Hullum et al v. Mici et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
LANCE HULLUM, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action
) 	No. 23-cv-10082-PBS
STEPHEN D. ADAMS, TAYLOR J. 	)
LANDRY, STEVEN C. CLARK, and 	)
BRENDON P. METCALF, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________ 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
April 1, 2026
Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Lance Hullum brings this action pursuant to
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	against 	four 	correction 	officers 	of 	the
Massachusetts 	Department 	of 	Correction 	in 	their 	individual
capacities 	(“Defendants”). 	Hullum 	claims 	that 	when 	he 	was
previously incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Souza-Baranowski
Correctional 	Center 	(“SBCC”), 	Defendants 	called 	him 	various
derogatory 	names 	like 	“pedophile,” 	“skinner,” 	“rapist,” 	and
“snitch” 	in 	front 	of 	other 	inmates 	with 	the 	intent 	to 	incite
violence against him. Defendants deny these allegations.
Hullum 	brings 	two 	claims: 	a 	First 	Amendment 	claim 	alleging
that 	Defendants 	acted 	in 	retaliation 	for 	his 	filing 	grievances
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about their misconduct and a failure-to-protect claim under Eighth
Amendment standards. He does not claim that any inmate physically
injured him because of Defendants’ conduct. He seeks compensatory
damages for his ongoing psychological issues and the impact of his
stress on his lupus.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on Hullum’s failure-
to-protect 	claim 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	qualified 	immunity.1 	The 	Court
concludes 	that 	the 	evidence, 	when 	viewed 	in 	the 	light 	most
favorable 	to 	Hullum, 	would 	permit 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	to 	find 	that
Defendants 	violated 	Hullum’s 	clearly 	established 	constitutional
rights. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 243).
BACKGROUND
Although 	the 	parties 	heavily 	dispute 	the 	underlying 	facts,
the 	Court 	“examin[es] 	the 	record 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to
the nonmovant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” 	Dusel 	v. 	Factory 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	52 	F.4th 	495, 	502 	(1st
Cir. 2022). Hullum has submitted evidence of the following facts,
1 	The 	Court 	previously 	denied 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	partial
summary 	judgment 	based 	on 	administrative 	exhaustion 	and 	denied
Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	based 	on 	qualified 	immunity. 	See
Hullum 	v. 	Mici, 	No. 	23-cv-10082, 	2025 	WL 	928778, 	at 	*5 	(D. 	Mass.
Mar. 	26, 	2025). 	In 	the 	instant 	motion, 	Defendants 	do 	not 	seek
summary judgment on Hullum’s First Amendment claim that Defendants
were 	verbally 	harassing 	him 	in 	retaliation 	for 	his 	filing
grievances against them.
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primarily 	through 	declarations 	and 	affidavits 	(including 	from
other inmates).2
Lance Hullum pleaded guilty in 1990 to four counts of raping
four 	different 	children 	by 	force 	in 	violation 	of 	Mass. 	Gen. 	Laws
ch. 	265, 	§ 	22A. 	Hullum 	is 	currently 	awaiting 	trial 	in 	connection
with 	unrelated 	charges 	for 	physical 	assault. 	He 	was 	held 	at 	SBCC
from 	January 	2020 	to 	April 	2024. 	During 	the 	period 	at 	issue,
Defendants Stephen Adams, Taylor Landry, Steven Clark, and Brendon
Metcalf were correction officers at SBCC.
According to evidence submitted by Hullum, Defendants called
Hullum 	various 	derogatory 	names 	-- 	including 	“pedophile,” 	“child
molester,” “chicken hawk,” “skinner,” “rapist,” and “snitch” -- in
front of other inmates on several occasions between November 2023
and 	early 	2024.3 	A 	sworn 	declaration 	from 	Hullum 	states 	that
2 	Given 	Hullum’s 	pro 	se 	status, 	this 	Court 	considers 	various
affidavits and potentially admissible evidence submitted by Hullum
throughout the history of this case, even those that are “somewhat
buried 	in 	the 	record.” 	Pace 	v. 	Salamone, 	No. 	24-1865, 	2025 	WL
2798641, at *1 (1st Cir. Sep. 29, 2025).
