Tahchawwickah v. Davis et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CHRISTOPHER TAHCHAWWICKAH,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3103-JWL
ANGIE DAVIS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Christopher Tahchawwickah is hereby required to show good cause why this
action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed
herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is currently
in custody at the Jess Dunn Correctional Center in Taft, Oklahoma. The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Angie Davis denied Plaintiff mental health medication “several
times” while he was housed at the Seward County Jail in Liberal, Kansas (“SCJ”). (Doc. 1, at 1–
2, 5.) 	Plaintiff claims that he was denied medication twice before writing a medical grievance
against Defendant. 	Id. at 2. 	Plaintiff claims negligence, medical malpractice, and an Eighth
Amendment violation. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff states that he filed a motion attempting to join Case
No. 24-3095, and is now filing a pro se suit against the Defendants. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff names as defendants Angie Davis, SCJ Nurse, and (fnu)(lnu) Unnamed Employer
of Angie Davis. Plaintiff seeks $5,000,000 in damages. Id. at 4, 9.
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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 	A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 	The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. 	See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he attempted to join his claims in Case No. 24-3095.
In his motion to join that case, Plaintiff states that Angie Davis denied him mental health
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medications at the Seward County Jail in 2023. See Scott v. Ward, Case No. 24-3095-JWB-GEB,
Doc. 14 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2024). Plaintiff’s motion to join was denied on September 5, 2024. Id.
at Doc. 15.
The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is determined from looking at the
appropriate state statute of limitations and tolling principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536,
539 (1989). “The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights
claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. . . . In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of
limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a).” Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch.,
465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual
date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388
(2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause
of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983 action
accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” 	Fogle v.
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
cert. denied 549 U.S. 1059 (2006). A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent
plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute
of limitations. 	Id. at 1258–59; see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Hawkins v.
Lemons, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009).
It plainly appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to
dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed his Complaint
on April 28, 2026. Plaintiff’s alleged violations occurred in 2023. It thus appears that any events
or acts of Defendants taken in connection with Plaintiff’s claims took place more than two years
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prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint and are time-barred. See Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673,
674-75 (10th Cir. 1995) (district court may consider affirmative defenses sua sponte when the
defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be
developed). 	Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that he would be entitled to statutory or
equitable tolling. 	Plaintiff should show good cause why his claims should not be dismissed as
barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in
dismissal of this matter without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until May 29, 2026, in which
to show good cause, the in writing to the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, United States District
Judge, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated April 29, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ James P. O’Hara
JAMES P. O’HARA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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