Black v. De La Cruz et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JORDAN BLACK,
Plaintiff,
v.
EMILY DE LA CRUZ, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-2036-DDC-ADM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a transgender woman, alleges that defendants Emily De La Cruz and Kassiah
Martin—employees of the Kansas Board of Cosmetology (KBC)—discriminated against her
because she’s transgender. As plaintiff tells it, defendants erected novel barriers to delay
processing her application for a license to practice electrology in Kansas. Defendants have filed
a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 43). Plaintiff responded, but defendants didn’t file a reply brief, and
the time to do so has passed. As explained below, the court grants in part and denies in part
defendants’ motion.1
1 	Plaintiff also has listed “Unknown Kansas Board of Cosmetology Subcommittee Members” as
defendants in this case. Doc. 37 at 1. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 46), asking for
additional time to amend her pleading to name these defendants. Magistrate Judge Angel D. Mitchell
denied that motion as moot after staying discovery in this case. Doc. 49 at 3. If plaintiff doesn’t move for
leave to amend her operative pleading to name these parties or move for leave for additional time to do so
within 30 days of this Order, the court will require plaintiff to show cause why the court shouldn’t dismiss
these unnamed defendants for failing to serve them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The court’s reference to
“defendants” in this Order thus is limited to the two moving defendants—Ms. De La Cruz and Ms.
Martin.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 1 of 17

2
I. 	Background
The court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and
view[s] them in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], the non-moving party.” Purgatory
Recreation I, LLC v. United States, 157 F.4th 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation cleaned
up).
Plaintiff here is a transgender woman. Doc. 37 at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 8). She completed an
electrogy program at a school in Kentucky. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13). Through this schooling,
plaintiff completed 600 hours of course work, which exceeds Kansas’s 500-hour requirement to
secure an electrology license. Id. at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18). In February 2023, plaintiff began
applying for an electrology license in Kansas. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19). Her point of contact for
the Kansas Board of Cosmetology (KBC) was De La Cruz, an administrative assistant. Id. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 20–21). De La Cruz knew plaintiff is transgender because plaintiff called and spoke
with a “very feminine” voice and also provided her driver’s license which represents that she is
male. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24–26). De La Cruz informed plaintiff that Kentucky needed to
certify her schooling hours. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28). But the KBC had not required any such
certification for two other recent graduates from the same Kentucky school that plaintiff had
attended. Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–33). In other words, De La Cruz invented “fictitious”
requirements for plaintiff to receive a license, and she didn’t impose those requirements on other
applicants who aren’t transgender. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39).
Eventually, plaintiff’s application made its way to Martin, the KBC’s licensing director.
Id. at 4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 41–42). Martin also knew that plaintiff is transgender because
plaintiff met with Martin in person and presented as a woman, even though her application
indicated she’s a man. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43–44). Martin reiterated the requirement that
De La Cruz had communicated, asserting that Kentucky must certify that plaintiff had completed
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 2 of 17

3
the requisite hours. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–47). Plaintiff learned that it wasn’t possible to
secure this type of certification from Kentucky. Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–50). Martin thus
denied plaintiff’s application as incomplete. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 53). So, plaintiff asked Martin
how two other students—persons who had attended the same school in Kentucky as plaintiff and
weren’t transgender—managed to secure Kansas electrology licenses. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 51).
Martin never answered. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52).
Plaintiff submitted an appeal to a licensing subcommittee. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54).
Martin intentionally didn’t provide the subcommittee with all of plaintiff’s materials. Id. at 7
(Am. Compl. ¶ 58). And Martin deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to communicate with the
subcommittee. Id. at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 121). The subcommittee denied plaintiff’s appeal and
her application for a license. Id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 59).
In January 2024, after Martin no longer worked at the KBC, De La Cruz contacted
plaintiff, informing her that her application was complete and she qualified to take the licensing
exam. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65, 67). De La Cruz couldn’t explain what had changed with
plaintiff’s application. Id. at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68–69). Plaintiff secured her electrology
license in March 2024. Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 71).
Plaintiff asserts two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—one for equal protection and a
second for procedural due process.
II. 	Legal Standard
Defendants’ motion invokes Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court describes the governing legal standard for motions made under both
of these rules.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 3 of 17

