Cumpton v. Wonnell et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SHARA CUMPTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE ROBERT WONNELL, BLAIR GISI,
ASHLEE YEAGER, JENNIE LEACH, MARK
YORK, KEVIN CORLEW, TAYLOR
CLEVERINGA, JOHN YOUNG, BYRON
ROBERSON, ROD HOFFMAN, and JUDGE
DAVID HAUBER in their individual capacities,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:25-cv-02619-DDC-TJJ
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and
recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), Plaintiff may file
a written objection to this report and recommendation. A party must file any objections within the
fourteen-day period if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or recommended disposition. If no objections are timely filed, no appellate
review will be allowed by any court.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Relevant Background
Plaintiff Shara Cumpton, proceeding pro se, filed her Complaint (ECF No. 1) alleging
claims arising out of ongoing cases in Johnson County, Kansas District Court: Shara Dianne
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Cumpton v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, et al., JO-2025-CV-002339 and Mark York v. Shara Dianne
Cumpton, Case No. JO-2025-LM-014658, concerning the title, foreclosure of, and eviction from
the property at issue. Plaintiff claims her constitutional rights have been violated throughout the
course of such proceedings, and various actors have acted in bad faith and to unjustly enrich
themselves.
Plaintiff brings her claims against Johnson County District Court Judges Robert Wornell
and David Hauber; Johnson County District Court Clerk Jennie Leach; Johnson County Sherriff
Byron Roberson; attorneys Blair T. Gisi, Ashley Yager, Kevin Corlew, Taylor Cleveringa, and
Rod Hoffman; and individuals Mark York and John Young, President of the Young Management
Group (collectively “Defendants”). In her Complaint, Plaintiff seeks an immediate and
preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, restoration of her property and deed in fee simple
absolute, restoration of her true and lawful name and status in all records, a full equitable
accounting, and marshaling of all assets wrongly diverted or held in controversy. Plaintiff does
not seek monetary damages from any Defendant.
On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining
Order in Equity and Emergency Preliminary Injunction Under Exigent Circumstances (ECF No.
9). In her motion, Plaintiff alleges an eviction hearing was held on October 6, 2025, and a Bench
Trial is scheduled for November 14, 2025. Plaintiff alleges the opposing party in the underlying
state eviction action sought to remove Plaintiff from her home “even though title to the property
remains in dispute and under active appeal.”1 Plaintiff asks this Court to issue a temporary
restraining order preventing Defendants, the Johnson County Sheriff, and any other actors from
executing or enforcing any eviction from the property at issue.
1 Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining Order in Equity and Emergency Preliminary
Injunction Under Exigent Circumstances, ECF No. 9, p. 2.
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After careful review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes
the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief and none of Plaintiff’s
purported claims are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the
Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
I. Applicable Legal Standards
When a party seeks to proceed without the prepayment of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires
the court to screen the party’s complaint. The court must dismiss the complaint if it determines
that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.2 The purpose
of § 1915(e) is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon,
baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit
and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.”3
This Court reviews the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint under the same standards as
those used when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).4 Plaintiff “must
allege sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible—more than merely conceivable—on its
face.”5 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement
of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Additionally, the complaint must state
more than “labels and conclusions” and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief beyond the speculative level.”6 Plaintiff proceeds pro se, thus her pleadings must be
2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
3 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
4 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007).
5 Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
6 Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 545.
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construed liberally.7 However, she still bears the burden to allege “sufficient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based,”8 and the Court cannot “take on the responsibility of serving
as [her] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”9
“Apart from the court’s obligation to screen IFP complaints for merit, the court has an
independent obligation to determine if subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”10 “[F]ederal courts are
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction” and “may only hear cases when empowered to do so
by the Constitution and by act of Congress.”11 Within the meaning of § 1915(e), a complaint is
frivolous “if its subject matter is outside the jurisdiction of the court.”12
II. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Claims for Equitable Relief
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges “the proceedings in the District Court of Johnson County,
Kansas, concerning the misuse of her name, the foreclosure of her home, and the misappropriation
of her property, were conducted in violation of constitutional and equitable principles, resulting in
the taking of property without due process or just compensation.”13 Plaintiff concludes that during
such proceedings her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated. Plaintiff seeks various forms of
equitable and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff requests the Court issue preliminary and
permanent injunctions to protect the property at issue, restore the property to Plaintiff, restore
7 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
8 Id.
9 Mays v. Wyandotte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2010 WL 6032763, at *2 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)).
10 Martinez v. Pickering, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2021 WL 12146947, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2022 WL 21778539 (D. Kan. Feb. 28,
2022) (citing Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015)).
