Ross v. Life Centers of Kansas, LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ELIZABETH ROSS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-2642-JWB
LIFE CENTERS OF KANSAS, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16.) The
motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 17, 27, 29.) The motion is DENIED IN PART
and GRANTED IN PART for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	Facts
The facts set forth below are taken from the first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 11.)
This case is a federal employment discrimination and retaliation action brought by Elizabeth Ross
(“Plaintiff”) against her former employer, Life Centers of Kansas, LLC (“Defendant”), under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).1 (Id. ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff worked as a Direct Services Provider (“DSP”) for Defendant from September
2021 until her termination in May 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 11, 12.) Plaintiff’s role involved supporting
clients with intellectual and physical disabilities, which required her to assist with wheelchair use
and moving clients. In January 2024, she suffered injuries to her shoulders and neck after slipping
on ice at work, which impaired her ability to lift and push clients. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) She worked
with management to arrange informal accommodations that reduced her wheelchair and lifting
1 The governing law is the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), and the court applies the amended statute
and regulations. However, for ease of reference the court continues to use the term “ADA.”
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duties. 	Based on those discussions, Plaintiff alleges that management for Defendant was either
aware of her disability or perceived her as disabled.
On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff was paired with a coworker, Kathy Burns, to take clients into
the community. 	(Id. ¶ 18.) 	During the outing, Burns was hostile towards Plaintiff, eventually
abandoning her alone with the clients when Plaintiff reminded Burns of her physical limitations
due to injury. 	Plaintiff alleges that Burns implied she was faking her injuries. 	(Id. ¶ 20.) 	In
response, Plaintiff texted her scheduling coordinator, Tessa Dunfield, to report Burns’ conduct and
request not to be assigned with her. Management convened a meeting between Plaintiff and Burns,
but it quickly deteriorated when Burns verbally attacked Plaintiff, accusing her of avoiding work
and fabricating her injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Presumably during the meeting, Burns also informed
Defendant that Plaintiff intended to pursue legal action against them for her workplace injuries.
Plaintiff left the meeting upset and said to herself that she quit, though not directing the comment
at anyone. 	Cassandra Meyers from HR, however, overheard Plaintiff’s statement. 	Plaintiff
explained she was venting frustration and had no intention of resigning, and Meyers assured her
she would disregard any such suggestion. 	(Id. ¶ 28.) 	But the following day, Meyers contacted
Plaintiff and accepted her resignation, despite Plaintiff invoking their prior conversation.
Plaintiff alleges that the real reason for her termination was Burns’s statements to
management—that Plaintiff was malingering, trying to avoid work, and planning to sue—and that
management used the alleged resignation as a pretext to act on those statements.
On December 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and, on
August 12, 2025, received her right to sue letter. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) This action was subsequently filed
on November 3, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff brings two ADA claims: discrimination (“Count I”) and
retaliation (“Count II”). (Doc. 11.) Defendant seeks dismissal of only Count I. (Doc. 16.)
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II. 	Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. 	Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 	Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d
1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court’s
consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that she was discriminated against due to her disability. The ADA prohibits
“discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application 	procedures, 	the 	hiring, 	advancement, 	or 	discharge 	of 	employees, 	employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). 	The elements of an ADA discrimination claim require Plaintiff to show she is: (1)
disabled or regarded as disabled, as defined by the ADA, (2) qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job, and (3) was terminated “under circumstances which give rise to an inference
that the termination was based on [her] disability.” Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d
530, 544 (10th Cir. 2014). Defendants challenge the first and third elements.2 (Doc. 17 at 2.)
But before Plaintiff can bring her claim under the ADA, she “must have exhausted her
administrative remedies as to that claim before filing suit.” Edmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
17 F.4th 975, 988 (10th Cir. 2021). To do so, Plaintiff must have “timely filed an EEOC charge
for which [she] has received a right-to-sue letter.” Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1181
2 Because Defendant did not raise arguments regarding the second element, the court assumes for the purposes of this
motion that Defendant has conceded that Plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.
