Santano v. Tulane University et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JUDITH SANTANO 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 2:24-cv-2748
TULANE UNIVERSITY, et al. 	SECTION: T (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are multiple Motions to Dismiss the claims of Plaintiff, Judith Santano,
filed by defendants Jordan Karubian (R. Doc. 26), the Administrators of the Tulane Educational
Fund (“Tulane”), Erica Woodley, Tiffany Smith, Avery Pardee, and Jonathan Small (collectively,
“Individual Defendants”) (R. Doc. 28), and Marcus Foster (R. Doc. 32). Having reviewed the
record, the briefs, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Karubian’s Motion (R. Doc. 26) and
Foster’s Motion (R. Doc. 32) should be GRANTED, and that Tulane and Individual Defendants’
Motion (R. Doc. 28) should be GRANTED IN PART and otherwise DENIED AS MOOT.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Judith Santano was a PhD candidate at Tulane University (“Tulane”) studying
avian ecology. R. Doc. 1, p. 2. Plaintiff alleges that, while on a university-sponsored research trip
to a facility in Ecuador, Fundación para la Conservación de los Andes Tropicales (“FCAT”),1 she
was sexually assaulted by an FCAT staff member, Beto Gonzalez, on two occasions. Id. at pp. 6-
7. Plaintiff states that she reported the assaults to her research advisor at Tulane, Dr. Jordan
Karubian, in February 2023. Id. at p. 8. Karubian was a founding member of FCAT, coordinated
Tulane’s collaboration with the facility, and supervised Plaintiff’s work there. Id. at pp. 4, 7-8.
Plaintiff further alleges that Karubian mishandled his response by waiting three months to forward
1 “FCAT hosts graduate student researchers from Tulane and other universities.” R. Doc. 1, p. 7.
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the report to the university (in apparent violation of university policy to immediately forward such
reports) and discussing the allegations with Gonzalez “and other members of the community . . . ,
thus interfering with the university’s investigation and violating her right to privacy.” Id. at pp. 7-
8.
In the summer of 2023, Plaintiff discussed her concerns with Karubian and eventually
asked two other Tulane professors, Sunshine Van Bael and Hannah Frank, to be her co-advisors.
Id. at p. 9. Van Bael and Frank denied Plaintiff’s request. Id. Later that month, at a meeting with
Van Bael, Frank, and Karubian, Plaintiff discussed her research and her disappointment with how
her report was handled with the faculty members. Id. “She told the group that she felt she was
being treated as the problem.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that, on November 30, 2023, the advisory
committee issued a letter terminating Plaintiff from Karubian’s advisory. Id. Subsequently, Van
Bael allegedly confirmed that she would only serve as Plaintiff’s replacement advisor if Plaintiff
agreed she would not return to FCAT. Id. at p. 10. Plaintiff alleges that Karubian “deprived her of
her procedural rights under university policy” because he terminated her “without first reporting
to the Title IX office the allegations [] that he claimed formed the basis for her termination.” Id.
In December 2023, Plaintiff approached Erica Woodley, Dean of Students at Tulane, who,
despite “express[ing] concern about possible retaliation and about the fact that Plaintiff did not
have anyone advising her through the situation,” allegedly “did nothing to prevent or unwind the
action against Plaintiff.” Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff also alleges that Marcus Foster, the Title IX
coordinator at Tulane, and Tiffany Smith, Tulane’s Director of Institutional Equity and Resolution
Management, “failed to intervene when they were notified that Plaintiff may have experienced
retaliation.” Id. at pp. 5, 11-12. As a result of her termination from Karubian’s advisory, Plaintiff
states that she “did not have the same opportunities to supervise and mentor undergraduate students
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in the field, study the subjects of her research in nature, or expand the data she was collecting.” Id.
at p. 12.
In February 2024, the university’s ongoing investigation into Plaintiff’s report of sexual
assault was expanded to address potential retaliation by Karubian. R. Doc. 19, p. 12. The assault
investigation, conducted by an outside investigator hired by Tulane, concluded on April 10, 2024,
and a report was given to Plaintiff on July 29, 2024. Id. at p. 13. Plaintiff alleges that the
investigation was “decidedly not neutral, did not satisfy Title VII’s requirements, and risked
exposing Plaintiff and others to further harassment.” Id. Plaintiff also cites several elements of the
report that she claims demonstrate deficiencies of gender bias in the investigation. See id. at pp.