4
A. 12(b)(1)
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move the court to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and, as such, [they] must have a statutory basis to exercise jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296
F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must
dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is
lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). The party
invoking federal jurisdiction—here, plaintiff—bears the burden to prove it exists. Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C.
v. Century Sur. Co., 906 F.3d 926, 931 (10th Cir. 2018) (presuming “no jurisdiction exists absent
an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction”).
Rule 12(b)(1) motions take one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Stuart v.
Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). “A facial attack asserts that the
allegations in the complaint, even if true, are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
By contrast, a factual attack on the complaint challenges the veracity of the allegations upon
which subject matter jurisdiction depends.” Cnty. Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 614 F.
Supp. 3d 944, 951 (D.N.M. 2022) (quotation cleaned up). Here, defendants make a facial attack
on jurisdiction. So, the court assumes the allegations in the Amended Complaint are true.
B. 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss an action for failing “to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 4 of 17

5
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556);
see also Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“The question is whether, if the allegations are true, it is plausible and not merely possible that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the relevant law.” (citation omitted)).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must assume that factual
allegations in the complaint are true, but it’s “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation[.]’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
And, while this pleading standard doesn’t require “‘detailed factual allegations,’” it demands
more than a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action’” which, as the Supreme Court explained, “‘will not do.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. 	Analysis
Defendants’ motion advances three distinct arguments for dismissal: Eleventh
Amendment immunity, mootness, and qualified immunity. The court takes those arguments in
turn.
A. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. Doc. 43 at 4–7. But that form of
immunity isn’t theirs to assert.
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a nonconsenting state
brought by the state’s own citizens.” Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 928 F.3d 1209, 1212
(10th Cir. 2019). “This immunity extends to arms of the state and to state officials who are sued
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 5 of 17

6
for damages in their official capacity.” Id. Where properly raised, Eleventh Amendment
immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (“Once effectively asserted,
Eleventh Amendment immunity constitutes a bar to the exercise of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.” (quotation cleaned up)). But “suits seeking damages from state officials in their
individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Cornforth v. Univ. of Okla.
Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).
Here, plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities. Doc. 37 at 1; Doc. 47 at 3.
So, Eleventh Amendment immunity doesn’t protect them. See Cornforth, 263 F.3d at 1132.
Perhaps predicting this outcome, defendants also argue that state law requires Kansas to
indemnify its employees. Doc. 43 at 6. So, defendants argue, plaintiff essentially is suing
Kansas. See id. Circuit precedent squarely forecloses this argument. A “state cannot extend its
sovereign immunity to its employees by voluntarily assuming an obligation to indemnify them.”
Cornforth, 263 F.3d at 1133. Defendants thus may not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.
And the court thus denies their request to dismiss on this basis.
B. 	Standing
Defendants next assert that plaintiff lacks standing to bring her claims because, by
plaintiff’s own admission, she now has secured her electrogy license. Doc. 43 at 7–10. The
court disagrees, for the most part.
“Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to decide only ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies.’” Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2). “‘To establish a case or controversy, a plaintiff must possess standing to sue.’” Id.
(quoting S. Furniture Leasing, Inc. v. YRC, Inc., 989 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2021)). “For
Article III standing, a plaintiff must have (1) ‘suffered an injury in fact,’ (2) that is ‘fairly
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 6 of 17

7
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,’ and (3) that is likely to be ‘redressed by a
favorable decision.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
Here, plaintiff has standing to assert her claims for compensatory and punitive damages.
Even though she now has received her electrology license, she retains an interest in securing
damages based on the constitutional violation she allegedly sustained. See Day v. Bond, 500
F.3d 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a plaintiff has standing to assert that his
or her First Amendment rights have been violated.”). Likewise, she has standing to seek
damages for income she was unable to earn for the time defendants allegedly wrongfully denied
her license. See Doc. 37 at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 84); see Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1217
(10th Cir. 2006) (“By definition claims for past damages cannot be deemed moot.”). Stated
simply, plaintiff retains a present interest—standing—in winning money damages to redress her
injuries. See Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Damages
are available for violations of § 1983 to compensate persons for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights.” (quotation cleaned up)). The court thus declines to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims for damages on standing grounds.
But the Amended Complaint also requests injunctive relief. Doc. 37 at 16. Plaintiff lacks
standing to assert a claim seeking this form of relief because plaintiff has secured her electrology
license. Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 71). There’s nothing to enjoin. Plaintiff hasn’t alleged that she’s
likely to suffer a “sufficiently imminent and substantial” future injury. TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 435 (2021). So, she has no standing to seek injunctive relief. As such,
the court dismisses without prejudice plaintiff’s claims to the extent they seek injunctive relief.
See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (instructing that
dismissals for lack of jurisdiction “must be without prejudice”).
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 7 of 17

