Dickerson v. Queens Nassau Nursing Home Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT L. DICKERSON, et al 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 	25-0644
QUEENS NASSAU NURSING HOME INC.,
d/b/a QUEENS NASSAU REHABILITATION
AND NURSING CENTER
SECTION: “M” (4)
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
Pending before the Court is Defendant Queens Nassau Nursing Home Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26) and Amended Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 33). This matter was
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and Local Rule 73. R. Doc. 9.
I. 	Introduction
A. Factual Background
This litigation arises from a family dispute regarding the medical care and guardianship of
an incapacitated man. On March 10, 2022, Brandon R. Dickerson (“Brandon”) suffered a brain
aneurism at the age of thirty-one, which resulted in a severe traumatic brain injury that has left him
incapacitated. See R. Doc. 20-1 at 49-50. Brandon was living with his four-year-old daughter in
Harvey, Louisiana, at the time of this incident and initially received medical care at West Jefferson
Medical Center, in Marrero, Louisiana. Id. Brandon was enrolled in an acute thirty (30) day
rehabilitation program at West Jefferson Medical Center, and his doctors recommended that he be
enrolled in a long-term rehabilitation program. R. Doc. 1 at 4.; See R. Doc. 20-1 at 46-48.
According to his medical records from West Jefferson Medical Center, Brandon’s family disagreed
on where he should receive further medical treatment. R. Doc. 20-1 at 39.
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This disagreement regarding Brandon’s medical care resulted in a contentious legal battle
for custodial rights. Brandon’s sisters, Geneva Dickerson (“Geneva”), and Jennifer Herring
(“Jennifer”), filed a petition of interdiction on his behalf in the 24 th Judicial District Court for the
State of Louisiana (“Louisiana Court”) on March 22, 2022. See R. Doc. 26-2. Geneva sought to be
appointed as Brandon’s Curator, with Jennifer appointed as Undercurator. Id. Robert L. Dickerson
(“Robert”), Brandon’s father, intervened in the interdiction proceedings on April 15, 2022. R. Doc.
26-4 at 1. Due to the competing interests of the petitioners, the Louisiana Court appointed Elaine
Appleberry (“Appleberry”) as Brandon’s Curator Ad Hoc on May 26, 2022. See R. Doc. 16-1 at
2.
On May 20, 2022, in the midst of the Louisiana interdiction proceedings, Brandon was
flown directly from West Jefferson Medical Center to Defendant Queens Nassau Nursing Home
Inc. (“Queens Nassau”)’s facility in Queens, New York, for further treatment. R. Doc. 20-1 at 52-
54. According to Brandon’s medical records, Robert selected Queens Nassau to provide Brandon’s
treatment and joined him on the flight to their facility. Id. Robert contends that Brandon was only
meant to undergo a one-year aggressive traumatic brain injury rehabilitation program with Queens
Nassau, running from the date of his arrival on May 20, 2022. R. Doc. 1 at 3.
On October 25, 2022, the Louisiana Court issued a Judgement of Full Interdiction releasing
Curator Elaine Appleberry, appointing Robert as Brandon’s Curator, and appointing Geneva
Dickerson (“Geneva”) as Undercurator. R. Doc. 26-4. Geneva attempted to register the Louisiana
Court’s Judgement of Full Interdiction with the County Clerk for Queens County, New York, on
November 18, 2022, but failed to follow New York’s procedural requirements for registering a
foreign interdiction. R. Doc. 20-1 at 17-25. Inexplicably, Geneva and Jennifer then filed an
identical petition seeking custodial rights over Brandon in the Supreme Court of New York,
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Queens County (“New York Court”), on December 14, 2022. R. Doc. 25-7 at 1. Therein, Geneva
and Jennifer sought to be appointed co-guardians of Brandon, along with Brandon’s mother. Id.
Geneva’s choice to institute duplicative guardianship proceedings has resulted in extensive
litigation in both Louisiana and New York. After Geneva and Jennifer initiated proceedings in the
New York Court, Robert then petitioned the Louisiana Court to remove Geneva as Undercurator.
R. Doc. 16-1 at 3. On June 1, 2023, the Louisiana Court found that it had continuing and exclusive
jurisdiction over Brandon’s guardianship proceedings and denied Geneva’s request to transfer the
proceedings to New York. R. Doc. 16-1. The Louisiana Court also found that Robert remains
Brandon’s lawful guardian and removed Geneva as Undercurator for knowingly filing duplicative
guardianship proceedings in New York. Id.
