Wagner v. AT&T Services, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FREDDIE L. WAGNER, JR. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1672
AT&T SERVICES, INC. 	SECTION: “P” (5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (rec. doc. 11) filed by Defendant AT&T Services, Inc.
(AT&T). Plaintiff, Freddie L. Wagner, filed an opposition and a supplemental opposition to
the motion. (Rec. docs. 10, 13). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court
recommends as follows.
I. 	Factual Background
On July 16, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Freddie L. Wagner filed suit in the 21st Judicial
District for the Parish of Tangipahoa. AT&T subsequently removed the matter to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction. (Rec. doc. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint stems from an alleged
trespass on his property at 40009 Olde Mill Lane in Ponchatoula, Louisiana on or about
March 23, 2025. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that an AT&T worker
or contractor physically entered his locked, secured backyard without consent; performed
unauthorized work; and caused visible property damage. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts a plethora
of related harms including property damage, trespass and invasion of privacy, negligence
and industry misconduct, and emotional distress and anguish. (Id. at 7-12). Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages in the amount of $400,000.00 dollars. (Id. at 13).
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II. 	Standard for a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 	The
statement of the claim must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). 	A pleading does not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,”
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557) (alteration omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to
dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 	A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Plausibility does not equate to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” 	Id.
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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts pleaded in the complaint “do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged –
but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court employs the two-pronged approach described in Twombly. Clofer v. Connick, No. CV
23-6268, 2024 WL 4855475 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 25-30139, 2025
WL 2020968 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025). The court “can choose to begin by identifying pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated
a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of
success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012)). A
court's review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss
that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).
Courts “liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent standards
to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel.” Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d
523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). This does not mean, however, that a court “will invent, out of whole
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cloth, novel arguments on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the absence of meaningful, albeit
imperfect, briefing.” Jones v. Alfred, 353 F. App'x 949, 952 (5th Cir. 2009). Even a liberally-
construed pro se complaint “must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be
granted.” Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. 	Law and Analysis
AT&T argues that each cause of action alleged by Plaintiff fails to establish factual
allegations that raise his right to relief above the speculative level. 	(Rec. doc. 11-1 at 3).
Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against AT&T: (A) trespass; (B) negligence; (C)
property damage; (D) invasion of privacy; (E) emotional distress; (F) unauthorized wiring,
liability, and demands for subpoena testimony; (F-1) unauthorized wiring, liability, and
demands for subpoena testimony;1 (F-2) pattern of deflection, proxies, and diversion; and
(G) retaliation and civil rights violations related to protected reporting. 	(Rec. doc. 1-1).2
Defendant argues that each claim fails to provide a short and plain statement showing that
Plaintiff is entitled to relief because each is speculative, lacks factual support, or accuses
unconnected third parties of wrongdoing. (Rec. doc. 11-1 at 4).
A. 	Trespass
Regarding his trespass claim, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant, AT&T Services, Inc., through its agents or contractors, entered
petitioner's private residential property without notice, consent, or legal
justification. 	This unauthorized entry constitutes trespass under Louisiana
law. AT&T had no recorded easement, no right-of-way authorization specific
to petitioner's yard, and no permission from the homeowner. The intrusion
extended beyond public access points and into petitioner's locked and secured
1 The paragraph numbers (i.e., F-1, F-2, etc.) correspond to those listed in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
2 The lettering is Plaintiff’s, taken from his Complaint.
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backyard, a space known to be routinely restricted even to authorized
personnel such as lawn care providers.3
(Rec. doc. 1-1 at 7) (footnote added).
