Tommy Ngo

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE:
TOMMY NGO,
DEBTOR.
§ CASE NO: 22-11179
§
§ CHAPTER 7
§
§ SECTION A
§
ROSE NGUYEN AND MAN NGO,
PLAINTIFFS,
V.
CARROLLTON & OAK, LLC and
NIDAL JABER,
DEFENDANTS.
§
§
§
§
§
§ ADV. NO. 24-1029
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 24, 2024, Rose Nguyen and Man Ngo (the “Plaintiffs”), filed a Petition for
Payment in Full of Past Due Promissory Note in Louisiana state court in the Civil District Court
for the Parish of Orleans, No. 2024-03174 (the “State Court Action”) against Carrollton & Oak,
LLC (“C&O”) and its principal, Nidal Jaber (“Jaber” and, together with C&O, the “Defendants”).1
Through the State Court Action, Plaintiffs assert a claim for amounts allegedly past due and owing
under a promissory note executed in April 2014 and made payable to Tommy Ngo, Rose Nguyen
(Tommy’s wife) and Man Ngo (Tommy’s son) (the “Promissory Note”). The Promissory Note
1 The Petition in the State Court Action lists Tommy Ngo, a debtor in this Court at the time the
Plaintiffs filed the Petition, as a “non-appearing” “plaintiff-to-be” and represents that “Mr. Tommy Ngo is
currently subject to an automatic stay under Title 11: 362 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana and thus is temporarily barred from joining the instant Petition.” [ECF Doc. 2].
The Petition also names a third defendant, Gerard McGovern, but Plaintiffs did not request service on Mr.
McGovern, and the Petition prays for judgment against only Defendants C&O and Jaber. See id.
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was executed contemporaneously with a lease-with-purchase-option (the “Lease”) executed by
Tommy Ngo. Under that contract, C&O leased a mixed-use property then-owned by Tommy Ngo
and located at 1200 South Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana (the “Carrollton Avenue
Property”).
On October 4, 2022, about 18 months before Rose Nguyen and Man Ngo filed the State
Court Action, Tommy Ngo (“Ngo” or, post-petition, the “Debtor”) commenced the above-
referenced bankruptcy case by filing a petition for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
[No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 1]. The Court converted the Debtor’s case to one under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code on February 7, 2023. [No. 22-11179, ECF. Doc. 34]. Barbara Rivera-Fulton
was appointed as the chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”) on March 1, 2023. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc.
55].
The Defendants timely removed the post-petition State Court Action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452 and Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9027 as related to the Debtor’s bankruptcy case; the District Court
referred the case to this Court. [ECF Docs. 1 & 2]. Currently before the Court is Defendants’
motion for summary judgment in which Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary
judgment against Plaintiffs because (1) Plaintiffs cannot state a claim as a matter of law against
Jaber in his personal capacity; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims are barred under principles of res judicata;
and, (3) Plaintiffs’ filing of the State Court Action constitutes an attempt to exercise control over,
or gain possession of, property of the Debtor’s estate—namely, the cause of action arising under
the April 2014 Promissory Note—in violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) (the “Motion
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for Summary Judgment”). [ECF Doc. 28].2 Defendants alternatively contend that if the Court
does not grant summary judgment, it should dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for lack of standing due to Plaintiffs’ failure to join the Trustee as a
required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See id. On June 20, 2025, the Plaintiffs
filed an opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment as well as a statement of contested facts,
[ECF Docs. 31 & 32], and, on June 27, 2025, Defendants filed a reply in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment, [ECF Doc. 33].3
Having considered the pleadings and the undisputed material facts supported by the
summary judgment record and the records in the Debtor’s main case and related adversary
proceedings, for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendant Jaber, in both his
individual capacity and as the corporate representative of C&O, and Defendant C&O are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief provided for herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334. The matter presently before the Court constitutes a core proceeding that this Court may
hear and determine on a final basis under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue is proper pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
2 Defendants filed as attachments to their Motion for Summary Judgment a memorandum in support,
[ECF Doc. 28-1], a statement of uncontested facts, [ECF Doc. 28-2], and the Declaration of Nidal Jaber,
[ECF Doc. 28-3 & 29].
