Pittman et al v. Montgomery et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN HENRY PITTMAN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-2576
WARREN MONTGOMERY, ET AL. SECTION “G” (2)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Brian Henry Pittman filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing,
if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1) and(2). Upon review of the record, the Court has determined that this matter can be
disposed of without an evidentiary hearing.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Brian Pittman, a convicted inmate housed in Caldwell Correctional Center in Grayson,
Louisiana, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis § 1983 complaint against defendants Detective
Timothy Crabtree, Special Agent Matthew Vasquez, Detective Brooks McGeever, retired Judge
August J. Hand, Assistant District Attorney John Alford, Assistant District Attorney Jo Halland,
Judge Richard Swartz, former St. Tammany Parish Coroner Tara Brown, and the former St.
Tammany Parish District Attorney Warren Montgomery. ECF No. 5 at 1, ¶II, at 2, ¶III(B)-(I), at
4; see also id. at 9. Pittman was convicted of aggravated battery, attempted armed robbery, and
simple burglary. Id. at 16.
Broadly construing his complaint, Pittman alleges that on May 2, 2016, defendants Det.
Crabtree and Judge August J. Hand committed perjury by issuing a false arrest warrant. ECF No.
5 at 14. Further, Pittman claims that he was indicted without probable cause based on faulty DNA
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evidence, Coroner Tara Brown was a witness for the State who conducted the DNA testing, and
District Attorney Warren Montgomery and Assistant District Attorneys John Alford and Jo
Halland committed perjury and prosecutorial misconduct. Pittman also claims that Judge Richard
Swartz engaged in acts of treason during his trial. Id. at 15.
Pittman requests the Court order his release, have those involved arrested for kidnapping,
and that he be awarded monetary compensation for every hour that he has been incarcerated. Id.,
¶V, at 5.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Statutorily Required Screening
As soon as practicable after docketing, the court must review a prisoner’s § 1983 complaint
for a cognizable claim, or dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim.1 A
claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”2 A claim lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”3 A factually frivolous claim alleges only
facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise to the
level of the irrational or wholly incredible . . . .”4 A court may not dismiss a claim simply because
the facts are “unlikely.”5
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Martin, 156 F.3d at 579-80.
2 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Macias v. Raul A., 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
3 Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).
4 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).
5 Id. at 270.
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A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual
allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in
the complaint are true, even if doubtful.6 The Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is generally confined to a
review of the complaint and its proper attachments.7 The Fifth Circuit has summarized the
standard for Rule 12(b)(6):
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” A claim
for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” A claim for relief is implausible on its face when “the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.”8
“[W]hen evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept[ ] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”9 Thus, the
court should assume the veracity of all well-pleaded allegations, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, “‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.’”10
In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that a claim
6 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
7 Walch v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
8 Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009), and quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544).
9 Id. at 803 n.44 (quoting True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)); accord
Murchison Capital Partners, L.P. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 625 F. App’x 617, 618 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wood
v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014)); Maloney Gaming Mgt., L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Par., 456 F. App’x 336, 340
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff ’s Off., 530 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 696); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017)).
10 Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F. App’x 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664); see also Dorsey v.
Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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that is dismissed under one rule does not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.11 If an in forma
pauperis complaint lacks even an arguable basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule
12(b)(6) and § 1915(e).12 “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district
court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate; however, dismissal under [§ 1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”13
B. Required Elements of a § 1983 Claim
Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or
statutory rights under color of state law:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law . . . .14
“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority to deprive
individuals of federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”15
A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability:
(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;
(2) that occurred under color of state law; and
(3) was caused by a state actor.16
Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any
substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability.”17
This requires the plaintiff to identify both the constitutional violation and the responsible person
11 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
15 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).
16 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
17 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
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acting under color of state law.18 “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law
requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”19
III. ANALYSIS
A. Section 1983 May Not Be Used for Habeas Relief
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that “Congress has determined that habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of
their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.”20
Section 1983 and the federal habeas statute are thus distinct. Habeas applies to a specific kind of
plaintiff (a prisoner) seeking a specific and exceedingly powerful injunction (release from custody)
under specific legal standards unique to habeas (and today include AEDPA) whereas § 1983 is
more general and applies to constitutional and statutory claimants seeking an array of remedies
(including a variety of injunctions but also money damages) without regard to the common-law
and statutory restrictions on habeas.21
The Fifth Circuit’s bright line rule makes clear that a habeas petition “is the proper vehicle
to seek release from custody,” while a civil rights suit is the “proper vehicle to attack
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures.”22 A habeas request is not
properly asserted or sought in a §1983 civil rights action as overturning a conviction or obtaining
18 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
19 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); accord
Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1984).
20 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
21 Wilson v. Midland Cnty., Texas, 116 F.4th 384, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457
U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (holding that, unlike the federal habeas statute, § 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of
state remedies)), petition for cert. filed (Dec. 20, 2024).
22 Maxwell v. Thomas, No. 23-40699, 2025 WL 1000117, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (citing Melot v. Bergami, 970
F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020)).