11 Gad, 787 F.3d at 1035.
12 Oltremari by McDaniel v. Kan. Social & Rehabilitative Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1994).
13 Pl.’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, p. 7.
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Plaintiff’s true and lawful name in all records, conduct a full accounting, and marshal all assets
and property interests held in controversy. As discussed below, the Court concludes it lacks
jurisdiction over such claims for equitable relief pursuant to the principles of Younger abstention
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
“Younger abstention dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings
by granting equitable relief—such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory
judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings—when such relief could
adequately be sought before the state court.”14 There are three factors that dictate whether Younger
abstention applies: “(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2)
the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and
(3) the state proceedings ‘involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state
law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.’”15
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, limited Younger’s
application to the following three types of state court proceedings: (1) ongoing state criminal
prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions; and (3)
“civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability
to perform their judicial functions.”16 These three categories are the “exceptional” circumstances
to which Younger applies.17 The “exceptional circumstances” requiring abstention under
Younger’s third civil proceedings category are present only when “the relief requested from the
federal court would enjoin or otherwise interfere with such [state court] proceedings.”18 This case
14 Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999)).
15 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999)).
16 Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013).
17 Id.
18 Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 672 (10th Cir. 2020).
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falls within the third circumstance, which applies because Plaintiff’s requested relief would “enjoin
or otherwise interfere with” the state court foreclosure and eviction proceedings.19 Therefore, the
Court now analyzes whether Younger abstention is appropriate in this matter.
First, Plaintiff’s state court cases Shara Dianne Cumpton v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, et
al., JO-2025-CV-002339 and Mark York v. Shara Dianne Cumpton, Case No. JO-2025-LM-
014658, are ongoing.20 Therefore, the first Younger factor is met.
Second, the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the
Complaint. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that state law prevents her from presenting
her federal claims in the state court proceedings.21 However, Plaintiff merely states that her
constitutional rights have been violated or otherwise ignored. Plaintiff does not provide any
authority or arguments that would support a conclusion the state court could not entertain the
constitutional claims arising from the state court proceedings. In fact, state courts have been found
adequate forums for federal constitutional claims.22 To the extent Plaintiff has already raised her
19 See id; Horton v. Clark, 948 F.2d 1294, at *1 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding a state foreclosure proceeding
“is precisely the type of case where federal courts out of concerns of comity and the nature of our federal
system properly refuse to exercise jurisdiction and intermeddle in the state court proceedings”);
Columbian Fin. Corp. v. Stork, 811 F.3d 390, 393 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Younger requires federal courts to
refrain from ruling when it could interfere with ongoing state proceedings”); Wilson v. Mennonite
Housing, No. 22-1155-JAR-KGG, 2022 WL 3345003, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2022) (finding Younger
prevents federal court from exercising jurisdiction over ongoing eviction proceedings in Sedgwick
County, Kansas District Court); Egbune v. Baum, No. 23-cv-02830-PAB, 2024 WL 1374905, at *5 (D.
Colo. Apr. 1, 2024) (finding complaint seeking injunctive relief related to a state foreclosure proceedings
constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” under Sprint because such request “essentially asks [the court]
to enjoin, or at the very least overturn, a state court foreclosure judgment”).
20 See Shara Dianne Cumpton v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, et al., Case No. JO-2025-CV-002339
(Johnson County, Kan.). A publicly accessible review of the docket shows Plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal in this matter on November 5, 2025. See Collins v. Zmuda, No. 25-cv-3077-JWL, 2025 WL
1927720, at *7 (D. Kan. July 14, 2025) (finding case was ongoing for purposes of Younger abstention
when state court appeal was still pending). See also Mark York v. Shara Dianne Cumpton, No. JO-2025-
LM-014658. A publicly accessible review of the docket shows this matter was filed on October 29, 2025,
and there are filings entered as recently as November 14, 2025. There does not appear to be a judgment
or other disposition of the state court matter entered into the docket.
21 See Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013).
22 Id. (finding state court adequate forum for raising constitutional claims).
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constitutional concerns in the state court, “that court’s decisions are not ‘inadequate’ for Younger
purposes simply because the court did not rule in her favor.”23 Therefore, the second Younger
factor is met.
Third, the state court proceedings involve important state interests. Plaintiff’s allegations
arise from foreclosure and eviction actions. Such proceedings are traditionally resolved under
state law.24 And the Supreme Court has held it is “beyond question” that states have an important
and essential interest in enforcing rights to and against real estate.25 Therefore, the third Younger
factor is met.