The primary elements of proof for trespass are (1) a physical invasion of (2) the
plaintiff’s property by a defendant where (3) that invasion was unlawful. Turner v. Murphy
Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 609 (E.D. La. 2006). Even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true
(that AT&T entered Plaintiff’s property at some point), public record indicates that Plaintiff’s
property is encumbered by a utility easement both towards Highway 22 and in the rear of
his property. (Rec. doc. 11-3). Plaintiff’s property is identified in his Cash Deed as Lot 1 in
the Olde Mill Subdivision. 	(Rec. doc. 11-2). 	The attached plat of Olde Mill Subdivision
identifies a “utility servitude” located on the side of Plaintiff’s property parallel to Highway
22 as well as a “utility parcel” in the rear 25 feet of Plaintiff’s property. (Rec. doc. 11-3).
Access to a utility servitude is given to utility companies, such as AT&T, to install,
maintain, and repair essential infrastructure like lines, cables, and equipment on private
property for public benefit.4 As Louisiana law provides, the owner of the dominant estate
has the right to enter with his workmen and equipment into the part of the servient estate
that is needed for the construction or repair of works required for the use and preservation
of the servitude. 	La. Civ. Code art. 745. 	The utility pole at question in the supplemental
exhibit to his opposition (rec. doc. 13 at 1-2) is located on the boundary line of the property
that falls within the recorded utility servitude and is considered part of that easement.
3 Of note, Plaintiff provides conflicting dates regarding this unauthorized entry. 	He claims he began noticing
unauthorized utility work in or around his property on March 23, 2025. (See rec. doc. 1-1 at 4). However, he then
states that fiber optic infrastructure was buried without petitioner’s knowledge, consent, or any formal notice back in
2024. (Id.). Although the alleged unauthorized fiber optic infrastructure work is the basis for his negligence claim, it
seems also to be the overall incident at issue for each claim including trespass. (Id.).
4 A utility is a service, such as electricity, water, sewer, gas, telephone, cable, and power and communication networks,
of the kind commonly used in the operation of an ordinary household, whether the service is provided to a household
or business. La. Civ. Code art. 1281.
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Merely because the utility pole is within Plaintiff’s fenced backyard does not mean it is not
part of the utility servitude. 	Any installation at any time would have been within public
utility right of way and therefore not a trespass. As such, an installation by AT&T would be
considered preservation of the servitude.
As recognized by Plaintiff, servitude rights “are to be exercised in a way least
inconvenient for the servient estate.” La. Civ. Code art. 743. A utility company entering a
private backyard for servitude use, even if inconvenient, is generally considered a normal,
necessary part of exercising the servitude. 	See La. R.S. § 9:1282. 	Therefore, Plaintiff has
failed to provide a sufficient claim for trespass because there was no unlawful invasion, and
therefore there is no entitlement to relief.
B. 	Negligence
Next, Plaintiff alleges that AT&T acted negligently by failing to exercise reasonable
care in verifying its right of access before conducting fiber optic infrastructure work. 	He
further alleges that AT&T failed to notify him of its access, made no effort to confirm legal
entry, and caused direct interference to his private property. 	Plaintiff claims there is
currently a loose fiber optic wire near his residence that is unsecured and potentially
hazardous. He also believes the area may contain live power sources, underground poles, or
improperly-routed equipment that he claims would pose a danger to individuals and a
continued disruption to his home. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 4).
To state a negligence claim under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard; (2) the defendant's
conduct failed to conform to that standard; (3) the defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact
of the plaintiff's injuries; (4) the defendant's conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's
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injuries; and (5) actual damages. Alexis v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 493 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508 (E.D.
La. 2020). 	Failure to plead a single element with factual plausibility warrants dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that actual injury or damages occurred and that they
were caused by AT&T. 	Instead, he points to hypothetical harm such as a “potentially
hazardous” loose or exposed fiber optic wire. 	Additionally, his belief that the area may
contain live power sources, underground poles, or improperly-routed equipment is a
hypothetical harm of which Plaintiff has no actual knowledge. Accordingly, there is no actual
injury or damage found in Plaintiff’s negligence allegations. Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence
claim fails.