14-16. A report regarding the retaliation investigation was completed on July 31, 2024, followed
by a hearing on December 11, 2024. Id. at pp. 20-22. The hearing panel then submitted its findings,
including that Plaintiff “offered no evidence that Dr. Karubian engaged in any form of retaliation,”
to Tulane’s Provost, Robin Forman, on December 16, 2024. Id. at p. 22. Plaintiff alleges that the
panel’s findings were erroneous, ignoring evidence of motives and other indicators of potential
retaliation, and wrongly determining that Karubian’s actions did not cause harm to Plaintiff. Id.
Provost 	Forman 	notified 	Plaintiff 	of 	his 	intent 	to 	accept 	the 	hearing 	panel’s
recommendation on March 20, 2025, and Plaintiff’s subsequent appeal to Forman was denied on
July 11, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that the denial offered “no explanation of the rationale for the
decision” and did not “address any of the arguments made in the appeal.” R. Doc. 57, pp. 22-23.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on November 25, 2024, alleging violations of Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and Louisiana state law. R. Doc. 1, p. 2. In her initial Complaint,
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Plaintiff named Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund (“Tulane”),2 as well as the
following Tulane employees and faculty members as defendants: Jordan Karubian, Sunshine Van
Bael, Hannah Frank, Erica Woodley, Marcus Foster, and Tiffany Smith. Id. at pp. 4-5.
Additionally, Plaintiff sued Doe Defendants 1-20, “additional employees or agents of Tulane who
were responsible for retaliation against Plaintiff.” Id. at pp. 5-6. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed
her claims against defendants Frank and Van Bael with prejudice, R. Doc. 17, and filed an
Amended Complaint naming the following additional defendants: Jonathan Small, Tulane’s Vice
President for Human Resources and Institutional Equity, and Avery Pardee, an attorney contracted
by Tulane to conduct investigations into Plaintiff’s sexual assault allegations, R. Doc. 19, p. 5.
On March 28, 2025, Defendant Karubian filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Karubian’s Motion”)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging that the three tort claims Plaintiff
filed against Karubian—negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress—should be dismissed because the pleadings do not state a claim
for relief. R. Doc. 26. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Karubian’s Motion, R. Doc. 44,
and Karubian filed a reply in support, R. Doc. 46. The matter is now submitted to the Court.
On April 1, 2025, institutional defendant Tulane and individually named defendants Erica
Woodley, 	Tiffany 	Smith, 	Avery 	Pardee, 	and 	Jonathan 	Small 	(collectively, 	“Individual
Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). R. Doc. 28.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, R. Doc. 44, and the moving defendants filed a reply in
support, R. Doc. 47. The matter is now submitted before the Court.
On April 17, 2025, defendant Marcus Foster filed a separate Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). R. Doc. 32. Plaintiff filed a response memorandum in
2 This party was incorrectly named as “Tulane University” and “Tulane Board” in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. R.
Doc. 28, p. 1 n.1.
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opposition, R. Doc. 44, and Foster has not filed a reply in support.
Plaintiff was later granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which was filed on
August 14, 2025, and added Tulane Provost Robin Forman as a defendant. R. Doc. 57, p. 6.
Because Plaintiff asserted new and supplemental arguments against defendant Tulane in the
Second Amended Complaint, Tulane filed a subsequent Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint on September 11, 2025, “adopt[ing] and maintain[ing] all arguments made
in its original Motion to Dismiss” and addressing the newly raised and modified claims in the
Second Amended Complaint.3 R. Doc. 64. Newly added defendant Robin Forman also filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). R. Doc. 65. Plaintiff
has filed memoranda in opposition to Tulane and Forman’s respective motions, R. Docs. 68, 70,
and the moving defendants have each filed a reply in support, R. Docs. 69, 71.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Each of the motions presently before the Court seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to seek
dismissal of a complaint based on the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
3 “Because the allegations brought against the [I]ndividual [D]efendants are unchanged by Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint, no further response from them is necessary. Tulane, however, addresses Plaintiff’s amended
Title VII erroneous outcome claim and Plaintiff’s new Title IX erroneous outcome claim [in their second Motion to
Dismiss], [arguing that] both . . . should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.” R. Doc. 64, p. 6.
