Thiessen v. Plains, Kansas, City of

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PETER THIESSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PLAINS, KANSAS,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-1078-DDC-BGS
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Peter Thiessen filed this action pro se1 alleging violations of his constitutional due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. In
conjunction with his federal court Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff filed an application to proceed
without prepayment of fees, which the Court concurrently grants under separate Order. After
review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, the Court recommends to the District Court that
Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Also pending before the District Judge is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(also referred to herein as a “TRO motion”). (Doc. 5.) The undersigned Magistrate Judge also
addresses that motion herein and recommends to the District Judge that this motion be denied.
SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
I. 	Standard of Review for IFP Complaints.
When a Plaintiff proceeds IFP, the court may screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The court “shall dismiss” an in forma pauperis case “at any time if the court determines
1 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally and holds him to a less stringent standard than
trained lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Court does not, however, assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Id., at 1110.
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that … the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court has a duty to
review the complaint to ensure a proper balance between these competing interests.” Mitchell v.
Deseret Health Care Facility, No. 13-1360-RDR-KGG, 2013 WL 5797609, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,
2013). The purpose of § 1915(e) is “the prevention of abusive or capricious litigation.” Harris v.
Campbell, 804 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Kan. 1992) (internal citation omitted) (discussing similar
language contained in § 1915(d), prior to the 1996 amendment). Sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(d)
may be appropriate when “on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that the action is frivolous
or malicious.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Henriksen v. Bentley, 644
F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir.1981)).
In addition, the court also has an obligation to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear and resolve the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The court may raise the issue
sua sponte. See 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006).
A pro se Plaintiff’s complaint must still “set forth the grounds of plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief through more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110
(holding that a plaintiff need not precisely state each element, but must plead minimal factual
allegations on those material elements that must be proven)). “In other words, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible – rather than merely conceivable – on its face.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). See also Bemis, 500 F.3d at 1218 (stating that
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factual allegations in the complaint must establish “above the speculative level” that plaintiff is
entitled to relief).
The Court’s relaxed scrutiny of the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings “does not relieve [him] of the
burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. It is insufficient for a pro se plaintiff to plead conclusory statements to state a claim because
no special legal training is required to “recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury[.]” Id. See
also Olson v. Carmack, 641 Fed. App’x. 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2016). If this Court finds, after construing
the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the Court is compelled to recommend that the action be dismissed.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims and Factual Allegations.
The following facts come from Plaintiff’s Complaint and the attached exhibit. (See generally
Docs. 1, 1-1.) For § 1915 screening purposes, the Court accepts the Plaintiff’s allegations as true
and construes all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007).
On April 1, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Peter Thiessen initiated this action by filing a civil
Complaint, which he drafted himself rather than using the Court’s standard form. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Plains, Kansas terminated his access to water at his residence
on March 28, 2026, “with a lock put in place preventing restoration of water access.” (Doc. 1-1.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant City for violations of his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and asserts that his claims are actionable pursuant to
42 U.S. Code § 1983. (Doc. 1, at 3.) In short, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s “deprivation of
natural and essential resources, specifically the termination of [Plaintiff’s] access to water, constitutes
a violation of the natural and unalienable rights of all men to life, sustenance, and the preservation of
health.” (Doc. 1, at 1.) The Complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as
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compensatory damages. (Id., at 4.) For the reasons stated below, however, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.
III. 	Analysis.
Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to invoke federal court jurisdiction by reference to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 and his constitutional due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Due
process violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require Defendant to be a
governmental actor. Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that due process
claims under the Fifth Amendment do not apply to private actors); Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp.
Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 927-28 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating same as to Fourteenth Amendment). Although
Plaintiff has sued a municipality, he has misconstrued the scope of the Fifth Amendment.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to action by the federal
government while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by state
governments.” Koessel v. Sublette Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 717 F.3d 736, n.2 (10th Cir. 2013). The pro se
Plaintiff herein alleges only conduct by state (or, more accurately, municipal) authorities. (See
generally Docs. 1, 1-1.) As such, with no named federal government Defendant(s), there is no viable
claim for violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. Koessel, 717 F.3d 736, at n.2.
The Court thus recommends dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim.
This leaves Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim brought against the Defendant
municipality pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from
‘depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Teigen v. Renfrow,
511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme Court has held that “municipal
ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action and are within the prohibition of the
amendment.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). “[T]o
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prevail on either a procedural or substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must first establish that a
defendant’s actions deprived plaintiff of a protectible property interest.” 2 Teigen, 511 F.3d at 1078.