However, the New York Court found that the Louisiana Court’s Judgment of Interdiction
was not properly registered in New York before the parallel guardianship proceedings began, and
Robert’s Curatorship was therefore not enforceable in New York. R. Doc. 25-5. The New York
Court then appointed Joseph Ruotolo as Brandon’s Guardian ad Litem on April 18, 2024. Id. The
New York Court’s decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York on December 11, 2024. R. Doc. 25-7.
B. Federal Lawsuit
On April 4, 2025, Robert instituted this suit, as curator on behalf of his adult son Brandon,
in this Court against Queens Nassau, the nursing home where Brandon still resides.1 R. Doc. 1 at
1. He alleges that Queens Nassau held itself out to him and the public as a facility possessing the
proper degree of skill and etiquette in regarding the rights of patients in their care pursuant to the
1 Robert also filed another federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York alleging the same facts alleged herein.
See Dickerson v. Dickerson, No. 23-cv-3859, 2023 WL 3931696 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2023). The case was dismissed
on grounds that his requests are barred under the Younger Abstention Doctrine. Id. at *3.
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American with Disability Act (“ADA”). 	R. Doc. 1 at 3. However, Robert alleges that Queens
Nassau failed to comply with the ADA. 2
Robert, as Brandon’s curator, also seeks the release of his son from the nursing home to
avoid irreparable harm to Brandon’s mental and physical health. R. Doc. 3 at 4. Robert contends
that Brandon was only supposed to be enrolled in a one-year aggressive traumatic brain injury
program. Id. at 2. He contends that more than a year has passed, and therefore, his son should be
released and returned home to Louisiana. Id.
He further claims that his son Brandon was deemed incapacitated by a Court in the State
of Louisiana on October 25, 2022, and a Louisiana court appointed him as his son’s curator. R.
Doc. 1 at 1. Therefore, Robert claims that this Court is a proper venue because Louisiana is
Plaintiff’s Home State. R. Doc. 1 at 1, R. Doc. 1-1 at 2. Robert likewise seeks the termination of
the ongoing New York state court temporary guardianship because the Louisiana curatorship order
precedes it and should be recognized. R. Doc. 5, 8-9. Robert currently resides in New York. R.
Doc. 1 at 7.
C. Motion to Dismiss
Queens Nassau filed the subject motion seeking dismissal of the complaint with prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. R. Doc. 33 at 1. Queens Nassau particularly explains
that this lawsuit is a request to have this Court adjudicate a purely state law matter where two states
disagree with each other on the interpretation of their respective laws, which is the heart of the
2 Robert claims that Queens Nassau has kept Brandon isolated from his family, and that their facility was not equipped
to provide the promised treatment. R. Doc. 1 at 4. He therefore raises claims against Queens Nassau for fraudulent
inducement and violation of Title III and IV of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 3-6.
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Younger Abstention Doctrine. Id. at 7. Queens Nassau further contends that New York is the proper
venue for this dispute, because all of the parties reside there. Id. 6-7.
Robert Dickerson opposes the motion and again requested that the court grant his
emergency motion (R. Doc. 3) to prevent irreparable harm to his incapacitated son, Brandon. R.
Doc. 27 at 1. Plaintiff also contends that the court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Younger
exceptions. Id. at 2. According to Dickerson, Younger must bow to the litigant’s rights to raise
claims alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. Dickerson maintains that his incapacitated
son would be irreparably injured if he is not permitted to seek recourse for the violations of his
ADA Title III and IV rights. Id.
Dickerson additionally contends that Queens Nassau’s Motion to Dismiss should be
dismissed because its counsel violated this Court’s procedures for filing documents under seal. R.
Doc. 27 at 6. Dickerson then proceeds to argue the factual nature of the proceedings, his
displeasure with the results of the proceedings in New York, and the details regarding the
appointment of a curator ad hoc to represent his son’s interest. Id. at 6-11. Dickerson lastly disputes
that he was properly served because as a pro se litigant he is not registered in the Court’s EC/ECF
electronic filing system. Id.
II. 	Standard of Review
A. Title 28 U.S. C. 1915(e)(2)
Title 28 U.S. C. § 1915(e)(2) provides that if the allegations in a in forma pauperis
complaint are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the Court shall dismiss the
case at any time. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). To survive the pleading stage, a civil complaint must set
forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). And to prevent “abusive or captious litigation,” the IFP statute “authorizes
federal courts to dismiss” any action that “is frivolous or malicious.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989) (cleaned up). Frivolous complaints are those that “lack [ ] an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.” Id. And a “complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or
abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims decided in prior cases.” Young Yil Jo v. Six
Unknown Names Agents, No. 1:06-cv-01714, 2006 WL 3483429, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2006).
