Reed (ID 2000041548) v. Easley

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
NOAH DEMETRIUS REED,
Petitioner,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3047-JWL
STATE OF KANSAS 1 ,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This matter is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by
Petitioner and Kansas state prisoner Noah Demetrius Reed, who proceeds pro se. (Doc. 1.) He has
moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 2 and 4), but has not submitted the financial
certificate required to support his request. Under the local rules:
Where a petitioner . . . is an inmate of a penal institution and desires to
proceed without prepayment of fees, he or she must also submit a certificate
executed by an authorized officer of the institution in which he or she is confined.
The certificate must state the amount of money or securities on deposit to his or her
credit in any account in the institution.
D. Kan. R. 9.1(g)(2)(A).
Petitioner informs the Court, however, that “technical difficulties” experienced by the
Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) have resulted in his being unable to obtain the
required certificate. (Doc. 4.) This mirrors similar information provided to the Court in other cases.
1 Petitioner has named the State of Kansas as Respondent in this action, but the proper respondent in a federal habeas
action by a state prisoner is the person who has custody over the petitioner. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
443 (2004) (“[I]n habeas challenges to present physical confinement . . . the default rule is that the proper respondent
is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.”). Thus, Tim Easley, the current warden of Larned State
Correctional Facility, where Petitioner is confined, is hereby substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25(d)
and 81(a)(4).
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 1 of 9

2
Thus, Petitioner’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be provisionally granted and
Petitioner will be granted additional time to file the required certificate.
The Court has conducted an initial review of the petition as required by Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. For the reasons explained
below, the Court concludes that the timeliness of the petition depends on a future ruling by the
state courts in a related case. Thus, the Court will direct Petitioner to show cause in writing why
this matter should not be stayed and held in abeyance pending final resolution of the state-court
case. Also before the Court is Petitioner’s “Motion for Appointment of Counsel,” (Doc. 5) which
the Court will deny without prejudice for the reasons explained below.
Background
In 2016, a jury in Sedgwick County, Kansas convicted Petitioner of aggravated kidnapping,
attempted second-degree murder, and criminal threat; the state district court later sentenced him
to 685 months in prison. (Doc. 1, p. 1); see also State v. Reed, 2018 WL 4839660, *2 (Kan. Ct.
App. Oct. 5, 2018) (unpublished) (Reed I), rev. denied Sept. 27, 2019. Petitioner then pursued a
direct appeal. Reed I, 2018 WL 4839660, at *1. On October 5, 2018, the Kansas Court of Appeals
(“KCOA”) affirmed his convictions and, on September 27, 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court
(“KSC”) denied the related petition for review.
On May 28, 2020, Petitioner filed in Sedgwick County District Court a motion for state
habeas relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. (Doc. 1, p. 3); see also Reed v. State, 2023 WL 7271858, *1
(Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2023) (unpublished) (Reed II), rev. denied Mar. 27, 2025. The district court
denied relief and Petitioner appealed. Reed II, 2023 WL 7271858 at *1. On February 11, 2022,
while that appeal was pending before the KCOA, Petitioner filed in this Court a petition for federal
habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Reed v. Kansas, 2022 WL 705341, *1 (D. Kan.
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 2 of 9

3
Mar. 9, 2022) (unpublished) (Reed III).
United States Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow screened the federal habeas petition as
required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
Id. at *2. In a notice and order to show cause issued on March 9, 2022, Judge Crow explained his
conclusion that some of the claims in the federal habeas petition were unexhausted but could be
exhausted in the then-pending appeal from the denial of Petitioner’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Id.
Judge Crow granted Petitioner time in which to show cause why his federal habeas case should
not be dismissed without prejudice so that Petitioner could exhaust available state-court remedies.
Id. at *3. After the April 11, 2022 deadline to respond passed without Petitioner filing anything
further, Judge Crow dismissed the federal habeas case without prejudice. See Reed v. Williams,
Case No. 22-3029-SAC, Doc. 8.
On November 3, 2023, the KCOA affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s K.S.A. 60-1507
motion and, on March 27, 2025, the KSC denied the related petition for review. See Reed II, 2023
WL 7271858, at *1. On June 17, 2025, Petitioner filed another motion for state habeas relief under
K.S.A. 60-1507. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) As of the date of this order, it appears that the 2025 K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion remains pending before the state district court. See Reed v. State, Sedgwick County
Case No. SG-2025-CV-001482, available at https://casesearch.kscourts.gov. The docket reflects
that the State filed a response to Petitioner’s motion on November 7, 2025, and on February 19,
2026, Petitioner filed a “Motion of Dismissal From Judicial Misconduct due to Kan. Sup. Ct.
Rules,” which remains pending.
On February 23, 2026 2 , Petitioner filed the pro se petition for federal writ of habeas corpus
2 The Court received the petition on March 9, 2026. (Doc. 1.) “Because [Petitioner] was a prisoner and filed his motion
pro se, he may rely on the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ which makes the date on which he presented his motion to prison
officials for mailing the filing date for timeliness purposes.” United States v. Hopkins, 920 F.3d 690, 696 n. 8 (10th
Cir. 2019). The last page of the petition contains a declaration under penalty of perjury that Petitioner placed his
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 3 of 9