C. 	Property Damage
Regarding his property damage claim Plaintiff alleges that
[a]s a direct result of defendant's unauthorized entry, petitioner discovered a
patched section of exterior brickwork, which was evaluated by a licensed
masonry contractor and determined to be fresh and improperly repaired.
Petitioner asserts that this damage is consistent with unauthorized digging or
infrastructure intrusion. 	Coupled with ongoing electrical irregularities and
unacknowledged equipment interference, these findings support petitioner's
claim of physical damage and disruption to his residence.
(Rec. doc. 1-1 at 7).
As mentioned above, to survive a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint does
not need detailed factual allegations, but plaintiffs do have an obligation to provide the
“grounds” of their “entitle[ment] to relief” which requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements. 	Further, factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of
the complaint's allegations are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
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Here, there are not enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence that AT&T caused damage to Plaintiff’s property. There is no factual support
that AT&T caused the need for patched brickwork. Instead, Plaintiff merely speculates that
this damage is consistent with what he alleges occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to set
forth a cause of action for property damage that raises a right to relief beyond the speculative
level.
D. 	Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiff also claims that he experienced serious intrusion into the privacy and quiet
enjoyment of his home due to unauthorized installation of infrastructure and the presence
of residual EMF interference. He believes that these actions also contributed to surveillance-
related violations5 that were amplified by AT&T’s failure to disclose the full scope of its
activity.
In Louisiana, the tort of invasion of privacy can occur in four ways: (1) by
appropriating an individual's name or likeness; (2) by unreasonably intruding on physical
solitude or seclusion; (3) by giving publicity which unreasonably places a person in a false
light before the public; and (4) by unreasonable public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts. Bednyak v. Fin. Risk Mitigation, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 3d 353, 372 (E.D. La. 2024) (citing
Juge v. Springfield Wellness, L.L.C., 274 So. 3d at 8 (La. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Alessi v. Loehn,
76 So. 3d 1142, 1143 (La. 2011)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to raise any of the four ways in
which invasion of privacy can occur.
5 Plaintiff provides an affidavit explaining incidents that led to his feelings of being surveilled and targeted by his
neighbors. He also feels as if there could be collaboration between local law enforcement and nearby residents.
Plaintiff explains that these incidents align with a broader pattern of increased surveillance, harassment, and
institutional misconduct. (Rec. doc. 1-1).
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Even if the installation of infrastructure occurred, such an installation is not
considered an unreasonable intrusion on Plaintiff’s physical solitude. 	As previously
mentioned, a utility company such as AT&T has the authority to manage and preserve a
utility servitude. Again, Plaintiff’s belief that the actions of AT&T contributed to surveillance-
related violations is hypothetical harm based on a conspiracy theory. Even so, the allegations
in this case still lack the proper factual support because it is altogether unclear how an
outdoor cable installation could lead to a “serious intrusion into the privacy and quiet
enjoyment of his home.” 	Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim lacks the proper factual
allegations to meet any of the requirements offered by Louisiana law.
E. 	Emotional Distress
Plaintiff further alleges that he has endured prolonged mental anguish, stress, and
emotional hardship because of AT&T’s conduct, which includes the lack of transparency,
refusal to provide justification, and dismissive communication by company representatives.
“For a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
there must be proof that the defendant violated some legal duty to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff must meet the heavy burden of proving outrageous conduct by the defendant.”
Succession of Harvey v. Dietzen, 716 So. 2d 911, 917 (La. Ct. App. 1998). “[P]laintiff must show
an ‘especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special
circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.’” Doerr v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 935 So.2d 231, 237 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Moresi v. State Through Dep't of
Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990)).
Here, there is no allegation of outrageous conduct at all in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Lack
of transparency, refusal to provide justification, and dismissive communications by company
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representatives simply cannot be considered outrageous conduct that would meet the
requirements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. And again, any installation
by AT&T was justified by way of its utility servitude. 	It is again unclear from Plaintiff’s
Complaint how the outdoor installation of fiber optic infrastructure from a utility company
could lead to “endured, prolonged mental anguish.” Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to assert a
claim for any infliction of emotional distress beyond mere belief or speculation.