B. Fed. Rule 12(b)(1)
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court
should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.”
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). This prevents courts from
prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice when they do not have the necessary jurisdiction. Id.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when
the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate’ the claim.” Home Builders Ass'n,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998); see also Tubesing v. United States,
810 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2016). The well-pled factual allegations of the complaint are construed
as true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d
548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008).
The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction lies with the party asserting jurisdiction,
and it must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ballew v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 668
F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the court has jurisdiction based on the complaint and evidence.”) (citation omitted). 	To test
whether the party asserting jurisdiction has met its burden, a court may rely on: “(1) the complaint
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alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Barrera-
Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
C. Fed. Rule 12 (b)(2)
The plaintiff must also make a “prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists in
order to defeat dismissal.” Command-Aire Corp. v. Ontario Mech. Sales & Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d
90, 95 (5th Cir. 1992) Where the district court relies solely on written submissions and affidavits
to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing or limited
discovery, the plaintiff’s burden is “relatively slight.” Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d
1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988). The pleadings and affidavits submitted must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and the district court should not weigh “the controverting assertions of
the party seeking dismissal.” Peters Broad Eng’g, Inc. v. 24 Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 438 (6th
Cir. 2022) The Court must find it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant before making any
decision as to the merits. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,
431 (2007).
D. Fed. Rule 12(b)(3)
“On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, the court must [again] accept
as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.” Braspetro
Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F. App'x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citations
omitted). In deciding such motions, the Court may examine all evidence in the record. See
Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.2009) (citations omitted).
When venue is challenged, district courts in the Fifth Circuit have been inconsistent in
allocating the burden of proof. See Uviado, LLC v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 2d 767, 779 n.7
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(S.D. Tex. 2010) (acknowledging the split in authority). 	Most courts in this District, however,
hold that a plaintiff bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Summer v. Kenton, OH Policea, No. 11–
3162,2012 WL 1565363, at *4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012); Vaughn Med. Equip. Repair Serv., LLC
v. Jordan Reses Supply Co., No. 10–00124, 2010 WL 3488244, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug.26, 2010);
Ross v. Digioia, Jr., No. 11–1827, 2012 WL 72703, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2012).
E. Fed. Rule 12(b)(6)
Lastly, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim
upon which any relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The same standard is applied
for a motion to dismiss brought under either Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction or under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Benton v. United States,
960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010); Guidry v.
Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court, however, has declared that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(internal citation omitted). Moreover, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” and “[t]he plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Guidry, 512 F.3d at 180 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has explained:
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A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face, the Court
“draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 	Thus, as
mentioned above, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). 	In order for a claim to be plausible at the pleading stage, the complaint need not
strike the reviewing court as probably meritorious, but it must raise “more than a sheer possibility”
that the defendant has violated the law as alleged. Id.
III. 	Analysis
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In the present suit, Robert alleges that Queens Nassau Nursing Home, Inc. d/b/a Queens
Nassau Rehabilitation and Nursing Center held itself out to possess the proper degree of skill and
etiquette to adhere to the American with Disabilities Act. 	R. Doc. 1 at 3. 	However, Robert
contends that Queens Nassau’s treatment of his son Brandon has been cruel, inhumane, and
constitutes a “pseudo prison” in violation of ADA Title III. Id. at 3-4. Robert additionally claims
that Queens Nassau isolated Brandon from his friends and family. Id. 	Robert maintains this
violates Title IV of the ADA, which provides for the disabled to have access to telecommunications
devices. Id. at 6. Robert additionally alleges that Queens Nassau did not possess the proper
equipment for his son’s rehabilitation therapy. Id. at 5. Robert therefore seeks monetary damages
as well as a request for the facility to release his son. R. Doc. 1 at 6 and R. Doc. 3.
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The defendant does not address the issue of Brandon’s medical status at its facility.
Defendant solely seeks dismissal based on the Younger doctrine. See R. Doc. 33.
A case involves federal question jurisdiction if it is apparent from the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint3 that the cause of action arises under federal law or that the plaintiff’s right to
relief “depends upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).
“A mere ‘suggestion’ of a federal question is not sufficient.” Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d
124, 127 (8th Cir. 1968).
