USA v. Charles

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	Criminal Action
) 	No. 14-cr-10252-PBS
STEVEN CHARLES, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
______________________________ 	)
ORDER
December 19, 2025
Saris, J.
Defendant 	Steven 	Charles 	moves 	to 	vacate 	his 	sentence 	under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the basis that his constitutional rights were
violated 	when 	the 	Court, 	rather 	than 	a 	jury, 	determined 	that 	his
predicate 	offenses 	were 	committed 	on 	separate 	occasions 	for
purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The government
opposes Charles’s motion. After review of the parties’ filings and
the relevant portions of the record, the Court denies the motion.
On June 3, 2015, Charles pleaded guilty to one count of being
a 	felon 	in 	possession 	of 	a 	firearm. 	The 	primary 	dispute 	at
sentencing 	was 	whether 	Charles’s 	prior 	convictions 	included 	the
three predicate offenses necessary for classification as an armed
career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Court concluded that
Charles was an armed career criminal based on three offenses: (1) a
January 	1997 	conviction 	for 	possession 	with 	intent 	to 	distribute
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 7

2
heroin 	that 	occurred 	on 	June 	28, 	1996; 	(2) 	a 	January 	1997
conviction 	on 	two 	counts 	of 	assault 	with 	a 	dangerous 	weapon 	that
occurred on June 6, 1996; and (3) an April 1999 conviction on two
counts of assault with a dangerous weapon that occurred on August
8, 	1998. 	The 	Court 	imposed 	the 	resulting 	fifteen-year 	mandatory
minimum 	prison 	term. 	The 	First 	Circuit 	affirmed 	the 	sentence 	in
May 2017. Charles did not file a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, so his conviction became final in August 2017. See
Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 531 (2022) (“For someone who
. 	. 	. 	does 	not 	petition 	th[e 	Supreme] 	Court 	for 	certiorari, 	a
judgment becomes final when the time to seek certiorari expires -
- ordinarily, 90 days after judgment.”).
In 	June 	2024, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	decided 	Erlinger v. 	United
States, holding that for the ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence 	to 	apply, 	the 	Fifth 	and 	Sixth 	Amendments 	require 	that 	a
unanimous 	jury 	determine 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt 	that 	a
defendant’s 	predicate 	offenses 	were 	committed 	on 	separate
occasions. 	See 	602 	U.S. 	821, 	834-35 	(2024). 	Charles 	filed 	this
§ 2255 motion in February 2025, arguing that his classification as
an armed career criminal violated the rule set forth in Erlinger.
There is no dispute that Charles’s sentencing did not comport with
Erlinger 	because 	the 	Court, 	rather 	than 	a 	jury, 	made 	the
determination 	that 	his 	predicate 	offenses 	occurred 	on 	different
occasions. 	The 	government 	argues, 	however, 	that 	Charles 	cannot
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 7

3
secure 	relief 	based 	on 	Erlinger 	because 	that 	decision 	does 	not
apply retroactively on collateral review.
The 	applicability 	of 	a 	new 	Supreme 	Court 	decision 	on
collateral review turns on two factors. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 593
U.S. 255, 264-65 (2021). A court first must determine whether the
decision 	“announce[d] 	a 	‘new 	rule’” 	or 	only 	“appl[ied] 	a 	settled
rule” 	to 	new 	facts. 	Chaidez 	v. 	United 	States, 	568 	U.S. 	342, 	347
(2013). 	“A 	rule 	is 	new 	unless 	it 	was 	‘dictated 	by 	precedent
existing 	at 	the 	time 	the 	defendant’s 	conviction 	became 	final,’”
that is, “already ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists.’” Edwards,
593 	U.S. 	at 	265 	(first 	quoting 	Teague v. 	Lane, 	489 	U.S. 	288, 	301
(1989); and then quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528
(1997)). 	A 	decision 	“does 	not 	‘announce 	a 	new 	rule 	when 	it 	is
merely 	an 	application 	of 	the 	principle 	that 	governed’ 	a 	prior
decision to a different set of facts.” Shea v. United States, 976
F.3d 	63, 	71 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020) 	(emphasis 	omitted) 	(quoting 	Chaidez,
568 	U.S. 	at 	347-48). 	If 	the 	new 	decision 	applied 	a 	settled 	rule,
a defendant may invoke the decision on collateral review. See id.
If the decision instead announced a new rule, the court must
then 	assess 	whether 	that 	rule 	is 	substantive 	or 	procedural. 	See
Edwards, 593 U.S. at 276. “New substantive rules alter ‘the range
of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,’” while
“[n]ew procedural rules alter ‘only the manner of determining the
defendant’s culpability.’” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 7

4
U.S. 348, 353 (2004)). Only substantive rules apply retroactively
on collateral review. See id.
There is no question that Erlinger’s rule is procedural. See
Schriro, 	542 	U.S. 	at 	353 	(explaining 	that 	“[r]ules 	that 	allocate
decisionmaking 	authority” 	between 	the 	jury 	and 	the 	judge 	“are
prototypical procedural rules”). So Charles may not secure relief
under 	§ 	2255 	based 	on 	Erlinger’s 	holding 	if 	Erlinger 	announced 	a
new rule.
The Court concludes that Erlinger did announce a new rule. It
is true that before Charles’s conviction became final in 2017, the
Supreme 	Court 	had 	held 	in 	Apprendi 	v. 	New 	Jersey, 	530 	U.S. 	466
(2000), 	and 	Alleyne 	v. 	United 	States, 	570 	U.S. 	99 	(2013), 	that 	a
jury 	must 	find 	any 	fact 	that 	increases 	a 	defendant’s 	statutory
maximum 	or 	minimum 	penalty. 	See 	Erlinger, 	602 	U.S. 	at 	833
(describing 	Apprendi 	and 	Alleyne). 	And 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	in
Erlinger 	did 	describe 	the 	issue 	it 	was 	facing 	“as 	nearly 	on 	all
fours with Apprendi and Alleyne as any [it] might imagine.” Id. at
835.
Yet 	the 	rule 	in 	Erlinger 	was 	neither 	dictated 	by 	existing
precedent nor apparent to all reasonable jurists. That is because
the 	Supreme 	Court 	in 	Almendarez-Torres 	v. 	United 	States 	had
recognized 	an 	exception 	to 	the 	general 	rule 	requiring 	a 	jury 	to
find 	facts 	that 	increase 	a 	statutory 	penalty 	that 	allows 	a 	judge
to 	make 	certain 	determinations 	related 	to 	prior 	convictions. 	See
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 7