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alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court should confine itself to the
pleadings, Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004), and
the documents attached to the complaint, Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496,
498 (5th Cir. 2000). However, the court “may also consider documents attached to either a motion
to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and
are central to a plaintiff’s claims.” Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748
F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).
The court’s review must “take the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint as true
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). A
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must offer more than mere labels,
legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Additionally, courts may not rely on “legal conclusions
that are disguised as factual allegations.” Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995)). If factual allegations
are insufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, the claim should be dismissed.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
a. 	Karubian’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26)
Dr. Karubian’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26) asks this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
to dismiss the three tort claims against him—negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress—“because they do not and cannot plausibly state a
claim for relief” for three distinct reasons. R. Doc. 26-1, p. 4.
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First, Karubian argues, Plaintiff’s claims for any alleged tortious conduct that occurred
prior to November 26, 2023, have prescribed because they occurred more than one year prior to
Plaintiff’s original filing.4 Id. at p. 5. Under the current Louisiana Civil Code, delictual actions
(i.e., tort actions) “are subject to a liberative prescription of two years.” La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1,
as enacted by TORT ACTIONS, 2024 La. Sess. Law. Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315). This is a change
from former Article 3492, which had established a prescriptive period of one year for delictual
actions. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492, repealed by TORT ACTIONS, 2024 La. Sess. Law. Serv.
Act 423 (H.B. 315). However, the change from a one-year to two-year prescriptive period was
“given prospective application only and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective
date of [Act 423],” which was July 1, 2024. TORT ACTIONS, 2024 La. Sess. Law. Serv. Act 423
(H.B. 315); see also Parker v. Chet Morrison Contractors, LLC, No. CV 23-5112, 2024 WL
3970312, at *5-7 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2024). Accordingly, because the tortious conduct alleged by
Plaintiff took place before the July 1, 2024, effective date of Act 423, a one-year prescriptive
period applies in this case.
Therefore, Karubian contends, any tort claims regarding his “alleged delay in reporting
Plaintiff’s allegation of sexual assault in May 2023, Plaintiff’s August 2023 meeting with Dr.
Karubian, Dr. Frank, and Dr. Van Bael, and any allegations pertaining to Dr. Karubian’s alleged
acts or omissions prior to November 26, 2023, including the ‘lead-up’ to the November 30, 2023,
remediation plan letter are untimely.” R. Doc. 26-1, p. 5. Accordingly, Karubian argues that the
only non-prescribed claims against him “relate to the Committee’s November 30, 2023,
remediation plan and its alleged damaging impact on Plaintiff,” and the others must be dismissed
for untimeliness. Id.
4 Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint on November 25, 2025. R. Doc. 1.
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Plaintiff does not argue that a two-year prescriptive period should apply in this case.
Instead, she contends that the series of actions by Karubian starting in February 2023 with his
alleged failure to properly respond to her initial report and continuing through the August 2023
meeting between Plaintiff and the other professors “clearly fall within Louisiana’s ‘continuing tort
doctrine.’” R. Doc. 44, p. 34 (citing Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992)). She
theorizes that “[e]ach incident on its own and in combination with the others constituted
dismissiveness towards Plaintiff’s traumatic experience with sexual violence.” Id.
Karubian counters by averring that the continuing tort doctrine does not apply because
Plaintiff “alleges three temporally disconnected tortious acts or omissions” rather than ongoing
wrongful conduct that gave rise to successive damages. R. Doc. 46, pp. 2-4. Specifically, Karubian
contrasts his alleged delay in reporting, his alleged communications with others about Plaintiff’s
complaint, and the November 30, 2023, remediation letter with examples of patterns of conduct
recognized as continuing torts by Louisiana courts. Id. (citing Lopez v. House of Faith Non-
Denomination Ministries, 29 So. 3d 680 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010) (continuous trespass); Risin v.