Here, Plaintiff brings his claim under Title III of the ADA, which provides that “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 	To prevail on a Title III claim, Plaintiff must prove: “(1)
that [ ]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that defendant[ ] own[s], lease[s], or
operate[s] a place of public accommodation; and (3) that defendant[ ] discriminated against h[im]
by denying h[im] a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the services defendant[ ] provide[s].”
Rossman v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 3d 422, 426 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Camarillo v.
Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008)). While a plaintiff proceeding under Title III may
seek injunctive and declaratory relief, “[m]onetary relief ... is not available to private individuals
under Title III of the ADA.” Powell v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.
2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a).
3 The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that a federal question appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Otherwise, the suit does not
arise under federal law. See id. The rule is not satisfied if on the face of the complaint, the plaintiff merely raises an
anticipated federal defense. See id. at 152.
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The ADA defines “public accommodation” to include most “inn[s], hotel[s], motel[s], or
other 	place[s] 	of 	lodging.” 	See 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12181(7)(A). 	However, 	“the 	term 	‘public
accommodation’ ‘does not include residential facilities or apartment buildings.’” Burke v. Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18-cv-4496, 2023 WL 2535165, at *16, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44776
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2023) (quoting Mazzocchi v. Windsor Owners Corp., No. 11-cv-7913, 2012
WL 3288240, at *7, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112479 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012)).
Lastly, a plaintiff must have standing to bring the lawsuit. A plaintiff “must show (i) that
he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the
injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
judicial relief.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d
351 (1992). A plaintiff pursuing injunctive relief must also establish that he “is likely to be harmed
again in the future in a similar way.” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir.
2016) (citation omitted). “[T]he central inquiry is not whether a complaint pleads the magic words
that a plaintiff intends to return, but if, examined under the totality of all relevant facts, the plaintiff
plausibly alleges a real and immediate threat of future injury.” Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd.,
36 F.4th 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2022). In other words, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself
show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief…if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974).
A review of the complaint shows that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing
federal question jurisdiction. The well-pleaded part of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Queens
Nassau failed to possess the proper degree of skill and etiquette to regarding the rights of patients
in their care pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. R. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that
Queens Nassau failed to perform the rehabilitative services for his son Brandon as promised in
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violation of Title III of the ADA. Id. Plaintiff also claims that Queens Nassau has isolated his son
from his family by denying him access to communication devices in violation of Title IV of the
ADA. Id. at 3-6. Accordingly, the well-pleaded part of Plaintiff’s allegations stem from medical
malpractice and negligence claims. Such claims, however, only gives rise to a state-created remedy
and not a federal action. See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the Plaintiff failed to state a federal claim because the adequate remedies for negligence or medical
malpractice actions arise under state law).
Plaintiff’s mere reference to the ADA is insufficient to establish federal question
jurisdiction. The Plaintiff must clearly set the basic facts necessary to support the conclusion that
this Court has jurisdiction and has not done so. See Fountain v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
265 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. La. 1967); Gilbeaux v. Univ. of Tex Med. Branch, 42 F. Supp. 2d 637,
641 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (concluding that a mere citation to a federal statute is insufficient to involve
federal question jurisdiction). Likewise, “[t]he ADA does not create a remedy for medical
malpractice” and therefore, cannot be the basis of the present suit. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d
246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Lee v. Martin & Plunkett, M.D., LLC, No. 3:21-cv-68, 2021 WL
1566969, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2021); Finn v. Haddock, 459 F. App’x 833, 837-38 (11th Cir.
2012) (stating “failure to provide adequate medical treatment…does not violate the ADA.”); Vang
v. Catawba Med. Ctr., No. 1:23-cv-00018, 2023 WL 1871106, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2023)
(dismissed the plaintiff’s Title III ADA claims on a 28 U.S.C. § 1915 review because “[t]he ADA
does not…provide for a claim based on disagreements with medical providers or even for
inadequate care that was not discriminatory.”)
Further, this Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims under the ADA.
Under Title III, Robert has failed to sufficiently allege a past injury relating to Brandon’s
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accessibility to the property or any difficulties with Brandon’s accessibility to the property due to
his disability. As stated previously, Plaintiffs claims are grounded in the alleged inadequate care
Queens Nassau is providing to his son. R. Doc. 1 at 3-6. However, there are no allegations that his
son Brandon is being discriminated against because of his disability or that Queens Nassau failed
to deny or enjoy the services available because of his disability.
Under Title IV, Plaintiff also has not asserted any basis for standing under Title IV of the
ADA. Plaintiff asserts that Brandon was denied a communications device to speak with his family
and friends but does not demonstrate how this allegation falls within Title IV. R. Doc. 1 at 6.
