.3d 934, 939 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).
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An 	agency 	relationship 	arises 	when 	a 	principal 	and 	an 	agent
manifest assent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf
and 	subject 	to 	the 	principal’s 	control.” 	Restatement 	(Third) 	of
Agency § 1.01 (A.L.I. 2006). “[T]he mere existence of a franchise
relationship does not necessarily trigger” an agency relationship
even 	though 	“[s]ome 	degree 	of 	control 	by 	the 	franchisor 	over 	the
franchisee” 	is 	“inherent 	in 	the 	franchise 	relationship.” 	In 	re
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 28 F.4th 1203, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(per 	curiam) 	(second 	alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Drexel v.
Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1978));
see 	Restatement 	(Third) 	of 	Agency 	§ 1.02 	cmt. 	a 	(providing 	that
franchise relationships “do not by themselves create relationships
of agency”). To determine if a franchisor and a franchisee are in
an agency relationship, courts focus on “the nature and extent” of
the franchisor’s right to control the franchisee. In re Volkswagen
Grp., 	28 	F.4th 	at 	1210 	(quoting 	Drexel, 	582 	F.2d 	at 	786). 	The
franchisor’s imposition of brand standards and measures to ensure
service 	quality 	and 	uniformity 	is 	not 	sufficient 	to 	transform 	a
franchise relationship into one of agency. See Restatement (Third)
of Agency § 1.01 cmt. f(1); Doe (K.E.C.), 750 F. Supp. 3d at 738;
H.G. v. 	Inter-Cont’l 	Hotels 	Corp., 	489 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	697, 	708-09
(E.D. 	Mich. 	2020); 	S.J., 	473 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	155. 	Instead, 	courts
examine “the degree of control that the franchisor maintains over
the 	daily 	operations 	of 	the 	franchisee 	or 	more 	specifically, 	the
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‘manner 	of 	performing 	the 	very 	work 	in 	the 	course 	of 	which 	the
[tort] occurred.’” In re Volkswagen Grp., 28 F.4th at 1210 (quoting
Kerl v. 	Rasmussen, 	672 	N.W.2d 	71, 	77 	(Wis. 	Ct. 	App. 	2003)); 	see
Doe 	(K.E.C.), 	750 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	739; 	H.G., 	489 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
708; S.J., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 155.
Plaintiff 	has 	plausibly 	alleged 	an 	agency 	relationship
between 	Hilton 	and 	Crosstown. 	The 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	Hilton
exercised 	control 	over 	Crosstown’s 	operation 	of 	the 	Hampton 	Inn
by, 	among 	other 	things, 	dictating 	room 	rental 	rates, 	setting
staffing levels and wages, participating in employment decisions,
enforcing 	standards 	for 	employee 	training, 	requiring 	use 	of
centralized 	platforms 	for 	bookings 	and 	property 	management, 	and
mandating that Crosstown purchase goods and services from approved
vendors. 	Most 	courts 	have 	concluded 	that 	factual 	allegations 	of
this sort are sufficient to plead the day-to-day control necessary
to establish an agency relationship between a hotel franchisor and
franchisee 	at 	the 	motion-to-dismiss 	stage 	in 	a 	TVPRA 	case. 	See,
e.g., Doe (K.R.D.), __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 2539010, at *5];
Doe (K.E.C.), 750 F. Supp. 3d at 739-40; A.M. v. Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, 	Inc., 	728 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	787, 	803-04 	(S.D. 	Ohio 	2024);
C.S. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1299
(M.D. Fla. 2021); J.L., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 1067-68; S.Y. v. Wyndham
Hotels 	& 	Resorts, 	Inc., 	521 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1173, 	1187 	(M.D. 	Fla.
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2021); 	E.S. 	v. 	Best 	W. 	Int’l, 	Inc., 	510 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	420, 	429-30
(N.D. Tex. 2021); A.B., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 940. This Court agrees.4
Hilton 	further 	argues 	that, 	even 	if 	Plaintiff 	has 	plausibly
pled an agency relationship, any TVPRA violation by Crosstown fell
outside 	the 	scope 	of 	Crosstown’s 	authority 	as 	an 	agent 	because
“violating 	the 	TVPRA’s 	prohibitions 	against 	sex 	trafficking” 	did
not “further[] Hilton’s interest.” Dkt. 17 at 26. This contention
is 	unpersuasive. 	A 	principal 	is 	liable 	for 	an 	agent’s 	tortious
conduct 	“when 	the 	agent’s 	conduct 	is 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	the
agent’s 	actual 	authority.” 	Restatement 	(Third) 	of 	Agency 	§ 	7.04.
An 	agent’s 	actual 	authority 	extends 	to 	any 	“action 	designated 	or
implied 	in 	the 	principal’s 	manifestations 	to 	the 	agent 	and 	acts
necessary 	or 	incidental 	to 	achieving 	the 	principal’s 	objectives,
as the agent reasonably understands the principal’s manifestations
and 	objectives 	when 	the 	agent 	determines 	how 	to 	act.” 	Id.
§ 2.02(1). 	It 	is 	plausible 	that 	Crosstown’s 	rental 	of 	rooms 	to
4 	In 	many 	of 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	Hilton 	in 	which 	courts 	dismissed
TVPRA 	vicarious 	liability 	claims 	against 	hotel 	franchisors, 	the
complaint 	vaguely 	alleged 	that 	the 	franchisor 	engaged 	in 	“one 	or
more” 	of 	a 	list 	of 	methods 	of 	control 	over 	the 	franchisee. 	See,
e.g. Doe (K.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 23-cv-2597, 2023 WL 8650785,
at *8 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2023); B.J. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 22-cv-
03765, 	2023 	WL 	3569979, 	at 	*8-9 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	May 	19, 	2023); 	L.H.,
604 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1361-62; 	H.G., 	489 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	708. 	In
others, 	the 	complaint 	included 	only 	conclusory 	allegations 	about
the 	agency 	relationship 	and 	the 	franchisor’s 	day-to-day 	control
over 	the 	franchisee. 	See, 	e.g., 	Doe 	(G.N.C.) 	v. 	Uniquest 	Hosp.,
LLC, No. 23-cv-7980, 2024 WL 4149251, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2024). Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from neither defect.
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Plaintiff’s 	trafficker, 	which 	forms 	the 	basis 	of 	Crosstown’s
alleged 	liability 	under 	the 	TVPRA, 	was 	undertaken 	based 	on 	a
reasonable understanding that doing so furthered Hilton’s interest
in a financially successful hotel franchise. That this conduct may
have 	constituted 	a 	TVPRA 	violation 	does 	not 	remove 	it 	from 	the
scope 	of 	Crosstown’s 	actual 	authority. 	See 	id. 	§ 7.04 	cmt. 	b
(“Tortious 	conduct 	by 	an 	agent 	. 	. 	. 	may 	be 	consistent 	with 	the
agent’s actual authority.”).
Plaintiff 	has 	therefore 	stated 	a 	claim 	of 	TVPRA 	beneficiary
liability against Hilton.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Hilton’s 	and 	Crosstown’s 	motions
to dismiss (Dkts. 16, 21) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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