Jones et al v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association et al

Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHAUNA B. JONES, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 25-998
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE,
INC., ET AL.
SECTION: "A" (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 33) filed by the
defendants, U.S. Bank Trust National Association, Not in its Individual Capacity But
Solely as Owner Trustee for RCAF Acquisition Trust, and Selene Finance LP. The
plaintiffs, Chauna B. Jones and Damon Smothers (“Plaintiffs”), have not responded to
the motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on October 15, 2025, is before the
Court on the briefs without oral argument.1
I. Background
This civil action arises out of an executory process foreclosure proceeding
initiated against Chauna B. Jones and Damon Smothers (“Plaintiffs”) in Orleans Parish
Civil District Court. Plaintiffs have filed this federal lawsuit alleging that the foreclosure
1 The defendants have requested oral argument on their motion to dismiss but the Court is
not persuaded that oral argument would be helpful in light of the issues presented.
The Court notes that the motion to dismiss is not based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the motion’s title notwithstanding.
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 1 of 13

Page 2 of 13
was wrongful, that they were victims of racial discrimination, and that the defendants
violated a litany of federal laws.
On February 8, 2019, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in the principal
amount of $451,250.00 secured by a mortgage encumbering real property located at 1
Rosedown Court, New Orleans, Louisiana. According to the state court petition filed on
November 21, 2024, Plaintiffs defaulted on the note by failing to pay when due the
monthly installment that was due on July 1, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 18-2 at 7 ¶ 7). On
December 2, 2024, a state district judge signed an order directing that a writ of seizure
and sale be issued commanding the sheriff to seize and sell the property at Rosedown
Court to satisfy the outstanding debt ($443,771.44 principal with interest thereon at
5.625% per annum from June 1, 2020 until paid) and attendant costs. (Id. at 40).
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ efforts to stop the foreclosure, the property was sold at a
judicial sale on May 29, 2025. Plaintiffs did not appeal the executory foreclosure order.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., U.S. Bank
Trust National Association, Selene Finance d/b/a Selene Mortgage (“the Lenders”), and
Dean Morris, LLC asserting claims for discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 1981), breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), fraud, and wrongful foreclosure. Dean Morris, LLC is the law
firm that prosecuted the foreclosure action on behalf of the Lenders.2
2 Plaintiffs also included separate claims for punitive damages, costs, and attorney’s fees
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 2 of 13

Page 3 of 13
The Lenders and Dean Morris moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety
arguing that a federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the principles
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that certain claims are time-barred, and beyond that
the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under any legal
theory. Dean Morris, LLC separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted
against it arguing that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for
relief against the Lenders’ attorneys.
On August 21, 2025, the Court entered its Order and Reasons granting in part
and denying without prejudice in part the motions to dismiss. (Rec. Doc. 30, Order and
Reasons). The Court dismissed the TILA claims and FDCPA claims with prejudice, and
dismissed the § 1981 discrimination claim and the RESPA claim without prejudice to
allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to properly allege those claims. The Court
deferred ruling on the supplemental state law claims against the Lenders until such time
as the Court determined whether any federal causes of action would remain in this
lawsuit (following Plaintiffs’ amendment of the § 1981 and RESPA causes of action).
The Court dismissed all claims against the Dean Morris law firm and its attorneys with
prejudice. (Id.).
Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint in order to properly allege their § 1981
and RESPA claims. (Rec. Doc. 31, Amended Complaint). Plaintiffs then moved for
reconsideration of the portion of the Order and Reasons that dismissed their TILA and
which are forms of relief and do not constitute separate causes of action.
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 3 of 13