Moreover, Title IV is enforced by the Federal Communications Commission. Therefore, to assert
a claim under Title IV, a complaint should be filed with the Commission.
Having determined that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction and Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring the lawsuit, the Court will consider the applicability of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine regarding the pending state court proceedings.
B. Younger Abstention
Robert next contends that there is a conflict between two state court judgments. R. Doc.
20. First, he alleges that the New York Court has disregarded the Louisiana Court’s Judgment of
Interdiction determination, which acknowledges him as guardian of his son Brandon and asserts
continuing jurisdiction over the matter. R. Doc. 5, 8-9, R. Doc. 16-1. Although Robert still resides
in New York, he filed this suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, a court in the state where the
original judgment of interdiction was issued. R. Doc. 1 at 1. He suggests that both states should
honor 	the 	guardianship 	proceedings 	of 	the 	other 	jurisdiction 	under 	the 	Uniform 	Adult
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. R. Doc. 20 at 7-8.
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Queens Nassau counters that this lawsuit is an attempt at forum shopping and at worst, a
repetitive and frivolous use of the Court’s time. R. Doc. 33-1 at 6. Queens Nassau contends that
the Supreme Court’s Appellate Division of New York recognized that Robert had not properly
registered his Letters of Curatorship in New York and therefore has no legal effect in the state. Id.
Queens Nassau also contends that his son Brandon Dickerson is and has been a resident of the
State of New York.4 Id. Therefore, Queens Nassau explains that this lawsuit is a request to have
this Court adjudicate a purely state law matter where two states disagree with each other on the
interpretation of their respective laws, which is the heart of the Younger Abstention Doctrine. Id.
The first consideration is the distinction between a “facial attack” and a “factual attack”
upon the complaint under Fed. R. 	Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint because they are presumed to be true. See Paterson v. Weiberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523
(5th Cir. 1981). If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient, the complaint stands. On the other
hand, if a defendant makes a “factual attack” upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the
lawsuit, the defendant submits affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials. 	Id. 	In the
latter case, a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter
jurisdiction. Id.
Additionally, a motion to dismiss grounded on the Younger Abstention Doctrine is more
appropriately adjudicated under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6). This is because such a
dismissal plainly is one that is not on the merits, while a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a
4 Queens Nassau further contends that this Court has no controlling jurisdiction over the Eastern District of New York,
who too has recognized that Robert Dickerson has no custodial rights over Brandon Dickerson in New York. R. Doc.
33-1 at 7. See Dickerson v. Dickerson, No. 23-cv-3859, 2023 WL 3931696 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2023); Dickerson v.
Siegal, No. 23-cv-3859, 2023 WL 6158833, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2023).
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dismissal generally on the merits. See Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir.
1986) (“Normally, Rule 12(b)(6) judgments are dismissals on the merits and Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissals are not.”); Wilkins v. Jakeway, 183 F.3d 528, 533 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Despite what the
court said about deciding the matter as a decision on the merits under 12(b)(6), what the court did
was to effectively decline to reach the merits of Plaintiff's claims as to the individual Defendants.”).
The Younger abstention doctrine was initially a federal court's relinquishment of
jurisdiction, when necessary, not to interfere with a parallel, pending state criminal proceedings.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention has subsequently been expanded to
apply in two additional scenarios. First, Younger has been expanded to encompass a federal court's
relinquishment of jurisdiction when necessary not to interfere with particular state civil
enforcement proceedings. See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 70, 134 S .Ct.
584, 187 L.Ed. 2d 505 (2013). Second, the Supreme Court expanded Younger to require abstention
from interfering with state civil proceedings that implicate a state's interest in enforcing the orders
and judgments of its courts. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95
L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).
After a court has found that a case falls into one of these categories, the court potentially
invoking Younger considers whether (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding (2) that
implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal
challenges. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct.
2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Where these prerequisites are satisfied, a federal court can only
assert jurisdiction if “certain narrowly delimited exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply.” Bice
v. Louisiana Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle,
388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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Younger principles are not invoked by the mere fact that federal relief has an impact upon
state governmental machinery, even in its quasi-criminal extensions. 	Its dismissal is called for
only where the successful defense of a state enforcement proceeding, initiated before substantial
federal proceedings on the merits had occurred, would fully vindicate the federal plaintiff's federal
right. See Younger at 41; Steffe v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 577, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S.592 (1974).
