Cheatham (ID 2000064842) v. Easley et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RYAN CHRISTOPHER CHEATHAM,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3218-JWL
TIM EASLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this pro se civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility, his claims relate to his incarceration at the
Larned State Correctional Facility in Larned, Kansas (“LSCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. On January 15, 2026, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order
(Doc. 15) (“M&O”) finding that this matter is subject to dismissal and granting Plaintiff an
opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. This matter is before the Court
for screening Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 19). The Court’s screening standards are set
forth in the M&O. (Doc. 15, at 4–5.)
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
(Doc. 19, at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated based on his disciplinary
proceedings at LSCF. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that his disciplinary hearing was terminated “due
to [him] not raising [his] right hand to be sworn in, which is against Plaintiff’s religious beliefs.”
Id.
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Plaintiff also alleges that a policy was enforced against him without giving him prior notice
of the policy. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that the policy at issue requires a year in segregation for
committing a battery on staff. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that he was not made aware of the policy
prior to his conviction for battery on a staff member. 	Plaintiff claims that this constituted a
violation of K.S.A. 75-5256(b) because all rules and regulations are supposed to be published and
made available to all inmates.1 Id.
Plaintiff claims that he was denied release from segregation at his Segregation Reviews.
Id. at 8. He claims that the Segregation Review Board collectively decided that he had to stay in
segregation for one year based on the policy regarding battery on a staff member. Id. Plaintiff
alleges that his appeal of the conviction was remanded for clarification of the record on October 30,
2024, and was not upheld until July 25, 2025. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that Defendants took the
position that his DR was upheld despite the 9-month delay and there being no proof of clarification
of the record. Id.
Plaintiff claims that he is not challenging his housing location during segregation, but
rather he takes issue with not being made aware of the policy in violation of K.S.A. 75-5256(b).
Id. at 9. Plaintiff states “[h]ow can I avoid sanctions without knowing the possible penalty.” Id.
He is also challenging the 9-month delay in receiving a ruling on his appeal of the DR, “with no
proof of any clarification of the record.” 	Id. at 9–10. 	Plaintiff alleges that the guidelines in
K.A.R. 44-13-402, K.A.R. 44-13-404, K.A.R. 44-13-406, K.A.R. 44-13-506, and K.A.R. 44-13-
704 were not followed. Id.
As Count II, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy based on Defendants’ participation in the
Segregation Review Boards, where they “decided together that [Plaintiff] had to stay in
1 	The statute also provides that it does not apply to “regulations and orders relating to emergency or security
procedures.” K.S.A. 75-5256(b).
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segregation.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that his appeal was not finalized until 9 months after it
was remanded for clarification of the record, yet the Defendants “stated it was upheld on appeal
when it wasn’t.” Id.
As Count III, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his freedom of religion rights under the First
Amendment. Id. at 14. In support, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Wyman terminated the disciplinary
hearing when Plaintiff failed to raise his right hand to be sworn in. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Megan
Davis upheld his conviction after she was informed of what happened in the hearing. Id. Plaintiff
argues that he was not in a court of law, and that he “is a Muslim and it goes against his religious
beliefs.” 	Id. at 11. Plaintiff argues that there is nothing in K.A.R. 44-13-403 that states that an
inmate must be sworn in. Id.
Plaintiff names as Defendants: 	LSCF Warden Tim Easley; KDOC Secretary of
Corrections Jeff Zmuda; LSCF Classification Administrator (fnu) Byrum, LSCF Unit-Team
Manager Travis Getty; Facility Management CMII Megan Davis; LSCF Deputy Warden Thomas
Loomis; LSCF EAI staff members (fnu) Corey and Miranda Schmidt; 	Major (fnu) Graham at
LSCF; LSCF mental health provider (fnu) Uing; LSCF Disciplinary Hearing Supervisor (fnu)
East; LSCF Sort Officer and Unit Team Shawn Porkorski; LSCF Master Sergeant and Hearing
Officer (fnu) Wyman; LSCF Captain (fnu) Bieberle; and LSCF Lt. (fnu) Lines. For relief, Plaintiff
seeks $500,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 15.