4
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that began this case. (Doc. 1.)
Standard of Review
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
requires the Court to review a habeas petition upon filing and to dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. Because Petitioner is
proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court does not assume the role of Petitioner’s advocate and it will
not construct arguments for him. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005).
Analysis
This action is subject to the one-year limitation period established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d)(1)
provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to case on collateral review; or
petition in the prison mailing system—which is more accurately described as giving his petition to prison authorities
for e-filing—on February 23, 2026. (Doc. 1, p. 14.) Thus, for purposes of calculating timeliness, the petition is deemed
filed as of February 23, 2026.
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 4 of 9

5
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The one-year limitation period generally runs from the date the judgment becomes “final,”
as provided by § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).
Nothing in the petition now before this Court suggests that another subsection of the statute applies
to control the date on which the one-year limitation period began. The United States Supreme
Court has held that direct review concludes—making a judgment “final”—when an individual has
exhausted the opportunity for direct appeal to the state courts and the opportunity to request review
by the United States Supreme Court. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009).
In this matter, the KSC denied review in Petitioner’s direct appeal on September 27, 2019.
Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari. (See Doc. 1, p. 3.) The Tenth Circuit has explained
that “if a prisoner does not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court after [his or her] direct appeal, the one-year limitation period begins to run when the time
for filing a certiorari petition expires.” United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir.
2003). The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States allow petitioners ninety days from the
date of entry of judgment in highest state court—in Kansas, the Kansas Supreme Court—to seek
certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).
Under this timeline, the last day on which Petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of
certiorari was December 26, 2019. On December 27, 2019, the one-year AEDPA limitation period
began to run. Under the “anniversary method” used in the Tenth Circuit, the final day for Petitioner
to timely file his § 2254 petition in this Court was December 27, 2020. See Hurst, 322 F.3d at
1261-62. Because December 27, 2020 was a Sunday, Petitioner had until the end of Monday,
December 28, 2020 to file a timely § 2254 petition in this Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1); Stuart
v. Utah, 449 Fed. Appx. 736, 738 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (applying Rule 6).
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 5 of 9

6
The AEDPA also includes a tolling provision: “The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, that means that the one-year AEDPA limitation
period was tolled, or paused, when Petitioner filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on May 28, 2020.
The Tenth Circuit has explained that when this type of statutory tolling applies, the number of days
that the relevant state-court matter is pending “is added to the one-year anniversary date to
establish the final deadline for filing a § 2254 application in federal court.” Stuart, 449 Fed. Appx.
at 738 (citing Harris v. Dinwiddie, 642 F.3d 902, 906 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011)).
The final order related to Petitioner’s first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion issued on March 27,
2025, when the KSC denied the petition for review in the related appeal. Thus, Petitioner’s K.S.A.
60-1507 motion was pending for approximately 1,765 days. When those days are added to the
original one-year anniversary date of December 28, 2020, it gives the new filing deadline for this
matter: November 28, 2025. This Court was closed for a holiday on Friday, November 28, 2025,
so Petitioner had until the end of Monday, December 1, 2025 to file his federal habeas petition.
Even taking as true the date on which Petitioner declares he placed his federal habeas petition in
the prison mailing system, Petitioner did not file this federal habeas case until February 23, 2026—
over 2 months past the deadline. (See Doc. 1, p. 14.)
As noted above, however, Petitioner filed another K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in June 2025
and that motion remains pending in the state district court. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) If that motion satisfies
the AEDPA’s federal tolling provision, the time for Petitioner to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition
was paused a second time on June 17, 2025 and has not yet resumed, meaning that the § 2254
petition currently before this Court is timely. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 6 of 9

