Ryan v. Process, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
LENROY RYAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 24-CV-11054-AK
v. )
)
PROCESS, INC., PROCESS OHIO )
CORPORATION, STOEVELAAR )
TRADING BV, and MONARCH )
GLOBAL EQUIPMENT, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT STOEVELAAR’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Plaintiff Lenroy Ryan (“Plaintiff”) injured his leg while working on a metal shredder
machine (“the Shredder”), imported by the Defendant Stoevelaar Trading BV (Stoevelaar) and
sold to domestic equipment distributor Defendant Monarch Global Equipment, LLC
(“Monarch”). Plaintiff sustained permanent injuries, including amputation of his left leg.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) includes several claims,
including defective design, failure to warn, breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence.
[Dkt. 58]. Pending before the Court is Defendant Stoevelaar’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of
personal jurisdiction. [Dkt. 70]. Defendant Monarch has also filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction which the Court will address separately. For the following reasons,
Stoevelaar’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint [Dkt. 70] is GRANTED.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this suit after sustaining injuries from a metal shredder, which resulted
in the amputation of his leg. On October 13, 2022, Ryan was working with the Shredder
manufactured by Hammel at his place of employment when the machine allegedly jammed and
caused him to injure himself. The Shredder was manufactured and sold by a German
manufacturer, Hammel, to the Dutch distributor, Stoevelaar. Stoevelaar then sold the machine to
Monarch and shipped it to Baltimore, Maryland, on November 6, 2020. The Shredder was then
sold to Process, Inc. (“Process”), which sold it to Plaintiff’s employer in Massachusetts.
The case was removed from the Massachusetts Superior Court in Suffolk County on
April 22, 2024. After two amended complaints, both Hammel and Stoevelaar moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Dkts. 41; 48]. In opposition, Plaintiff filed cross-motions for
jurisdictional discovery. [Dkt. 50]. The Court granted Hammel’s Motion to Dismiss and denied
Plaintiff’s Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery against Hammel. [Dkt. 56]. The Court also
denied Stoevelaar’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to proceed with
limited jurisdictional discovery. [Dkt. 57]. Following jurisdictional discovery, Stoevelaar filed a
renewed Motion to Dismiss in response to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 70].
Plaintiff attached and referred to the following evidence in opposition to Stovelaar’s
Motion to Dismiss: a terms of sale agreement for the sale of Hammel shredders between
Defendant Process Inc., whose principal place of business is listed as 15600 NE 8th Street, Suite
B1 #843, Bellevue, WA 98008, and Europe Recycling B.V., whose principal place of business,
Wolfveldseweg 1a, 7737 PK, Stegeren, the Netherlands, is Stoevelaar’s principle place of
business as alleged in the Amended Complaint; an invoice for the sale of the Shredder from
Stoevelaar to Monarch; and Stoevelaar’s website stating “Stoevelaar Machinery always has
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various used machines of varied brands in stock. Can’t find what you are looking for? Please
contact us and we will help you to find the right machine.” [Dkt. 73].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When personal jurisdiction is contested, the plaintiff has the “ultimate burden of showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists.” Vapotherm, Inc. v. Santiago, 38
F.4th 252, 257 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Adams v. Adams, 601 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)). When
courts assess their jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, the prima facie standard applies.
Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002).
Under this standard, the plaintiff must “proffer evidence which, taken at face value, suffices to
show all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose
Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016).
Courts review the pleadings, supplemental filings in the record, and undisputed facts,
giving credence to the plaintiff’s version of genuinely contested facts. Id. While the plaintiff’s
burden of proof is “light,” it nevertheless requires them not to rely on “mere allegations” alone
but to point to specific facts in the record that support their claims. Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v.
Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51). Courts “‘must
accept the plaintiff’s (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true’ . . . irrespective of
whether the defendant disputes them” for the purposes of the motion. Adelson v. Hananel, 510
F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138,
145 (1st Cir. 1995)). Courts view these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff’s
jurisdictional claim. Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1998). The defendant may also offer evidence, but their evidentiary proffers “become part
of the mix only to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 48 (citing Mass.
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Sch. of L., 142 F.3d at 34); see Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 (“We may, of course, take into
account undisputed facts put forth by the defendant.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Personal Jurisdiction
When determining whether a nonresident defendant is subject to its jurisdiction, “a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction ‘is the functional equivalent of a state court sitting
in the forum state.’” Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381,
1387 (1st Cir. 1995)). In that posture, Plaintiff must satisfy “both the forum state’s long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” C.W. Downer & Co. v.
Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Ticketmaster-New York,
Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994)). For reasons explained below, the Court holds
that Plaintiff’s jurisdictional contention is untenable, and Stoevelaar cannot be subject to
personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts.
1. Due Process
The First Circuit employs the following three-part test to determine whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due process: (1) the claims must directly
relate to the defendant’s forum-state activities; (2) the in-state contacts must represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state; and (3) the
exercise of personal jurisdiction must, in light of the Gestalt factors, be reasonable. United Elec.
Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992). The Court discusses
each prong of the jurisdictional calculus in turn.
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i. Relatedness
To show relatedness, the plaintiff must demonstrate that their “cause of action either
arises directly out of, or is related to, the defendant’s forum-based contacts.” Knox v.
MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 690-91 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Harlow v. Children’s Hosp.,
432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005)). This is a “flexible, relaxed standard.” N. Laminate Sales, Inc.
v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir.
1994)). Relatedness requires only that the claim have a “demonstrable nexus” to the defendant’s
forum contacts. Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 34; Knox, 914 F.3d at 691.
Here, there is no demonstrable nexus between Stoevelaar’s forum-based contacts and
Plaintiff’s claim because Stoevelaar simply does not have any forum-based contacts.
Stoevelaar’s principal place of business is in Steregen, Netherlands. [Dkt. 71-1 at 1]. Stoevelaar
sold the Shredder to Monarch and shipped it from Antwerp, Belgium to Baltimore, Maryland on
November 6, 2020. [Dkt. 71-1 at 10]. Monarch has headquarters in New Springfield, Ohio and
was the only named entity on all invoices submitted by Stoevelaar during jurisdictional
discovery. [Dkt. 71-1 at 10]. These facts contradict Plaintiff’s speculation that “[u]pon
information and belief, Stoevelaar intended or knew that the Shredder would be sold or
distributed to Massachusetts consumers through the defendant, Monarch.” [Dkt. 58 at ¶ 12].
Jurisdictional discovery did not reveal any evidence that Stoevelaar had any other contacts with
Massachusetts, as related to the purchases of shredders or otherwise. [Dkt. 71-2 at ¶ 7].
Furthermore, no documents reveal Stoevelaar possessed any knowledge, information or belief,
that its products were to be sold and/or delivered in Massachusetts. [Dkt. 71-2 at ¶ 6].
Therefore, there is no “demonstratable nexus” between Plaintiff’s injury and Stoevelaar’s
importation of the Shredder.
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ii. Purposeful Availment
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that the exercise of jurisdiction is
voluntary, foreseeable, and not premised on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated
contacts.” Carreras v. PMG Collins, LLC, 660 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The defendant’s conduct and connection
with the forum state must be such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. Knox, 914 F.3d at 691 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). This requirement applies
equally to foreign defendants. Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2018).
In J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, a divided Supreme Court addressed the issue of
exercising personal jurisdiction over a British manufacturer whose product was distributed by an
Ohio company and caused injury to the plaintiff in New Jersey. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). The
plurality held that such a defendant must reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection
of the forum state’s laws. Id. at 887. Concurring only in judgment, Justice Breyer and Justice
Alito found no personal jurisdiction under the “stream of commerce plus” analysis. Id. at 887-89.
Under this theory, mere awareness that the stream of commerce may carry a product into the
forum state is not enough; there must be “something more” targeting the specific forum. Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (“[S]omething more” may
include, “for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the
forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State,
or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State.”).
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Like other circuits, the First Circuit has held that the narrowest, and therefore binding,
opinion from McIntyre was Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Knox, 914 F.3d at 691; Plixer, 905
F.3d at 10 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)); accord Williams v. Romarm,
SA, 756 F.3d 777, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion controlling
under Marks); Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2013);
AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Though Stoevelaar may have targeted the United States market in general, it has not
revealed an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of Massachusetts’ law. McIntyre, 564
U.S. at 887 (plurality opinion). There is no evidence that Stoevelaar has ever marketed,
advertised, or tried to solicit business directly to Massachusetts. Stoevelaar submitted that
neither they nor their related entities operated or conducted business within Massachusetts at the
relevant times related to the suit; they do not advertise or solicit any business in Massachusetts;
they do not have offices, agents, property, or assets in Massachusetts; they do not have contracts,
licenses, or registrations within Massachusetts; and they do not have any affiliates, subsidiaries,
or parent companies in Massachusetts. [Dkt. 71-1 ¶ 4-8]. Plaintiff has not contested these facts
or submitted any evidence to the contrary.