3 The arguments asserted in the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment were first offered to
this Court in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After reviewing the
Petition, the motion to dismiss, and the opposition thereto, the Court concluded that it could not resolve the
motion without considering matters outside the scope of the pleadings, such as the Lease, and thus converted
the Rule 12 motion to one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. [ECF Doc. 25].
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following material facts are either uncontested, not the subject of a genuine dispute, or
are subject to judicial notice by this Court:4
C&O was organized as a Louisiana limited liability company on April 24, 2014. [ECF
Doc. 28-2, ¶ 6; ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 6; ECF Doc. 29, ¶ 4 & Ex. A]. Jaber is the managing member of
C&O. [ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 5; ECF Doc. 29, ¶ 2; ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 5]. Jaber became the sole member
of C&O in 2022; before then, Gerard McGovern (“McGovern”) and Jaber were the members of
C&O. [ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 7].
Effective April 24, 2014, C&O and the Debtor entered into the Lease of the Carrollton
Avenue Property. [ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 8; ECF Doc. 29, Ex. B; ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 8]. The Lease was
executed on behalf of C&O by its authorized representatives, Jaber and McGovern. [ECF Doc. 28-
2, ¶ 10; ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 10]. C&O, by and through Jaber and McGovern, also executed the
Promissory Note dated April 24, 2014, in the principal amount of $703,727.49, which was
paraphed with the Lease for identification. [ECF Doc. 2 (Complaint, Ex. B); ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 11;
ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 10]. The Promissory Note identifies the Debtor and the Plaintiffs as joint payees.
[ECF Doc. 2 (Complaint, Ex. B); ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 11; ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 10]. The Promissory Note
is signed by Jaber and McGovern beneath “Carrollton & Oak, LLC”:
4 A court may take judicial notice of its own records. See ITT Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 651 F.
2d 343, 345 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
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[ECF Doc. 2 (Complaint, Ex. B)]. Jaber’s signature appears only once on the Promissory Note.
See id.; [ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 12 (citing Complaint, Ex. B); ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 12].
In April 2019, C&O sued Ngo in Orleans Parish court, asserting claims arising under the
Lease; Ngo asserted a reconventional demand against C&O, asserting his own claim for payment
under the Promissory Note (the “Note Claim”). Although the Promissory Note identifies Ngo,
Rose Nguyen (his wife), and Man Ngo (his son) as joint payees, neither Rose nor Man were joined
as co-plaintiffs in reconvention with respect to the Note Claim asserted by Ngo. After a six-day
trial, the Orleans Parish court entered the State Court Judgment in favor of C&O and against Ngo,
rejecting Ngo’s reconventional demand based on the Note Claim—in other words, the Orleans
Parish state court concluded that C&O was not liable to Ngo under the Promissory Note. [No. 22-
11179, ECF Docs. 98 & 169].
Notwithstanding the entry of the State Court Judgment, Ngo, then represented by new
counsel, Justin Zitler, asserted the same Note Claim in connection with foreclosure proceedings
initiated by C&O in Jefferson Parish in September 2022. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, 3–4].
There, Zitler asserted that Ngo was entitled to a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure
because the State Court Judgment was not a final judgment. See id. Again, neither Rose Nguyen
nor Man Ngo, as joint payees under the Promissory Note, were included as parties in Ngo’s pursuit
of the preliminary injunction in C&O’s foreclosure proceedings. See id. After the Jefferson Parish
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court found that the State Court Judgment entered by the Orleans Parish court was a final judgment,
C&O returned to the Orleans Parish court and obtained a ruling from that court clarifying the State
Court Judgment and confirming the conclusion of the Jefferson Parish court that the State Court
Judgment was indeed a final judgment. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 4–5].