D.N.C. Investments, L.L.C., 921 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2005) (continuous exposure to
environmental contaminants); Coulon v. Witco Corp., 848 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2003)
(occupational exposure to carcinogens and neurotoxins multiple times per work shift)). He also
compares the alleged conduct in this case to the conduct in Hunter v. Tensas Nursing Home, 743
So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999), where a Louisiana court declined to apply the continuing tort
doctrine to repeated acts of neglect from a caregiver that resulted in numerous but varied injuries.
R. Doc. 46, p. 4.
The Court agrees with Karubian. Under Louisiana law, the continuing tort doctrine applies
only when both the wrongful conduct and the resulting damages are continuous. See Bustamento,
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607 So. 2d at 542 (applying doctrine “when the acts or conduct are continuous on almost a daily
basis, by the same actor, of the same nature, and the conduct becomes tortious or actionable
because of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic nature”). Where the alleged conduct consists of
completed, discrete acts that merely produce continuing effects, the doctrine does not apply. See
Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 45 So. 3d 991, 1002-03 (La. 2010) (citing Crump v. Sabine River
Authority, 737 So. 2d 720, 728-29) (“The inquiry is essentially a conduct-based one, asking
whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.”). Here,
Plaintiff’s allegations against Karubian concern separate acts that occurred at different times and
do not describe the type of ongoing, continuous wrongful conduct necessary to invoke the
continuing tort doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Karubian based on any conduct
occurring prior to November 25, 2023, have prescribed.
Second, Karubian argues that Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims against him are “thinly
disguised educational malpractice” claims that seek to impose tort liability for academic and
advisory decisions that fall outside the scope of any duty owed to Plaintiff. R. Doc. 26-1, pp. 6-7.
In support of this argument, Karubian contends that Plaintiff’s allegations arise entirely from his
role as an academic advisor and from decisions made within the context of Tulane’s academic and
administrative processes. R. Doc. 26-1, pp. 6-7. He argues that Louisiana courts do not recognize
claims for “educational malpractice” and consistently decline to impose tort liability for academic
judgment or internal institutional decision-making. Id. (citing Mills v. Tarver, 340 So. 3d 959, 971-
72 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2021) (quoting Miller v. Loyola Univ. New Orleans, 829 So. 2d 1057, 1061
(La. App. 4 Cir. 2002)) (“It is not the place of the court system to micro-manage the adequacy of
instruction or management at institutions of higher learning, even if it were feasible, which we feel
it is not. This is a task best handled by the universities themselves.”).
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Plaintiff responds that her claims are not based on academic performance or grading
decisions, but rather on Karubian’s alleged retaliation and mishandling of her report of sexual
assault. R. Doc. 44, pp. 26-37. Plaintiff contends that these actions therefore fall outside of the
scope of protected academic discretion and instead implicate duties to address misconduct and
protect students from physical harm. Id. She further argues that Tulane’s duties to ensure safety of
its students was delegated to Karubian due to his specific role. Id. at 36-37.
After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Karubian’s allegedly negligent conduct
arose from his role as an academic advisor and his participation in the university’s response to
Plaintiff’s report. Although Plaintiff characterizes this conduct as arising from retaliation and
misconduct, the specific conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint—Karubian’s handling
of the report, communications with colleagues, and participation in academic decision-making—
falls squarely within the realm of academic and administrative judgment.
Louisiana law does not recognize claims for “educational malpractice,” and courts decline
to second-guess academic decisions or the adequacy of institutional processes. See, e.g., Miller,
829 So. 2d at 1061. See also Guidry v. Our Lady of the Lake Nurse Anesthesia Program, 170 So.
3d 209, 215 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2015) (recognizing “strong public policy of judicial restraint in
disputes involving academic standards” unless institution “exercises its discretion in an arbitrary
or irrational fashion”). Allowing Plaintiff’s negligence claims to proceed would require the Court
to evaluate the propriety of academic judgment and internal university procedures, which is
precisely the type of inquiry courts in this state have rejected.