An individual has a property interest in a benefit for purposes of due
process protection only if he has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to
the benefit, as opposed to a mere ‘abstract need or desire’ or ‘unilateral
expectation.’ Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92
S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Such an interest arises not from
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution itself, but is ‘created by
independent sources such as a state or federal statute, a municipal
charter or ordinance, or an implied or express contract.’ 	Carnes v.
Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff must
demonstrate 	an 	‘entitlement 	to 	a 	substantive 	right 	or 	benefit’
supported by ‘rules or mutually explicit understandings ... that he may
invoke at a hearing.’ 	Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d
1074, 1085 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). While the underlying
interest is generally created by state law, ‘federal constitutional law
determines whether that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim
of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.’ 	Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658
(2005) (quotation omitted).
Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:
1. [Plaintiff’s a]ccess to water was terminated on the 28th day of March,
2026 by [Defendant] and/or its agents at the property referred to as
711 West Shocker, Plains, Kansas with a lock put in place to prevent
restoration.
2. [Plaintiff’] was not given prior notice of termination or an
opportunity to contest the basis for termination.
2 There are two types of constitutional protections provided by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
procedural due process and substantive due process. Gorenc v. Klaasen, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1158 (D. Kan. 2019) (citing
Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998)). Substantive due process “guarantees that the state will
not deprive a person” of certain rights “no matter how fair” the decision-making procedures are. Id. Procedural due
process “ensures that a state will not deprive a person of life, liberty or property unless fair procedures are used in
making that decision.” Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify whether he is bringing a procedural or a substantive
due process claim (or both). The Court surmises that the challenge is procedural because Plaintiff discusses Defendant
Municipality’s failure to provide notice and opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994,
32 L.Ed.2d 913 (1972) (citations omitted) (holding that “the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified.’”). The Court need not resolve this question here, however, given the other deficiencies pertaining to
his failure to establish an entitlement to a legally protected property interest and failure to meet the Monell requirement
that a plaintiff must point to an existing municipal policy or custom that resulted in the harm.
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3. On the 31st day of March, [Plaintiff] hand-delivered a notice of the
denial of due process and demand for immediate restoration of water
access to [Defendant’s] agents at City Hall.
4. Neither [Defendant] nor its agents took any action to remedy the
denial of due process or to restore water access.
5. [Plaintiff] is caused ongoing harm to [his] health, finances, and safety.
(Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint only alleges that his water was terminated with no prior notice. These
bare allegations are insufficient to establish a protected property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Plaintiff has failed to identify any statute, ordinance, contract, or other independent
legal source establishing his entitlement to continued water service. He has not adequately pleaded
the threshold element of a due process claim which warrants dismissal of the same.
Even if Plaintiff had established a protectible property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment, his claim should still be dismissed because he has failed to identify the existence of a
municipal policy or custom as required to impose liability on a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that a municipality
is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, but only where the alleged constitutional deprivation was
caused by an official policy or custom). To assert a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a
Plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom and (2) a direct causal link
between the policy or custom and the injury alleged. Poore v. Glanz, 724 Fed.Appx.635, 644 (10th
Cir. 2018); Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 993–94 (10th Cir.1996) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
Further, only alleged constitutional violations that are a result of “official municipal policy”
which are “made by its lawmakers or by those who edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy” are sufficient to attribute liability to a municipality. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction
Police Dept., 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013). “A municipal policy may be established by a single
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edict or act by a municipal official with final policy making authority.” Smith v. Barber, 195 F.
Supp.2d 1264, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002).
While Plaintiff has alleged Defendant is responsible for his water being cut off, he has failed
to include any factual allegations supporting the existence of a municipal custom or policy and that
there is a “direct causal link” between any such custom or policy and the alleged constitutional
violation. Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 993-94 (citation omitted). Further, although a single act by a municipal
official with final policymaking authority may constitute official policy, Plaintiff has not alleged that
the termination decision was made by any such official. His reference to unspecified “agents” is
insufficient to meet this standard. Simply stated, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual
allegations to establish that the Defendant’s actions deprived him of a protected property interest or
that Defendant enacted or employed an official policy or custom which caused his injury. As such,
the Court recommends to the District Court that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim brought
pursuant to § 1983 against the Defendant Municipality be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B)(ii) because he has failed to state a viable federal cause of action.