Page 4 of 13
FDCA claims against the Lenders and their attorneys with prejudice. (Rec. Doc. 32,
Motion for Reconsideration). The Court denied the motion for reconsideration. (Rec.
Doc. 40, Order).
The Lenders now move to dismiss the § 1981 and RESPA causes of action
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as realleged in the Amended Complaint.
II. Discussion
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege,
627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418
(5th Cir. 2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to Astate a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.@ Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009)). AA claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.@ Id. The Court does not accept as true Aconclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.@ Id. (quoting Plotkin v.
IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must be supported
by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff=s favor. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 4 of 13

Page 5 of 13
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)).
However, the foregoing tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550,
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
§ 1981 Discrimination
Section 1981 reads in relevant part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
. . .
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (c).
To establish a § 1981 claim for contractual discrimination, the plaintiffs must
allege that (1) they are members of a racial minority; (2) the defendants intended to
discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of
the activities enumerated in the statute, such as performing under a contract. Body By
Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing
Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997); Green v. State Bar of Tex.,
27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)).
When addressing the Lenders’ prior motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims,
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 5 of 13

Page 6 of 13
the Court stated as follows in its prior Order and Reasons:
Plaintiffs herein are African American, which satisfies the first element of a
§ 1981 claim. But their 31 page complaint contains not a single factual
allegation (direct or circumstantial) to suggest that any defendant in this
case discriminated against them due to their race much less that any
defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race. In fact, there is
nothing to suggest that the Lenders and their attorneys who initiated the
foreclosure proceeding were even aware of the plaintiffs’ race. The same
reasoning holds true for the unsupported and conclusory contention that the
plaintiffs were subjected to racial discrimination in the servicing of their loan.
The plaintiffs’ entire theory of racial discrimination seems to be grounded
only on the fact that they happen to be African American.3
(Rec. Doc. 30, Order and Reasons at 9-10).
Plaintiffs were then admonished that their § 1981 discrimination cause of action
would be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief if they did not (via their amended
pleading) allege facts to support such a claim.
The Lenders argue that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does nothing to cure the
noted deficiencies with their § 1981 cause of action. The Court agrees.
In Body By Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the Fifth
Circuit examined the sufficiency of allegations acceptable to plead an intentional
discrimination claim under § 1981. Body By Cook was a minority-owned automotive
repair shop that for years had unsuccessfully sought to become a referral auto repair
3 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ complaint contains significant inconsistencies in the § 1981
section of their complaint. Plaintiffs state at paragraph 54(a) that they faced foreclosure
even though they were not in default yet in 54(c) they concede that they were behind on
their mortgage when the foreclosure occurred. And even if the Plaintiffs were given
erroneous or incorrect information regarding the possibility of loan modification, they do not
in any manner tie the fact that loan modification did not occur, to intentional race
discrimination. The Court also notes that the foreclosure proceeding was not initiated until
2024 even though Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan in 2020.
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 6 of 13

Page 7 of 13
shop (Direct Repair Shop) for the major auto insurers. Body By Cook sued the major
auto insurers such as State Farm, Allstate, GEICO, and Liberty Mutual accusing them of
intentional race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs alleged that lesser
qualified or similarly situated, non-minority owned body shops had been given contracts
as Direct Repair Shops. Body By Cook, 869 F.3d at 384. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that the foregoing allegation was too non-specific and general to
support a claim for intentional race discrimination under § 1981. Id. at 387. The Fifth
Circuit noted that Body By Cook had failed to identify any specific instance when it was
refused a contract but a similarly situated non-minority owned body shop was given a
contract. Id. (citing Hall v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 252 Fed. Appx. 650, 653-54 (5th Cir.
2007)).
But the Fifth Circuit reversed as to State Farm because the complaint contained
more specific allegations regarding State Farm’s discriminatory intent. Id. at 387. As to
State Farm, the plaintiff alleged that a State Farm representative had visited and
inspected Body By Cook and found that it met all of State Farm’s qualifications for being
a Direct Repair Shop but that State Farm informed Body By Cook that it was not
admitting body shops into its Direct Repair Program. Id. Yet State Farm did admit into
the program a non-minority owned body shop with inferior equipment that did not meet
State Farm’s qualifications. Id. Plaintiffs were also able to allege that State Farm knew
that Body By Cook was minority-owned. Id. at 387 n.2. The Fifth Circuit was convinced
that these allegations made plausible the inference that the difference in treatment by
State Farm was because of Body By Cook’s minority-owned status. Id. at 387 (citing
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 7 of 13

