United States of America v. Five Properties, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1213
FIVE PROPERTIES, LLC ET AL. 	SECTION: “J”(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14) filed by
Defendants 	Five 	Properties, 	LLC 	and 	APMT, 	LLC 	d/b/a 	Tonti 	Management
(collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff United States of America (“the Government”)
opposes the motion. (Rec. Doc. 23) and Defendants filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 24). Having
considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that the motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This 	suit 	arises 	out 	of 	a 	lease 	executed between 	Dory 	Turnipseed and
Defendants. (Rec. Doc. 23-1, at 1–4). In May 2018, Turnipseed, a tenant of an
apartment owned by Five Properties, LLC and managed by Tonti Management, filed
a lawsuit in this Court against Defendant Tonti Management. (Rec. Doc. 23-4).
Turnipseed alleged, among other things, that Tonti Management violated the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”) because they refused to accommodate her mental disability and
allow her to live in the apartment with her emotional support dog. Id. at 2–9. One
month later, Turnipseed also filed a United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) complaint. (Rec. Doc. 23-1, at 8).
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In July 2018, Tonti Management moved to compel arbitration of the federal
suit. Id. at 6. This Court granted the motion and stayed the lawsuit pending
arbitration. Id. After nearly four years and a court order permitting an additional
thirty days to initiate arbitration, Turnipseed failed to initiate arbitration. Id. Tonti
Management subsequently moved to dismiss Turnipseed’s lawsuit for lack of
prosecution. Id. This Court granted the motion in December 2022 and dismissed
Turnipseed’s suit with prejudice. Id. at 7.
In January 2025, roughly six and a half years after Turnipseed filed her HUD
complaint, HUD completed its investigation and issued a charge of discrimination
and determination of reasonable cause. Id. at 19. The Government then filed this suit,
on behalf of Turnipseed, alleging that Defendants violated the FHA. Id. at 20.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When
assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a court considers “all of
the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co.,
530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party, but a party cannot defeat summary judgment with
conclusory allegations or
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unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be
satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted
at trial.’” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991).
The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either countering with
sufficient evidence of its own, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is
so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a
verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing
out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to
evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324.
The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts
that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
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PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
I. 	Res Judicata
Defendants argue that res judicata prevents the Government from bringing its
action because Turnipseed’s original suit against them was dismissed with prejudice.
(Rec. Doc. 14-1, at 9). Res judicata applies when (1) the parties are identical or in
privity (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the judgment in the prior action
(3) a final judgment on the merits concluded the prior action and (4) both actions
involved the same claims or cause of action. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh,
428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005).
The 	parties 	disagree 	over 	the 	first 	requirement, 	namely, 	whether 	the
Government is in privity with Turnipseed. Defendants argue that the Government is
in 	privity 	with 	Turnipseed 	because 	Turnipseed 	adequately 	represented 	the
Government’s interest in her prior suit, and “[t]he Government has only asserted
claims on behalf of Turnipseed. Nothing more.” (Rec. Doc. 14-1, at 10–11).
The Government argues that it has an independent interest in enforcing the
FHA and seeks broader remedies than the original suit, namely, to protect the public
interest by deterring future FHA violations. (Rec. Doc. 23, at 5–6). Thus, the
Government 	contends 	that 	Turnipseed 	did 	not 	adequately 	represent 	the
Government’s interest in her original suit. Id.
This Court agrees with the Government. “The United States has an interest in
enforcing federal law that is independent of any claims of private citizens.” United
States v. East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 594 F. 2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1979). Further,
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contrary 	to 	Defendants’ contention, 	the Government 	seeks 	relief 	beyond what
Turnipseed sought in her original suit. (Compare Rec. Doc. 23-4, at 13, with Rec. Doc.
4, at 12–13).
In Turnipseed’s complaint, she sought relief against Tonti Management which
a. 	Declares the discriminatory housing practices of Defendant, as set
forth above, violate the FHA (the original source reads “FHAA”) . . .
b. 	Grants Plaintiff the accommodation she has required . . .
c. 	Enjoins Defendant from discriminating against any person based
upon handicap by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation . . .
d. 	Enjoins Defendant from evicting, or threatening to evict, Plaintiff on
account of her reasonable accommodation request for an emotional
support animal;
e. 	Awards Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages as would fully
compensate her for the discriminatory conduct of Defendant;
f. 	Awards Plaintiff her attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing
this action to enforce the FHA (the original source reads “FHAA”),
and
g. 	Grants any other such relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
(Rec. Doc. 23-4, at 13).
In the Government’s amended complaint, it seeks relief against Defendants
which
a. 	Declares that Defendants’ actions, as alleged, violate the FHA;
b. 	Orders the Defendants to take all affirmative steps to ensure
their compliance with the FHA, including steps necessary to
prevent the recurrence of any discriminatory conduct in the
future and to eliminate to the extent practicable the effects
of their unlawful housing practices as described herein;
c. 	Orders the Defendants to take all affirmative steps to restore,
as 	nearly 	as 	practicable, 	the 	victims 	of 	the 	Defendants’
unlawful practices to the position they would have been in
but for the Defendants’ discriminatory conduct;
d. 	Awards monetary damages to Ms. Turnipseed as authorized by 42
U.S.C. §§ 3612(o) and 3613(c)(1); and
e. 	Awards such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.
(Rec. Doc. 4, at 12–13) (emphasis added).
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By seeking that Defendants take affirmative steps to ensure FHA compliance
and affirmative steps to restore the victims of Defendants’ allegedly unlawful
practices, 	the 	Government 	seeks 	to 	vindicate 	public 	interests 	beyond 	what
Turnipseed sought in her original suit. The Government’s independent and broader
interest preclude this Court from finding privity between it and Turnipseed. “The
United States will not be barred from independent litigation by the failure of a private
plaintiff.” East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 594 F. 2d 56, at 58. Accordingly, this Court
will not dismiss the Government’s claims for these affirmative steps.
Further, this Court will not prevent the Government from pursuing victim-
specific relief on behalf of Turnipseed because such a pursuit also serves the public
interest. As the Supreme Court has explained, a federal “agency may be seeking to
vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief . . . even when it
pursues entirely victim-specific relief.” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
296 (2002). By seeking damages on behalf of Turnipseed, the Government may be
seeking to deter Defendants from committing future FHA violations. Therefore, this
Court will not dismiss the Government’s claims to recover on Turnipseed’s behalf
based on res judicata.
II. 	Doctrine of Laches
Defendants also argue that this Court should dismiss this action under the
doctrine of laches. “[A] district court enjoys considerable discretion in deciding
whether to apply the doctrine of laches to claims pending before it.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Gov’t Emps. v. City of Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 707 (5th Cir.
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1994). However, the Fifth Circuit law is clear that “laches may not be asserted as a
defense against the United States when it is acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce
public rights or protect the public interest.” United States v. Popovich, 820 F. 2d 134,
136 (5th Cir. 1987). 	As discussed, the Government brings this action to protect the
public interest. Consequently, this Court will not apply the doctrine of laches to bar
the Government’s suit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Rec. Doc. 14) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of November, 2025.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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