Merrell v. 1st Lake Properties Inc

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KEVIN MERRELL 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 23-1450
1ST LAKE PROPERTIES, INC. 	SECTION “R” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of settlement1
and plaintiffs’ motion for approval of attorneys’ fees, expenses, and service
awards.2 Having considered the motions, the supporting memoranda of law,
the settlement, the record, and the arguments made during the final approval
hearing, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of settlement
and grants in part plaintiffs’ motion for approval of attorneys’ fees, expenses,
and service award.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant 1st Lake Properties, Inc. (“1st Lake”) is a developer and
property manager in the New Orleans area.3 This action arises from a data
breach of personally identifiable information (“PII”) 1st Lake collected and
1 	R. Doc. 60.
2 	R. Doc. 59.
3 	R. Doc. 24, at ¶ 5.
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held. 	The PII allegedly included names, Social Security numbers, driver’s
license numbers, financial account numbers, credit card numbers, and debit
card numbers.4
Plaintiff Kevin Merrell filed a class action in state court in March 2023
on behalf of himself and all individuals residing in Louisiana whose PII
defendant held and was affected by the data breach.5 	Defendant removed
the action to this Court in May 2023.6
On February 	4, 	2025, 	plaintiffs 	filed the 	unopposed motion for
preliminary approval and to direct notice of the proposed class settlement.
On May 22, 2025, the Court preliminarily certified the class for settlement
purposes, preliminarily approved the class action settlement, and appointed
RG/2 Claims Administration LLC as settlement administrator.7 	Now,
plaintiffs ask the Court to (1) certify the Settlement Class for purposes of
entering judgment on the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e); (2) finally approve the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
and (3) approve their requests for $174,983.50 in attorneys’ fees, $10,410.64
4 	Id. at ¶ 16.
5 	R. Doc. 1-2.
6 	R. Doc. 1.
7 	R. Doc. 57.
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in 	expenses, 	and 	a 	$5,000 	service 	award 	to 	the 	settlement 	class
representative, Kevin Merrell.
The settlement requires 1st Lake to pay a non-reversionary amount of
$525,000 to reimburse members of the settlement class for unreimbursed
economic losses, pro rata cash payments, credit monitoring, notice and
administrative expenses, payment of a service award approved by the Court,
and attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the Court.
To receive the settlement’s benefits, plaintiff and class members agreed
to release 1st Lake from all claims and causes of action asserted or that could
have been asserted by any settlement class member arising out of the data
breach incident.8
In 	the 	motion 	before 	the 	Court, 	plaintiffs 	state 	the 	settlement
administrator mailed 29,085 notices on June 20, 2025.9 After the mailing,
the U.S. Postal Service returned 5,241 as undeliverable.10 	The claims
administrator was able to locate updated addresses for 4,380 of those class
8 	R. Doc. 50, at 11.
9 	R. Doc. 60, at 7.
10 	Id.
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members.11 	Notice reached 97.25% of the class.12 	One class member
submitted an opt-out notice. There were no objections.13
The Court considers the motion below.
II. 	CLASS CERTIFICATION
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds it proper to certify, and
hereby does certify, for settlement purposes only, a Settlement Class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 	The settlement provides for a
Settlement Class defined as follows:
All individuals residing in the United States whose PII was
compromised in the data breach discovered by 1st Lake Properties, Inc.
in December 2021.14
Excluded from the class are the judges presiding over this litigation and
members of their direct families; the defendant, their subsidiaries, parent
companies, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the defendant
or their parents have a controlling interest, and their current or former
officers and directors; and the one settlement class member who submitted
a valid request for exclusion prior to the opt out deadline.15
11 	Id. at 8.
12 	Id.
13 	Id.
14 	R. Doc. 57.
15 	R. Doc. 50-1, at 6.
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A. 	Legal Standard
Class 	certification 	requires 	a 	“rigorous 	analysis 	of 	Rule 	23
prerequisites.” Madison v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 637 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.
2011). A settlement class must meet the requirements for class certification
as if the case were to be litigated. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 	To be certified under Rule 23, the class must first
satisfy four threshold requirements. A court may certify a class only if:
1. 	the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
4. the 	representative 	parties 	will 	fairly 	and 	adequately 	protect 	the
interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). The party seeking certification bears the burden
of establishing these requirements. 	Unger v. Amedisys, 401 F.3d 316, 320
(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475,
479–80 (5th Cir. 2001)). In addition to meeting the threshold requirements
under Rule 23(a), the proposed class must also meet one of the three
categories specified in Rule 23(b).
B. 	Discussion
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements
The Rule 23(a) requirements are all met in this case. There are nearly
30,000 settlement class members, and numerosity is not in question. Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); see Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino LLC, 186 F.3d 620,
624 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that class of 100 and 150 satisfies numerosity
requirement).