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(10th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exhaustion requirement serves
two purposes: (1) “to give notice of the alleged violation to the charged party,” and (2) “to give
the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the claim.” Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d
1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020). The ADA allows a plaintiff to proceed under three different theories
of disability. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to any “regarded as” theory of disability. 	(Doc. 17 at 2–5.)
While courts must construe the charge liberally, it must “contain facts concerning the
discriminatory and retaliatory actions underlying each claim,” and exhaustion depends on those
facts—not on the legal conclusions asserted. McDade v. Weston Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 24-8031,
2025 WL 415481, at *4 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (quoting Smith v. Cheyenne Ret. Invs. L.P., 904
F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2018)). Asserting an actual disability in a charge does not automatically
exhaust all three ADA disability theories; the factual allegations must give the EEOC reasonable
notice of the specific theory to be advanced in litigation. 	Id. at *10–11. 	In other words, the
“ultimate question” regarding exhaustion is whether “the conduct alleged [in the complaint] would
fall within the scope of an EEOC investigation which would reasonably grow out of the charges
actually made [in the charge].” 	Smith, 904 F.3d at 1164–65 (internal quotations omitted and
alterations in original). So, the question here is whether the “regarded as” theory of liability alleged
in the complaint would reasonably grow out of the charges actually made in Plaintiff’s EEOC
charge. The court finds it would not.
Here, Plaintiff’s charge (Doc. 27-1) unambiguously alleged the existence of an actual
disability. 	A review of the charge reveals that Plaintiff consistently asserted she was injured,
described the lifting/pushing restrictions that resulted from those injuries, and expressed distress
at her coworker’s suggestion to the contrary. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5–6, 9–10.) The factual thrust of the charge
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is that Plaintiff had an actual disability and that her coworker was wrong to imply otherwise. Those
allegations naturally direct an EEOC investigation toward an actual-disability theory; they would
not, however, prompt any inquiry into whether Defendant perceived Plaintiff as disabled when she
was not. As Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s own framing of the dispute confirms this. (Doc. 29
at 3.) The two factual scenarios Plaintiff identifies as possible—either management believed she
was really injured, or management believed she was faking—are both logically inconsistent with
a “regarded as” theory. 	If management believed Plaintiff, it credited an actual disability; if
management credited Burns’s accusation of malingering, it believed Plaintiff had no disability. In
neither scenario did management regard someone as disabled. The instant case is therefore unlike
Sink v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (D. Kan. 2001), to which Plaintiff directs
the court’s attention. 	In that case, the EEOC charge alleged that management had refused to
accept a physician’s release authorizing the plaintiff to return to work. Id. This allegation indicates
that the plaintiff, while not actually disabled (per the physicians note), was refused permission to
return to work because of the manager’s perception that the plaintiff was disabled. Id. That is a
scenario where the employer treated the employee as disabled despite contrary medical evidence,
placing the EEOC on notice of a “regarded as” claim. No such allegations exist here.
Plaintiff also argues that the allegations in her FAC support the conclusion that she
administratively exhausted her “regarded as” disability theory. (Doc. 27 at 2, 3, n.1 (citing Doc.
11 ¶ 17).) 	This argument is unavailing. 	When assessing whether a plaintiff has exhausted
administrative remedies, courts focus on the scope of the EEOC charge and not the allegations in
the complaint. See Lincoln, 2020 WL 4000912 at *7 (“To exhaust administrative remedies, the
charge must contain facts concerning the discriminatory . . . actions”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Lastly, Plaintiff argues that because she can plead her cause of action in the alternative, she
has sufficiently pled her “regarded as” theory. (Doc. 27 at 2.) Defendant, appropriately, does not
dispute this and notes that this assertion is of no concern in resolving the underlying question.
(Doc. 29 at 2.) Of course, Plaintiff may plead alternative legal theories. However, such theories
may only be pled once they have been administratively exhausted. See Edmonds, 17 F.4th at 988.
Here, Plaintiff has not carried her burden to show she administratively exhausted her “regarded
as” theory of liability under her ADA discrimination claim—so it is barred. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim proceeds only on an actual-disability theory.