Finally, Karubian argues that Plaintiff fails to allege essential elements of negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. R.
Doc. 26-1, pp. 8-14.
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The Court will first address the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim. Under Louisiana law, plaintiffs “may recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress [“NIED”] unaccompanied by physical injury in certain situations.” Lane v. Baywood
Hotels, Inc., No. CV 25-103, 2025 WL 1026452, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2025) (quoting Collett v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., No. CV 19-11144, 2021 WL 2579801 (E.D. La. June 23, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-
30449, 2022 WL 2387352 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022)). The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently
summarized:
[F]or 	negligent 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress 	claims 	absent 	physical
damage/injury, a plaintiff must prove “the especial likelihood of genuine and
serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious.” This rule must be “stringently applied” in
cases that are inherently speculative in nature. The actions of the defendant must
constitute negligence. 	The plaintiff's mental disturbance must be “serious.”
Evidence of generalized fear or evidence of mere inconvenience is insufficient.
Evidence of medical treatment is not required, nor is expert medical testimony;
however, a plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence of the nature
and extent of the mental anguish suffered that was caused by the defendant's
conduct. Whether the mental distress is “serious” is a matter of proof. Finally, we
reiterate that these guidelines must be applied with the policy considerations
discussed herein.
In reaching our conclusion, we further elaborate on what is not required to be
proven by a plaintiff seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
absent physical damage/injury. The existence of a special, direct duty owed by the
defendant is not required. We also decline to impose a requirement of outrageous
conduct on the part of a defendant. A claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is a claim that, by definition, requires a plaintiff to prove negligence.
Further, we expressly reject application of the standard set forth in Lejeune. The
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff need not be “reasonably foreseeable,” nor
“severe and debilitating.”
Spencer v. Valero Ref. Meraux, L.L.C., 356 So. 3d 936, 950 (La. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
Karubian argues that Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements
for a NIED claim because she has not alleged the type of “special circumstances” required under
Louisiana law. R. Doc. 26-1, pp. 8-10. As noted by Karubian in his reply brief, Plaintiff’s response
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fails to address any of his arguments supporting dismissal of Plaintiff’s NIED claim against him.
R. Doc. 46, p. 7. Indeed, Plaintiff’s opposition does not meaningfully address the elements of an
NIED claim; instead, she merely states that her “allegations clearly identify the specific conduct
at issue.” R. Doc. 44, pp. 29-30.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for NIED. Her First Amended
Complaint alleges a delay in reporting, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the school’s
investigation, and adverse academic decisions. See R. Doc. 19. These allegations do not fall within
the narrow category of cases in which recovery is permitted absent physical injury. “For example,
negligent infliction of emotional distress has been awarded when a plaintiff watches their property
get damaged, or when a plaintiff experiences ‘fright or nervous shock’ to the degree that they are
‘in great fear for [their] personal safety.” Harris-Gilchrease v. Cap. One Auto Fin., No. CV 24-
357, 2024 WL 5046006 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2024) (citing Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 698
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1967); Cooper v. Christensen, 212 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1968)) (alteration
in original). Other examples of the “special circumstances” in which NIED has been awarded
include fear of developing cancer after exposure to radioactive material, e.g., Lester v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 120 So. 3d 767, 775 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013), or the mishandling of corpses, e.g., French v.
Ochsner Clinic, 200 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1967). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations
fail to reach this narrow standard.
Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an underlying negligence
claim. Thus, because NIED is not an independent tort under Louisiana law and “by definition,
requires a plaintiff to prove negligence,” the claim fails. See, e.g., Pelitire v. Rinker, 270 So. 3d
817, 829-30 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of NIED claim where underlying
negligence claim failed due to nonexistence of cause of action for clergy malpractice); Gonzales
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v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 170 So. 3d 1099, 1106 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of
NIED claim where underlying medical malpractice claim failed).
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s claim against Karubian for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Fifth Circuit recently summarized the requirements for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim under Louisiana law:
In order to establish an IIED claim under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show: “(1)
that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant
desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress
would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct.” “The conduct
must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.” “Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”
English v. Crochet, 154 F.4th 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.