Commonality is likewise satisfied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Under Wal-
Mart 	Stores 	v. 	Dukes, 	commonality 	requires 	that 	the 	“common
contention . . . is capable of classwide resolution . . . .” 	564 U.S. 338, 350
(2011). 	“What matters . . . is . . . the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 	Id.
(citation omitted). Here, the settlement class members’ claims all pertain to
common questions of fact as to the alleged data breach. The common factual
question in this case is what actions 1st Lake took before, during, and after
the data breach to safeguard the class members’ personally identifiable
information. Class-wide proceedings would answer questions as to how the
breach occurred and what data was leaked in the data breach. 	Those
proceedings could also answer questions as to the appropriate standard of
care for storing personally identifiable information and whether 1st Lake was
in violation of such a standard. 	Answering the factual and legal questions
about 1st Lake’s conduct would assist in reaching class-wide resolution.
Commonality is satisfied under the Wal-Mart standard.
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Rule 23(a) requires that the named representative is typical of the
class. 	Whether 1st Lake negligently stored the plaintiffs’ data is common
throughout the class. 	The claims of Merrell are the same as the claims he
asserts on behalf of the class members—he asserts that 1st Lake negligently
stored his data. 	Moreover, 1st Lake’s defenses as to Merrell are the same
defenses that apply to all the settlement class members. Because this claim
revolves around 1st Lake’s conduct, as opposed to the characteristics of a
particular class member’s claim, the representative plaintiff is typical. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); see Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d
608, 616 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Rule 23 adequacy requirement requires a finding that the class
representative, class counsel, and the relationship between the two are
adequate to protect the interests of absent class members. 	Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005). 	Counsel must be both
competent and zealous in representing class interests. 	See, e.g., Feder v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2005). Finally, the Rule
23 adequacy inquiry seeks to uncover conflicts of interest between the named
plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982).
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The dual requirements of class counsel's competence and zeal are
satisfied here. The three co-lead class counsel—Raina Borrelli, Layne Hilton,
and Matthew Wilson—each have experience representing consumers and
other plaintiff classes in class-action litigation, including in similar data-
breach cases.16 	Class counsel have been vigorous in representing the class,
as demonstrated by their defeat of motions to dismiss and successful
negotiation of a settlement with 1 st Lake, which initially was reluctant to
settle.17
Analyzing adequacy of the class representative focuses on whether
there are intraclass conflicts between the class representatives and those they
seek to represent. 	Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299,
314. A class representative must “possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury as the class members.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–26 (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	Merrell has the same interests, and asserts the
same type of injury, as the members he seeks to represent. Neither 1st Lake
nor any objector has raised any fundamental intraclass conflict, and the
record discloses none outside of the service award, which the Court discusses
in Part D, supra. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir.
16 	R. Doc. 59-2, at 8, 11.
17 	Id. at 3.
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2003) (holding that district courts should scrutinize service awards carefully
to ensure they do not undermine the adequacy of class representatives). The
Court finds that the size and structure of the requested service award are not
such that they undermine the adequacy of Merrell’s representation here.
Given the nature of this case, the record as to class counsel, and the
absence of intraclass conflicts, the Court finds that class counsel and the class
representative are adequate.
In conclusion, the proposed settlement class meets all four of the Rule
23(a) requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.
2. Rule 23(b) Requirements
In addition to meeting the threshold requirements under Rule 23(a),
the proposed class must also meet one of the three categories specified in
Rule 23(b). 	Plaintiffs seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires 	that 	“questions 	of 	law 	or 	fact 	common 	to 	class 	members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action [is] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The 	predominance 	inquiry 	tests 	whether 	“proposed 	classes 	are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 	Amchem,
521 U.S. at 623. To determine if certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is proper,
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courts consider (A) the class members’ interests in individual control of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of litigation already begun as to
the matter; and (C) the desirability or lack thereof of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the forum. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(C); see also
id. at 620 (noting that courts need not consider whether the trial would
present intractable management problems when confronted with a request
for settlement-only class certification).
Here, dispositive issues of law and fact regarding the alleged data
breach are common to all class members, and these questions predominate
over any individual questions. The predominating questions in this case are
whether 1st Lake had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding,
securing, and protecting the PII of plaintiff and settlement class members,
and 	whether 	1st 	Lake 	breached 	that 	duty. 	See, 	e.g., 	La. 	Rev. 	Stat.
§§ 51:3074(A)-(E)18 	(imposing 	specific 	duties 	to 	(1) 	“implement 	and
maintain reasonable security procedures . . . appropriate to the nature of the
information to protect the personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure,” and (2) “take all reasonable
steps to destroy . . . the records . . . containing personal information that is
18 	Plaintiff asserted claims of gross negligence and negligence under La.
Rev. Stat. § 51:3074, et seq., and violations of La. Rev. Stat. § 51:3074,
et seq. R. Doc. 24 at 17–25.