5
523 U.S. 224, 239-40 (1998); see also Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 n.1
(calling 	Almendarez-Torres 	“a 	narrow 	exception 	to 	th[e] 	general
rule”). 	In 	reliance 	on 	Almendarez-Torres, 	all 	twelve 	regional
circuit courts, including the First Circuit, had held “that judges
may 	make 	the 	different-occasions 	determination” 	under 	the 	ACCA.
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (collecting
cases). 	Thus, 	while 	the 	majority 	in 	Erlinger 	read 	Almendarez-
Torres’s 	exception 	narrowly 	to 	not 	encompass 	the 	fact-based
separate-occasions 	inquiry 	under 	the 	ACCA, 	see 	id. 	at 	838-39,
Erlinger’s 	rule 	was 	not 	dictated 	by 	existing 	Supreme 	Court
precedent. 	Nor 	was 	Erlinger 	simply 	an 	application 	of 	a 	settled
rule 	to 	new 	facts. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	had 	to 	resolve 	the 	open 	and
reasonably 	debatable 	issue 	of 	whether, 	given 	Almendarez-Torres,
the rule established in Apprendi and Alleyne applied at all to the
separate-occasions 	inquiry 	under 	the 	ACCA. 	See 	Chaidez, 	568 	U.S.
at 349-54 (determining that a prior decision announced a new rule
where 	it 	“answered 	a 	question 	about 	the 	Sixth 	Amendment’s 	reach
that [the Supreme Court] had left open, in a way that altered the
law of most jurisdictions”).
Because Erlinger announced a new procedural rule, it does not
apply retroactively on collateral review, and Charles cannot rely
on Erlinger to vacate his sentence under § 2255. See Edwards, 593
U.S. 	at 	276. 	In 	holding 	that 	Erlinger 	is 	not 	retroactive, 	this
Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	many 	district 	courts 	that 	have 	reached 	the
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 5 of 7

6
same 	conclusion. 	See, 	e.g., 	Moore 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	22-cv-
1415, 2025 WL 3214360, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2025); Jackson
v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	25-cv-1021, 	2025 	WL 	2771525, 	at 	*4 	(W.D.
Mich. 	Sep. 	26, 	2025); 	Ramey 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	22-cv-00378,
2025 	WL 	2723414, 	at 	*4 	(M.D. 	Tenn. 	Sep. 	24, 	2025); 	United 	States
v. 	Pettis, 	No. 	15-cr-0233, 	2025 	WL 	2194410, 	at 	*2 	(D. 	Minn. 	Aug.
1, 2025); Cuyler v. United States, No. CR 120-036, 2025 WL 1136295,
at 	*6-7 	(S.D. 	Ga. 	Mar. 	21, 	2025); 	United 	States 	v. 	Hansford, 	No.
20-cr-57, 	2025 	WL 	90240, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ind. 	Jan. 	14, 	2025); 	United
States 	v. 	Abney, 	No. 	18-cr-133, 	2024 	WL 	5055827, 	at 	*3 	(E.D. 	Ky.
Dec. 10, 2024); cf. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“For any case that is already final, the Teague rule
will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in
collateral proceedings.”).
Moreover, Charles’s motion is untimely because Erlinger does
not 	apply 	retroactively 	on 	collateral 	review. 	A 	defendant
generally must file any § 2255 motion within one year of the date
his 	conviction 	becomes 	final. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2255(f)(1); 	Shea,
976 F.3d at 68. Charles’s conviction became final in August 2017,
so 	the 	one-year 	limitations 	period 	expired 	in 	August 	2018, 	years
before 	he 	filed 	this 	motion 	in 	February 	2025. 	Under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(3), this one-year limitations period “restarts . . . on
‘the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 6 of 7

7
Supreme 	Court 	and 	made 	retroactively 	applicable 	to 	cases 	on
collateral 	review.’” 	Shea, 	976 	F.3d 	at 	68 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(3)). 	Although 	Charles 	filed 	his 	motion 	within 	one 	year
of the Erlinger decision, Erlinger did not restart the limitations
period because the right it newly recognized is not retroactive.1
Accordingly, 	Charles’s 	motion 	to 	vacate 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2255 (Dkt. 133) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
1 	The 	Court 	notes 	that 	if 	Erlinger 	merely 	applied 	a 	settled 	rule
rather than announced a new rule, Charles’s motion would still be
untimely. As noted, Charles’s motion was not filed within one year
of 	the 	date 	his 	conviction 	became 	final. 	And 	Erlinger 	would 	not
have triggered a new one-year limitations period because it would
not 	have 	“newly 	recognized” 	the 	right 	Charles 	asserts. 	28 	U.S.C.
2255(f)(3).
Case 1:14-cr-10252-PBS Document 140 Filed 12/19/25 Page 7 of 7