8
The court now turns to defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.
C. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that qualified immunity protects them from suit. The court begins
with an overview of the law governing qualified immunity. Then, the court applies this law to
each one of plaintiff’s claims.
1. 	Governing Law
“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss phase, the
plaintiff ‘must allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the (1) defendant
plausibly violated their constitutional rights, and that (2) those rights were clearly established at
the time.’” Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1265 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation cleaned up)
(quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008)). That’s so because the
“doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Once a defendant has “asserted the
defense of qualified immunity, the burden is on Plaintiffs to establish their right to proceed.”
Matthews v. Bergdorf, 889 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2018).
A constitutional right is clearly established when, “at the time of the officer’s conduct,
the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing is unlawful. In other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the
officer’s conduct beyond debate.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)
(quotation cleaned up). A plaintiff can’t defeat qualified immunity “simply by alleging violation
of extremely abstract rights,” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quotation cleaned up), and
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 8 of 17

9
a court shouldn’t “define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
As the court explains, below, plaintiff has carried her burden to overcome defendants’
assertions of qualified immunity for her equal-protection claim. But plaintiff hasn’t shouldered
her burden on her procedural-due-process claim.
2. 	Equal Protection
Recall the crux of plaintiff’s Complaint: Defendants discriminated against her based on
her transgender status by refusing to process her application for an electrology license and
imposing more onerous barriers on her than other, similarly situated applicants.
a. 	Constitutional Violation
Taken as true, the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of plaintiff’s
equal-protection rights. Our Circuit has held that discrimination on the basis of transgender
status is discrimination on the basis of sex. Griffith v. El Paso County, 129 F.4th 790, 811–12
(10th Cir. 2025). So, by alleging defendants discriminated against her because she is
transgender, plaintiff “has plausibly alleged” that defendants “purposefully discriminate[d] on
the basis of sex.” Id. at 811 (quotation cleaned up). “Under these circumstances, heightened
scrutiny applie[s].” Id. at 812. To survive this heightened scrutiny—commonly called
intermediate scrutiny—“a gender-based classification needs an exceedingly persuasive
justification.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 799 (10th Cir.
2019) (quotation cleaned up). “The classification must serve important governmental interests
through means substantially related to achieving those objectives.” Id. (quotation cleaned up).
Defendants’ conduct, as plaintiff has alleged it, can’t pass constitutional muster. Plaintiff
alleges that defendants refused to process her license application for nearly a year because she is
transgender. Doc. 37 at 9, 12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86, 105). She further alleges that defendants
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 9 of 17

10
didn’t impede similarly situated applicants who were not transgender. Id. at 4, 6, 11 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 29, 51, 103). Accepted as true, these allegations provide the basis for a finding that
defendants treated plaintiff unfavorably because of her transgender status. The Supreme Court
long has held that “a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quotation cleaned
up). That is, bald and unjustified discrimination can’t survive even rational-basis review. See id.
So, as alleged here, defendants clearly lacked “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for
treating plaintiff differently. Free the Nipple, 916 F.3d at 799 (quotation cleaned up). Plaintiff
thus has stated a plausible § 1983 claim that defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.
b. 	Clearly Established
Binding precedent clearly establishes that intentionally and arbitrarily treating
transgender people differently violates the Equal Protection Clause. At least two cases supplied
clear notice that defendants’ conduct—as plaintiff has alleged it—violated clearly established
federal law.2
Nearly 70 years ago, the Supreme Court held that states “cannot exclude a person from
the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957). In regulating professional licenses, states “can require
high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency[,]” but “any
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity[.]” Id. at
2 	The Circuit decided Griffith after the events underlying this lawsuit. 129 F.4th 790 (published in
February 2025). So, defendants didn’t have clear notice that courts would apply heightened scrutiny to
differential treatment of transgender people. All the same, as the court explains, even without this notice
about heightened scrutiny, defendants’ alleged conduct violated clearly established law.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 10 of 17