At most, Plaintiff submitted evidence that another company, Europe Recycling B.V., with
the same principal place of business as Stoevelaar, sells Hammel shredders to Defendant Process
Inc. [Dkt. 73-1]. Even assuming Europe Recycling B.V. is the same entity as Stoevelaar, which
there is no evidence of, the agreement Plaintiff relies upon does not list where the shredders will
be shipped or contain any other information tying the seller to Massachusetts. Therefore, under
the McIntyre concurrence’s adoption of the “stream of commerce plus” theory, Plaintiff has not
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shown “something more” to support the contention that Stoevelaar specifically targeted
Massachusetts. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring).
This case is unlike Knox, in which the First Circuit found proper the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a German manufacturer whose product travelled through a distributor in
Georgia, ultimately injuring the plaintiff in Massachusetts. 914 F.3d at 694. The Knox court
distinguished its case from McIntyre largely because the machines in Knox were made-to-order
according to the purchaser’s specifications, and the distributor included instruction manuals for
the machines that included direct contact information for the manufacturer if the customer
needed spare parts. Id. at 693. The court found it reasonable to infer from these facts that the
defendant had opened channels of service with Massachusetts customers that allowed for the
proper exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id.
Unlike the manufacturer in Knox, which retained the ability to direct where its products
went, sold dozens of expensive products into the forum for nearly two decades, and initiated an
ongoing relationship with its in-forum customers, Stoevelaar lacked the ability to control the
final destination of its products and knew only “that its products are distributed through a
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty
states.” McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 879. Plaintiff alleges that Stoevelaar purposefully availed itself to
the forum because they generally marketed their services. [Dkt. 73 at 5]. Justice Breyer rejected
precisely this argument in McIntyre. Generalized awareness that a product might enter the
forum does not confer jurisdiction; there must be “something more” targeting the specific forum.
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 889. As Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently show that Stoevelaar
purposefully sought out business or that it has related contacts in Massachusetts, the Court does
not have personal jurisdiction over Stoevelaar.
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iii. Reasonableness
When a court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first two prongs of due process,
it need not proceed to the reasonableness requirement. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1394 (noting that
“[t]he [G]estalt factors come into play only if the first two segments of the test for specific
jurisdiction have been fulfilled.”) (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1091 n.11).
Even assuming arguendo that Stoevelaar purposely availed itself of the Massachusetts
market, exercising personal jurisdiction would not satisfy the third prong of due process because
it would not be reasonable. To assess reasonableness, courts consider the five “Gestalt” factors:
(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing in the forum state; (2) the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
(4) the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy;
and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies. C.W.
Downer, 771 F.3d at 69. These factors are designed to illuminate whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable. Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 64. Courts rely on these factors for close cases. Id.
at 65. To be clear, this is not such a case.
The first factor—the defendant’s burden—weighs against exercising personal
jurisdiction. Stoevelaar is a Dutch company, with its principal place of business in the
Netherlands, and has asserted that it would be burdensome to litigate this case in Massachusetts,
where it has no offices, operations, or employees. It is true that it is “almost always inconvenient
and costly for a party to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction.” Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d
708, 718 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 64). For this factor to tip the scale, “the
defendant must demonstrate that exercise of jurisdiction in the present circumstance is onerous in
a special, unusual, or other constitutionally significant way.” Id. (internal citation and quotations
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omitted). The burden of forcing a Dutch corporation with no presence in Massachusetts to
appear in the forum is onerous in terms of distance. See Medicus Radiology, LLC v. Nortek
Med. Staffing, Inc., No. 10-CV-300-PB, 2011 WL 9373, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 3, 2011) (holding it
is unreasonable to force a Texas corporate defendant with no presence in New Hampshire to
appear in the forum); see Philips v. Prairie Eye Center, 530 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding
that the burden on an Illinois defendant with no connection to the forum state was
disproportionate). The first factor therefore weighs against exercising personal jurisdiction over
Stoevelaar.