Page 8 of 13
Haskett v. Cont’l Land Res., LLC, 668 Fed. Appx. 133, 134 (5th Cir. 2013); Jeffrey v.
Columbia Med. Ctr., 48 Fed. Appx. 103 (5th Cir. 2002)).
The Fifth Circuit noted that Body By Cook had made several specific allegations
against Progressive Insurance, including that Progressive had repeatedly refused to
certify Body By Cook as a Direct Repair Shop, that Progressive knew that Body By
Cook was minority-owned, and that during the same time period Progressive had
sought out and approved non-minority-owned body shops to join the Direct Repair
Program. Body By Cook, 869 F.3d at 387 n.3. But these specific allegations were
insufficient to plead discriminatory intent with respect to Progressive because Body By
Cook did not plead that Body By Cook was as qualified or more qualified than the non-
minority body shops that Progressive had approved for its Direct Repair Program. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” engaged in intentional race discrimination in
two ways: “Defendants” did not comply with TILA requirements to allow review of
disclosure documents, (Rec. Doc. 31, Amended Complaint ¶ 53), and “Defendants” did
not accommodate Plaintiffs in their efforts to avoid foreclosure, e.g., providing no loss
mitigation options and refusing to negotiate payment of arrears to avoid foreclosure, (id.
¶ 54). In order to tie these alleged shortcomings to intentional race discrimination,
Plaintiffs plead that “on information and belief . . . Plaintiffs’ counterparts who are
Caucasians” were afforded TILA review and were given opportunities to avoid
foreclosure. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54).
Assuming the truth of these shortcomings, there is nothing inherently
discriminatory about them whatsoever. Plaintiffs’ allegation that similarly situated white
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 8 of 13

Page 9 of 13
borrowers received better treatment is generalized and conclusory, and is not supported
by a single factual allegation to render the claim of disparate treatment plausible.
Plaintiffs allege no facts to suggest that they would have any personal knowledge
regarding how any other borrower was treated, much less a single specific instance
where a similarly situated Caucasian borrower received better treatment than they did
under the same circumstances. And same as with their original complaint, Plaintiffs do
not allege that any defendant who allegedly engaged in intentional race discrimination
was even aware of their race. The non-specific, generalized group allegation that
Plaintiffs rely upon does not render their claim of intentional race discrimination to be
plausible.4
Plaintiffs did not respond to the motion to dismiss, and therefore have not
requested leave to amend their claims any further. The motion to dismiss the § 1981
discrimination claim is therefore granted.
RESPA
When addressing the Lenders’ prior motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ RESPA claim,
the Court stated as follows in its prior Order and Reasons:
4 The Court emphasizes “under the same circumstances” because Body By Cook makes
clear that intentional race discrimination could not be inferred if Causation borrowers with a
better payment history or better credit record or more financial resources were given better
opportunities to avoid foreclosure. Unless Caucasian borrowers with the exact same or
worse situations than Plaintiffs were given better treatment, intentional race discrimination
cannot be inferred.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have engaged in generalized group allegations directed at
“Defendants” even though the alleged TILA violation would have occurred in 2019 when the
loan was obtained (and would therefore be time-barred) against the original lender and the
latter complaints regarding foreclosure would have been against the subsequent note holder
and perhaps the loan servicer.
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 9 of 13