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no longer to be retained,” among others). 	The common questions here—
determining 	defendant’s 	duty 	and 	whether 	it 	breached 	that 	duty—
predominate over any individual issues. See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment
Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1059 (S.D.
Tex. 2012) (finding that common questions predominate when the central
issue was defendant’s “conduct before, during, and following the data
breach, and the resulting injury to each class member from that conduct”);
see also In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 312 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (finding that common questions predominate when the claim
depended on whether defendant “properly secured the stolen personal
information”).
Superiority examines whether a class action is a better vehicle for
resolving a case. 	Here, the individual claims are for small amounts, which
would likely preclude individual litigation, as the costs of litigation would
exceed the likely recovery. The Fifth Circuit has found such “negative value
suits” to be the “most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class
action.” 	Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
Similarly, the efficiency gained in a class-wide settlement demonstrates that
resolving the Settlement Class’s claims jointly is superior to a series of
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individual lawsuits and promotes judicial economy. 	The Court finds that
superiority is satisfied.
C. 	Class Counsel and Settlement Class Representatives
The Court finds that Matthew Wilson and Layne Hilton of Meyer
Wilson 	and 	Raina 	Borrelli 	of 	Strauss 	Borrelli 	PLLC 	have 	sufficient
experience in class actions and complex litigation, including data breach
litigation, and have fairly and adequately represented the interests of the
settlement class members.19 	The Court previously appointed Mr. Wilson,
Ms. Hilton, and Ms. Borrelli as interim class counsel and now appoints them
as class counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). The Court further concludes that
the named plaintiff has fairly and adequately represented the interests of the
settlement 	class 	members 	and 	appoints 	him 	as 	a 	settlement 	class
representative.
III. 	FINAL APPROVAL
Plaintiffs move for final approval of the proposed settlement. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the settlement of class actions. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23. A class action may not be dismissed or compromised without the
district court’s approval. 	Id. 	Because the parties’ interests are aligned in
favor of a settlement, the Court must take independent steps to ensure
19 	R. Doc. 59-2, at 8-12.
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fairness. 	See Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.
1983).
Rule 23(e) outlines five procedures the Court must follow when
reviewing a proposed settlement involving a certified class. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e). 	The Court must consider the notice to the class; whether the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate after holding a hearing; identify
any agreements made in connection with the proposal; provide a new
opportunity to be excluded if the class was previously certified; and consider
any class-member objections. 	Id. 	Here, during the fairness hearing, class
counsel represented that there are no agreements beyond the settlement
agreement at issue, which defense counsel confirmed; the class was not
previously certified; and there are no class-member objections. 	Thus, the
two remaining inquiries require the Court to consider the notice to the class
and whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1)-(2). For the following reasons, the Court approves the settlement.
A. Rule 23(e)(1): Notice
Notice was reasonable and provided due process under Rule 23(e)(1).
The administrator was able to reach more than 97% of the settlement class.20
The notice described the nature of the claims, issues, and defenses and the
20 	R. Doc. 60, at 8.
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impact of a class settlement; the scope of the settlement class; the date and
time of the fairness hearing; the maximum fees, costs, and service award;
and the rights of the class member to opt out.21
In total, 28,224 of the 29,085 class members received direct mail
notice.22 	One class member submitted an opt-out notice. 	There were no
objections.23 	By the September 19, 2025 claims deadline, the claims
administrator had received 1,660 approved claims for the cash payment, 741
approved 	claims 	for 	credit 	monitoring, 	and 	1 	approved 	claim 	for
reimbursement 	of 	economic 	losses 	expenses 	with 	valid 	third-party
corroboration.24
Based on the facts presented, the Court finds that notice to the
settlement was reasonable, thorough, comprehensive, and effective. 	The
Court finds that the notice and its distribution satisfies the requirements of
due process under the Constitution and Rule 23(e).
B. Rule 23(e)(2): Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate
There is a “strong presumption” in favor of finding a settlement fair
because the public interest strongly favors the voluntary settlement of class
21 	R. Doc. 60-1, at 27.
22 	R. Doc. 60, at 8.
23 	Id.
24 	Id.
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actions. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977). To determine
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, courts apply the
factors in Rule 23(e)(2), considering whether:
(A) 	the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
represented the class
(B) 	the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length
(C) 	the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
i. 	the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal
ii. the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing
relief to the class, including the method of processing class-
member claims
iii. the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,
including timing of payment; and
iv. any agreement required to be identified under Rule
23(e)(3); and
(D) 	the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each
other.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)-(D).
In addition, the Fifth Circuit considers the six factors set out in Reed v.