2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991)). Here, Karubian argues that “[e]ven if Plaintiff can establish she
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Dr. Karubian’s alleged conduct, which is denied,
Plaintiff cannot establish the first or third elements of the claim.” R. Doc. 26-1, p. 11.
Addressing the first element, Plaintiff contends that the “outrageous and extreme actions
that caused her emotional distress” include “Karubian delaying forwarding the sexual assault
report and ‘retaliating against Plaintiff . . . for making reports of sexual assault and mishandling of
her report,” R. Doc. 44, p. 31 (quoting R. Doc. 19, p. 45), and “Karubian terminating Plaintiff
without following procedures to ensure fairness . . . in order to ensure her termination . . . [and] by
lying about the reasons,” id. (citing R. Doc. 19, pp. 10-11, 45).
Karubian argues that these allegations “simply do not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary for this tort.” R. Doc. 46, p. 8. See also R. Doc. 26-1, p. 11-14. Once
again, the Court agrees with Karubian’s arguments. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has
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recognized, “[C]ourts require truly outrageous conduct before allowing a claim of [IIED] even to
be presented to a jury. Conduct which is merely [tortious] or illegal does not rise to the level of
being extreme and outrageous.” Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 1017, 1024-25. Recently,
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of two
students’ IIED claims against university officials, finding that alleged hurtful comments made by
these officials after the students reported sexual assaults, despite being insulting or insensitive,
“are not so beyond scale as to create a cognizable claim [for IIED].” Chen v. Hillsdale Coll., 150
F.4th 735, 745 (6th Cir. 2025).
Karubian’s motion highlights the case Doe v. Emerson College, where a student alleged
that university administrators mishandled her report of sexual assault, conducted a flawed
investigation, and failed to provide an adequate response to her complaints. 153 F. Supp. 3d 506,
508-13 (D. Mass. 2015). The student brought claims of negligence, NIED, and IIED against the
university and four university employees. Id. at 508. In reviewing the defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to the IIED claims, the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts found that the allegations—which were grounded in dissatisfaction with
investigative procedures, perceived insensitivity, and disagreement with outcomes—did not rise
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to state an IIED claim. Id. at 518.
Like the allegations in Doe, Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the demanding standard
under Louisiana law. Her allegations similarly concern delay, alleged mishandling of her report,
and disagreement with academic and administrative decisions. Even accepting these allegations as
true, the described conduct does not approach the level of being “atrocious” or “utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.” Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
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For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible tort claim against Karubian. The Court
will therefore GRANT Karubian’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26) and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against him with prejudice.
b. 	Tulane and Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 28)
Tulane and Individual Defendants Woodley, Smith, Pardee, and Small seek dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims against them on several grounds. R. Doc. 28-1. As an initial matter, the Court
notes that Tulane has filed a subsequent Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 64) addressing the newly
raised and modified claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and adopts and maintains
all arguments raised by the instant motion. Accordingly, this Order will only address arguments
raised as to Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants. The Court will address Tulane’s
arguments for dismissal in a subsequent order on Tulane’s second Motion to Dismiss.
First, Individual Defendants argue that any tort claims concerning conduct that occurred
before November 25, 2023, have prescribed and must be dismissed. R. Doc. 28-1, pp. 27-28. As
discussed in the Court’s review of Karubian’s motion, a one-year prescriptive period applies in
this case. See La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1; Parker, 2024 WL 3970312, at *5-7. Plaintiff’s arguments
concerning the continuing tort doctrine appear to be directed only at her claims against Karubian.
See R. Doc. 44, p. 34. Apart from that argument, she does not meaningfully address the prescription
argument raised by Individual Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff states that “Defendants’ argument is
misplaced” and clarifies that she is not suing over Gonzalez’s alleged sexual comments in 2021 or
alleged sexual assault in 2022. Id. at pp. 33-34. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed in the
previous subsection, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Individual Defendants based on
any conduct occurring prior to November 25, 2023, have prescribed.