11
239. “Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because” of her political affiliation,
race, or religion. Id. Nor can a state exclude an applicant when the state’s “action is invidiously
discriminatory.” Id. Schware provided defendants with notice that they couldn’t deny plaintiff a
professional license based on invidious discrimination, or based on reasons unconnected to her
fitness to practice electrogy.
More recently, our Circuit has explained “the clearly established rule prohibiting
intentional, arbitrary and unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals[.]” A.N. ex rel
Ponder v. Syling, 928 F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2019). In A.N., the Circuit explained that this
rule applies with “obvious clarity” in circumstances of irrational differential treatment. Id.
There, plaintiff alleged that defendants “publicly disclose[d]” her arrest records “even though
New Mexico law prohibits the disclosure of such information for all children under the age of
eighteen.” Id. at 1196. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants had treated her differently than
similarly situated minors. Id. Our Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity, explaining that
the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition against irrational differential treatment applied with
“obvious clarity” and that the rule “is not extremely abstract or imprecise . . . , but rather is
relatively straightforward and not difficult to apply.” Id. at 1198–99. A.N. thus gave defendants
fair notice. The Constitution forbade treating plaintiff differently, arbitrarily and intentionally,
based on her transgender status.
In short, defendants’ alleged conduct violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights to
equal protection. The court thus denies defendants’ request for qualified immunity against
plaintiff’s equal-protection claim.
The court reaches a different result, however, for plaintiff’s claim for procedural-due-
process. The court explains why, next.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 11 of 17

12
3. 	Due Process
a. 	Constitutional Violation
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Stepp v. Lockhart, No. 25-7038, 2026 WL 586738, at *8 (10th Cir.
Mar. 3, 2026) (published) (quotation cleaned up). “To assess whether an individual was denied
procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess
a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then (2) was
the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.” Id. (quotation cleaned up). Take those
steps in turn.
Plaintiff possessed a protected property interest. “A property interest exists if discretion
is limited by the procedures in question, that is, whether the procedures, if followed, require a
particular outcome.” JLPR, LLC v. Utah Dep’t of Ag. & Food, No. 21-CV-436 TS, 2022 WL
2230280, at *3 (D. Utah May 16, 2022) (compiling Tenth Circuit cases). Saying it another way,
a “benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion.” Schulz v. City of Longmont, 465 F.3d 433, 444 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation cleaned
up). Plaintiff alleges that she was “entitled” to an electrology license, implying the KBC had no
discretion to deny her one. Doc. 37 at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 91). Indeed, Kansas law requires the
KBC to issue an electrology license if an applicant meets all requirements. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 65-1904b(a) (explaining that a qualifying applicant “shall be granted a license entitling the
person to practice in this state” if the applicant meets all requirements). Plaintiff alleges that she
met all requirements for this license. Doc. 37 at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 91). The court accepts this
allegation as true. This conclusion takes care of step one.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 12 of 17

13
Now, the court asks whether plaintiff was “afforded an appropriate level of process.”
Stepp, 2026 WL 586738, at *8 (quotation cleaned up). “The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation cleaned up). “Impartiality of the
tribunal is an essential element of due process.” Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1112 (10th
Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff alleges that De La Cruz “intentionally hindered” and “refused to process”
plaintiff’s license application. Doc. 37 at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 93). She also alleges that De La
Cruz created “fictitious requirements” for plaintiff to secure her license and effectively delayed
plaintiff’s license by more than a year. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 94). And, plaintiff alleges, De La
Cruz misrepresented her application to the reviewing subcommittee, effectively denying her a
fair hearing. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 95). These allegations suffice. They establish that De La Cruz
allegedly contributed to depriving plaintiff of a timely and impartial review of her license
application.
The court reaches the same result for defendant Martin. Martin allegedly conjured
unreasonable and novel requirements for plaintiff’s application. Id. at 5–6, 13 (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 47–51, 119). Martin didn’t provide the reviewing subcommittee with all of plaintiff’s
application materials. Id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 58). And Martin denied plaintiff “the opportunity
to talk, explain the situation, or write a letter to the” subcommittee. Id. at 14 (Am. Compl.
¶ 121). Again, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these allegations state a
plausible procedural-due-process claim against Martin. They allege that Martin deprived
plaintiff of an impartial review of her application and deprived her of the opportunity to be heard
by the subcommittee.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 13 of 17