3 	See, 	e.g., 	Dkt. 	91 	at 	1 	(affidavit 	of 	Joshua 	Eloi 	stating 	that
he 	witnessed 	Adams 	verbally 	harassing 	Hullum 	by 	calling 	him 	a
pedophile, 	snitch, 	and 	“homo” 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	“fuel[] 	other
inmates to attack, stab, [and] even murder” Hullum); Dkt. 98 at 1
(declaration 	of 	Joshua 	Eloi 	stating 	that 	he 	heard 	Adams, 	Landry,
and 	Clark 	calling 	Hullum 	a 	pedophile 	and 	snitch); 	Dkt. 	99 	at 	1
(declaration 	of 	Wilnor 	Jean 	Baptiste 	stating 	that 	Metcalf 	called
Hullum a pedophile, snitch, and child molester, asked other inmates
“why they letting Hullum live here,” and offered a “bag for whoever
take[s] 	him 	out”); 	Dkt. 	100 	at 	1 	(declaration 	of 	Hullum 	stating
that all four Defendants called him a pedophile, chicken hawk, and
snitch 	“in 	front 	of 	other 	inmates 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	incite 	[them]
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Defendants used these epithets “in an attempt to incite” violence
against 	him. 	Dkt. 	100 	at 	1. 	An 	affidavit 	submitted 	by 	one 	inmate
at SBCC states that Defendants’ conduct resulted in “other cons in
the 	unit 	. 	. 	. 	laughing 	and 	yelling 	get 	that 	fucking 	pig.” 	Dkt.
107 at 1. Hullum also received death threats from Defendants.
Hullum was never physically attacked or harmed by Defendants
or 	by 	other 	inmates 	as 	a 	result 	of 	Defendants’ 	threats 	and
derogatory 	remarks. 	In 	his 	deposition, 	however, 	Hullum 	testified
that Defendants’ conduct exacerbated his lupus symptoms, including
by causing him to have lesions, skin rashes, muscle spasms, weight
loss, 	trembling, 	chills, 	and 	sleep 	deprivation. 	Hullum 	seeks
damages for these injuries and for psychological distress.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	when 	“there 	is 	no 	genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is
to 	react 	against” 	him); 	Dkt. 	102 	at 	1 	(declaration 	of 	Hadyetou
Diaby stating that he heard Metcalf call Hullum a skinner, snitch,
pedophile, and rapist multiple times); Dkt. 104 at 1 (declaration
of Damien Santos stating that he heard Adams and Landry call Hullum
a 	pedophile 	and 	snitch); 	Dkt. 	107 	at 	1 	(declaration 	of 	Luis 	Ruiz
stating 	that 	he 	heard 	Adams 	call 	Hullum 	a 	pedophile, 	rat, 	and
rapist 	“in 	front 	of 	many 	other 	inmates 	to 	the 	point 	that 	other
cons in the unit are laughing and yelling get that fucking pig”);
Dkt. 	108 	at 	1 	(declaration 	of 	Alfred 	Lane-Bey 	stating 	that 	Clark
called 	Hullum 	a 	chicken 	hawk 	and 	that 	Clark 	said 	he 	was 	“gonna
beat 	Hullum 	to 	death”); 	Dkt. 	110 	at 	1 	(declaration 	of 	Jose
Hernandez 	stating 	that 	he 	heard 	Adams, 	Landry, 	and 	Clark 	call
Hullum a pedophile and snitch).
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genuine 	where 	the 	evidence 	“is 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could
resolve 	the 	point 	in 	the 	favor 	of 	the 	non-moving 	party.” 	Rivera-
Rivera 	v. 	Medina 	& 	Medina, 	Inc., 	898 	F.3d 	77, 	87 	(1st 	Cir. 	2018)
(quoting Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23-24 (1st Cir.
2017)). “A fact is material” if “it has [the] potential of changing
a case’s outcome.” Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 79 (1st
Cir. 2018).