General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983). 	To ensure the
settlement is in the best interest of the class members, the Fifth Circuit
considers:
(1) 	the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement;
(2) 	the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation
(3) 	the 	stage 	of the 	proceedings 	and the 	amount of discovery
completed;
(4) 	the probability of plaintiff’s success on the merits;
(5) 	the range of possible recovery; and
(6) 	the opinions of the class counsel, class representatives, and
absent class members.
Id. at 172.
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The Court will consider the settlement in light of the 23(e)(2) and Reed
factors.
1. 	Adequate Representation
The Court finds that the settlement class representative and class
counsel have adequately represented the settlement class. As discussed infra
in the consideration of adequacy for the purposes of final class certification,
outside of the service award, Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with other
class members and is not subject to any unique defenses. 	Merrell has the
same interests, and asserts the same type of injury, as the members he seeks
to represent. Neither 1st Lake nor any objector has raised any fundamental
intraclass conflict, and the record discloses none outside of the service
award, which the Court discusses in Part D, supra. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing
Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that district courts should
scrutinize service awards carefully to ensure they do not undermine the
adequacy of class representatives). 	The Court finds that the size and
structure of the requested service award are not such that they undermine
the adequacy of Merrell’s representation here. 	Class counsel likewise
adequately represented the class. Counsel investigated the case, engaged in
mediation, performed a limited amount of discovery, and negotiated the
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settlement.25 Therefore, the Court finds that Merrell and class counsel have
satisfied the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(e)(2)(A).
2. Arm’s Length Negotiation
The Court finds that the settlement results from adversarial, arm’s-
length, non-collusive negotiations between the parties. The parties pursued
adversarial litigation, including two motions to dismiss, prior to reaching the
settlement and participated in mediation sessions with Bruce A. Friedman
acting as mediator.26 Counsel exchanged both formal and informal discovery
prior to the settlement.27 	See In re Heartland Payment Sys. Inc., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“A presumption of fairness, adequacy,
and reasonableness may attach to a class settlement reached in arm’s length
negotiations 	between 	experienced, 	capable 	counsel 	after 	meaningful
discovery.”)
3. Equitable Treatment
The Court further finds that the settlement treats class members
equitably 	relative 	to 	each 	other. 	All 	settlement 	class 	members 	who
submitted valid claims were eligible to recover under the settlement: 1,660
approved claims selected the pro rata cash payment; 741 approved claims
25 	R. Doc. 60, at 11.
26 	Id. at 12.
27 	Id. at 7-8.
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selected credit monitoring; and 1 approved claim sought reimbursement for
economic loss expenses with valid third-party corroboration.
4. Adequacy of Relief under Reed
The Court evaluates the final Rule 23(e)(2) factor—the adequacy of the
relief provided for the class—under the factors set forth in Reed. See Newby
v. Enron Corp., 394 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2004).
As to the first Reed factor, nothing in the record indicates that the
settlement was the result of improper collusion or improper dealings. 	In
addition, the parties presented evidence of their arm’s-length negotiations,
which included hiring a neutral mediator.28 	This factor favors approval of
the settlement.
As to the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation, this
too favors approval. In this context, the Court considers whether the settling
now avoids the risks and burdens of a potentially protected litigation. Ayers
v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 369 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, class counsel stated
at the final fairness hearing that the underlying facts would require extensive
expert testimony, as both class certification and the trial would require
explanations of the cyberattack, data breach, and appropriate protections for
collected personally identifiable information. 	The defendant would likely
28 	Id. at 7.
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have sought an immediate appeal of an order certifying a class for trial under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). If the Court of Appeals granted an appeal, the litigation
could be delayed for one or two years during the pendency of the appeal.
Further, the Court of Appeals may well have decertified the class. If the class
certification order stood, the parties would likely still have been a year out
from an expert-heavy trial on the merits. Under the circumstances, an early
settlement that obviated these delays and the risks of having to litigate makes
sense. Accordingly, the second Reed factor favors approval of the settlement.
The third Reed factor—the stage of the litigation—evaluates whether
the parties have sufficient information to evaluate the merits of their
positions. 	Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 369 (5th Cir. 2004). 	The
parties stated at the fairness hearing that, although they had not taken any
depositions, they had participated in sufficient written discovery, both
formal and informal, as well as motion practice, and mediation to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of their case and their opponent’s case. The Court
is satisfied that the parties were sufficiently informed to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of their positions and to make reasoned evaluation of
whether and on what terms to settle. Accordingly, the Court finds that this
factor strongly favors approval of the settlement.
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The fourth Reed factor is the probability of success on the merits. For
settlement approval purposes, the probability of success on the merits favors
approval when the class’s likelihood of success on the merits is questionable.
See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (5th
Cir. 1981). 	Should the case proceed, there could be significant obstacles to
class-wide judgment in favor of the class on both liability and damages.