However, a court may decline to abstain under Younger when extraordinary circumstances
are present, including when the underlying state court action was: (1) a criminal prosecution
commenced in bad faith or to harass, (2) based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute,
or (3) related to any other such extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of “irreparable injury”
both great and immediate.26 “[I]t is the plaintiff’s ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger
abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.”27
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in this case. First, Plaintiff’s underlying state court
cases concern foreclosure and eviction, not a criminal prosecution, so the first exception is
inapplicable. Next, Plaintiff does not allege the action is based on a flagrantly and patently
unconstitutional statute. Instead, her allegations are all based on actions of Defendants. The
second exception is therefore inapplicable. Finally, nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint rises to the
23 Id.
24 Fields v. Faircloth, No. 17-4037-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 8408247, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2017).
25 BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
26 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53–54 (1971)).
27 See Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Pro. Licensing of Dept. of Com. of State of Utah, 240 F.3d 871,
876 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889).
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level necessary to show a threat of “irreparable injury” to Plaintiff that is “both great and
immediate.”28 In Younger, the Supreme Court noted in order to show irreparable injury, “the threat
to plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against
a single criminal prosecution.”29 Although Plaintiff’s state court case is not a criminal prosecution,
the same principal applies. The pending state court actions may resolve any alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s protected rights, so the third exception is inapplicable.30 Thus, no exception to Younger
abstention applies.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Certified Copy of Journal Entry of
Foreclosure from Johnson County District Court (ECF No. 13). The “Notice” appears to contain
a Journal Entry of Judgment of Foreclosure in a third Johnson County District Court case involving
the property at issue. This case, Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Shara D. Collins, Case
No. JO-2024-00063, though not mentioned in the Complaint or Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, appears to be resolved, as a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in the matter on
August 20, 2024. To the extent Plaintiff’s is seeking equitable relief for any actions that occurred
during the course of this state court matter, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine precludes a losing party in state court who complains of injury
caused by the state-court judgment from bringing a case seeking review and rejection of that
judgment in federal court.”31 Here, to the extent, if any, Plaintiff seeks review and injunctive relief
28 Cheatham v. Thompson, No. 21-3195-SAC, 2021 WL 4206332, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2021)
(“Generally, a threat of irreparable injury occurs alongside a bad-faith prosecution or where there are a
series of repeated prosecutions” and “the threat to the [individual’s] federally protected rights must be one
that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution”); Hambright v. Kansas,
No. 21-3045-SAC, 2021 WL 1821801, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2021) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46)
(“irreparable injury” must be “both great and immediate”).
29 Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
30 Weitzel, 240 F.3d at 876 (finding third Younger exception did not apply when state court proceedings
could resolve claims brought in federal court).
31 In re Miller, 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012).
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from the state court’s concluded foreclosure and eviction proceedings, such claims are clearly
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.32
Therefore, based on the principles of Younger abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief. Because Plaintiff only
brings claims for equitable relief, the undersigned therefore recommends dismissal of this matter
in its entirety.
B. Plaintiff’s Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court
construes Plaintiff’s claims that her constitutional rights have been violated leniently—as claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for violation of constitutional rights by
persons acting under color of state law.33 However, Plaintiff does not explain how her
constitutional rights were violated. She makes conclusory allegations that her property was
fraudulently taken without due process or just compensation, but does not support such claims
with factual assertions. In fact, the Complaint is completely devoid of any facts regarding several
of the named Defendants and their involvement in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to state any plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III. Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining Order in Equity and
Emergency Preliminary Injunction Under Exigent Circumstances (ECF No. 9)
To secure a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, Plaintiff must show: (1)
she is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) she will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction or temporary restraining order is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the injury
the opposing party will suffer under the injunction or temporary restraining order; and (4) the
32 See Dillard v. Bank of New York, 476 F. App’x 690, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2012).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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injunction or temporary restraining order is not adverse to the public interest.34 Because the court
must abstain from deciding Plaintiff’s claims under the principles of Younger and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff cannot show that she is likely to succeed on the merits.35 Therefore,
the undersigned also recommends Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining
Order in Equity and Emergency Preliminary Injunction Under Exigent Circumstances be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Judge dismiss without
prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, as set forth in the Complaint, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for
equitable relief, and she otherwise fails to state a claim. The undersigned further recommends that
the Court deny Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for Temporary Restraining Order in Equity and
Emergency Preliminary Injunction Under Exigent Circumstances (ECF No. 9).
A copy of this Report and Recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated November 14, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
34 See Schwab v. Kansas, 691 F. App’x 511, 514 (10th Cir. 2017).
35 See id.; Fields, 2017 WL 8408247, at *1.
Teresa J. James
U. S. Magistrate Judge
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