7
has explained that “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” so when a state court
rejects a motion for post-conviction relief as untimely, “it was not ‘properly filed,’ and [the
petitioner] is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 417 (2005); see also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-7 (2007) (reaffirming Pace and holding
that it does not matter whether the time limit in question “is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense,
or something in between”; it is still a filing condition). Thus, if the state district court denies
Petitioner’s currently pending K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as untimely filed and any such ruling is
upheld on appeal, it will mean that the motion did not toll the federal habeas statute of limitations
and the current § 2254 petition was not timely filed.
Because the information now before this Court indicates that the timeliness of this federal
habeas petition depends on a future ruling by the state courts, the Court concludes that this matter
should be stayed pending completion of the state-court proceedings related to the currently pending
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The Court will, however, grant Petitioner time in which to show cause, in
writing, why this matter should not be stayed and held in abeyance. If Petitioner fails to timely file
a response to this order, the Court will stay this case and hold it in abeyance and will direct
Petitioner to file periodic status reports on the progress of the state court case.
Conclusion
In summary, the information now before the Court indicates that this matter should be
stayed and held in abeyance until the state courts resolve the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion currently
pending in state court under case number SG-2025-CV-001482. The Court will grant Petitioner
time to show cause why this matter should not be stayed and held in abeyance. If Petitioner fails
to timely respond to this order, this matter will be stayed and held in abeyance and the Court will
set a deadline for Petitioner to update this Court on the status of the state court proceedings.
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 7 of 9

8
Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 5)
Also before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 5.) Liberally
construed, the motion asserts that Petitioner lacks the financial resources to retain counsel. Id. As
the motion acknowledges, Petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in a federal habeas
corpus action. Id. at 1; See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Lomack v.
Farris, 2025 WL 397520, *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) (unpublished) (citing Finley and Coronado
v. Ward, 517 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008), for the holding that “there is no constitutional right
to counsel in habeas proceedings.”). Rather, the decision whether to appoint counsel rests in the
Court's discretion. Swazo v. Wy. Dept. of Corr. State Penitentiary Warden, 23 F.3d 332, 333 (10th
Cir 1994). This Court may appoint counsel in a federal habeas action if it “determines that the
interest of justice so require.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).
The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his
claim to warrant appointment of counsel. Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006)
(citing Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004)). It is not enough
“that having counsel appointed would have assisted [the prisoner] in presenting his strongest
possible case, [as] the same could be said in any case.” Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1223 (citing Rucks v.
Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)). In deciding whether to appoint counsel for
Petitioner, the Court has considered “the merits of [his] claims, the nature and complexity of the
factual and legal issues, and [Petitioner’s] ability to investigate the facts and present his claims.”
Rucks, 57 F.3d at 979; Hill, 393 F.3d at 1115.
The Court concludes that the appointment of counsel is not warranted at this early stage of
the proceedings. It is not yet clear whether the petition in this matter was filed within the applicable
statute of limitations and Petitioner appears able to adequately investigate the facts and clearly
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 8 of 9

9
present his claims. Thus, the motion will be denied without prejudice. Petitioner may refile his
motion if this case survives the initial screening and develops in a way that requires counsel.
IT 	IS 	THEREFORE 	ORDERED 	THAT 	Tim 	Easley, 	Warden 	of 	Larned 	State
Correctional Facility, where Petitioner is confined, is substituted as Respondent in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Petitioner’s motions for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Docs. 2 and 4) are provisionally granted. Petitioner is granted to and including May
12, 2026 to file either (1) the financial certificate required to support his motions for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis or (2) a status report containing any additional information he has
received on the availability of such a certificate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel
(Doc. 5) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Petitioner is granted until and including April 13,
2026, in which to show cause, in a single written response to this order, why this matter should not
be stayed and held in abeyance until the final resolution of the related state court proceedings under
K.S.A. 60-1507.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	This 12th day of March, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
United States District Judge
Case 5:26-cv-03047-JWL Document 6 Filed 03/12/26 Page 9 of 9