Plaintiffs allege negligence in the storage of their PII. Even assuming a duty
of care, a factfinder could have determined that 1st Lake exercised reasonable
care, given current technology and industry standards. 	The settlement
avoids such risks and provides immediate benefits to class members,
including access to credit monitoring in closer proximity to the date of the
data breach. This factor weighs in favor of final approval.
The focus of the fifth Reed factor, the range of possible recovery, is
whether the settlement is reasonable. 	Courts compare the settlement
amount to the relief expected at trial. 	See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d
1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). Under the settlement, class members can ask for
either economic losses or the pro rata cash settlement. 	Only one class
member has submitted supporting documentation for its economic loss,
which amounted to around $600. That most class members have asked for
the pro rata payment in lieu of the economic loss payment reflects the
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difficulty the class members would have faced in showing at trial that the
breach involved their data and an injury resulting from that breach.29 Given
this difficulty, the likely recovery could very well have been nothing; the $160
pro rata cash payment favorably compares to the relief expected at trial.
Finally, the Court looks to the opinions of class counsel, the class
representative, and absent class members. 	See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d
1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that in determining whether a settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the “trial court is entitled to rely upon the
judgment of experienced counsel for the parties”). Here, class counsel and
the lead plaintiff agree to the settlement. 	Class counsel are experienced in
data breach litigation, and the court finds them well-positioned to evaluate
the reasonableness of the settlement. See, e.g., Newby v, Enron Corp., 394
F.3d 296, 309 (5th Cir. 2004). 	The opinions of the absent class members
appear to favor the settlement. Overall, approximately 6% of the absent class
members have submitted claims forms to participate in the settlement,
which class counsel represented in the final fairness hearing is on par with
the response rates in similar settlements. 	See In re Wawa, Inc. Data
Security Litigation, 2024 WL 1557366, at *17 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (noting that a
29 	Indeed, the claims administrator has rejected nearly 200 economic
loss claims because of claimants’ failure to provide documentation of
economic losses.
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claims rate of 2.56% “compares favorably to the claims rates in other data
breach class actions”); see also In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litigation, 322
F.R.D. 276, 291 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (observing that a high claims rate was an
indication of the success of the notice program). 	After the class received
notice, there were no objections and only one opt-out. 	In general, courts
consider receipt of no objections to be indicative that the settlement is
adequate. 	4 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class
Actions § 13:58 (6th ed. 2025). 	This factor, too, weighs in favor of final
approval.
In addition to the Reed factors, Federal Rule 23(e)(2)(C) includes
terms of any proposed award of attorneys’ fees, including timing of payment
as 	a 	factor 	that 	weighs 	in 	determining 	whether 	a 	settlement 	is 	fair,
reasonable, and adequate. 	Here, while the requested fees are above the
average 	range 	of 	attorneys’ 	fees 	in 	like 	cases, 	the 	request 	is 	not 	so
unreasonable as to require disapproval of the settlement. See, e.g., 4 William
B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 13:54 (6th ed.
2025).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds after the fairness hearing
that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 	Therefore,
the Court finally approves the settlement.
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IV. 	Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, Expenses, and Service Award
In an unopposed motion, class counsel moves for attorneys’ fees of
$174,983.50, reimbursement for $10,410.64 in expenses, and approval of a
$5,000 service award for named plaintiff Kevin Merrell.
Notice of the requested attorneys’ fees, expenses, and service award
was provided to settlement class members on the postcard that was sent as
notice and on the website.30 No settlement class member has objected. For
the reasons below, the Court grants in part the motion for attorneys’ fees,
expenses, and service award.
A. Attorneys’ Fees
In common fund cases, courts in the Fifth Circuit use either the
percentage 	method 	in 	which 	the 	court 	awards 	fees 	as 	a 	reasonable
percentage of the common fund, or the lodestar method, in which the court
calculates the fees by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation and then applying an upward or
downward multiplier. Union Asset Management Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc.,
669 F.3d 632, 642-43 (5th Cir. 2012). 	The factors in Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), inform the analysis
under either method. Union Asset Mgmt., 669 F.3d at 644.
30 	R. Doc. 60-2.
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The Johnson factors, intended to ensure “a reasonable fee,” are: (1) the
time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the
skill required to perform the legal service adequately; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorneys because they accepted this case; (5) the
customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or 	contingent; 	(7) 	time 	limitations 	imposed 	by 	the 	client 	or 	the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717, 720.
In this case, the percentage method, cross-checked by the lodestar
method, is the appropriate method for scrutinizing the proposed attorneys’
fee award. 	See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys. Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1073 (S.D. Tex. 2012). The first step in the percentage method requires
determining the monetary value conferred to the class by the settlement. Id.
The court then sets a benchmark percentage that applies to that value. 	Id.
The court then applies the Johnson factors to determine whether a positive
or negative adjustment of the benchmark is warranted. Id.