After Ngo commenced his chapter 13 bankruptcy case on October 4, 2022 (which later
converted to chapter 7), C&O filed a proof of claim against Ngo’s estate, attaching as an exhibit
its recorded State Court Judgment, and asserted a claim in the principal amount of $6,455,889.19
secured by “[a]ll immovable property and improvements thereon owned or in the name of the
Debtor in Orleans and Jefferson Parish.” [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 5 (quoting Proof of
Claim No. 2)]. Zitler objected to C&O’s proof of claim on behalf of the Debtor, pressing the Note
Claim again and asserting that Ngo was entitled to offset the amounts claimed by C&O against the
Ngo estate by amounts allegedly owed to Ngo under the Promissory Note. [No. 22-11179, ECF
Doc. 325, at 7–8]. The Court ultimately overruled Ngo’s objection to C&O’s proof of claim and
allowed C&O a secured claim in the full amount listed on its proof of claim (the “Claim Allowance
Order”). [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 98; see also ECF Doc. 325]. The Debtor appealed that ruling,
and the District Court affirmed this Court. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 135]. The Debtor did not
timely appeal the District Court’s decision, and the Claim Allowance Order became a final order.
Zitler continued to press the Note Claim and collaterally challenge the State Court
Judgment, this Court’s Claim Allowance Order, and other final Orders of this Court repeatedly in
the Debtor’s main bankruptcy case and related adversary proceedings for over a year. [No. 22-
11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 9–26].5 Ultimately, the Court granted C&O’s requests for sanctions
against Zitler for abuse of the judicial process:
5 One of those final Orders was the approval of the Trustee’s motion to sell fifteen developed
and undeveloped estate properties, including the Debtor’s residence at 801 Marlene Drive and the
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This Court is averse to assess sanctions against attorneys or their clients, but
in this case, the Court is left without choice. Dissatisfied with court rulings on the
disputes between his client, Ngo, and C&O, Zitler has abused the judicial process
by continuing to advance theories and press claims that are barred by res judicata.
As an officer of the court and a member of the Louisiana bar, Zitler is held to a
higher standard than his client, an individual chapter 7 debtor, to know the effects
of a final Order. Thus, the Court places responsibility for the vexatious litigation
tactics and unprofessional behavior toward opposing counsel that the Court has
observed in this matter squarely upon Zitler.
[No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 37–38]. Relevant here, on May 19, 2023, C&O initiated an
adversary proceeding against Ngo, asserting that the debt owed by Ngo to C&O should be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at
9]. After the pleadings were joined and the Court issued a Scheduling Order, Zitler sought leave
of this Court to amend the Debtor’s Answer to assert counterclaims and third-party claims against
C&O and Jaber. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 9–10]. Although painted by Zitler as “post-
Carrollton Avenue Property, to C&O (the “Sale Order”). [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 223; see also ECF
Doc. 325, at 19–20]. The transaction contemplated C&O’s credit-bid and contribution of cash sufficient to
pay all superior encumbrances existing on the properties, all outstanding real estate taxes, and the Debtor’s
homestead exemption. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 20].
In his sworn Schedules, the Debtor claimed the full state homestead exemption but simultaneously
identified Nguyen as a “spouse, former spouse, or legal equivalent” who lived with him at 801 Marlene
Drive in Louisiana, a community property state, within the eight years prior to filing for bankruptcy
protection. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 23–24]. But shortly after entry of the Sale Order, Zitler began
to assert on behalf of the Debtor and his wife, Rose Nguyen, that the 801 Marlene Drive property was not
community property but was instead property co-owned by the two of them because it was acquired at a
time when Rose Nguyen was married to Ngo Vinh Loi and living under a Vietnamese community property
regime. [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 24]. So, in connection with the Sale Order, the Trustee initiated
an adversary proceeding against Rose Nguyen and her alleged ex-husband, Ngo Vinh Loi, pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code § 363(h) and Bankruptcy Rule 7001(3) to obtain approval to sell both the interest of the
estate and that of an alleged co-owner in the property located at 801 Marlene Drive. See id. In the course
of resolving disputes early in that adversary proceeding, this Court found that
an actual conflict exists between Tommy Ngo, the debtor in the above-captioned main
bankruptcy case, and Rose Nguyen regarding the character of the property at issue under
Louisiana state law and its disposition. Pursuant to Rule 1.7 of the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct, Justin A. Zitler is PROHIBITED from further representation of
Rose Nguyen in this adversary proceeding due to the actual conflict of interest.
