USA v. Brown, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 21-84
CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON 	SECTION: "S"
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel
(Rec. Doc. 435) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Rec. Doc. 429-1) is DENIED without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2023, defendant Christopher Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to
distribute more than 1 kilogram of heroin, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams
of heroin, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), and
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. Johnson was sentenced to 84 months in prison, and is
now serving his sentence at Yazoo City Low FCI, with an anticipated release date of June 28,
2028.
Johnson has filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
352(c)(1)(A), arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons are present that justify his early
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release. The government opposes the motion, contending that Johnson has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and that he has not demonstrated reasons so extraordinary and
compelling that he is deserving of a reduced sentence. In connection with his reply
memorandum, Johnson has also filed a motion seeking appointment of counsel to assist him in
his request for compassionate release.
I. Appointment of Counsel
There is no general constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, except in cases where the court holds an evidentiary hearing. See Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, while a “person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate judge or the court
through appeal, including ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings,” 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(c), a post-conviction reduction motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 is generally not
considered to be “ancillary” as contemplated by that rule. See United States v. Garcia, 689 F.3d
362, 364 (5th Cir. 2012)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c)) (other citations omitted); see also,
United States v. Moore, 400 F. App'x 851, 852 (5th Cir. 2010)(“There is no right to appointed
counsel in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.”). Because defendant's motion is brought pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582, he is not entitled to appointment of counsel 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c).
Moreover, while 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(b) grants federal district courts discretionary
power to appoint counsel to indigent individuals seeking relief when “the interests of justice so
require,” that provision is applicable only when a defendant has raised factually and/or legally
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complex issues that cannot be adequately presented to the court without the assistance of
counsel. United States v. Diaz, No. 22-40044, 2023 WL 1879404, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023).
That is not the case here, and accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to appointment of counsel in
this case.
II. Motion for Compassionate Release
Applicable Law
Defendant's motion for compassionate release is premised on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Under that provision, the court,
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion
on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request
by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the
term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that–(i) extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.... and that such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission[.]
Thus, to prevail on a motion for compassionate release, a defendant must: (1) exhaust his
remedies within the BOP; (2) demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling reasons support
compassionate release; (3) demonstrate that compassionate release is consistent with applicable
policy statements; and (4) demonstrate that it is consistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. §
3553. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
The requirement that a defendant file a request with the BOP before filing a motion in
federal court is a mandatory, but non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. United States v.
Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020). Thus, exhaustion is mandatory if properly raised, but
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may be waived or forfeited by an opposing party. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct.
710, 714 (2019).
Discussion
In this case, the government has not waived the exhaustion requirement, but rather
invoked it. The government's exhaustion argument is twofold: first, that Johnson has not
demonstrated that the BOP ever received his request for compassionate release, and second, that
the email he did send seeks relief on a basis different than that provided in his motion, so even if
the claims in the email where exhausted, those presented here are not.
In support of his motion, Johnson has provided a copy of an email purportedly sent to the
warden of his facility seeking compassionate release. Johnson argues that the date stamp on the
provided email is conclusive of its receipt. The email reflects that it was sent on February 27,
2026 and is addressed to "Warden LOW", a subheading addresses "Warden Turner", and the
salutation reads "Dear AW Woods." It does not indicate the BOP email address to which it was
sent or even which facility to which it was sent. In addition, the United States has represented to
the court that it reached out to the BOP and was informed that they had no record of receiving a
compassionate release request from Johnson. On these facts, the court cannot conclude that the
email was ever received by the BOP, and thus the 30-day waiting period has not commenced.
Further, a defendant's motion for compassionate release must be based on the same
grounds as those contained in his request for release to the warden of the facility where he is
housed. United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 2026 WL 2280646, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2026) (citing United States v. Dodd, 2020 WL 7396527, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2020); accord
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United States v. Gonzalez, 849 F. App'x 116, 117 (5th Cir. 2021) (other citations omitted). In
this case, different grounds are set forth in the email purportedly sent to the warden and the
motion filed in this court. In the email, Johnson bases his request on his "positive institutional
record, significant program completion, lack of disciplinary history, low custody status, and the
substantial portion of [his] sentence already served." Rec. Doc. 429-6. The instant motion seeks
relief due to "personal circumstances—hazardous conditions he cannot mitigate, profound
rehabilitation, and family needs." Rec. Doc. 429, 11. Thus, even if the warden had received the
email, defendant has not exhausted the claims presented here. "It is well-settled that the
exhaustion requirement is not satisfied when the defendant previously sought administrative
relief on a different ground than the ground presented to the district court." United States v.
DeJean, No. 2:18-CR-120, 2025 WL 3687269, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing United
States v. Rivas, 833 F. App'x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020) (other citations omitted).
As well, the court notes that the email supplied does not comply with the requirements
for submitting a compassionate release request under 28 C.F.R. § 571.61 because, while it
asserts that defendant has "family and community support awaiting upon release", it does not
actually describe defendant's proposed release plans. See § 571.61(a)(2).
The requirement that a defendant exhaust administrative remedies is not an arbitrary
hurdle but rather ensures that "prison administrators can prioritize the most urgent claims" and
"investigate the gravity of the conditions supporting compassionate release and the likelihood
that the conditions will persist." United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2020). To
overlook the exhaustion requirement would undermine the "orderly system for reviewing
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compassionate-release applications" and "incentivize[ ] line jumping" by allowing a defendant to
present grounds for compassionate release to the court that the BOP has not had the opportunity
to consider. Id. at 834.
As the foregoing establishes, Johnson has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
and "[b]ecause the Government properly raised the rule requiring exhaustion in the district court,
'the court must enforce the rule.' " United States v. Harper, No. 24-30275, 2024 WL 4664018, at
*1 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2024) (quoting Franco, 973 F.3d at 468) (other internal citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel
(Rec. Doc. 435) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Rec. Doc. 429-1) is DENIED without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of October, 2026.
____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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