Here, the Court first determines the monetary value conferred to the
class. In this case, that is a straightforward determination, as the settlement
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is for $525,000 and encompasses all relief for the class. 	This valuation
amount includes administrative costs and attorneys’ fees, which are viewed
as part of the class recovery for the purposes of the percentage method. See
In re Heartland Payment Sys. Inc., 851 F. Supp. at 1075.
The next step is to determine an appropriate benchmark. 	See, e.g.,
Gooch v. Life Invs. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 426 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that
most common-fund fee percentages ranged from 20% to 30%); 	In re
Heartland Payment Sys. Inc., 851 F. Supp. at 1086 (collecting data privacy
class-action settlement cases, noting that the previous data privacy cases had
percentage awards of 7.7%, 20%, and 3.7%, and adjusting the benchmark in
the case down to 20%). The Fifth Circuit does not have a specific benchmark
for common fund cases. 	Compare In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy
Litigation, 926 F.3d 539, 570 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that the Ninth Circuit
uses 25% as a benchmark for common-fund cases.). Overall, empirical data
shows that percentage awards in class actions generally range from 20% to
30%, with the average near 25%. 	5 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and
Rubenstein on Class Actions § 15:83 (6 th ed. 2025) (compiling empirical
studies). A review of the empirical studies shows that the average recovery
in the Fifth Circuit is near 25%. Id. In determining the benchmark, the Court
considers fee awards in similar cases, which the Court notes is the last of the
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Johnson factors. Given that the data shows that 25% is the average recovery
for class action settlements in the Fifth Circuit, the Court sets the initial
benchmark at 25%.
As to the relevant Johnson factors, the Court finds that:
(a) 	Time and Labor Required: The Court finds that the amount of time
and 	labor 	required 	in 	this 	case 	warrants 	a 	decrease 	of 	the
benchmark percentage. 	The case was settled well before trial,
before intensive discovery began, and after limited motion practice.
The Court does not question the number of hour that class counsel
spent. 	The question is whether the 398 hours were reasonable.
Even recognizing that the case required initial motion practice and
settlement negotiations, the number of attorneys and absence of
any evidence of billing judgment support a negative adjustment.
(b) 	Novelty and Difficulty of Questions: The case did not involve novel
or factually complex issues. 	Data breach cases have become
commonplace. See, e.g., In re Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation,
2024 WL 1557366 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (collecting data breach cases).
This factor is neutral in adjusting the benchmark.
(c) 	Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service: The early stage of the
litigation in this case did not require extensive legal skill from class
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counsel beyond filing the initial complaint and addressing two
motions to dismiss. 	This case never proceeded to dispositive
motions or opposed class-certification motions. 	This factor is
neutral.
(d) 	Preclusion of other employment: The Court finds that considering
the number of attorneys involved, the straightforward nature of the
claims, the absence of intense litigation, and the time the attorneys
actually expended, this factor does not merit an increase in the
benchmark percentage.
(e) 	Contingency Fee: Consideration of this factor is designed to reflect
the attorneys’ expectations when undertaking the case. Johnson,
488 F.2d at 718. Here, counsel took the case on a contingency fee
basis.31 The Court finds that consideration of this factor justifies an
increase in the fee award. 	See 5 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg
and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 15:73 (6th ed. 2025).
(f) 	Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or Circumstances: The
Court finds that there are no facts in this case to suggest this factor,
which gives a premium for priority work that delays a lawyer’s other
work, justifies an adjustment in the benchmark fee.
31 	R. Doc. 59-1, at 12.
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(g) 	Amount Involved and Results Obtained: 	The Court finds that
counsel obtained a favorable settlement for the plaintiff class, with
class members who submitted claims, even without proof of loss,
receiving cash payments of around $160. 	Counsel has achieved a
settlement in an efficient manner that minimizes the drain on the
parties’ and the Court’s resources. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the consideration of this factor warrants an increase in the fee
award.
(h) 	The “undesirability” of the case: There is no shortage of data breach
litigation, which shows that the cases are not so undesirable as to be
rarely 	taken 	up. 	See, 	e.g., 	In 	re Wawa, 	Inc. 	Data Security
Litigation, 2024 WL 1557366 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (collecting data
breach cases). 	The Court finds that consideration of this factor is
neutral in determining the fee award.
(i) 	The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client: There is no evidence of any special or lengthy professional
relationship between class counsel and the class members. The
relationship 	did 	not 	antedate 	the 	litigation, 	nor 	will 	it 	likely
continue beyond the closure of this case. The Court finds that
consideration of this factor is neutral.
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(j) 	Customary Fees for Similar Work in the Community: In setting the
benchmark, the Court has considered the data supporting the
reasonableness of the percentage. In addition, the Court considers
the empirical data that suggests a negative correlation between the
percentage recovery of attorneys’ fees and the size of the settlement.