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a release from custody is not an available remedy under § 1983.23 If a favorable determination of
the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the proper
vehicle is a civil rights suit.”24 Release and reversal of a conviction are not appropriate remedies
under § 1983.25 Thus, a prisoner cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement in a § 1983
action.26
Pittman’s challenge to the legality of his criminal proceedings and request for reversal of
his subsequent convictions constitutes a challenge to “the fact or duration of confinement.” As his
claims directly challenge the constitutionality of his conviction and “necessarily imply the
unlawfulness” of his detention, his claim is strictly habeas in nature.27 For that reason, Pittman’s
request for habeas relief is inappropriately brought through this § 1983 complaint.28 That requested
relief must be pursued on habeas corpus grounds.29
B. Heck Doctrine
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that, to
avoid improper collateral attacks to convictions, a claim under § 1983 is barred if success in the
suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction or a plaintiff's
23 See Smith v. Lafourche Par., No. 21-1714, 2021 WL 4975698, at *3 (E.D. La. Sep. 30, 2021) (discussing when
habeas relief can be granted), R.&R. adopted, 2021 WL 4972374 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2021); accord Lerille v. Lafourche
Par., No. 21-1729, 2021 WL 4975754, at *3 (E.D. La. Sep. 30, 2021), R.&R. adopted, 2021 WL 4972369, at *1 (E.D.
La. Oct. 26, 2021).
24 Id.
25 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974).
26 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998).
27 Mount v. Wakefield, 738 F. App’x 280 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90; Carson v. Johnson, 112
F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (a petition for writ of habeas corpus permits a petitioner to seek immediate or earlier
release from custody, where a § 1983 complaint provides for challenges to unconstitutional conditions of confinement
and prison procedures); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
28 See Schipke v. Van Buren, 239 F. App’x 85, 85-86 (5th Cir. 2007) (“allegations that challenge the fact or duration
of confinement are properly brought in habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and
procedures affecting conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions”).
29 Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986).
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present confinement.30 The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a civil rights action under § 1983
may not recover damages for an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,”
unless he proves “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”31 The Heck doctrine
applies to civil actions for both monetary and injunctive or other relief.32
Pittman does not allege that his conviction has been overturned, invalidated, or in any way
called into question as required by Heck and its progeny. For these reasons, even if Pittman were
seeking only monetary relief under § 1983 rather than habeas relief, his claims challenging the
constitutionality of his arrest and conviction must be dismissed pending his compliance with the
conditions expressed in Heck.33
C. Ground for Dismissal Apart from Heck
The Fifth Circuit requires a court to address dismissal of immune defendants and cull those
claims that cannot proceed under § 1983 without regard to any Heck bar.34
1. Eleventh Amendment/Judicial Immunity
Pittman named retired St. Tammany Parish Judge August J. Hand and Judge Richard
Swartz as defendants. Whether named in an individual or official capacity, judges enjoy absolute
immunity from suit.
30 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-85.
31 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (internal footnote omitted).
32 Clarke, 154 F.3d at 189 (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).
33 Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (1996) (Heck dismissal is with prejudice until the conditions are met).
34 See Busick v. City of Madison, Miss., 90 F. App’x 713, 714 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the district court should
consider grounds for dismissal other than Heck); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F. 3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (immunity
must be considered as a threshold matter prior to applying Heck).
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A state official in his official capacity is not considered a “person” subject to suit under
§ 1983.35 As a state court judge, any judgment against either judge in their official capacities
would be satisfied out of the state treasury rendering the State liable for any alleged wrongs.36
Thus, claims against judges in an official capacity are considered claims against the State of
Louisiana itself, and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.37 The Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits suit against a State in federal court without the State’s
consent.38 The State of Louisiana has not waived its sovereign immunity or consented to the
exercise of federal judicial power in civil actions against it.39
Immunity applies to a judge acting in his authority as a presiding officer, regardless of
whether the judge’s actions were erroneous, malicious, or in excess of his authority.40 “A judge’s
immunity is overcome only for actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity or for action taken
in complete absence of all jurisdiction.”41 Any claims against Judge August J. Hand or Judge
Richard Swartz related to Pittman’s conviction or subsequent appeals would involve actions taken
in their judicial capacity, and Pittman has not urged any action that was nonjudicial in nature. 42
35 Will v. Mich. Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (suit against a state official in official capacity is not a suit
against the individual person but a suit against the official’s office); Boyd v. Lasher, No. 09-7645, 2010 WL 677663,
at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2010) (ordering adopting R&R) (a judge is a state official and state officials acting in that
capacity are not considered to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983); McCloud v. Craig, No. 09-3287, 2009 WL
2515609, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2009) (same).
36 LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1; Voisin’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1986).
37 Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996) (“Suits against state officials in their official
capacity are considered to be suits against the individual office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state
itself.”); Rackley v. Louisiana, No. 07-504, 2007 WL 1792524 at *3 (E.D. La. Jun. 21, 2007) (suit against Louisiana
state judge in an official capacity is suit against the State); Voisin’s Oyster House, Inc., 799 F.2d at 188; Doris v. Van
Davis, No. 08-4138, 2009 WL 382653, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2009) (judgment against a Louisiana state judge in
official capacity would be satisfied out of the state treasury rendering a claim against the judge a claim against the
state).