“The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the 	non-moving 	party 	and 	draw 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	in 	[its]
favor.” 	Carlson 	v. 	Univ. 	of 	New 	Eng., 	899 	F.3d 	36, 	43 	(1st 	Cir.
2018). Courts construe the filings of a pro se party “liberally,”
holding 	them 	“to 	less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings
drafted 	by 	lawyers.” 	Erickson 	v. 	Pardus, 	551 	U.S. 	89, 	94 	(2007)
(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants 	seek 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Hullum’s 	failure-to-
protect claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity. They argue
that 	Hullum 	has 	failed 	to 	provide 	evidence 	of 	a 	constitutional
violation and that even if he has, the unlawfulness of Defendants’
actions was not clearly established.
State 	officials 	“are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	under
§ 1983 	unless 	(1) 	they 	violated 	a 	federal 	statutory 	or
constitutional 	right, 	and 	(2) 	the 	unlawfulness 	of 	their 	conduct
was ‘clearly established at the time’” of that violation. District
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of 	Columbia 	v. 	Wesby, 	583 	U.S. 	48, 	62-63 	(2018) 	(quoting 	Reichle
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “‘Clearly established’ means
that, 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	[defendant]’s 	conduct, 	the 	law 	was
‘“sufficiently 	clear” 	that 	every 	“reasonable 	official 	would
understand that what he is doing”’ is unlawful.” Id. at 63 (quoting
Ashcroft 	v. 	al-Kidd, 	563 	U.S. 	731, 	741 	(2011)). 	To 	be 	clearly
established, 	a 	legal 	rule 	must 	be 	“dictated 	by 	‘controlling
authority’ 	or 	‘a 	robust 	“consensus 	of 	cases 	of 	persuasive
authority.”’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741-42); see also
Rivas-Villegas 	v. 	Cortesluna, 	595 	U.S. 	1, 	6 	(2021) 	(per 	curiam)
(requiring 	plaintiffs 	in 	most 	instances 	to 	“identify 	a 	case 	that
put 	[the 	defendant] 	on 	notice 	that 	his 	specific 	conduct 	was
unlawful”). 	“A 	‘robust 	consensus’ 	does 	not 	require 	the 	express
agreement of every circuit.” Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 76 (1st
Cir. 	2020); 	see 	id. 	at 	77 	(noting 	that 	the 	agreement 	of 	three 	or
four circuits is sufficient to clearly establish the law).
The 	Court 	examines 	each 	prong 	of 	the 	qualified 	immunity
analysis in turn.
I. 	Constitutional Violation
As 	a 	pretrial 	detainee, 	Hullum 	is 	“protected 	under 	the
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	rather 	than 	the 	Eighth
Amendment; however, the standard to be applied is the same as that
used in Eighth Amendment cases.” 	Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307
F.3d 	1, 	7 	(1st 	Cir. 	2002). 	The 	Eighth 	Amendment 	prohibits 	the
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imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. 	As 	part 	of 	this 	prohibition, 	the 	Eighth 	Amendment 	“imposes
duties 	on 	[prison] 	officials,” 	including 	to 	“take 	reasonable
measures 	to 	guarantee 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	inmates.” 	Farmer 	v.
Brennan, 	511 	U.S. 	825, 	832 	(1994) 	(quoting 	Hudson 	v. 	Palmer, 	468
U.S. 	517, 	526–27 	(1984)). 	As 	relevant 	here, 	“[p]rison 	officials
must 	take 	reasonable 	measures 	to 	guarantee 	inmates’ 	safety 	from
attacks 	by 	other 	inmates.” 	Calderón-Ortiz 	v. 	LaBoy-Alvarado, 	300
F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2002).
While “[a]n inmate may sue a correctional facility under the
Eighth 	Amendment 	for 	failure 	to 	afford 	adequate 	protection 	to
inmates 	from 	attack 	by 	other 	inmates 	. 	. 	. 	, 	not 	every 	injury 	a
prisoner suffers at the hands of another prisoner is actionable.”