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
As mentioned above, also pending before the District Judge is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 5.) Temporary Restraining Orders are governed by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65, which provides in relevant part that a court
may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice
to the adverse party or its attorney only if: 	(A) specific facts in an
affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s
attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).3 Such an order will not exceed 14 days. Id., at (b)(2).
3 Plaintiff has alleged that he “has made reasonable efforts to notify [Defendant] of the emergency and
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As the party seeking a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff must establish: (1) irreparable
harm to him if the injunction is not granted; (2) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the
merits; (3) the threatened injury to him outweighs possible harm to the opposing party if the
injunction is granted; and (4) that the injunction would not be contrary to the public interest.
ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999). A party seeking a temporary restraining
order must make a showing on all four conditions and if one is dispositive, the others need not be
considered. Steede v. Levy, No. 25-2136-DDC-TJJ, 2025 WL 1029422, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 2025).
A temporary restraining order “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Riggs v. City of
Wichita, Kan., No. 09-1105-EFM, 2011 WL 2970828, at *2 (D. Kan. July 21, 2011) (citing Lippoldt v.
City of Wichita, Kan., No. 01-1226-JTM, 2001 WL 849526, at *3 (D . Kan. July 16, 2001) (quoting
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). Whether to impose a temporary restraining order is
within the discretion of the court. Steede, 2025 WL 1029422, at *3.
The Court may deny a request for a TRO based on procedural, rather than substantive,
reasons such as the movant failing to file a verified complaint or supporting affidavit. Mavrovich v.
Vanderpool, 427 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1087 (D. Kan. 2006). A TRO motion may also be denied if it “fails
to state specific facts showing imminent and irreparable harm.” Id.; see also Riggs, 2011 WL 2970828,
at *2 (denying a motion for a temporary restraining order wherein the plaintiff did not include a
verified complaint or affidavit and failed to show imminent harm).
the intention to seek emergency relief in federal court should [Defendant] fail to act timely to remedy the situation.
(Doc. 5 (citing Doc. 5-1).) Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order a March 29, 2026, correspondence to the Defendant notifying it that if water was not immediately restored, he
will seek relief in federal court. The lawsuit was filed three days later on April 1, 2026. It is unclear whether the letter
was mailed or hand-delivered and is also unclear if the Defendant was specifically notified of the intent to file a motion
for a temporary restraining order. Further, the Defendant has not been served, has not appeared, and has not been
served with the present motion. This potential procedural deficiency could also warrant denial of the motion; however,
the Court declines to further analyze this issue given that Plaintiff’s motion fails on the merits of the four-factor
showing.
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A verified complaint is one that has been signed under the penalty of perjury. El Bey v. Roop,
530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). Such a pleading carries the same evidentiary weight as an affidavit.
Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the allegations contained in a
verified complaint “have the same force and effect as an affidavit for purposes of responding to a
motion for summary judgment”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy
Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154, 1163 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that a verified complaint may be considered an
affidavit carrying “testimonial evidence” in context of a summary judgment motion). Plaintiff’s
Complaint is verified as it includes a signed and sworn certification of its truth and accuracy under
penalty of perjury. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff’s motion also includes a signed and sworn certification
(Doc. 5, at 4.)
In his motion, Plaintiff moves for a temporary restraining order directing Defendant to
immediately restore water service to his residence and maintain that service pending further order of
the Court. He contends that the shutoff deprives him of essential water service and constitutes
irreparable harm “to [his] health, safety, and ability to sustain life” that can only be resolved by Court
intervention. He further contends that he provided notice to Defendant of the alleged violation,
that Defendant failed to act, that he informed Defendant he would seek relief in federal court, and
that he remains without water service. He asserts that these facts establish that “no alternative
remedy exists and that [Plaintiff] faces harm that is imminent, continuous, and irreparable.” (Doc. 5,
at 2).
Courts in the Tenth Circuit apply heightened requirements to certain types of injunctions
and restraining orders. Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, Colo., 916 F.3d 792, 797 (10th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).4 Disfavored injunctions and restraining orders “may exhibit any of
4 Although the Free the Nipple-Fort Collins ruling involves a request for a preliminary injunction rather than a TRO, courts
in the Tenth Circuit have uniformly held that the legal analysis for preliminary injunctions and TROs is identical.
