Williams v. CertainTeed LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANTWAIN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 25-cv-2692-EFM-ADM
CERTAINTEED LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Antwain Williams’ Motion to
Remand (Doc. 14) and Defendant CertainTeed LLC’s Motion for Leave to Amend Notice of
Removal (Doc. 24). For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand and denies Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Notice of Removal as moot.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Antwain Williams, a Kansas citizen, is a former employee of Defendant.
Defendant is an LLC organized under Delaware law. Defendant’s sole member is CertainTeed
Holding Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware and has a principal place of business in
Pennsylvania.
On February 4, 2025, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment for allegedly lying on
his timecard. On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the District Court of Wyandotte
County, 	Kansas. 	The 	Complaint 	asserted 	claims 	for 	wrongful 	termination 	and 	disparate
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treatment/race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and a claim for
disparate treatment/race discrimination in violation of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination
(“KAAD”). On November 24, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. Defendant answered Plaintiff’s Complaint on
November 26, 2025.
On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint abandoning his Title VII
claims and leaving his KAAD claims. The next day, pursuant to the standard District of Kansas
Scheduling Order, Plaintiff communicated a settlement demand to Defendant in an amount
exceeding $75,000.
On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand the case on the basis that the
Court no longer has federal question jurisdiction. Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion,
and at the same time, filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Notice of Removal.
II. 	Legal Standard
A party may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction.”1 The removal must contain a “short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal” and must “be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the
defendant” of the state court complaint.2
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they must have a statutory basis for their
jurisdiction.” 3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases “arising
1 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b).
3 Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. City of
Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.2012)).
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under” the Constitution and laws of the United States, regardless of the amount in controversy
(federal question jurisdiction). “A case arises under federal law if its ‘well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’”4 Additionally, under
28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal courts also have jurisdiction over civil actions where there is a diversity
of citizenship. To invoke diversity jurisdiction, a party must show that complete diversity of
citizenship exists between the adverse parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.5
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s removal of this case to federal court. Instead, he
seeks to remand this case on the basis that it no longer has federal question jurisdiction. Defendant
opposes Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and contends that the Court may, and should, exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. In the alternative, Defendant asks the
Court for leave to amend its Notice of Removal. The Court will first address Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand.
A. 	Motion to Remand
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a federal district court must remand an action removed from
state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.”6 The removing defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that removal was
4 Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2006).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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proper by showing that the federal court had jurisdiction.7 When ruling on a motion to remand, the
district court must look at the plaintiff’s complaint at the time the notice of removal was filed.8
Here, Defendant has met its burden to show that removal was proper. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b), a defendant has 30 days to remove a case to federal court after being served with a state
court petition. Defendant filed its removal notice within the required 30 days.
Furthermore, the Complaint properly conferred federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s
Complaint asserted a claim under Title VII, which is a federal law that created Plaintiff’s cause of
action.9 The Court also had supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s KAAD claims. 	A district
court with federal question jurisdiction may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims that derive from the “common nucleus of operative fact” as the federal claim.10 Plaintiff’s
KAAD claims arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as his Title VII claim—his termination
of his employment. The Court thus could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
law claim. Accordingly, Defendant properly removed the action to this Court.
Plaintiff argues that the Court must remand the case because the Court no longer has subject
matter jurisdiction. He contends that because his Amended Complaint no longer asserts a federal
claim, the Court no longer has federal question jurisdiction. However, as the Court noted above,
on a motion to remand, the Court examines the complaint at the time the notice of removal was
7 Ruiz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 757 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)).
8 Id. (citing Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1021 (1988)).
9 See Morris, 39 F.3d at 1111 (stating that a case arises under federal law if the complaint establishes that
federal law creates the cause of action) (citation omitted).
10 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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filed.11 And, if “federal question jurisdiction existed at the time of removal, [a district court] has
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims which are part of the same
case or controversy as federal claims which have been dismissed.”12 Thus, even though Plaintiff
no longer asserts a Title VII claim, the Court may exercise its discretion to assert supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction still exists, and
the Court is not required to remand the case under § 1447(c).13
When deciding whether to assert supplemental jurisdiction, courts must look to whether
remand would “promote values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”14 Often, these
factors weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction.15 In this case, however, they weigh in
favor of it.
Defendant asserts, and the Court agrees, that since Plaintiff filed his Complaint, it has
become apparent that the Court has diversity jurisdiction. The parties are diverse. Plaintiff is a
Kansas citizen; Defendant is an LLC organized under Delaware law. Defendant’s sole member is
CertainTeed Holding Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware and has a principal place of
business in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, on December 9, 2025, Plaintiff communicated a settlement
demand to Defendant for an amount in excess of 75,000. Thus, because the amount in controversy
11 Ruiz, 757 F. Supp. at 1197 (citation omitted).
12 Howard v. Burlington Coat Factory, LLC, 2007 WL 2746784, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 20, 2007) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) and (c)); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F .3d 1223, 1242 n.29 (10th Cir. 2006)).
13 Howard, 2007 WL 2746784, at 3 n.2; see also Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n v. 1950 Logan Condos Condo.
Ass’n, 2013 WL 6858821, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2013) (“[W]hen all federal claims giving rise to jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1331 are dismissed, the [d]istrict [c]ourt retains its statutory supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
14 Howard, 2007 WL 2746784, at *3 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353 (1988)).
15 See Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have been
dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”)
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requirement is now satisfied,16 the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the action. Were the Court
to remand the case, Defendant would have viable grounds for removing it again. Thus, it would be
a waste of judicial resources to remand the action only for it to be removed again.17 Therefore, the
Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim and denies Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand.
B. 	Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Notice of Removal
Defendant moves for leave to amend its Notice of Removal as an alternative basis for the
Court to retain jurisdiction over the case. Defendant’s proposed Amended Notice of Removal
asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction instead of
federal question jurisdiction. However, the Court need not rule on this Motion because it exercises
it discretion to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s KAAD claims.18 Therefore,
Defendant’s Motion is denied as moot.
16 See Padilla v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1249 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2017) (“[A]
defendant may rely on the plaintiff’s proposed settlement amount if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the
plaintiff’s claim, because the plaintiff’s own estimation of its claim is a proper means of supporting the allegations in
the notice of removal.”). Additionally, in Defendant’s proposed Amended Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that
KAAD allows for the recovery of lost wages, and Plaintiff’s lost wage claim through the end of 2026 would be
approximately $ 88,700.
17 See 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3733 (Rev. 4th ed. updated Sept.
2025) (“When events after removal do not oust the court of jurisdiction but do eliminate the jurisdictional basis upon
which the removal was predicated—as, for example, when the plaintiff drops its federal-question claims—the courts
should recognize that the case may remain in federal court and that no amendment of the removal notice is necessary
to enable the case to do so.”).
18 Even if the Court were to consider Defendant’s Motion on the merits, it must be denied. “A defendant
generally may not cure a defective notice of removal by asserting a new basis of jurisdiction not contained in the
original notice of removal.” Colo. Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 2016 WL 8578095, at *5
(D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2016) (citation omitted); see also Wright & Miller § 3733 (“[D]efendants may not add completely
new grounds for removal or furnish missing allegations, even if the court rejects the first-proffered basis of removal.”).
Thus, Defendant’s amendment to the Notice of Removal to assert diversity jurisdiction as a new basis for subject
matter jurisdiction would be improper.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) is
DENIED. The Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s KAAD claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Notice of
Removal (Doc. 24) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2026.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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