USA v. Bright et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-10087-5-JWB
COLE MORIN,
a/k/a Cole Alexander,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the government’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s order
of release, and its motion for detention. (Doc. 54.) The court held a hearing on October 22, 2025.
For the reasons stated herein, the government's motion for detention is GRANTED, the magistrate
judge’s order of release (Doc. 49) is REVOKED, and Defendant is committed to the custody of
the Attorney General of the United States pending trial.
I. 	Facts
On September 3, 2025, a grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant that charged
him with one count of production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). (Doc.
1.) The government proffered facts relating to the alleged offenses as follows.
Defendant’s communications with Minor Victim 1 (“MV1”) were discovered after a
forensic extraction of MV1’s phone. 	The government proffers that this extraction showed that
Defendant, along with a multitude of other men, sent MV1 messages to engage in child
pornography and sex offenses. MV1’s messages show that Defendant began sending messages on
or around April 25, 2025, when MV1 was in middle school and Defendant was 22. 	Defendant
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sent MV1 messages calling her “baby”, “babe”, “wife”, “wifey” and “mommy”, tells her she is
sexy, and describing how much he loves her.
On or about May 2, 2025, Defendant sent the following messages to MV1:
• 	Defendant: I bet you won’t show me your tits
• 	MV1: I can
• 	Defendant: I bet you won’t
• 	Defendant: I’m horny right now baby
MV1 then sent a picture message, containing an image of MV1 from the waist up with her nude
breasts exposed. Defendant replies, “Yes baby” and “I bet you won’t show me your pussy baby.”
Investigators then saw a picture message was sent shortly thereafter, containing an image of MV1
standing in front of the camera, wearing no pants or underwear with her vagina exposed, to which
Defendant replies, “Yes sexy mommy.”
On May 6, 2025, Defendant contacted MV1 again via Facebook Messaging, and saying, “I
bet you won’t show me something below baby. I bet you won’t show me anything” MV1 replies,
“I can,” and a 1 hour, 34 minute and 28 second video call follows. 	Defendant then sent more
messages to MV1 over the following days, including:
• 	“I bet you won’t show me your pussy baby”
• 	“Can you show me your pussy please wife”
• 	“Take your shirt off. Make it cum for daddy”
These communications were followed by an exchange on May 16, 2025, where Defendant sends
MV1 the Facebook message, “I love you baby girl,” and MV1 replies, “I love you to baby boy.”
After this exchange, investigators saw a picture message was sent from MV1, where MV1 is not
wearing a shirt or bra, and her nude breasts are exposed.
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The next day, May 17, 2025, MV1 sent Defendant the Facebook message, “I am getting
ready to get in the tub I will call you when I get out,” to which Defendant replies, “Send me pictures
on Snapchat when you are done.” In response, MV1 says “Ok I will do that baby” and she sent
Defendant a message containing a picture where she is standing nude in front of the camera with
her breasts and vagina exposed. A similar incident occurred on June 29, 2025, when MV1 sent a
message to Defendant saying, “If you want to call me you can I’ll just be in the shower” followed
by a message which was not recoverable. 	Defendant replies, “Yes baby,” and a 1 minute, 56
second video occurs between Defendant and MV1. After this, MV1 sent Defendant a nude photo,
where MV1 is positioned in front of the camera, on her hands and knees with her breasts and pubic
area visible.
Based on the indictment in this case, Defendant was arrested on October 3, 2025. 	That
same day, Defendant was detained upon the government’s motion at his arraignment and counsel
was appointed to represent him. (Docs. 31, 32.) The government moved for a detention hearing,
and on an oral motion, that detention hearing was continued. (Doc. 32.) On October 10, 2025, the
magistrate judge held a detention hearing and ordered that Defendant be released pending trial
under various conditions. (Docs. 48, 49.) The government now seeks revocation of the order of
release and an order that Defendant be detained pending trial. (Doc. 52.)
Considering the motion, the court held a hearing at which the government proffered the
above facts, and the court also heard testimony from Ms. Tammy Hammond about a potential
individual justice plan which would place Defendant at Rosewood Services (“Rosewood”) in Great
Bend, Kansas. 	Rosewood provides group home living arrangements and daily activities for
individuals with intellectual disabilities. 	Ms. Hammond is the executive director of Rosewood,
and she testified that she believes that Rosewood can provide Defendant with a secure environment
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that would mitigate any danger Defendant presents to the community while also allowing
Defendant to await trial on the present charges in a safe environment suited to his mental and
physical needs.