Page 10 of 13
Plaintiffs allege no facts in support of a RESPA claim. Because paragraph
103 of the complaint mentions that RESPA entitles a borrower to various
information, the Court will assume that the Plaintiffs are alluding to a claim
brought under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). In fact, Plaintiffs confirmed in their
opposition that their RESPA claim is based on § 2605(e). Section 2605(e)
requires a loan “servicer” of a “federally related mortgage loan” to respond
to a “qualified written request from the borrower” for information relating to
“the servicing of such loan” within certain time delays. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
In their opposition Plaintiffs state that “Defendants” did not respond to
QWRs in violation of RESPA. Plaintiffs provide no supporting detail or facts
whatsoever.
(Rec. Doc. 30, Order and Reasons at 10-11).
Plaintiffs were then admonished that their RESPA cause of action would be
dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief if they did not (via their amended pleading)
allege facts to support such a claim. The Court explained:
In their amendment, Plaintiffs must identify the loan servicer, and must be
able to allege that their mortgage was “federally related.” Moreover,
Plaintiffs must allege the specifics (including the date sent) of the alleged
QWRs that they claim to have sent to the loan servicer. Not every request
for information constitutes a QWR for purposes of the RESPA. The RESPA
cause of action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief if
Plaintiffs do not allege facts to support a RESPA violation.
(Rec. Doc. 30, Order and Reasons at 11-12).
The Lenders argue that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does nothing to cure the
noted deficiencies with their RESPA cause of action. The Court agrees.
First of all, RESPA only applies to federally related mortgages and
notwithstanding the Court’s express warning, Plaintiffs do not allege that their mortgage
was federally related. That deficiency alone defeats their RESPA claim. Second,
although Plaintiffs once again make no attempt to allege any facts in support of their
RESPA claim, Plaintiffs for the first time have alleged that “Defendants” violated 12
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 10 of 13

Page 11 of 13
C.F.R. § 1024.41 by engaging in dual tracking, i.e., representing to Plaintiffs that they
were considering loan modification while simultaneously prosecuting foreclosure
proceedings on the same loan.
As with their restated § 1981 claim, Plaintiffs have engaged in collective pleading
against “Defendants” making no attempt to plead who specifically of the various
defendants misled them regarding loan modification opportunities. Further, § 1024.41(g)
stalls foreclosure if the borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application after a
servicer has made the first notice or filing required by applicable law for any judicial or
non-judicial foreclosure process but more than 37 days before a foreclosure sale. As the
Lenders point out, Plaintiffs do not allege that they submitted a complete loss mitigation
application much less one within the time constraints imposed by the regulation.
Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for a RESPA violation.
Plaintiffs did not respond to the motion to dismiss, and therefore have not
requested leave to amend their claims any further. The motion to dismiss the RESPA
claim is therefore granted.
State Law Claims
All claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction have been dismissed.
The state law claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, fraud, and wrongful foreclosure lack an independent basis for original subject
matter jurisdiction. The state law claims are brought under the district court’s
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 11 of 13

Page 12 of 13
supplemental jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).5 The supplemental
jurisdiction statute gives the district court the discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all of the federal claims supporting
original jurisdiction have been dismissed. Id. § 1367(c)(3).6 Given that this case is in its
infancy, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims. The state law
claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, Failure to State a Claim, and in the Alternative, Motion for a More
Definite Statement (Rec. Doc. 18) filed by defendants U.S. Bank Trust National
Association, Not in its Individual Capacity But Solely as Owner Trustee for RCAF
5
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supplemental Jurisdiction)
6
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if--
. . .
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction,
. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (emphasis added).
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 12 of 13

Page 13 of 13
Acquisition Trust, and Selene Finance LP is GRANTED as to all federal claims, which
are dismissed with prejudice as to the defendants, U.S. Bank Trust National
Association, Not in its Individual Capacity But Solely as Owner Trustee for RCAF
Acquisition Trust, and Selene Finance LP. All state law claims against these defendants
are dismissed without prejudice.
October 28, 2025
___________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-00998-JCZ-MBN Document 41 Filed 10/29/25 Page 13 of 13