14
The court now progresses to the second prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry:
whether defendants violated a clearly established right.
b. 	Clearly Established
Plaintiff has failed to shoulder her burden on this second part, one requiring her to show
that defendants violated her clearly established rights to procedural due process when they
conjured novel requirements to apply to her application and delayed its consideration. Plaintiff
cites six cases to help her cause. None is availing.
Plaintiff first cites Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232. Doc. 47 at 8. As
the court already has explained, Schware held that states may not exclude persons from
occupations “in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 353 U.S. at 238–39. But Schware says nothing about
procedural due process. It merely holds that a state’s qualification for an occupation “must have
a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity[.]” Id. at 239. This statement of
law isn’t about procedural due process. It’s about substantive due process—i.e., the government
can’t deprive “a person of life, liberty, or property in a manner so arbitrary it shocks the judicial
conscience[.]” Stepp, 2026 WL 586738, at *18. So, Schware can’t “clearly establish” the
contours of plaintiff’s right to procedural due process for the simple reason that it’s not about
procedural due process.
Plaintiff next cites Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). Doc. 47 at 8. In Barry, a state
agency suspended a horse trainer’s license pending a hearing. 443 U.S. at 59–61. The Supreme
Court held that the trainer had a protected property interest in his license. Id. at 64. It explained
that the agency’s prehearing suspension of the license comported with due-process requirements,
but ultimately, the Court held that the agency had deprived plaintiff of due process because it
didn’t sponsor a reasonably prompt hearing after the suspension. Id. at 65–66. Barry gets
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 14 of 17

15
plaintiff closer than Schware because at least it’s about the right that plaintiff asserts. But it’s
still “too factually dissimilar to serve as the clearly established law.” Stepp, 2026 WL 586738, at
*20. Barry was about suspending a license already in effect—not about an application for a
license. What’s more, plaintiff doesn’t allege an inordinate delay in having the subcommittee
review her application. At best, Barry clearly establishes that a professional has a property
interest in an existing occupational license. But it doesn’t speak directly to “the violative nature
of the particular conduct at issue” here. A.N., 928 F.3d at 1197 (quotation cleaned up). So, it
can’t clearly establish the law that defendants purportedly violated.
Plaintiff’s next three cases—FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988); Guttman v. Khalsa,
669 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2012); and Stidham v. Peace Officers Standards & Training, 265 F.3d
1144 (10th Cir. 2001)—all suffer the same problem. Doc. 47 at 8 (listing cases). Each case
recognizes that a professional license can constitute a property interest and that hampering such a
license requires due process. But none of these cases involves applying for a professional
license. That is, plaintiff has failed to pinpoint a case holding that a delay in processing an
application for a professional license violates procedural due process. Nor has plaintiff located a
case suggesting that imposing new requirements on an applicant or meddling with an applicant’s
ability to secure a license violates procedural due process. In short, plaintiff has failed to cite
any case about “the violative nature of the particular conduct at issue[.]” A.N., 928 F.3d at 1197
(quotation cleaned up).
As a last resort, plaintiff cites Mathews v. Edlridge, 424 U.S. 319. Doc. 47 at 8. As
plaintiff acknowledges, Mathews establishes a generic framework for determining the quantum
and kind of process that’s due. But it says nothing about professional licenses, applications, or
the constitutional violations alleged in this case. Mathews is a perfect example of the type of
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 15 of 17

16
case that defines “clearly established law at too high a level of generality.” Stepp, 2026 WL
586738, at *7 (quotation cleaned up). Its uber generic statements of law don’t clearly establish
the law for this case because Mathew’s facts aren’t materially similar to this case. Nor do they
apply with obvious clarity. See id. (“The relevant precedent is considered on point if it involves
materially similar conduct or applies with obvious clarity to the conduct at issue.” (emphasis in
original) (quotation cleaned up)).
Simply put, existing law didn’t put defendants on clear notice that they were violating
plaintiff’s procedural-due-process rights by imposing artificial barriers to her license, failing to
timely process her application, and meddling with her ability to secure her license. The court
thus grants defendants’ request for qualified immunity against plaintiff’s claim for procedural
due process. The court dismisses plaintiff’s procedural-due-process claim with prejudice
because any amendment can’t cure plaintiff’s failure to carry her burden to show that the alleged
violation was clearly established. See Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Schs. Bd. of
Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse of discretion where district court
dismissed claim with prejudice after granting qualified immunity).
IV. 	Conclusion
Plaintiff lacks standing for her request for injunctive relief, so the court dismisses that
claim for relief. The court also grants defendants’ request for qualified immunity against
plaintiff’s procedural-due-process claim. The court thus dismisses this claim as well. The court
otherwise denies defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 43).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendants Emily De La
Cruz and Kassiah Martin’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 43) is granted in part and denied in part, as
set out in full in this Order.
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 16 of 17

17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-02036-DDC-ADM Document 53 Filed 03/26/26 Page 17 of 17