Having dismissed the “regarded as” theory on exhaustion grounds, the court turns to
whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an actual disability.3 On the disability element, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient and conclusory because she identified only
discrete job-related tasks—pushing wheelchairs and lifting clients—rather than a limitation on a
major life activity. (Docs. 17 at 4–5; 29 at 4–5.) Plaintiff responds that she identified her injury
with specificity (shoulder and neck injuries from a January 2024 workplace fall), described its
duration through the end of her employment, and alleged that it limited her ability to lift and push—
both are recognized major life activities under the ADA. (Doc. 27 at 1–2.) Plaintiff further notes
that the Tenth Circuit does not require a precise description of the major life activity at the pleading
stage. Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App’x 827, 832 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] was not
required to provide a precise description of the major life activity allegedly affected by her
disability.”). The court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an actual disability under the ADA.
The ADA lists “lifting” as an example of a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
At this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations that she suffered injuries to her shoulders and neck in January
3 Defendant concedes that Plaintiff exhausted her ADA discrimination claim under an actual disability theory. (Doc.
17 at 4.) In reviewing the charge, the court agrees. (Doc. 27-1.)
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2024 that imposed lifting and pushing restrictions lasting through the remainder of her employment
plausibly suggest a substantial limitation on a major life activity. This case is distinguishable from
this court’s prior case cited by Defendant, where the plaintiff alleged only the need for more
frequent restroom breaks that bore a more attenuated relationship to a recognized major life
activity. See Castro v. Dot’s Pretzels, LLC, No. 20-2579-JWB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156471,
at *21 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2021). 	Unlike in Castro, Plaintiff here alleges severe impairments,
resulting in a formal accommodation arrangement with management. 	While the allegations are
not elaborate, they are sufficient at this stage to plausibly allege that Plaintiff is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA. Defendants’ motion on this ground is denied.
As to the third element, Defendant argues that all of the alleged discriminatory conduct is
attributable only to Burns, a coworker with no supervisory authority, and that Plaintiff’s “cat’s
paw” 4 theory—also known as subordinate bias liability—fails because there are no factual
allegations linking Burns’s bias to the termination decision. 	(Docs. 17 at 5–7; 29 at 5–7.)
Defendant further contends that the FAC undermines discriminatory intent by showing that
management granted Plaintiff’s accommodation request and convened a meeting to address the
workplace conflict. 	(Doc. 17 at 6.) 	Plaintiff responds that she has sufficiently alleged a
subordinate bias liability claim: a biased coworker (Burns) communicated her animus directly to
management and management terminated Plaintiff the next day. (Doc. 27 at 4–6.) Plaintiff argues
that a biased subordinate need not have supervisory authority for the theory to apply—it is enough
that the subordinate’s conduct was the proximate cause of the adverse decision. The court agrees.
Under the subordinate bias liability theory, a plaintiff can establish employer liability by
showing that a “biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions
4 See E.E.O.C. v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the fable
from which the “cat’s paw” doctrine derives its name).
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caused the adverse employment action.” 	EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476,
487 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Burns angrily accused her of malingering and of
planning to sue Defendant in a meeting that management itself convened. Further, that Defendant
terminated Plaintiff the following day, refusing to honor the HR representative’s own assurance
that the offhand “I quit” statement would be disregarded. 	(Doc. 11 ¶¶ 22–28.) 	Taking those
allegations as true, it is plausible that Burns’ statements at the meeting influenced the termination
decision. While Defendant focuses its argument on lack of facts regarding what, if any, influence
Burns exercised on management, the close temporal proximity between the meeting and
termination supports an inference that Burns may have influenced the decision to terminate.
Defendant’s contention that management conducted an independent investigation is a factual
dispute that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. Finally, Defendants suggest that the biased
subordinate liability theory only applies to “subordinate supervisors” and not “coworkers,” such
as Burns. 	(Doc. 17 at 5–6.) 	The cases Defendant cites do not support that proposition and the
court can otherwise find none. In summary, the allegations here are sufficient to plausibly connect
Burns’ conduct to the termination decision. Defendants’ motion on this ground is denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
THEREFORE, Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s “regarded as” theory of liability is barred for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Plaintiff, however, has sufficiently pled an ADA discrimination claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.
__s/ John W. Broomes________________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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