The second factor, which considers the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,
weighs against keeping the suit in Massachusetts. Though a “state generally has a ‘manifest
interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by
out-of-state actors,” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, the alleged wrongful conduct by Stoevelaar,
the defective design and manufacture of the metal shredder, occurred entirely outside of
Massachusetts. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s injury occurred in Massachusetts “is not . . .
enough to establish its substantial interest in the suit.” Merced v. JLG Indus., Inc., 193 F. Supp.
2d 290, 295 (D. Mass. 2001); see Medicus, 2011 WL 9373, at *6 (finding that the state’s interest
in litigation is diminished where alleged tortious conduct occurred outside of forum); Sawtelle,
70 F.3d at 1395 (“This factor . . . cuts against jurisdiction” when “the acts comprising the
defendants’ alleged negligence occurred almost entirely outside of [the forum].”).
Third, while the plaintiff’s choice of forum must be accorded a degree of deference, “the
plaintiff’s actual convenience seems to be at best a makeweight in this situation.” Ticketmaster,
26 F.3d at 211 (emphasis in original) (discussing the difficulty in concluding which forum state
would be more convenient when the alleged tortious injury and witnesses exist in different forum
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states). Here, it is not immediately clear that Massachusetts is the most convenient forum when
key witnesses and evidence are likely located in Ohio or abroad.
The fourth factor, the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effective resolution
of the controversy, is usually “a wash.” Nowak, 94 F.3d at 718 (citing Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at
211). As the First Circuit has reasoned, “[e]ven though Massachusetts courts can effectively
administer justice in this dispute, they have no corner on the market.” Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d
at 41.
The last factor, which can be effectively summed as pertinent policy arguments,
addresses the interests of the governments in enacting substantive social policies. See Nowak, 94
F.3d at 719. While Massachusetts has an interest in protecting its citizens from defective
products made by foreign manufacturers, the Netherlands and Ohio also have substantial
interests in promoting and ensuring product safety, as well as holding accountable the
corporations they house. Thus, this last factor does not tip in either parties’ favor.
The reasonableness prong evokes “a sliding scale: the weaker the plaintiff’s showing on
the first two prongs (relatedness and purposeful availment), the less a defendant need show in
terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.” A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d
54, 61 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 210). On balance, the Gestalt factors
make pellucid what was already clear: exercising jurisdiction over Stoevelaar would not be
reasonable. Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the purposeful availment prong of due process cannot be
overcome.
1. Long Arm Statute
The Massachusetts long-arm statute provides that a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from, inter alia, the
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person’s “(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this commonwealth[.]” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 223A, § 3 (2025).
The First Circuit has treated the limits of Massachusetts’ long-arm statute as coextensive
with those of the Due Process Clause. Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 2016). The First Circuit has also suggested that the Massachusetts long-arm statute
might impose more restrictive limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction than does the
Constitution. Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 124 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing
Copia, 812 F.3d at 4). Having concluded that the Due Process Clause does not permit the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Stoevelaar in this case, the Court “need not untangle this
potential ‘tension in our precedent here.’” A Corp., 812 F.3d at 59 (quoting Copia, 812 F.3d at
4); Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, 101 F.4th 90, 95 (1st Cir. 2024) (explaining that
although the reach of the Massachusetts long-arm statute may not be identical to that of the Due
Process Clause, the court need not inquire into such distinctions when the plaintiff has not
satisfied the constitutional minimum demanded by due process).
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied his constitutional burden, the Court
does not need to address the statutory requirements. Motus, 23 F.4th at 124 (stating that it would
“serve no useful purpose” to analyze statutory authorization under Massachusetts’ long-arm
statute when plaintiff has not satisfied the federal constitutional requirements for personal
jurisdiction); Ward v. AlphaCore Pharma, LLC, 89 F.4th 203, 211 (1st Cir. 2023) (refusing to
conduct further statutory analysis when the court has found defendant’s activities to be
insufficiently related to Massachusetts to satisfy the strictures of due process); Chouinard v.
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Marigot Beach Club & Dive Resort, 20-CV-10863-MPK, 2023 WL 2743305, at *7 (D. Mass.
Mar. 31, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-1390, 2023 WL 7321758 (1st Cir. June 29, 2023)
(declining to address the statutory requirements under the Massachusetts long-arm statute
because the court found that plaintiffs have not satisfied their constitutional burden).
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the Court that jurisdiction exists over the
Defendant. Plaintiff has failed in this regard, compelling the Court to dismiss Stoevelaar from
this case. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Stoevelaar’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 70] is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 13, 2026 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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