Id. 	at 	63-64. 	Rather, 	“[p]rison 	officials 	violate 	the
constitutional conditions of confinement” in a failure-to-protect
case “only where two requirements are met.” Id. at 64. First, “the
inmate 	must 	show 	that 	he 	is 	incarcerated 	under 	conditions 	posing
a 	substantial 	risk 	of 	serious 	harm.” 	Lakin 	v. 	Barnhart, 	758 	F.3d
66, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Second,
“the 	prison 	official 	must 	have 	acted, 	or 	failed 	to 	act, 	with
‘deliberate 	indifference 	to 	inmate 	health 	or 	safety.’” 	Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Court now analyzes each of
these two requirements.
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A. 	Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
“The 	risk 	of 	inmate-upon-inmate 	violence 	has 	been 	held 	a
sufficiently 	serious 	harm 	to 	implicate 	inmates’ 	constitutional
rights.” 	Calderón-Ortiz, 	300 	F.3d 	at 	66. 	Although 	verbal
harassment 	does 	not 	itself 	constitute 	cruel 	and 	unusual
punishment, 	see 	DeWalt 	v. 	Carter, 	224 	F.3d 	607, 	612 	(7th 	Cir.
2000), abrogated 	on 	other 	grounds 	by Savory 	v. 	Cannon, 	947 	F.3d
409 	(7th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(en 	banc), 	courts 	had 	repeatedly 	recognized,
prior to November 2023 (when the alleged name-calling began), the
physical 	dangers 	posed 	by 	a 	prison 	official 	labeling 	an 	inmate 	a
“snitch,” “sex offender,” or similar derogatory terms. See, e.g.,
Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2022) (“It is obvious
that 	branding 	[the 	prisoner 	plaintiff] 	a 	sex 	offender 	could 	make
him 	a 	target 	of 	prison 	violence.”); 	Moore 	v. 	Mann, 	823 	F. 	App’x
92, 96 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting “that the sex offender
label is stigmatizing in the prison context, and that prison norms
may call for the assault of sex offenders”); Benefield v. McDowall,
241 	F.3d 	1267, 	1271 	(10th 	Cir. 	2001) 	(“[L]abeling 	an 	inmate 	a
snitch 	has 	the 	potential 	for 	great 	harm 	and 	may 	violate
constitutional 	guarantees.”); 	Neal 	v. 	Shimoda, 	131 	F.3d 	818, 	829
(9th 	Cir. 	1997) 	(“We 	can 	hardly 	conceive 	of 	a 	state’s 	action
bearing 	more 	‘stigmatizing 	consequences’ 	than 	the 	labeling 	of 	a
prison 	inmate 	as 	a 	sex 	offender.”); 	see 	also 	Renchenski 	v.
Williams, 	622 	F.3d 	315, 	326 	(3d 	Cir. 	2010) 	(“[S]tudies 	suggest
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that sexual offenders’ rate of sexual abuse in prison ranges from
34% to 50% higher than that of the general prison population.”).
Accordingly, numerous courts have found a substantial risk of
harm 	under 	similar 	conditions 	of 	incarceration. 	See, 	e.g.,
Dongarra, 	27 	F.4th 	at 	178-79 	(concluding 	that, 	where 	prison
officials 	required 	the 	prisoner 	plaintiff 	to 	wear 	a 	T-shirt 	that
identified 	him 	as 	a 	sex 	offender, 	the 	plaintiff 	“faced 	an
objectively 	serious 	risk 	of 	harm”); 	Benefield, 	241 	F.3d 	at 	1270-
71 	(finding 	that 	prisoner 	plaintiff 	stated 	an 	Eighth 	Amendment
violation 	by 	alleging 	that 	prison 	official 	“put 	him 	in 	danger 	of
attack or even death at the hands of other inmates by circulating
rumors that he was a snitch”). The same is true here: by allegedly
calling 	Hullum 	a 	“pedophile,” 	“child 	molester,” 	“chicken 	hawk,”
“skinner,” 	“rapist,” 	and 	“snitch” 	in 	front 	of 	other 	inmates,
Defendants 	created 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of 	harm 	to 	Hullum. 	Indeed,
one 	inmate 	affidavit 	states 	that 	Defendants’ 	actions 	resulted 	in
“other cons in the unit . . . laughing and yelling get that fucking
pig.” Dkt. 107 at 1.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment
because Hullum “admits that he did not suffer an actual injury as
a 	result 	of 	any 	Defendant’s 	conduct.” 	Dkt. 	244 	at 	11-12. 	But 	the
lack of an actual attack does not defeat an Eighth Amendment claim.
