USA v. Jones et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 24-20070-01-DDC
NEWTON JONES (01),
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Spencer Fane LLP, counsel for defendant Newton Jones, has filed a Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel (Doc. 483). In support, Spencer Fane explains that Mr. Jones has breached their
engagement agreement by neglecting to pay the firm for attorneys’ fees he had incurred. Spencer
Fane provided notice to Mr. Jones—attached to its motion as Exhibit A. The notice indicates that
counsel has discussed with Mr. Jones “several times since March” that his account with Spencer
Fane “is seriously past due.” Doc. 483-1 at 2. On July 9, 2026, the court convened a hearing on
Spencer Fane’s motion. At the hearing, Mr. Jones confirmed that he hasn’t paid his attorneys’
final invoice. He also announced that he didn’t oppose its request to withdraw.
The government opposes the motion. Doc. 492. It argues that Spencer Fane hasn’t
shown good cause for counsel to withdraw at this stage of the proceedings. Id. at 2. Specifically,
the government contends that Spencer Fane’s motion doesn’t “allege there is a breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship that would otherwise prevent Spencer Fane from representing the
defendant.” Id. At the hearing, the government expressed concern that allowing withdrawal now
would delay the litigation’s conclusion significantly, especially in light of the case’s complexity
and the length of the trial.
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The court shares the government’s concerns about delay. It doesn’t plan for this case to
idle because of a collateral fee dispute. At the same time, the court’s not inclined to require
Spencer Fane to continue to work without pay, indefinitely. Balancing these concerns, the court
grants Spencer Fane’s motion—with one caveat. Spencer Fane still must prepare and file a reply
brief supporting Mr. Jones’s pending Supplemental Motion for Acquittal (Doc. 487). Such an
approach avoids a disruption mid-briefing. At the same time, it limits the amount of work
Spencer Fane must perform without timely compensation.
The court explains its reasoning, below.
When reviewing a motion to withdraw in a criminal case, our Circuit has employed the
standard applied to substituting counsel. United States v. Johnson, 961 F.2d 1488, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1992). That standard requires a showing of “‘good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a
complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently
unjust verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1987)). The
Tenth Circuit hasn’t addressed whether non-payment of legal fees constitutes good cause to
withdraw in a criminal case. Some courts have expressed reluctance “to allow retained defense
counsel to withdraw ‘mid-stream’” from a case when it’s “solely because the retained client fails
to honor a fee agreement[.]” United States v. Herbawi, 913 F. Supp. 170, 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
But other courts—including at least one in our Circuit—have opined that non-payment may
qualify as good cause. Judge Browning framed the question this way:
[T]he Court is not persuaded that nonpayment of legal fees cannot be a sufficient
basis to permit an attorney to withdraw representation. Defense attorneys should
not have to work for free; there [is] no public policy that says this group of attorneys
should give their services to defendants who will not pay or cannot pay. In cases
like this one, where the defendant retained counsel, exhausted his resources, and
now needs CJA counsel, the public has benefitted, in that the defendant, not the
public, funded most of the defense expense. There is no benefit to society to, by
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judicial fiat, make lawyers stay on a case without compensation.
United States v. Chavez, No. CR 12-3290 JB, 2014 WL 936721, at *8 n.4 (D.N.M. Mar. 6, 2014).
Indeed, the Criminal Justice Act itself contemplates replacement of retained counsel with
appointed counsel when non-payment issues arise from financial inability to pay. 8 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(c) (“If at any stage of the proceedings, including an appeal, the United States magistrate
judge or the court finds that the person is financially unable to pay counsel whom he had
retained, it may appoint counsel . . . as the interests of justice may dictate.”). And the Second
Circuit has identified circumstances in which failure to pay legal fees furnishes good cause
sufficient to allow attorney withdrawal.
A client’s refusal to pay attorney’s fees may constitute good cause to withdraw. In
most cases, however, courts have permitted counsel to withdraw for lack of
payment only where the client either deliberately disregarded financial obligations
or failed to cooperate with counsel. Non-payment of legal fees, without more, is
not usually a sufficient basis to permit an attorney to withdraw from representation.
