USA v. Tilcock et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-10002-JWB
ZANE TILCOCK,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Zane Tilcock was scheduled for jury trial to begin on January 26, 2026. The
court was informed approximately thirty minutes before the start of trial that Defendant requested
to be represented by counsel. 	This matter is now before the court on Defendant’s motion to
continue the trial. (Doc. 77.) The motion is unopposed by the government. For the reasons stated
herein, the motion is GRANTED, though not without the following admonitions.
I. 	Facts
Defendant is charged with three counts of bank robbery and three counts of brandishing
and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. (Doc. 16.) These are serious
federal offenses carrying substantial potential sentences. Defendant was initially represented by
Assistant Federal Public Defender David Freund. 	On September 10, 2025, following a Faretta
hearing, the court granted Mr. Freund’s motion to withdraw as counsel and permitted Defendant
to proceed pro se. (Docs. 41, 42, 45, 47.) At that time, deadlines were continued to October 6,
2025, in the interests of justice to give Defendant an opportunity to familiarize himself with pro se
representation. 	The court made clear to Defendant the risks and disadvantages of self-
representation, and Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
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At the October 6, 2025, status conference (Doc. 50), Defendant requested a continuance
until November 4, 2025, which was granted and Defendant waived his speedy trial rights. 	On
November 4, 2025, Defendant requested another continuance to December 4, 2025, to further
familiarize himself with the case, which the court granted. (Doc. 56.) Again, Defendant waived
his speedy trial rights. 	At the December 4, 2025, status conference (Doc. 64), Defendant once
again requested a continuance and again waived his speedy trial rights. The court continued the
matter and set a final pretrial conference for January 22, 2026, and jury trial for January 27, 2026.
Before the final pretrial conference, on January 16, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment (Doc. 74), based in part on an argument that his right to a speedy trial had
been violated. The court denied that motion at the January 22 status conference. (Doc. 76.) The
court noted the irony of Defendant’s position—repeatedly requesting continuances and waiving
speedy trial rights while simultaneously claiming speedy trial violations.
Nevertheless, on the morning of January 26, 2026, approximately thirty minutes before
Defendant’s jury trial was scheduled to commence and much to the court’s surprise, the court was
informed that Defendant now wished to be represented by counsel. 	Standby counsel, Richard
Paugh, was appointed by the court and informed that he would be trying the case. On the record,
Mr. Paugh expressed his lack of preparedness due to Defendant seeking his representation less
than three days prior to trial. The court made an oral record on all this the morning trial was set to
commence, and granted Defendant’s oral motion for continuance. However, in order to make a
clear record on this issue, the court directed Defendant’s counsel to supplement the record with a
written motion for continuance, which he did. The court now addresses that written motion.
II. 	Analysis
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The court is faced with an uncomfortable situation. 	On the one hand, Defendant faces
serious charges with the potential for decades of imprisonment. The government does not oppose
a continuance, and newly appointed counsel was instructed, when he was appointed as standby
counsel, on the need to be prepared to take over the representation on short notice should that
become necessary. On the other hand, Defendant’s conduct throughout these proceedings has been
troubling and appears calculated to delay the resolution of this case.
The procedural history detailed above reveals a pattern of behavior that gives this court
pause. Defendant insisted on proceeding pro se after a full Faretta hearing. He was given three
separate status conferences over the course of several months, each time requesting additional
continuances to prepare his case. At each of these conferences, Defendant affirmatively waived
his speedy trial rights. Yet, Defendant filed a motion alleging that his speedy trial rights had been
violated—rights that he himself had repeatedly waived. 	(Doc. 74.) 	Moreover, after the court
permitted him to proceed pro se and gave him ample time to remedy any perceived deficiencies in
his prior representation, Defendant filed a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel—
against himself, in effect. 	(Doc. 66.) 	Then after months of pro se representation, Defendant
suddenly requests counsel on the morning of trial. 	While the soundness of this decision by
Defendant is not lost in court, this last-minute reversal has the practical effect of further delaying
these proceedings.
While the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to self-representation in criminal
proceedings, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975), the right is “not absolute.” Martinez
v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161–62 (2000). 	“[T]he
government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the
defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.” 	Id. 	For example, federal courts have long
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recognized 	that 	defendants 	cannot 	manipulate 	proceedings 	by 	switching 	between 	pro 	se
representation and appointed counsel as a means of delay. See, e.g., United States v. Mackovich,
209 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that defendant’s “requests for self -representation were
merely a tactic for delay,” where the defendant utilized appointed counsel for months before
requesting leave to represent himself and then sought several continuances); 	United States v.
Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir.1994) (“We have repeatedly shown concern with the use
of the right to waive counsel as a ‘cat and mouse’ game with the courts.”). As can be seen, federal
courts have recognized that requests to change representation made in proximity to trial, when no
genuine conflict exists, may reasonably be inferred to constitute delay tactics. In other words, “a
defendant may not manipulate the proceedings by willy-nilly leaping back and forth between the
choices [of self-representation and appointed counsel].” Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 259 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893 (1984).
Given this well-established precedent and Defendant’s conduct in this case, the court could
justifiably require Defendant to proceed to trial pro se as he has insisted upon doing for the past
four and a half months. Nevertheless, the court is mindful of the gravity of the charges Defendant
faces. Each of the three bank robbery counts along with each of the three charges of brandishing
and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence carries a cumulative potential
exposure that is measured in decades of imprisonment. Accordingly, given these stakes, the lack
of objection from the government, and the fact that counsel was indeed informed on very short
notice that he would be trying this case, the court concludes that the better course—though not
without reservation—is to grant the continuance. 	The interests of justice, in this particular
instance, are best served by ensuring that Defendant receives a trial at which he is represented by
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counsel who has had adequate time to prepare, even if Defendant’s own actions have precipitated
this situation.
Finally, the court finds that the period of delay resulting from the continuance granted
pursuant to this order shall be excludable time in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act,
because the ends of justice served outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial. Specifically, the time from January 26, 2026, to March 2, 2026, shall be excluded.
III. 	Conclusion
THEREFORE, Defendant’s motion to continue (Doc. 77) is GRANTED. 	The jury trial
shall be continued until March 2, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., U.S. Courthouse, Wichita, Kansas, Courtroom
238, a status conference is scheduled for February 17, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., U.S. Courthouse,
Wichita, Kansas, Room 232, and the entirety of the time from January 26, 2026, until the new trial
date of March 2, 2026, shall be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 28th day of January, 2025.
___s/ John W. Broomes_______________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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