Langley v. Manly et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
AUSTIN BRYCE LANGLEY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3033-JWL
WILL MANLY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Austin Bryce Langley is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the
undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody
at the Shawnee County Jail in Topeka, Kansas.1 The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings. 	Plaintiff alleges that the
prosecutors lied to win a false conviction and to enslave Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, at 1.) Plaintiff claims
prosecutors lied by stating that Plaintiff said “I’m about to fucking kill somebody;” lied by saying
Plaintiff stabbed the victim twice when one was just a scratch; and lied by saying the victim’s pain
was 10/10 when it was 5/10. Id. at 1, 3. Plaintiff acknowledges that he stabbed the victim, but
argues that the victim was only in the hospital for an hour and 21 minutes and only received six
1 Although Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner, it appears that he is currently housed at the Shawnee County Jail for court
proceedings. The Kansas Adult Supervised Population Electronic Repository (“KASPER”) shows that Plaintiff was
transferred from the El Dorado Correctional Facility to Shawnee County on July 20, 2025, for “Court Appearance.”
See https://kdocrepository.doc.ks.gov/kasper/search/detail?offenderID=32799 (last visited February 20, 2026).
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stitches. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also claims that “not a single organ was touched.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff alleges that he was convicted of attempted murder in the 1st degree and Level 4
aggravated battery, received a sentence of 55 years and one month, and owes $17,228.45 in
restitution. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff claims that “they are also trying to convict [him] of Level 5 Battery
on an L.E.O.” and for two punches on the ear he is looking at another 11 years. Id. at 2. Plaintiff
claims that the length of his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
Plaintiff names as defendants: 	Will Manley, Deputy District Attorney; Carolyn Smith,
Assistant District Attorney; and Kris Kobach, Attorney General of Kansas. 	For relief, Plaintiff
seeks to have the Defendants pay the restitution ordered in his state criminal case. Id. at 5.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis in this matter, the Court is required to
“dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—. . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 	A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 	The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. 	See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
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a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Heck Bar and Habeas Nature of Claim
Plaintiff’s claims challenge the validity of his sentence. To the extent Plaintiff challenges
the validity of his sentence in his state criminal case, his federal claim must be presented in habeas
corpus. “[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional
challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When the legality of a confinement is
challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a
habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with
the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994);
see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court
remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)
(requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies). “Before a federal court may grant habeas
relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the
state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those
claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999);
see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982).
Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
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Likewise, before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages
based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has
been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. Heck, 512 U.S. 477. If a judgment
on Plaintiff’s claim in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, the claim
may be barred by Heck. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a
state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 487. 	In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily
implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until
the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by
executive order. Id. at 486–87. Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated. As set forth below, it appears that Plaintiff’s state court criminal cases are currently
pending.
2. Immunity
The State of Kansas and its agencies are absolutely immune from suits for money damages
under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional bar to suits
against a state and “arms of the state” unless the state waives its immunity. Peterson v. Martinez,
707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wagoner Cnty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. Grand
River Dam Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009)). 	Therefore, in the absence of some
consent, a suit in which an agent or department of the state is named as a defendant is “proscribed
by the Eleventh Amendment.” 	Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984). It is well established that Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when
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it enacted § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338–45 (1979); Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d
1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002).
For § 1983 purposes, a state official is the state itself when sued in his or her official
capacity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). A state officer sued in his
or her official capacity also enjoys this protection. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th
Cir. 2017). “When a suit alleges a claim against a state official in his official capacity, the real
party in interest in the case is the state, and the state may raise the defense of sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.” 	Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted).
Defendants Manly and Smith appear to be prosecutors in the Shawnee County District
Attorney’s Office. See Doc. 1–1, at 1 (stating that the prosecutors work in the DA’s Office at 200
S.E. 7th, Topeka, Kansas). 	“[C]ounty district attorneys work for the state, not the county.”