F. 	Other Claims
Finally, the remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint (subparagraphs F through G) fails to
set forth a cause of action and instead makes allegations about a hypothetical conspiracy that
are completely irrelevant to any trespass claim. 	First, Plaintiff requests that this Court
subpoena representatives from AT&T, Charter Communications (Spectrum), and Entergy to
explain whether they are the utility company responsible for installation of a live line
connected to Petitioner’s AT&T box and telecom junction box. 	He is interested in this
information because he claims to rely exclusively on cellular data and has no landline or
wired telecom of any kind. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 9-12). Further, Plaintiff seeks to inquire whether
surveillance or covert data transmission could occur through such infrastructure and
whether such installation poses any electric or public safety hazard to the homeowner. (Id.).
Here, Plaintiff offers no factual support for his belief that AT&T installed wiring
without authorization. 	Instead, he wants to use this Court to find out whether the line
connected to his AT&T box and telecom junction could be used for the purposes of
surveillance or covert data and whether he has a claim against AT&T to bodily harm. These
inquiries are based upon pure speculation with no other foundation and do not present a
valid claim; they are completely irrelevant to any trespass claim.
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Second, Plaintiff believes that the act of deflection of topic during a conversation by
an AT&T technician when asked about the unauthorized telecom wiring, cable routing, and
tampered infrastructure supports the conclusion that contractors tied to these institutions
are aware of the “sabotage,” but are attempting to minimize liability or redirect scrutiny.
(Id.). Plaintiff does not make a valid claim here because he states these facts as observations
that he wants the Court to understand and not as a claim to which he is entitled to relief.
Third, Plaintiff claims that following the reporting of child sexual abuse material, he
observed a distinct and disturbing change in how he was treated by local law enforcement
and surrounding institutions. (Id.). Further, he alleges that he began to experience increased
surveillance, deliberate intimidation, and a campaign of psychological manipulation and
retaliation designed to discredit and destabilize him. (Id.). These allegations involve entities
other than AT&T and do not implicate or support a trespass claim. Further, AT&T does not
control local law enforcement. Even accepting these allegations as true, there is no cause of
action against AT&T based upon them.
For all other claims (subparagraphs F through G), Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts outside of conspiracy and inquiry that properly amount to a claim for relief.
Thus, Plaintiff has asserted no legally cognizable claims.
G. 	Leave to Amend
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend is “by no
means automatic.” Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.
1981). Instead, the decision to grant or deny leave is one left to the sound discretion of the
trial court. 	In deciding whether leave should be granted, the district court can consider
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factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the
opposing party . . . [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
“When the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should generally be done
without prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.” 	Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). “However, a district court may dismiss with prejudice
if the plaintiff has been given adequate opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading
or if the pleadings ‘demonstrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case.’” Id. (quoting
Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) and citing Brewster v. Dretke, 587
F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Here, Plaintiff was given no “opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading.” Id.
And the pleadings demonstrate that he has not pleaded his best case. Plaintiff has not been
able to plead crucial elements of a plausible claim because he lacked the necessary facts to
allege a claim that is plausible on its face. 	“With the benefit of more specific allegations,
[Plaintiff] may be able to state a claim.” Id. at 423-24. Thus, “the general rule that dismissal
should be without prejudice applies.” 	Id. at 424. 	The Court therefore recommends that
Plaintiff be allowed to amend his Complaint no later than 30 days from any dispositive action
by the District Judge.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (rec. doc. 11) be GRANTED. 	Plaintiffs’ claims
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should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, and he should be
allowed 30 days within which to amend his Complaint.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error,
from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such
consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this __________ day of __________________, 2026.
____________________________________
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
February	2nd
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