Second, the instant motion contends that because the negligence claims against Individual
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Defendants “are premised upon academic decisions regarding Plaintiff’s advisory relationship, her
research work abroad, and Defendants’ purported failure to adhere to supposed internal policies,”
these claims must be dismissed under Louisiana law. R. Doc. 28-1, p. 28. Like Karubian,
Individual Defendants argue that “Plaintiff is clearly attempting to repackage an ‘educational
malpractice’ claim as ‘garden variety’ negligence because Louisiana does not recognize a cause
of action for educational malpractice.” Id. at p. 29.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s claims are similar to those brought in Mills v.
Tarver, where nine nursing students brought negligence claims against a university and its
individual faculty and administrators based on alleged acts and omissions following the students’
filing of formal grievance procedures. Id.; Mills, 340 So. 3d at 963-65. The Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly dismissed the students’ negligence claims
because “the plaintiffs’ claims are academic disputes” and “Louisiana law does not recognize a
tort claim for educational malpractice.” Mills, 340 So. 3d at 970-72. Plaintiff argues that Mills is
not applicable to the facts of this case because the plaintiffs in Mills did not allege “discrimination
or retaliation for protected activity.” R. Doc. 44, p. 35. The Court disagrees and finds Mills, among
several other cases in which Louisiana courts have dismissed similar claims for educational
malpractice, see, e.g., Miller, 829 So. 2d at 1061; Guidry, 170 So. 3d at 215, to be both applicable
and instructive. Like the students in Mills, Plaintiff attempts to raise negligence claims premised
on academic decisions made by Individual Defendants as part of their employment at Tulane.
Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to identify any independent legal duty owed to her by Individual
Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not raise a viable negligence claim against Individual
Defendants.
Third, Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for NIED or IIED.
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R. Doc. 28-1, pp. 29-32. Specifically, they argue that “[e]ven if Plaintiff’s factual allegations are
taken as true, they do not amount to an actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.” Id. at p. 31. As previously discussed, because Plaintiff fails to state a viable negligence
claim against Individual Defendants, her NIED claim against them likewise fails. Moreover,
Plaintiff has not alleged the type of “special circumstances” required under Louisiana law to
sustain a claim for NIED absent physical injury. See Spencer, 356 So. 3d at 950. Plaintiff’s
allegations against Individual Defendants, which concern their alleged roles in the investigation
and administrative handling of her complaints, do not fall within the narrow category of cases in
which recovery for NIED is permitted. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for NIED against
Individual Defendants.
The same is true of Plaintiff’s claims for IIED against Individual Defendants. Even
accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the conduct attributed to Individual Defendants—
namely, their alleged failures to intervene, alleged investigative deficiencies, and participation in
university decision-making processes—does not rise to the level of conduct that is “atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See English, 154 F.4th at 374. Thus, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim satisfying the elements of IIED against Individual Defendants.
Finally, Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligent
supervision, training, and staffing, because such duties are owed by Tulane rather than by
individual employees acting within the course and scope of their employment. R. Doc. 28-1, pp.
32-33. Plaintiff responds that her allegations are not premised on “supervising the safety of
students” but “relate instead to negligent supervision of other defendant-employees in their
obligations to Plaintiff.” R. Doc. 44, p. 36. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Even as
reframed by Plaintiff, this claim still arises from Individual Defendants’ roles in overseeing
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Tulane’s response to Plaintiff’s complaints and in carrying out internal university functions.
Plaintiff identifies no independent legal duty owed by Individual Defendants, in their individual
capacities, to supervise, train, or staff other university employees on Tulane’s behalf. Nor does she
allege any facts demonstrating that any Individual Defendant personally undertook supervisory or
staffing obligations. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim against Individual
Defendants for negligent supervision, training, or staffing.
For 	these 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Individual 	Defendants 	for 	negligent
supervision, training and staffing, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, Tulane
and Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART to the extent
that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Individual Defendants and is otherwise
DENIED AS MOOT.
c. 	Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32)
Foster’s Motion, much like the motions filed by Karubian and Individual Defendants, seeks
dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against him—negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). R.
Doc. 32.