5 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions
§ 15:83 (6th ed. 2025) (compiling empirical studies). Given that the
percentage recovery of fees tends to increase as the size of the
settlement decreases, the Court finds that this factor merits an
increase in the benchmark in this case.
(k) 	The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys: The
Court 	is 	satisfied 	with 	the 	experience 	and 	reputation 	of 	the
attorneys involved in this case. 	However, the Court finds that the
quality of counsel is already accounted for in the enhancement the
Court grants for the quality of the result and that this factor
warrants no further enhancement.
In conclusion, three of the Johnson factors merit an increase in the
benchmark, one of the Johnson factors merits a decrease, and the remaining
Johnson factors are neutral. 	The Court finds that these factors, taken
together, warrant an increase in the benchmark to 28% of the common fund.
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A much stronger showing on the Johnson factors would have been necessary
to justify the 33% fee requested in this case.
The Court next calculates a lodestar for purposes of checking the
percentage fee award. 	In calculating the lodestar, the Court multiples the
reasonable number of hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate for each
participating attorney. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
The reasonable hourly rates are “calculated according to the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.” McClain v. Lukin Indus. Inc., 649
F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011).
The Court first considers the number of hours. 	Class counsel asserts
that the two firms worked a total of 398 hours on this case, incurring fees of
$225,111.50. The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting and
supporting 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	all 	time 	expenditures 	for 	which
compensation is sought. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The remedy for failing to
exercise “billing judgment” is to exclude hours that were not reasonably
expended. 	Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Court finds that having six partners and four associates bill for this case
was unreasonable and unjustified by the evidence in the record.32 	But the
Court also considers that half of the listed partners and one of the listed
32 	R. Doc. 62.
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associates spent less than five hours on the case. Accordingly, the Court
reduces the requested number of hours by 10%.
The Court next turns to consider the reasonable hourly rate. 	Here,
Matthew Wilson seeks an hourly rate of $985, Raina Borelli seeks an hourly
rate of $700, and Layne Hilton seeks an hourly rate of $525. The Court may
reduce the hourly rate if it determines that the requested rate is not within
the prevailing market rates. 	Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. 	Counsel did not
provide affidavits establishing the reasonable hourly rates in the community.
The figures requested are far beyond what courts in the Circuit
regularly award even the most experienced litigators. 	Raina Borrelli and
Layne Hilton both have 14 years of experience and request $700 and $525
per hour, respectively. 	A significant reduction is necessary to reflect rates
awarded to other attorneys with similar experience in this District. 	See
Grant v. Gusman, 2023 WL 315937, at *13 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2023) (reducing
a proposed billing rate of $350 per hour to $275 for an attorney with 11 years
of experience); Jones v. New Orleans Reg'l Physician Hosp. Org., 2019 WL
6770029 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2019) (reducing rate of attorney with 13 years of
experience from $350.00/hour to $300.00/hour); Shaw v. Alpha Air &
Heating, L.L.C., 2024 WL 1556861, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2024) (reducing
rate of attorney with 13-14 years of experience from $500.00/hour to
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$350.00/hour). 	For the purposes of the lodestar cross-check, the Court
reduces the hourly award for Borrelli and Hilton to $350.00 an hour. 	See
Jones v. New Orleans Reg'l Physician Hosp. Org., 2019 WL 6770029 (E.D.
La. Dec. 12, 2019) (reducing rate of attorney with 13 years of experience from
$350.00/hour to $300.00/hour). 	The Court reduces the hourly award for
all other listed associates to $200.00 an hour.
As to Matthew Wilson’s proposed rate, that too exceeds the prevailing
market rates. 	See Archer W. Contractors, L.L.C. v. McDonnel Grp., L.L.C.,
2025 	WL 	2088911, 	at 	*4-5 	(E.D. 	La. 	July 	9, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted (reducing the requested hourly rate of an attorney
with 39 years of experience from $530/hour to $500/hour). 	Accordingly,
for the purposes of calculating the lodestar, the Court reduces the hourly
award for Wilson to $500/hour. The Court further reduces the hourly rate
for all other listed partners to $350/hour. 	The Court also notes that the
requested 	hourly 	rate 	for 	paralegals 	ranges 	from 	$225.00/hour 	to
$325.00/hour. The Court reduces the paralegal hourly rate to $125/hour to
be commensurate with the prevailing rate in the community. 	See Dong
Phuong Bakery, Inc., 2023 WL 3453885, at *3 (affirming award of $125 per
hour for paralegal as within prevailing market rates); Nelson v. Constant,
No. 17-14581, 2021 WL 76407, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2021) (approving hourly
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rate of $95 for investigative paralegal and collecting cases); MCP Int'l, LLC
v. Formula Four Beverages, Inc., No. 20-3440, 2021 WL 6102383, at *3
(E.D. La. Nov. 23, 2021) (citations omitted) (finding that that $125/hour is
the prevailing hourly rate for a paralegal in this district).