[No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 25 (quoting Adv. No. 24-1004, ECF Doc. 15)]. Rose Nguyen obtained
conflicts counsel and quickly reached a settlement with the Trustee that allowed the property to be sold
under § 363(h). [No. 22-11179, ECF Doc. 325, at 25].
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petition” claims, those claims included the Note Claim as well as prepetition alter-ego claims
against Jaber and property-damage claims against C&O. Id. Because the Debtor’s claims under
the Lease and Promissory Note were subject to the doctrine of res judicata, on November 16, 2023,
the Court denied Ngo’s motion for leave to file counterclaims and third-party claims. [No. 22-
11179, ECF Docs. 325, at 10 (citing No. 22-11179, ECF Docs. 169 & 170)].
On April 24, 2024, Zitler filed the State Court Action on behalf of Rose Nguyen and Man
Ngo in Orleans Parish court, asserting the Note Claim against Jaber and C&O.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A court grants summary judgment when the pleadings, discovery responses, and affidavits
show no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the evidence entitles the movant to judgment
at trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) & (c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7056; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005). A court views the facts and evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Campo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 F.3d 751, 754
(5th Cir. 2009).
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of informing the court
of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the record which it asserts demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. To satisfy that
burden, the moving party must either “submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or “demonstrate to the Court that the nonmoving party’s
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Id. at
331–32. Although the Court must consider the evidence with all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party, the nonmovant must produce specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine
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issue exists for trial. See Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Tex., 139 F.3d 532, 536
(5th Cir. 1998). “[I]f the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the
movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the moving party
is entitled to summary judgment.” Addison v. La. Reg’l Landfill Co., No. 19-11133, 2024 WL
3274645, at *3 (E.D. La. July 1, 2024) (citations omitted).
B. Defendant Jaber, Sued by Plaintiffs in His Personal Capacity, Is Entitled to
Summary Judgment in His Favor.
Defendant Jaber is entitled to summary judgment in his favor because he is not personally
liable under the Promissory Note. In Louisiana, section 10:3-402 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
governs whether a signatory to an instrument is liable under that instrument in his representative
capacity or in his personal capacity:
(b) If a representative signs the name of the representative to an instrument and the
signature is an authorized signature of the represented person, the following rules
apply:
(1) If the form of the signature shows unambiguously that the signature is made on
behalf of the represented person who is identified in the instrument, the
representative is not liable on the instrument.
(2) [Subject to an exception not applicable here], if (i) the form of the signature
does not show unambiguously that the signature is made in a representative
capacity or (ii) the represented person is not identified in the instrument, the
representative is liable on the instrument to a holder in due course that took the
instrument without notice that the representative was not intended to be liable
on the instrument.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:3-402(b). “[S]ignatures to an instrument are not mere ornaments.”
Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1983) (citation omitted). Louisiana courts have
held that an authorized representative’s signature following the word “by” beneath a typed
represented party’s name expressly shows that the signatory signed in his representative capacity
and is not personally liable under the instrument. See, e.g., Parlay Enters., Inc. v. R-B-CO, Inc. of
Bossier, 504 So. 2d 660, 661–62 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987). If a court determines that the form of
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signature on an instrument shows unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of a
represented person, then the court’s inquiry ends there. See Pelican Plumbing Supply, Inc. v.
J.O.H. Constr. Co., 653 So. 2d 699, 702 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1995).
Uncontested is the fact that Jaber’s signature appears only once on the Promissory Note;
Jaber signed the Promissory Note after the word “By:” under the name of C&O, the represented
person. [ECF Doc. 28-2, ¶ 12 (citing Complaint, Exhibit B); ECF Doc. 32, ¶ 12]. Pursuant to
section 10:3-402 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the Court finds that the form of signature on
the Promissory Note shows unambiguously that Jaber signed on behalf of C&O and thus is not
personally liable on the Promissory Note as a matter of law.
C. Plaintiffs Rose Nguyen and Man Ngo Are Barred by Res Judicata from
Asserting the Note Claim Against Defendants.