Moreover, the exhaustion of a retainer is not evidence of a deliberate violation.
United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 81, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation cleaned up).
Here, Mr. Jones reported at the hearing that he already paid a portion of his substantial
legal fees. But then, in September 2025, Spencer Fane informed him that the representation
would require another significant sum. In May 2026, counsel represented Mr. Jones at a five-
week jury trial. During trial, counsel submitted another invoice to Mr. Jones—for a sum greater
than the amount anticipated by the September 2025 conversation. This still-unpaid invoice
prompted Spencer Fane’s motion.
At the hearing, Mr. Jones explained that he doesn’t have the funds to pay Spencer Fane.
And he repeatedly referenced “misunderstandings” that “happened both ways,” presumably
referencing the fees at issue. He reported that he receives a considerable monthly pension. And
he owns two homes and a car that he could sell. But, he explained, he’s encountered difficulty
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retaining a real estate agent willing to help him sell his properties. He also reported he would
sell his car, but he needs it to come to court.
The court concludes Mr. Jones deliberately has disregarded his financial obligations to
Spencer Fane. He has known since at least September 2025 that he would owe substantial
additional fees. And the notice Spencer Fane provided to Mr. Jones indicates multiple
conversations about his delinquent account, all to no avail. Doc. 483-1 at 2 (“As we’ve
discussed several times since March, and as recently as last week, your account with Spencer
Fane is seriously past due. I have made several attempts to resolve this with you, but you have
failed to pay our fees.”). Nonetheless, at the hearing, Mr. Jones tied his attempt to secure a real
estate agent to July 4, 2026—more than nine months after the September additional-fees
conversation. And needing a car for court appearances smacks of pretext. Could Mr. Jones not
employ an alternative mode of transportation? Perhaps he could rent a car when needed for
travel to court. Rideshare services abound and both Raleigh and Kansas City have readily
accessible airports. True, the Second Circuit has held that the exhaustion of a retainer isn’t
evidence of a deliberate violation. Parker, 439 F.3d at 104. But here, Mr. Jones had months
after notice of his retainer’s exhaustion, and he has assets he could have liquidated. He simply
didn’t do so. That’s deliberate disregard. And so, the court grants Spencer Fane’s Motion to
Withdraw (Doc. 483), effective after Spencer Fane files a reply brief supporting Mr. Jones’s
Supplemental Motion for Acquittal (Doc. 487).
The court ordered Mr. Jones to report by email how he plans to proceed. On July 14, Mr.
Jones informed the court that he has tried to engage new retained counsel, but hasn’t succeeded
so far. He indicated that he intends to request a court-appointed attorney, if he qualifies
financially. And he reported that he will attempt to liquidate what he has left to augment his
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representation. If he cannot secure retained counsel and doesn’t qualify for a court-appointed
attorney, Mr. Jones plans to represent himself at sentencing.
Finally, given the current state-of-play, the court informs Mr. Jones about the proper
procedure should he decide to represent himself. Where a criminal defendant waives his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the court must determine that he makes that decision voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. United States v. Hamett, 961 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2020).
That is, the court must ensure that Mr. Jones is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation” and “knows what he is doing” such that “his choice is made with eyes open.”
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quotation cleaned up). Our Circuit has
determined that “the tried-and-true method for a district court to assess whether a waiver is being
made knowingly and intelligently is to conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of
the defendant on the record”—often referred to as a Faretta hearing. Harnett, 961 F.3d at 1255
(quotation cleaned up). Should Mr. Jones decide to represent himself, he must appear so the
court can conduct such a waiver hearing “to ensure that [Mr. Jones] is not unwittingly or
impulsively disposing of his constitutional right to counsel.” Id. (quotation cleaned up).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT Spencer Fane LLP’s Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel (Doc. 483) is granted, effective after it files a reply brief as set forth in
this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 15th day of July, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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