See, 	e.g., 	Moore, 	823 	F. 	App’x 	at 	96 	(“[A]n 	inmate 	need 	not 	wait
until an actual attack occurs to obtain relief.”); Benefield, 241
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F.3d 	at 	1272 	(holding 	that 	inmate’s 	allegations 	that 	officer
labeled him a snitch in front of other inmates stated a claim under
Eighth 	Amendment 	even 	though 	he 	had 	not 	in 	fact 	been 	assaulted);
Brown v. Narvais, 265 F. App’x 	734, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2008) (same,
as to allegation that defendants had labeled the plaintiff a child
molester). 	As 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	stated, 	“a 	prisoner 	need 	not
wait to be assaulted to obtain relief for the infringement” of his
right 	to 	be 	“protect[ed] 	from 	violence 	at 	the 	hands 	of 	other
prisoners.” Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 824-25 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quoting Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1979)).
Similarly, Defendants cite a section of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) that provides that “[n]o [f]ederal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury
suffered 	while 	in 	custody 	without 	a 	prior 	showing 	of 	physical
injury.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1997e(e). 	Although 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has
declined 	to 	decide 	whether 	this 	provision 	applies 	to
constitutional claims, see Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5
(1st 	Cir. 	2011), 	many 	circuits 	have 	held 	that 	it 	applies 	to 	all
federal 	civil 	actions 	including 	those 	alleging 	constitutional
violations, 	see 	Thompson 	v. 	Carter, 	284 	F.3d 	411, 	417 	(2d 	Cir.
2002) (collecting cases). Hullum alleges exacerbation of his lupus
illness. 	He 	testified 	in 	his 	deposition 	that 	Defendants’ 	conduct
caused 	him 	to 	have 	lesions, 	skin 	rashes, 	muscle 	spasms, 	weight
loss, 	trembling, 	chills, 	and 	loss 	of 	sleep. 	Defendants 	point 	out
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in 	a 	footnote 	that 	Hullum 	submitted 	no 	medical 	expert 	to 	support
this 	testimony, 	but 	they 	do 	not 	develop 	the 	argument. 	See 	P.R.
Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC, 874 F.3d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 2017)
(“[A]rguments raised only in a footnote or in a perfunctory manner
are waived.” (quoting Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 	38, 	60 	n.17 	(1st 	Cir. 	1999))). 	They 	also 	do 	not 	brief 	the
issue of whether Hullum’s alleged injuries are “more than . . . de
minimis physical injur[ies],” the standard used by most circuits.
Johnson 	v. 	Reyna, 	57 	F.4th 	776 	(10th 	Cir. 	2023); 	see 	id. 	at 	776-
77 	(collecting 	cases). 	The 	Court 	thus 	concludes 	that 	Hullum’s
testimony is “enough to keep his claims alive.” Kuperman, 645 F.3d
at 73 n.5; see Moore, 823 F. App’x at 97 & n.4.
Accordingly, 	viewing 	the 	record 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable
to 	Hullum, 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	find 	that 	Defendants 	placed
Hullum 	at 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of 	serious 	harm 	by 	calling 	him
stigmatizing names that could incite violence from other inmates.
B. 	Deliberate Indifference
Turning 	to 	the 	second 	requirement 	of 	an 	Eighth 	Amendment
failure-to-protect 	claim, 	Hullum 	must 	show 	that 	Defendants 	acted
with deliberate indifference. See Calderón-Ortiz, 300 F.3d at 64.