First, Foster argues that any tort claims against him based on conduct occurring prior to
November 25, 2023, have prescribed and must be dismissed. R. Doc. 32-1, pp. 4-5. As previously
discussed in connection with Karubian and Individual Defendants, a one-year prescriptive period
applies in this case. See La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1; Parker, 2024 WL 3970312, at *5-7.
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against
Foster based on any conduct occurring prior to November 25, 2023, have prescribed.
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Second, Foster argues that any of Plaintiff’s tort claims which “are predicated on a
purported failure to adhere to internal policies and procedures in conducting investigations into
her complaints” amount to non-actionable educational malpractice claims. R. Doc. 32-1, pp. 5-6.
He further argues that “[a]ll of the conduct that the Plaintiff has placed at issue in her claims against
Defendant Foster is related to internal procedures and decisions by administrative staff,” rather
than the breach of any independent legal duty he personally owed to Plaintiff. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff,
on the other hand, contends that Foster’s actions are not merely academic decisions but instead
involve retaliation, failures to address discrimination, and negligent responses to foreseeable
further harm to students. R. Doc. 44, pp. 34-37.
As discussed in the above subsections, Louisiana law does not recognize claims seeking to
impose tort liability for alleged deficiencies in academic or administrative decision-making. See,
e.g., Miller, 829 So. 2d at 1061; Guidry, 170 So. 3d at 215; Mills, 340 So. 3d at 970-72. Here,
Plaintiff’s allegations against Foster arise from his role as Tulane’s Title IX coordinator and
concern his alleged failure to intervene, his oversight of the investigative process, and his alleged
failure to ensure a fair investigation. R. Doc. 19. Even as framed by Plaintiff, these allegations
directly challenge Foster’s role in university decision-making, and Plaintiff offers no independent
legal duty owed to her by Foster in his individual capacity. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a
viable negligence claim against Foster.
Third, Foster argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for NIED or IIED because
“Plaintiff’s alleged facts do not establish the requisite elements to sustain these causes of action
against [him].” R. Doc. 32-1, p. 6. Regarding the NIED claim, Foster states that Plaintiff’s factual
allegations against him are “limited to complaints about the discretionary decisions and/or
measures taken during the course of the investigation itself” and argues that Plaintiff “fail[s] to
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indicate how these issues amount to a breach of duty by Defendant Foster resulting in actual harm
to the Plaintiff.” Id. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged the type of “special
circumstances” required to sustain a claim for NIED absent physical injury. See Spencer, 356 So.
3d at 950. Furthermore, as previously discussed, because Plaintiff fails to state a viable negligence
claim against Foster, her NIED claim against him likewise fails. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim for NIED against Foster. Regarding the IIED claim, Foster argues that Plaintiff does
not allege conduct “constitute[ing] anything remotely resembling ‘extreme and outrageous’ or
‘atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” R. Doc. 32-1, p. 8. The Court agrees
and therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable IIED claim against Foster. See English,
154 F.4th at 374.
Finally, Foster argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a negligent supervision,
training, and staffing claim against him. Id. Foster characterizes Plaintiff’s attempts to allege such
a claim as “attempting to fit a square peg into a round hole” because negligent supervision cases
in Louisiana generally involve physical injuries to younger students attending lower grade and
secondary schools due to improper supervision. Id. at pp. 9-10 (citing Robinson v. St. John the
Baptist Par. Sch. Bd., 270 So. 3d 838 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2019); Carter v. St. John Elem. Sch., 105
So. 3d 856 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012); Booth v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 919 (La. App. 5
Cir. 2010); Brooks v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 560 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff
does not meaningfully distinguish those principles or identify any independent duty owed by
Foster, in his individual capacity, to supervise, train, or staff other university employees on
Tulane’s behalf. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Foster for negligent
supervision, training, or staffing.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible tort claim against Foster. The Court
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will therefore GRANT Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32) and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against him with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Karubian’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 26) is GRANTED, and
that Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Jordan Karubian are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Tulane and Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(R. Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART, that Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Erica Woodley,
Tiffany Smith, Avery Pardee, and Jonathan Small are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
that the Motion is otherwise DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32) is
GRANTED, and that Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Marcus Foster are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026.
GREG GERARD GUIDRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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