Accounting for the 10% reduction in hours and the reduced billing
rates to reflect the prevailing rates in the community, the lodestar calculation
comes to $124,886.30. 	The lodestar is slightly below the figure the Court
found appropriate using the benchmark analysis, resulting in a lodestar
multiplier of 1.2 for the lodestar cross-check. 	The multiplier is reasonable
when 	compared 	to 	similar 	cases, 	which 	thus 	suggests 	that 	the 	28%
benchmark is reasonable. See, e.g., Grice v. Pepsi Beverages Co., 363 F.
Supp. 	3d 	401, 	411 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2019) (finding 	that 	the 	average 	lodestar
multiplier for complex consumer cases is 1.82).
For the above reasons, the Court grants attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $147,000. 	The Court finds that 28% is an appropriate percentage given
the work involved in this case, and that it appropriately reflects adjustments
made for the Johnson factors and the lodestar cross-check.
B. Expenses
Class counsel also requests reimbursement of $10,410.64 in litigation
expenses incurred in prosecuting this case. 	There is no objection to class
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counsel’s request for reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses. 	The
Court finds that class counsel’s expenses incurred were reasonable and were
expended in furtherance of the litigation and should be reimbursed. 	See,
e.g., In re Pool Products Distribution Market Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL
235781 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2016) (approving reimbursement of expenses to
which no class members objected and that were necessary to the litigation of
the case). The costs are recoverable so long as they are documented and
would otherwise be paid by a fee-paying client. 5 Newberg on Class Actions
§ 16:10 (5th ed.); see DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 334 (W.D.
Tex. 	2007) (“The appropriate analysis 	to apply 	in determining 	which
expenses are compensable in a class action case is whether such costs are of
the variety typically billed by attorneys to clients.” (cleaned up and collecting
cases)). The costs charged here are for e-discovery, mediation fees, and filing
fees, all of which would otherwise be paid by a fee-paying client. The Court
therefore approves the request for reimbursement of costs and expenses.
C. Service Award
Finally, class counsel requests that Kevin Merrell be awarded a service
award of $5,000. While courts commonly permit service or incentive awards
to class representatives above those received by the class, the incentive
awards are not automatically granted. See In re Heartland, 851 F. Supp. 2d
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at 1089 (citing Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 870
(E.D. La. 2007)). In the Fifth Circuit, courts look to the actions the plaintiff
has taken to protect the interest of the class, the degree to which the class has
benefitted from those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
expended in pursuing the litigation to determine whether an incentive award
is warranted. 	Id.; see also Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir.
1998).
“While there does not appear to be any Fifth Circuit precedent
identifying 1% of the common fund as a ceiling for service awards, a review
of the case law on this issue reflects that where service awards are paid out
of a common fund, they tend to be far less than 1% of the common fund.” Lee
v. Metrocare Services, 2015 WL 13729679, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Indeed,
recent service awards in the Fifth Circuit have averaged around .5%. 	See
Jenkins 	v. 	Trustmark 	Nat. 	Bank, 	300 	F.R.D. 	291 	(S.D. 	Miss. 	2014)
(awarding 	seven 	$5,000 	service 	awards 	in 	a 	$4,000,000 	settlement
(.875%)); Plunkett v. FirstKey Homes, 2024 WL 5315330 (N.D. Tex. 2024)
(awarding two $15,000 service awards in $5,000,000 settlement (.6%));
Armstrong v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 2024 WL 1123034 (N.D. Tex. 2024)
(awarding twenty-two $2,500 service award in $17,500,000 settlement
(.31%)).
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The Court finds that, while Merrell materially advanced the litigation,
the requested service award of $5,000 is excessive here. $5,000 is nearly 1%
of the common benefit fund, which is almost double the percentage of recent
service awards in this district. 	Counsel has provided no records to suggest
that Merrell expended a significant amount of time pursuing the litigation.
While Merrell provided facts and documents and answered questions during
the settlement process, he was neither deposed nor underwent preparation
to testify at trial.33 	The Court finds that a service award of $2,500
appropriately recognizes Merrell’s role in advancing the litigation and is in
line with service awards for plaintiffs who performed similar roles. See
Armstrong, 2024 WL 1123034 at *7. Such an award is .48% of the common
benefit fund, a percentage the Court finds appropriate given the degree of
Merrell’s involvement in this case.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	CERTIFIES 	the 	class 	for
settlement purposes. The Court GRANTS the motion for approval of the final
settlement. The Court GRANTS attorneys’ fees in the amount of $147,000.
33 	R. Doc. 59-1, at 15-16.
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The Court GRANTS fees in the amount of $10,410.64. The Court GRANTS a
service award to Kevin Merrell in the amount of $2,500.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of November, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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