Heartland Outdoor, Inc. v. Miller, No. 23-1182-DDC-BGS, 2023 WL 6376751, at n.3 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2023) (holding that
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three characteristics: (1) the requested order mandates action (rather than prohibiting it), (2) it
changes the status quo, or (3) it grants all the relief that the moving party could expect from a trial
win.” Id. (citation omitted). 	In the present situation, the requested TRO implicates the first two
characteristics as it would mandate the action of Defendant restoring Plaintiff’s water service and it
would change the status quo of terminated water service. 	Consequently, Plaintiff bears a heavier
burden and must make a stronger showing that the likelihood of success and balance of harms
weigh in his favor. Id. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
To begin, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he is substantially likely to succeed on the
merits. Given the preceding analysis resulting in the recommendation of dismissal of his Complaint,
supra, Plaintiff cannot make a “strong showing” as to the likelihood of his success on the merits.
Specifically, he has failed to set forth any factual allegations to establish that the Defendant’s actions
deprived him of a protected property interest or that Defendant enacted or employed an official
policy or custom which caused his injury. This is sufficient in and of itself to warrant denial of his
request for a temporary restraining order. See generally Steede, 2025 WL 1029422.
That stated, Plaintiff has also failed to make strong showing that the balance of harms weigh
in his favor and that the requested restraining order is not contrary to the public interest. For
instance, in neither his Complaint nor the TRO motion does Plaintiff indicate why his water service
was terminated. (See generally Docs. 1, 5.) There are circumstances in which the ongoing termination
of Plaintiff’s water service would be in the public interest – for instance, if he had refused or failed
to pay his water bill or if there are legitimate reasons for the shutoff. See Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co.,
506 F.2d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing with approval the Kansas State Corporation
it “really doesn’t matter” whether a party seeks a preliminary injunction or a TRO as they follow the same procedure and
same four-part analysis); DBU v. RMM, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1273 (D. Colo. 2025) (holding that “the legal standard
governing TROs is the same standard governing preliminary injunctions”); Speight v. Gordon, 582 F. Supp. 3d 897, 902-03
(D. Wyo. 2022) (holding that “[w]hen addressing a motion for temporary restraining order, the court applies the same
standard as it applies to a motion for preliminary injunction.”) (citation omitted).
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Commission’s finding that “utility costs attributable to those of the utilities’ customers who do not
pay their bills when due should not be so shifted to those who do promptly pay for the utility
services they have received.”). This would clearly weigh against Plaintiff’s request because, if
Plaintiff has failed to pay his utility bill, he would be unable to establish that his potential injury
outweighs the possible harm to Defendant that could result with a mandatory restoration order and
could undermine the public interest in orderly utility administration. Further, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the requested injunction serves the public interest. Where legitimate reasons may
exist for termination of water service, there is no public interest in compelling its restoration on
demand.
Plaintiff’s motion also fails to set forth irreparable harm if a temporary restraining order is
not entered. “Irreparable harm is not harm that is merely serious or substantial.” Steede, 2025 WL
1029422, at *6. A party must demonstrate “ ‘a significant risk that he or she will experience harm
that cannot be compensated after the fact by monetary damages.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]holly
conclusory statements alone will not constitute irreparable harm.” Universal Engraving, Inc. v. Duarte,
519 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148 (D. Kan. 2007).
Plaintiff’s motion contains no specific facts regarding why the alleged harm is not reparable
without the relief requested. Instead, Plaintiff makes conclusory statements that there are no other
remedies and continued disservice will result in health risks, sanitation concerns, inconvenience, and
distress. Further, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate harm that cannot be compensated by monetary
damages later because it is unclear whether Plaintiff has access to water elsewhere or alternative
means to obtain water. As previously indicated, given the prospective nature of the relief sought,
Plaintiff must make a strong showing of irreparable harm. He has failed to do so.
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Plaintiff has failed to make the requisite stronger showing as to all four requirements to
warrant the entry of the extraordinary remedy of temporary restraining order. Thus, the
undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s TRO motion (Doc. 5) be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED to the District Court that Plaintiff’s complaint
(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED to the District Court that Plaintiff’s TRO Motion
(Doc. 5) be DENIED for the reasons set forth above.
IT IS ORDERED that a copy of these recommendations shall be sent to Plaintiff via
certified mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and D. Kan, Rule 72.1.4,
Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of these proposed findings and
recommendations to serve and file with the U.S. District Judge assigned to the case, any written
objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations of the undersigned
Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s failure to file such written, specific objections within the 14-day period
will bar appellate review of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended
disposition. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Dated May 4, 2026, at Wichita, Kansas.
/S /BROOKS G. S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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