For example, “a federal court may refuse to abstain and grant the requested equitable
relief…[when] the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing
the federal plaintiff[.]” All American Check Cashing, Inc. v. Corley, 191 F.Supp.3d 646, 655 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 22, 2016) (Lee, T.) 	“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere
with the state proceeding, we look to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the state
proceedings.” Bice, 677 F.3d at 717 (quotation omitted). Under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence,
interference is established were “the requested relief would interfere with the state court’s ability
to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding
directly.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, the pleadings show that regarding Dickerson, state guardianship proceedings
were filed in New York and in Louisiana. They remain continuing and ongoing.
The record shows an order issued by the Louisiana Court on June 1, 2023, in which the
court denied his son sister’s Geneva request to transfer the proceeding to New York and held that
it had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over this matter. R. Doc. 16-1. By contrast, the New
York Court issued an order on December 11, 2024, finding that the Louisiana Court’s judgment
of interdiction was not properly registered in New York. R. Doc. 33-9. Therefore, the Court found
that the New York Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Id.
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Under these circumstances, Robert’s request for this Court to order Brandon’s release from
the Queens Nassau facility would interfere with the Louisiana Court and New York Court’s
pending guardianship orders. See Bice, 677 F.3d at 712. Therefore, the first requirement for the
Younger Abstention doctrine is met.
Additionally, both Louisiana and New York have a strong interest in adjudicating questions
of guardianship. See e.g. Dickerson v. Siegal, No. 23-3859, 2023 WL 6158833, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 21, 2023) (Komitee, E.) (finding that adjudicating questions of guardianship was an
important state interest, and citing supporting jurisprudence from the Second Circuit, which
governs New York). See Shipula v. Texas Dept. of Family Protective Services, No. 10-3688, 2011
WL 1882521, at *9 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2011) (Harmon, M.) (noting that “family relations…are
important state interests”). Therefore, the second requirement for the Younger Abstention doctrine
is also met.
Finally, federal jurisprudence provides that the Court “should assume that state court
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the
contrary.” Thomas v. State, 294 F.Supp.3d 576, 594 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (Ramirez, M.J.)
(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)). In this case, Robert has not identified
any barrier precluding him from raising his claims in an appropriate state appellate court. 	Further,
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence provides that the plaintiff must establish “actual proof of bad faith” for
the bad faith exception to the Younger Abstention Doctrine to apply. See Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d
874, 881 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
In this case, Robert requests that the Court intervene in the New York guardianship
proceedings. According to his pleadings, he requests that the Court force Queens Nassau to release
Brandon pursuant to his authority as a Curator appointed by the Louisiana Court. Brandon,
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however, has been in New York receiving medical treatment since May 20, 2022, and both Robert
and Geneva are New York residents. R. Doc. 16-1 at 4. Geneva also alleged that she had filed a
parallel New York guardianship proceeding because she learned that Robert was causing harm to
Brandon. Id. at 9-10.
Although the Court is sympathetic to Robert’s concerns regarding Brandon’s care, this
dispute regarding Brandon’s guardianship has already been raised in two ongoing state court
proceedings, and Robert has not provided “actual proof of bad faith.” Raising the same dispute in
another court will not resolve the underlying state court proceedings.
Moreover, Robert has already filed suit against Queens Nassau in the Eastern District of
New York on May 24, 2023, requesting that the court intervene in the ongoing state guardianship
proceedings. See R. Doc. 33-10. The Court ultimately dismissed Robert’s suit on September 21,
2023, and held that Robert’s request to enjoin the state court proceedings was barred by the
Younger Abstention Doctrine. Id. Now, two years after his claims against Queens Nassau were
dismissed by another federal court under the Younger Abstention Doctrine, Robert has filed suit
in this Court seeking to compel Queens Nassau and the New York Court to recognize his position
as Brandon’s Curator.
This Court finds that Robert’s claims remain barred by the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
The Court additionally finds that the state court proceedings provided the plaintiff with an adequate
opportunity to his guardianship claims. Further, the Court sue sponte finds that there is no original
jurisdiction in this case because Dickerson’s basis for his lawsuit is in state court, and there is no
federal question raised in the pleadings. Lastly, all of the parties to the matter reside in New York
and not Louisiana. 	Therefore, Robert’s suit should be dismissed as barred under the Younger
Abstention Doctrine.
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IV. 	Recommendation
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26 & R. Doc.
33) be GRANTED for the reasons assigned above.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Robert L. Dickerson’s claims against
Defendant Queens Nassau Nursing Home Inc. be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.
1996).5
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of October 2025.
KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5 Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1,
2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.
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