II. 	Standard
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1), the government may seek review of a magistrate
judge's order of release. The district court's review of a magistrate judge's order of release is de
novo. United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2003). A de novo evidentiary
hearing, however, is not required. 	The district court may either “start from scratch and take
relevant evidence or incorporate the record of the proceedings conducted by the magistrate judge
including the exhibits admitted.” United States v. Collier, No. 12-20021-09, 2012 WL 4463435,
at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 2012) (citing United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991)).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to detention hearings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The
court may allow the parties to present information by proffer or it may insist on direct testimony.
See id.
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the court must order a defendant's pretrial release, with
or without conditions, unless it “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 	In making this determination, the court must take into
account the available information concerning:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
offense is a crime of violence, [or] a violation of section 1591...;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-
(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
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community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings;
and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on
probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal,
or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law;
and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person's release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Authority to request detention in this matter arises from several subsections of the Bail
Reform Act. Detention is authorized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), as production of child
pornography is a crime of violence as that term is defined in § 3156(a)(4)(C) which specifically
lists offenses under Chapter 110. Detention would otherwise be authorized pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(1)(E) as the offense involves minor victims. 	Moreover, there is a presumption of
detention that applies in this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). 	“A grand jury
indictment provides the probable cause required by the statute to trigger the presumption.” United
States v. Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing United States v. Quartermaine,
913 F.2d 910, 916 (11th Cir. 1990)).
The burden of production on Defendant to overcome the presumption is not a heavy one,
but Defendant must produce some evidence. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th
Cir. 1991). Even if Defendant overcomes the presumption, the presumption remains a factor in
the court's detention decision. Id. The burden of proof remains with the government to show that
no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the accused's presence in later
proceedings and/or the safety of other persons and the community. United States v. Lutz, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1251 (D. Kan. 2002) (burden of persuasion regarding risk of flight and danger to
community always remains with government). The government must prove dangerousness to any
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other person or the community by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1252
III. 	Analysis
A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
In reviewing this factor, the court is to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether it is a crime of violence. The offense charged here constitutes a crime
of violence since it involves the production of child pornography, a felony under chapter 110 of
Title 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(C). The communications between MV1 and Defendant, as
proffered at the hearing, show that Defendant willingly accepted child pornography and in fact
requested it on several occasions. Moreover, the government proffered at the hearing that based
on a recent search of Defendant’s phone, investigators identified two additional minor victims who
appear naked in chats and images. Additionally, the government proffered that based on this same
search of his phone, Defendant was communicating with at least six other individuals, both male
and female, under the age of 18 in a manner that the government characterizes as grooming those
minors to pursue relationships with them. 	No additional charges arising out of those recent
discoveries have yet been filed. 	Defendant’s counsel proffered that Defendant has the mental
capacity of only a 15-year-old male, but even taking this fact into consideration, Defendant’s
willful and sustained sexual pursuit of MV1 and other minors indicates that Defendant’s release
would pose a high degree of danger to others in the community. Thus, this factor weighs in favor
of detention.
B. Weight of the Evidence
The government’s proffer indicates the weight of the evidence as to Defendant’s
involvement in child pornography is strong. Notably, Defendant did not dispute the facts about
what transpired in his communications with MV1. 	It is true that Defendant is entitled to a
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presumption of innocence; however, the evidence as proffered shows a continuous desire to obtain
sexually explicit material from an individual whom Defendant knew was underage and is deeply
concerning. After review of the proffered evidence, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor
of detention.
C. History and Characteristics of Defendant
Defendant is a disabled individual who has been diagnosed with ADHD, oppositional
defiant disorder, mild intellectual disability, and autism spectrum disorder. Defendant has resided
at Rosewood as an adult for several years, but before taking up residence at Rosewood, he had
been living with his biological father and stepmother until the age of 18. Prior to that, he had been
living in the foster care system because he had been removed from the care of his mother at the
age of four. 	Def. Ex. A. 	According to testimony by Ms. Hammond and the Positive Behavior
Support plan prepared by Rosewood, Defendant has struggled with “aggressive and explosive
behaviors,” and even while in Rosewood’s care, “[Defendant] has struggles with sexually
inappropriate behaviors, inadequate self-care, and limited adult-living skills, posing risks to his
and others’ safety.” Id. This behavior is exemplified by Defendant’s prior records. He has several
state charges for battery and disorderly conduct, though only one charge for disorderly conduct
resulted in a conviction. 	However, in a far more concerning situation, Defendant has a 2018
juvenile charge of aggravated criminal sodomy for performing oral sex on his younger stepbrother
who was 6 at the time of the incident. 	Although there was no formal adjudication, the facts
surrounding this charge, in addition to the charges and evidence in this case, show that the
Defendant has a history of deviant sexual behaviors with minors.1 As a result, Defendant’s history
1 The court also notes that Ms. Hammond in her testimony at the hearing stated that Rosewood was not aware of this
prior incident involving the stepbrother when they created their individual justice plan for Defendant; however, she
went on to testify that she did not believe any guardians of potential housemates would object to Defendant residing
with them because one of the other housemates was also on an Individual Justice Plan for sexual behaviors.