“[D]eliberate 	indifference 	entails 	something 	more 	than 	mere
negligence 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	Id. 	The 	standard 	is 	“a 	subjective 	one” 	which
is 	satisfied 	“only 	if 	the 	official 	‘knows 	of 	and 	disregards 	an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer,
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511 U.S. at 837). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which 	the 	inference 	could 	be 	drawn 	that 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of
serious 	harm 	exists, 	and 	he 	must 	also 	draw 	the 	inference.’” 	Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Hullum has presented evidence that all four Defendants sought
to 	incite 	violence 	against 	him 	by 	other 	inmates 	by 	calling 	him
derogatory 	names 	and 	that 	Defendants 	even 	made 	death 	threats
against him. A reasonable factfinder could conclude based on this
evidence 	that 	Defendants 	were 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	a 	risk
to 	his 	safety 	(or, 	indeed, 	that 	they 	even 	consciously 	intended
such 	a 	risk). 	“After 	all, 	who 	better 	knows 	the 	opprobrium 	and
consequent 	effect 	thereof 	that 	attaches 	to 	the 	label 	of 	snitch
than those who work daily within the inmate population.” Irving v.
Dormire, 	519 	F.3d 	441, 	451 	(8th 	Cir. 	2008); 	see 	also 	Farmer, 	511
U.S. 	at 	842 	(“[A] 	factfinder 	may 	conclude 	that 	a 	prison 	official
knew 	of 	a 	substantial 	risk 	from 	the 	very 	fact 	that 	the 	risk 	was
obvious.”). Because Hullum’s evidence permits a reasonable jury to
find 	in 	his 	favor 	on 	both 	requirements 	of 	a 	failure-to-protect
claim, he has satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity
test at this stage.
II. 	Clearly Established
The Court also concludes that Hullum has met his burden as to
the 	second 	prong 	of 	the 	qualified 	immunity 	inquiry. 	While 	no
controlling 	Supreme 	Court 	or 	First 	Circuit 	cases 	are 	directly 	on
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point, 	there 	was 	“a 	robust 	‘consensus 	of 	cases 	of 	persuasive
authority’” 	from 	other 	circuits 	by 	November 	2023 	placing 	a
reasonable 	official 	on 	notice 	that 	Defendants’ 	alleged 	actions
were unconstitutional. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (quoting Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
By 	2023, 	at 	least 	three 	circuits 	had 	held 	in 	published
opinions 	that 	prison 	officials 	could 	be 	liable 	under 	the 	Eighth
Amendment 	for 	calling 	a 	prisoner 	certain 	derogatory 	terms. 	See
Benefield, 	241 	F.3d 	at 	1271 	(“snitch”); 	Irving, 	519 	F.3d 	at 	451
(“snitch”);4 	Dongarra, 	27 	F.4th 	at 	179 	(“sex 	offender”). 	Other
circuits 	had 	espoused 	similar 	views, 	albeit 	not 	expressly 	in 	the
context 	of 	Eighth 	Amendment 	claims. 	See, 	e.g., 	Valandingham 	v.
Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 1989); Harmon v. Berry,
728 	F.2d 	1407, 	1409 	(11th 	Cir. 	1984) 	(per 	curiam). 	By 	November
2023, 	then, 	a 	robust 	consensus 	of 	circuit 	authority 	placed 	a
reasonable 	state 	official 	on 	notice 	that 	calling 	an 	inmate 	a
“pedophile,” 	“child 	molester,” 	“chicken 	hawk,” 	“skinner,”
“rapist,” or “snitch” in front of other inmates violated the Eighth
Amendment. See Irish, 979 F.3d at 77 (noting that the agreement of
4 	It 	is 	notable 	that 	as 	of 	2008 	-- 	more 	than 	a 	decade 	before 	the
events at issue here -- the Eighth Circuit already felt that “the
clear 	weight 	of 	authority 	in 	the 	circuits 	that 	have 	ruled 	on 	the
question” 	would 	have 	put 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	on 	notice 	that
labeling an inmate a snitch was a constitutional violation. Irving,
519 F.3d at 451.
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three or four circuits is sufficient to clearly establish the law).
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment (Dkt. 243) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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