II. Discussion
A. Due Process
“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving citizens of liberty without due
process of law.” Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005). This guarantee applies to
prison inmates, but “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and
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the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 	Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The Supreme Court has established that protected liberty
interests are at issue in the prison setting only when an inmate is subjected to (1) conditions that
“impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life” or (2) disciplinary actions that “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”
Harrison v. Morton, 490 F. App'x 988, 992 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484,
487).
Plaintiff has not alleged that his disciplinary proceedings resulted in the loss of good time
credit or otherwise affected the duration of his sentence. He claims that he received placement in
segregation as a sanction for his conviction.
Plaintiff has failed to show that his placement in segregation constituted an atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 	The Supreme Court has
held that “the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more
adverse conditions of confinement.” 	Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005) (citing
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause
itself in transfer from low-to maximum-security prison because “[c]onfinement in any of the
State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has
authorized the State to impose”). “Changing an inmate’s prison classification . . . ordinarily does
not deprive him of liberty, because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison.”
Sawyer v. Jefferies, 315 F. App’x 31, 34 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d
367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225)); cf. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24
(finding atypical and significant hardship in assignment to supermax facility where all human
contact prohibited, conversation not permitted, lights on 24-hours-a-day, exercise allowed for only
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one hour per day in small indoor room, indefinite placement with annual review, and
disqualification of otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration).
Any loss of privileges he has received also fails to create a protected liberty interest. This
Court has found that where the duration of a prisoner’s sentence is not affected, punishments in
the form of privilege restrictions and fines fail to create a protected liberty interest. See Lewis v.
Zmuda, 2023 WL 8005022, at *10 (D. Kan. Nov. 17, 2023), aff’d 2025 WL 1215505 (10th Cir.
April 28, 2025) (citing see Beauclair v. High, No. 14-3020-SAC, 2015 WL 93636, at *3 (D. Kan.
Jan. 7, 2015) (citing Hornsby v. Jones, 392 F. App’x 653, 655 (10th Cir. 2010), for the proposition
that punishments of fines and segregation for a limited number of days generally fail to implicate
a protected liberty interest); see also Marshall v. Laird, 2013 WL 3226632, at *3 (D. Kan. June 25,
2013) (“[A] denial of privileges does not impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life, and consequently no liberty interest is at stake where the
inmate may be sanctioned with a loss of privileges only.”); Blum v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,
189 F.3d 477, 1999 WL 638232, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999) (concluding that 90-day
disciplinary segregation which left inmate without “store privileges, radio, phone calls, etc.” were
“such conditions . . . not different in such degree and duration as compared with ‘the ordinary
incidents of prison life’ to be a protected liberty interest under the Due Process clause.” (citations
omitted))).
Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he is not challenging his housing in
segregation, but rather the process used in his disciplinary proceedings. 	He claims that various
Kansas regulations were not followed, and that he was not made aware of the policy requiring a
one-year placement in segregation for being convicted of a battery on staff. This Court in Lewis
went on to find that Kansas has not created a liberty interest through state regulations. Id. (citing
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see Grossman v. Werholtz, 264 P.3d 1060, 2011 WL 6385650, *3 (Kan. App. 2011) (“[I]n Kansas,
even if a statute or regulation mandates that punishment will not occur absent specified substantive
predicates, there is no due process violation unless the resulting administrative punishment results
in a significant and atypical hardship for the inmate over and above the inmate’s underlying
sentence.” Ramirez v. State, 931 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Kan. App. 1997), rev. denied 262 Kan. 962
(1997))).2 Plaintiff must show good cause why his due process claim should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
B. Conspiracy
Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy based on Defendants’ participation in the Segregation Review
Boards, where they determined that Plaintiff should remain in segregation. The Court held in the
M&O that the Tenth Circuit has considered “a § 1983 conspiracy claim” as “a conspiracy to violate
a right protected by § 1983.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted). “Provided that there is an underlying constitutional deprivation, the conspiracy
claim allows for imputed liability; a plaintiff may be able to impose liability on one defendant for
the actions of another performed in the course of the conspiracy.” Id. (citations omitted). 	The
Court found in the M&O that because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege an underlying
constitutional violation, he has not stated a plausible claim for relief based on conspiracy liability.
