Marcella et al v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Norma
Marcella, Scott Marcella, Troy Marcella, and Toni Hebert (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seeking
dismissal of the Boyle and Yearsley government-immunity defenses raised by defendant
Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“Avondale”) as those defenses relate to certain of Plaintiffs’
state-law claims.1 	Specifically, Plaintiffs seek a ruling that Avondale “is not immune from
Plaintiffs’ state law claims for failing to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos, or from
taking precautions to prevent the spread of asbestos dust at Avondale Shipyard during the
employment and exposure of Ronald Marcella, from 1962 to 1964.”2 	In so arguing, Plaintiffs
point out that other sections of this court have repeatedly granted similar motions in other cases
presenting like claims.3 Avondale responds in opposition, arguing that all other sections of this
court have reached the wrong conclusion by misapplying the applicable case law.4 Plaintiffs reply
to reurge that Avondale has repeatedly failed to overcome similar motions for summary judgment
1 R. Doc. 107.
2 Id. at 1. Plaintiffs also sought a ruling stating that Avondale is not immune from state-law claims arising
from its “failure to prevent the spread of asbestos dust from the Avondale Shipyard[] to the public, including The
Capri and Bridge Circle Inn restaurants where Mr. Marcella sustained para-occupational exposures to asbestos from
Avondale workers.” 	Id. 	After Plaintiffs filed their motion, the Court dismissed without prejudice the para-
occupational exposure claims on the joint motion of Plaintiffs and Avondale. R. Doc. 109 (citing R. Doc. 104).
Accordingly, this ruling does not apply to those claims.
3 R. Doc. 107-1 at 8 n.1 (collecting cases).
4 R. Doc. 157.
NORMA MARCELLA, et al.
VERSUS
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INC., et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-780
SECTION M (4)
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filed in this district.5 	Plaintiffs note that Avondale has filed nearly identical briefs in all of the
referenced cases.6
I. 	BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury case concerning alleged exposure to asbestos. Marcella died on
October 21, 2023, and an autopsy later revealed that he had asbestos-related mesothelioma.7
Plaintiffs, his widow and adult children, filed this suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, State of Louisiana, against Avondale and various other defendants, alleging that Marcella
was occupationally and environmentally exposed to asbestos in the 1960s and 1970s when he
worked at Avondale’s shipyard. 8 Plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to protect Marcella from,
and to warn him about, the dangers of asbestos.9 On March 27, 2024, Avondale removed this case
to federal court on the basis of federal-officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), raising a
Boyle “government contractor immunity” defense and a Yearsley “derivative sovereign immunity”
defense.10 Plaintiffs now move for partial summary judgment on those defenses.11
II. 	LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex
5 R. Doc. 168.
6 Id. at 1-2.
7 R. Doc. 2-1 at 3.
8 Id. at 1-4. Plaintiffs also alleged that Marcella was exposed to asbestos at his family’s restaurants near the
shipyard, which were frequented by Avondale employees who carried asbestos fibers on their clothing. Id. The Court
dismissed those claims without prejudice on the joint motion of Plaintiffs and Avondale. R. Doc. 109 (citing R. Doc.
104). 9 R. Doc. 2-1 at 5-22.
10 R. Doc. 2 at 1, 7-8.
11 R. Doc. 107.
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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A party
moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary
judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the
conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets
that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324.
A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive
law identifies which facts are material. 	Id. 	Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a
rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a
whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); EEOC
v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). 	Unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory
allegations, and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary-judgment
motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co.
v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court
must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet,
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a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actual
controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37
F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmovant must articulate specific facts showing a genuine issue and point to supporting,
competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). Such
facts must create more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586. When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,
the moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essential
element of the nonmovant’s claim in order to satisfy its summary-judgment burden. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial that could
support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37
F.3d at 1075-76.
B. Discussion
As Plaintiffs explain, their argument and Avondale’s opposition are rather familiar to the
Eastern District of Louisiana in failure-to-warn/failure-to-implement-safety-measures cases like
this one. 	This Court has compared Plaintiffs’ motion and Avondale’s opposition to the
“government immunity defense” summary-judgment motions and oppositions filed in other
sections of this court and found them to be substantially similar, if not nearly identical. Having
reviewed the orders granting those motions, this Court sees no reason to depart from the consistent
holdings in those cases that Avondale is not entitled to use the Boyle and Yearsley government-
immunity defenses as shields to the particular state-law claims asserted. See LeBoeuf v.Huntington
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Ingalls, Inc., 2025 WL 744152, at *2-4 & n.12 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2025) (collecting cases);
Constanza v. Sparta Ins. Co., 2025 WL 3227783 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2025); Steib v. Huntington
Ingalls, Inc., 2025 WL 2532696 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2025). 	Specifically, in this case, Plaintiffs’
motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to finding that Avondale cannot use the Boyle
and Yearsley government-immunity defenses against Plaintiffs’ state-law claims alleging that
Avondale (1) failed to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos and (2) failed to take
precautions to prevent the spread of asbestos dust at the Avondale shipyard during the employment
and exposure of Marcella from 1962 to 1964.12
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment (R. Doc. 107) is
GRANTED, and Avondale is not permitted to use the Boyle and Yearsley government-immunity
defenses against Plaintiffs’ state-law claims alleging that Avondale (1) failed to warn its employees
of the dangers of asbestos and (2) failed to take precautions to prevent the spread of asbestos dust
at the Avondale shipyard during the employment and exposure of Marcella from 1962 to 1964.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11 th day of December, 2025.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12 Plaintiffs confirm that they do not bring a general negligence claim against Avondale for its “mere use of
asbestos.” R. Doc. 168 at 3.
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