Wanjiku v. Johnson Cty., 173 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1236 (D. Kan. 2016) (citing K.S.A. § 22a-101(a)2
(stating the district attorney is the “executive officer of the judicial district in which he is elected”
and “in no event shall said district attorney be deemed an officer of any county”); Oltremari v.
Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1347 (D. Kan.1994) (holding that “county district
attorneys are officers of the state,” to which the Eleventh Amendment gives them immunity from
suit, unlike county officers)).
Plaintiff has also named the Attorney General of Kansas as a defendant. Plaintiff’s only
mention of the Attorney General in the Complaint is a statement that the Attorney General “said
2 The statute establishes the office of district attorney for the state’s judicial districts 3, 10, 18 and 29, and abolishes
the office of county attorney for those judicial districts. K.S.A. § 22a-101(a) and (b). Those judicial districts are for
the following counties: 3rd Judicial District – Shawnee; 10th Judicial District – Johnson; 18th Judicial District –
Sedgwick; and 29th Judicial District – Wyandotte. See https://kscourts.gov/About-the-Courts/District-Courts (last
visited Feb. 20, 2026).
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[Plaintiff] owe[s] $17,228.45” and a claim that the Attorney General “is familiar with [his] case,
and he knows [Plaintiff is] now considered a slave for Cadena Perpetua.” (Doc. 1, at 2, 5.) Not
only do these statements fail to state a claim, but the Attorney General also enjoys Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 	“The state sovereign immunity enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment
confers immunity on the Attorney General . . . in [his] official capacit[y].” Free Speech Coalition,
Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 741 (10th Cir. 2024) (finding that where the Attorney General did
not enforce or give effect to the Act in question, the Ex parte Young exception to that immunity
did not apply); see also Goico v. Kansas, 2020 WL 3034814, at *2 (D. Kan. 2020) (“As an
employee of the state acting in the course of her duty to the state, [the official with the Kansas
Attorney General’s Office] is generally entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as her
state employer because the Attorney General’s office is regarded as an arm of the state.”); Nelson
v. Schoenhofer, 2017 WL 4758966, at *2 (D. Kan. 2017) (The plaintiff’s complaint fails to specify
whether the defendant is sued in his official capacity, individual capacity, or both. If this is an
official capacity action, the “Kansas Attorney General is the ‘chief law officer of the state’ and
therefore is entitled to the same immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as the State itself.”)
(citing Maley v. Kansas, 543 Fed. Appx. 889, 2013 WL 6171080 at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 2013)
(citations omitted)).
The prosecutors also enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages for activities
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430 (1976). “As Imbler and its progeny establish, absolute prosecutorial immunity is
intended to protect the judicial process, not the prosecutor.” Chilcoat v. San Juan Cty., 41 F.4th
1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “Since Imbler, the Supreme Court has prescribed,
and we have followed, a ‘functional approach’ to absolute prosecutorial immunity.” Id. at 1208–
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09 (citing Bledsoe v. Vanderbilt, 934 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Burns, 500 U.S.
at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934); see also Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (“[O]ur cases clearly
indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant.”)).
“Under the functional approach, we ‘look to which role the prosecutor is performing’ at the time
of the challenged conduct, Mink, 482 F.3d at 1262, and examine ‘the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it’ Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229,
108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).” Id. at 1209.
Courts determine whether a prosecutor is performing a function “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process,” by applying a “ ‘continuum-based approach’ and the
‘more distant a function is from the judicial process, the less likely absolute immunity will
attach[.]’ ” Id. (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that:
We begin with an obvious benchmark: a prosecutor is absolutely
immune when functioning “within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at
410, 96 S.Ct. 984. By “initiating and presenting the government’s
case,” the prosecutor is cast in “the role of an advocate.” Mink, 482
F.3d at 1261. As we have summarized, “Prosecutors are entitled to
absolute 	immunity 	for 	their 	decisions 	to 	prosecute, 	their
investigatory or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of
evidence, their determination of whether probable cause exists, and
their 	determination 	of 	what 	information 	to 	show 	the 	court.”
Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir.
2009).
“The doctrine of absolute immunity, however, is not without limits.”
Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 925 (10th Cir. 2007). Absolute
prosecutorial immunity is justified “only for actions that are
connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for
every litigation-inducing conduct.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 494, 111
S.Ct. 	1934. 	We 	will 	not 	extend 	absolute 	immunity 	when 	a
prosecutor functions “in the role of an administrator or investigative
officer rather than that of advocate.” Mink, 482 F.3d at 1259
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct.
984). The public policy considerations that support the protection of
prosecutorial functions are not applicable to investigative and
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administrative acts. See Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1193
(10th Cir. 2014) (“Absolute immunity extends only so far as is
necessary to protect the judicial process.”).
For example, when a prosecutor conducts investigative work
normally performed by the police, they are not performing a
prosecutorial function. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
273-74, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). “Although
identifying those acts entitled to absolute immunity is not always
easy, the determinative factor is ‘advocacy’ because that is the
prosecutor’s main function . . ..” Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843
(10th Cir. 1985); see also Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 403 (6th
Cir. 	2011) 	(“The 	analytical 	key 	to 	prosecutorial 	immunity,
therefore, is advocacy—whether the actions in question are those of
an advocate.”) (citation omitted).
Id.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors made misstatements during his criminal
trial. See id. at 1209–10 (noting that the claims against the prosecutor were based on his courtroom
conduct—statements made in court during the preliminary hearing). The prosecutors’ statements
were made in their role as advocates in court, and arguments made during trial “are quintessential
advocacy.” 	Id. at 1210. 	“[C]ourtroom advocacy is an activity ‘intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Id. (citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has held that the falsity of a prosecutor’s statements during courtroom
advocacy “cannot defeat absolute immunity.” Id. In Burns, the “Supreme Court determined the
prosecutor had functioned as an advocate at the probable-cause hearing and was absolutely
immune because, at common law, ‘prosecutors . . . were absolutely immune from damages liability
. . . for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings (at least so long as the
statements were related to the proceeding).’ ” Id. (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489–90, 111
S.Ct. 1934 (1991)). Therefore, the prosecutors in this case enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity
for statements made during Plaintiff’s criminal trial.
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3. Younger Abstention
The Court may be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims under Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case
where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state interest;
and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.”
Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of
Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). 	“Once these three conditions are met,
Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court
is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 F. App’x at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain
Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
An online Kansas District Court Records Search shows that Plaintiff’s state criminal
proceedings are pending. 	See State v. Langley, Case No. SN-2020-CR-1245 (District Court of
Shawnee County, Kansas). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 20, 2024. Id. The last
docket entry in the case is the December 9, 2025 Order for Records received from the Appellate
Court. Id.; see also State v. Langley, Case No. 128508 (Kansas Court of Appeals) (the last entry
is a January 29, 2026 Order denying Appellant’s motion seeking permission to file a supplemental
brief).
Plaintiff also mentions that he was charged with battery on an L.E.O. The Court would
likewise be required to abstain regarding any claims related to this charge because it appears that
Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings regarding this charge are ongoing. 	See State v. Langley, Case
No. SN-2024-001312 (District Court of Shawnee County, Kansas) (the last entry being the
February 19, 2026 Return of Service – Subpoena Criminal).
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Therefore, it appears that the first and second conditions for Younger abstention would be
met because Kansas undoubtedly has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through
criminal proceedings in the state’s courts. 	In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described
as “Our Federalism.”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). 	Likewise, the third condition would be
met because Kansas courts provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional
claims by way of pretrial proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as
well as post-conviction remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may
be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”)
(quotation omitted); see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation
‘to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United
States . . . .’”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all
but unusual cases, would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating
constitutional rights).
“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for
the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” D.L. v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d
1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)); Myers v. Garff,
876 F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (directing district court to stay claim for damages).
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the
reasons stated herein. 	Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of this matter
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without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until
March 20, 2026, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s
Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated February 20, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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