2 Violations of state law or prison regulations do not provide a cause of action under § 1983. See Porro v. Barnes,
624 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding prisoner must establish that violation
of a prison policy necessarily stated a constitutional violation). As the Tenth Circuit has stated:
[N]o reasonable jurist could conclude that [a plaintiff’s] claim that prison officials
deprived him of due process by violating internal prison regulations rises to the
level of a due process violation. Prison regulations are “primarily designed to
guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison [They are] not
designed to confer rights on inmates….” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-
82, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
Brown v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, 234 F. App’x 874, 878 (10th Cir. 2007).
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See Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1231 (10th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not cure this deficiency. Plaintiff must show good cause why
his conspiracy claim in Count II should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
C. First Amendment
Plaintiff alleges in Count III that his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion
was violated when his disciplinary hearing was terminated based on his refusal to raise his hand
to be sworn in. The only support Plaintiff provides is his assertion that he was not in a court of
law, and that he is a Muslim and it goes against his religious beliefs. 	However, in Plaintiff’s
attached grievance, he claims that the hearing officer terminated his hearing based on Plaintiff’s
refusal to participate. (Doc. 19–1, at 2.) Plaintiff claims in the grievance that this is a lie because
he “raised [his] hand like she ask[ed].” Id.
“To state a valid constitutional claim, a prisoner must allege facts showing that officials
substantially burdened a sincerely held religious belief.” Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1133
(10th Cir. 2021) (citing Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)). 	Our Circuit has
articulated the following test to determine when the government places a substantial burden on a
plaintiff’s free exercise of religion:
The government substantially burdens a person’s religions exercise
... when it (1) “requires participation in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief,” (2) “prevents participation in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief,” or (3)
“places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage
in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.”
Blair v. Raemisch, 804 F. App’x 909, 916–17 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone,
600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Based on Plaintiff’s grievance, it is not clear whether or not Plaintiff raised his right hand
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at the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff has provided no factual support as to why raising his hand to
be sworn in violated a sincerely held religious belief. Plaintiff merely argues that there is nothing
in K.A.R. 44-13-403 that states that an inmate must be sworn in. However, the regulation provides
that “[t]he hearing officer shall rule on all matters of evidence. Strict rules of evidence, as used in
a court of law, shall not be required, but the hearing officer shall exercise diligence to admit reliable
and relevant evidence and to refuse to admit irrelevant or unreliable evidence.” 	K.A.R. 44-13-
403(j). In addition, K.A.R. 44-13-106 provides that:
(a) The warden, a deputy warden, the disciplinary administrator
appointed pursuant to K.A.R. 44-13-105, and those persons serving
as hearing officers at the facility disciplinary hearings shall be
authorized to administer oaths to witnesses in those proceedings.
(b) Oaths shall be administered in a form and a manner that are in
accordance with K.S.A. 54-101 et seq., and amendments thereto.
K.A.R. 44-13-106(a) and (b). 	K.S.A. 54-103 provides that “[a]ny person having conscientious
scruples against taking an oath, may affirm with like effect.” K.S.A. 54-103. 3
Plaintiff 	provides 	no 	details 	as 	to 	his 	sincerely 	held 	religious 	belief, 	what 	was
objectionable, or whether he requested or was offered any alternatives such as affirmation.
Plaintiff must show good cause why his First Amendment claim should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
Plaintiff is ordered to show good cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of this matter without
further notice for failure to state a claim.
3 The Federal Rules of Evidence include a similar provision. See Fed. R. Evid. 603 (“Before testifying, a witness
must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s
conscience.”); Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 603 (“This rule is designed to afford the
flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, atheists, conscientious objectors, mental defectives, and
children.”).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until March 19, 2026, in which
to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated February 19, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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