The resolution of the Motion for Summary Judgment requires this Court to consider the res
judicata effect of the State Court Judgment, this Court’s Claim Allowance Order, and other of its
final Orders addressing the Note Claim on the Plaintiffs, Rose Nguyen and Man Ngo. [No. 22-
11179, ECF Docs. 98, 169 & 223]. When a federal court considers the res judicata effect of a state
court judgment, it applies the preclusion laws of the state that rendered the judgment. See In re
Coupel, No. 25-30048, 2025 WL 3092766, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (citations omitted);
Dotson v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 24 F. 4th 999, 1002 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Federal
common law principles govern the res judicata effect of federal court judgments. See Ries v. Paige
(In re Paige), 610 F.3d 865, 870 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010). No significant differences exist between
Louisiana’s preclusion law and federal common law.6 Indeed, “[t]he purpose of both federal and
6 As explained by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit:
In Louisiana, res judicata is implemented through a framework of code articles and
statutes; effective January 1, 1991, that framework was amended by the Legislature to be
more akin to federal and common law. Since 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
considered the chief inquiry to be whether the second action asserts a cause of action which
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state law on res judicata is essentially the same[:] to promote judicial efficiency and final
resolution of disputes by preventing needless relitigation.” Armbruster v. Anderson, 250 So. 3d
310, 316 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
“The rule of res judicata encompasses two separate but linked preclusive doctrines: (1)
true res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.” Test Masters
Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F. 3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Under res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Ries v. Paige (In re Paige),
610 F.3d 865, 870 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit’s test for
res judicata has four prongs: “(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the
prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded
by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both
actions.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 428 F. 3d at 571 (citations omitted). No party here
contests the second, third, and fourth elements.
What does it mean for parties to be “in privity” for purposes of the first element of res
judicata?
A non-party is in privity with a party for res judicata purposes in three instances.
First, if he has succeeded to the party’s interest in property, he is bound by prior
judgments against the party. Second, if he controlled the prior litigation, he is
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action.
This change in the law serves the purposes of judicial economy and fairness by requiring
the plaintiff to seek all relief and to assert all rights which arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence.
Armbruster v. Anderson, 250 So. 3d 310, 316 n.13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “As the Louisiana res judicata statute is modeled on federal preclusion doctrine and the
Restatement on Judgments, federal jurisprudence may be consulted when the relevant Louisiana cases leave
doubt a[s] to the meaning of the statute.” Donley v. Hudsons Salvage, L.L.C., 517 F. App’x 220 (5th Cir.
2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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bound by its result. Third, he is bound if the party adequately represented his
interests in the prior proceeding.
Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 896 F. 2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). As to
that last instance, “a non-party will be considered in privity or sufficiently close to a party in the
prior suit so as to justify preclusion, where the party to the first suit is so closely aligned with the
nonparty’s interest as to be his virtual representative.” Donley v Hudsons Salvage, L.L.C., 517 F.
App’x 220, 221 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Forum for
Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 738, 745 (La. 2005) (holding that the interests of non-
parties to litigation were nevertheless bound by the results of the litigation because their interests
were closely aligned with those of the litigation parties and thus adequately represented in the
litigation).
Here, it is an undisputed fact that the Promissory Note identifies the Debtor and the
Plaintiffs as joint payees. The Court finds that the interests of Plaintiffs Rose Nguyen and Man
Ngo are closely, if not entirely, aligned with those of the Debtor, Tommy Ngo; thus, although
Plaintiffs were not parties to the underlying litigation between Tommy Ngo and C&O that resulted
in the State Court Judgment, this Court’s Claim Allowance Order, and other final Orders of this
Court addressing the Note Claim, Plaintiffs’ interests were adequately represented in that
litigation. The Court finds that Plaintiffs Rose Nguyen and Man Ngo are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata from asserting the Note Claim against the Defendants in the State Court Action.7
7 Having found the Plaintiffs are barred under principles of res judicata from bringing the Note Claim
against Defendants, the Court need not address Defendants’ other summary judgment arguments or their
alternative theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and
that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted by Rose Nguyen and
Man Ngo in the State Court Action.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
A separate judgment on the Petition in the above-captioned adversary proceeding
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously and in
accordance with Bankruptcy Rules 7058, 5003, and 9021.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 9, 2026.
__________________________________________
MEREDITH S. GRABILL
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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