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and characteristics weigh in favor of detention.
D. Danger to the Community
The court is required to order the pretrial release of a person subject to conditions unless
the court determines that such release will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). 	“The concern about safety is to be given a broader
construction than the mere danger of physical violence. Safety to the community refers to the
danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community.”
United States v. Kroeker, No. 22-3092, 2022 WL 2610344, at *4 (10th Cir. July 8, 2022) (quoting
United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989)).
While the facts in this case are certainly concerning, the court does acknowledge the
excellent job Rosewood has done in preparing an Individual Justice Plan for Defendant. The court
has rarely seen a more well-developed plan from a non-law enforcement entity regarding
supervising an individual in similar conditions as Defendant, and the court is also impressed by
the broad range of activities and resources Rosewood cultivates for all individuals in its care.
Rosewood provides necessary and life-affirming services to a vulnerable and underserved portion
of our society, and regardless of the decision in this case, Rosewood should be commended for its
actions and services.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the court finds that the available information concerning
the § 3142 factors show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant’s release would pose a
danger to the community. Defendant is charged with production of child pornography, and while
his counsel argues that Defendant’s diminished mental capacity is a mitigating factor, Defendant
does not dispute that he contacted MV1, an individual whom he knew to be 13-14 years old, and
requested explicit, sexual images on various occasions. Moreover, according to the government’s
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search of his phone, Defendant was allegedly engaged in similar deviant behaviors with two other
minor victims and was potentially grooming half a dozen potential victims. Defendant’s alleged
criminal conduct in this case indicates that he is a danger to the community. 	Although the
testimony of Ms. Hammond and the supervision procedures proposed by Rosewood purport to
provide Defendant with round-the-clock supervision to protect the community from Defendant’s
proclivities, Rosewood’s proposed plan also indicates only a limited expectation that staff
members at the group home would physically intervene to prevent Defendant from harming staff,
house members, or guests.
And therein lies one of the court’s biggest concerns. The fact that Defendant will be housed
with other individuals who are among the most vulnerable subset of our community only serves to
heighten the court’s concern that Defendant presents a risk to those around him. 	Group homes
such as those managed by Rosewood provide an important service to persons with intellectual
disabilities and their families. In many cases families and guardians of such disabled persons see
facilities such as Rosewood’s group homes as providing an avenue to prepare their disabled family
member or loved one for some level of assisted or independent living. 	Parents especially may
agonize over these decisions because they are planning for the day that their disabled child must
press on with life without them. The court does not see it as controversial to conclude that many
such parents, family members, or guardians would be stunned and deeply troubled to learn that
their intellectually disabled child or family member was being housed with a person who has a
background like this defendant. Of all the things that such people want, surely the safety of the
environment where their loved one is housed must rank near the top of the list.
It is with those concerns in mind that the court concludes that even the robust program
Rosewood proposes is not sufficient in this case, and Defendant needs to be detained to protect
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others from his previous behaviors, especially those with whom he would be housed or otherwise
in community with at Rosewood.2 The court finds that there are no conditions or combination of
conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of the community if Defendant were released.
IV. 	Conclusion
The government has carried its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
there is no combination of conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of others and the
community if Defendant were released pending trial. The magistrate judge’s order of release (Doc.
49) is accordingly REVOKED and the government’s amended motion for detention (Doc. 54) is
GRANTED.
Defendant Cole Morin is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General,
pending trial, for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from
persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal. Defendant shall
be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel and, upon an order of a
court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the government, the person in charge of
the corrections facility in which Defendant is held shall deliver Defendant to a United States
Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 29th day of October, 2025.
__s/ John W. Broomes__________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 The court adds the phrase “in community with” to reflect that, while the discussion thus far has focused on the group
home where Defendant would live under the Rosewood plan, part of the daily activities that Defendant would
undertake under Rosewood’s supervision would include working and performing other activities and services at
various Rosewood locations around Great Bend, Kansas. While the evidence presented at the hearing proposed that
Rosewood would provide continuous supervision of Defendant in those situations, they nevertheless place Defendant
in close proximity to other vulnerable individuals with intellectual disabilities throughout the day, thereby raising the
risk for those members of the community and relying exclusively on the supervision of Rosewood employees to
prevent any harmful interactions between Defendant and others. That is a heavy burden for non-law enforcement
personnel to carry day in and day out, and it is one with which the court is not comfortable given the risks posed by
this defendant.
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