38 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 659 (1974).
39 LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106(A); LA. CONST. art. I, § 26; Harris v. La. Office of Juvenile Justice, No. 18-13356, 2019
WL 2617175, at *4 (E.D. La. June 26, 2019) (citing Holliday v. Bd. of Sup’rs of LSU Agr. & Mech. Coll., 149 So. 3d
227, 229 (La. 2014)).
40 Du Bois v. Warne, 336 F. App’x 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1996)).
41 Id. (citing Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284).
42 Du Bois, 336 F. App’x at 409 (citing Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284-85).
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As such, Pittman has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against retired Judge August J. Hand
and Judge Richard Swartz in their individual capacities that would overcome their absolute
immunity from suit.
For these reasons, the claims against retired Judge August J. Hand and Judge Richard
Swartz, whether in their official or individual capacities, are frivolous, seek relief against immune
defendants, and otherwise fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As such, these
claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A.
2. The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorneys of St. Tammany Parish
Pittman asserts that former St. Tammany Parish District Attorney Warren Montgomery
and Assistant District Attorneys John Alford and Jo Halland committed perjury and prosecutorial
misconduct to obtain his conviction. The Complaint is unclear whether Pittman asserts these claims
against these defendants in their individual or official capacities. If named in their individual
capacities, Pittman cannot proceed with these claims against these defendants, as district attorneys
enjoy absolute immunity from suit under § 1983.43
If pursued as an official capacity claim, that claim is considered the equivalent to suit
against Orleans Parish.44 “[M]unicipalities cannot be held liable for constitutional torts under
§ 1983 ‘on a respondeat superior theory,’ but they can be held liable ‘when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
43 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Beard v. Wolf, No. 13-4772, 2014 WL 3687236 at *2-3 (E.D. La. Jul. 22,
2014).
44 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59-60 (2011) (a district attorney in Louisiana is a Parish official and claims
against Orleans Parish District Attorney in an official capacity are addressed under the standards of Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)); Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir.
1999) (“For purposes of ‘official capacity’ suits under § 1983, the district attorney’s office resembles other local
government entities.”); Bean v. Pittman, No. 14-2210, 2015 WL 350284, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2015) (official
capacity against Jefferson Parish sheriff’s deputies is suit against the Parish through the Sheriff’s Office); see also
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (refusing to apply immunities for personal liability to Monell
claims against local governments because “there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations”).
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may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”45 Thus, to state a non-frivolous
claim against a prosecutor in an official capacity, Pittman would first have to identify that person,
establish that the person was a final parish policymaker, and identify the parish policy or custom
which allegedly caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights.46 Pittman has not alleged any
policy claims in his complaint nor does he allege that former District Attorney Warren
Montgomery or assistant district attorneys Alford and Halland were final policy-makers for the
parish. Further, Pittman has not identified any parish policy that led to a constitutional violation
during his prosecution or that resulted in any alleged bias, prejudice, or denial of due process that
caused him constitutional injury. Therefore, he has not stated a plausible official capacity/Monell
claim against these defendants.
For these reasons, Pate’s claims against former St. Tammany Parish District Attorney
Warren Montgomery, Assistant District Attorney John Alford, and Assistant District Attorney Jo
Halland, in either their individual or official capacities, are frivolous, brought against immune
defendants, and otherwise fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As such, the claims
should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), § 1915A.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Brian Henry Pittman’s § 1983 claims against all defendants
(Detective Timothy Crabtree, Special Agent Matthew Vasquez, Detective Brooks McGeever,
Judge August J. Hand, Assistant District Attorney John Alford, Assistant District Attorney Jo
45 Burge, 187 F. 3d at 470 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
46 Rinker v. New Orleans Dist. Atty., No. 10-0810, 2010 WL 2773236 at *4-5 (E.D. La. Jun. 15, 2010), R&R adopted
by 2010 WL 2773383, at *1 (E.D. La. Jul. 12, 2010) (citing Murray v. Town of Mansura, 76 F. App’x 547, 549 (5th
Cir. 2003); Treece v. Louisiana, 74 F. App’x 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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Halland, Judge Richard Swartz, St. Tammany Parish Coroner Tara Brown, and St. Tammany
Parish District Attorney Warren Montgomery) be DISMISSED as Heck barred.
ALTERNATIVELY, IT IS RECOMMENDED that, in the event the case is not
dismissed under Heck, Pittman’s claims against defendants Judge August J. Hand, Assistant
District Attorney John Alford, Assistant District Attorney Jo Halland, Judge Richard Swartz, and
St. Tammany Parish District Attorney Warren Montgomery be DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915(e), § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e as frivolous and otherwise for failure
to state a claim for which relief can be granted but that Plaintiff’s claims against Detective
Timothy Crabtree, Special Agent Matthew Vasquez, Detective Brooks McGeever and St.
Tammany Parish Coroner Tara Brown be allowed to proceed for further proceedings.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.47
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of March, 2026.
_____________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
47 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously
applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended
to extend the period to fourteen days.
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