Coones v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, KS Board of County Commissioners et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DEIRDRE COONES, as Executor of the Estate
of Olin Coones,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
THE UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF
WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY,
KANSAS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-2447-JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Deirdre Coones, as Executor of the Estate of Olin Coones, brings this action
asserting federal civil rights claims and state law tort claims against Defendants Board of County
Commissioners of the Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas;
Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (“Unified Government”);
William Michael; and Angela Garrison. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her deceased husband,
Olin Coones’, wrongful conviction for the murders of Carl and Kathleen Schroll (“Carl” and
“Kathleen”). Now before the Court are the parties’ motions in limine (Docs. 136, 141, 142, 143,
144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared
to rule. As discussed more fully below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the parties’
motions.
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I. Background
The Court assumes the reader is familiar with the facts and legal background of this case,
which is set forth in detail in this Court’s summary judgment order,1 and in the Tenth Circuit’s
ruling on Defendants’ interlocutory appeal.2 This case was previously set for trial on November
4, 2024.3 Prior to that trial setting, the parties complied with several pretrial filing deadlines,
including motions in limine and responses thereto. Before the Court could decide the pending
motions in limine, Defendants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal of the Court’s summary
judgment decision denying qualified immunity on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleged in Counts
I and II.4 The Tenth Circuit has now affirmed the Court’s qualified immunity ruling as to
Defendants Michael and Garrison, and dismissed the Unified Government’s pendent appeal.5
The case has been remanded for trial.
After consulting with the parties, the Court reset trial for October 16, 2026, on the
remaining claims under § 1983 in Counts 1 (due process violations) and 2 (malicious
prosecution) against Defendants William Michael and Angela Garrison, and the corresponding
municipal liability claims against the Unified Government. Also set for trial are state law claims
against Michael, Garrison, and the Unified Government for malicious prosecution and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties advised the Court at the most recent
status conference that they will stand on the motions in limine and responses they filed before the
interlocutory appeal.
1 Doc. 121-1.
2 166 F.4th 1 (10th Cir. 2026).
3 The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Defendants’ Interlocutory Appeal as Frivolous. Doc. 126.
4 Doc. 123.
5 Doc. 174.
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II. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine
Plaintiff filed eleven separate motions in limine. Four of these motions are unopposed:
Motion in Limine No. 8 to Bar References to Jurors’ Pecuniary Interests as Taxpayers (Doc.
148); Motion in Limine No. 9 to Bar Reference to the Fact that Plaintiff’s Attorneys are from
Out of Town (Doc. 149); Motion in Limine No. 10 to Bar Undisclosed Expert Opinion
Testimony (Doc. 150); and Motion in Limine No. 11 to Exclude Non-Party Witnesses from the
Courtroom (Doc. 151). These four motions are therefore granted. The Court proceeds to
consider Plaintiff’s contested motions in turn.
A. Motion in Limine No. 1 to Bar Argument that Plaintiff’s Constitutional
Rights were not Violated Because his Attorney was Ineffective (Doc. 141)
Plaintiff asks the Court to prohibit Defendants from asserting a defense at trial that
Plaintiff’s wrongful conviction was caused by his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Plaintiff
urges that such a defense misstates the law and would mislead the jury. Defendants respond that
Mr. Coones asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his habeas petition before the
state court, that there was evidence presented at trial that would have allowed his counsel to
argue a murder-suicide theory, and that counsel failed to either exploit inconsistencies in the
evidence or hire an investigator to “conduct a background review on Ms. Schroll.”6 According
to Defendants, it was “the defense’s job, not that of the detectives, to pursue this issue.”7
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants generally may not assert an ineffective
assistance of counsel “defense” to the claims alleged in this case. On the due-process claims,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Mr. Coones’ due process rights by (1) withholding
exculpatory evidence; (2) failing to preserve evidence; and (3) fabricating evidence. Defense
6 Doc. 160 at 3.
7 Id.
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counsel’s effectiveness is not relevant to the elements of these claims, which turn on whether
Defendants breached their constitutional duties to Mr. Coones.
All three types of due process claims have some materiality element. For example, on
the Brady claim, Plaintiff must show that the withheld evidence was material, meaning that it
“could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.”8 And it is axiomatic that the government must disclose Brady
material even if the defense does not specifically request it.9 Introducing the concept of
ineffective assistance of counsel—a Sixth Amendment claim that Plaintiff does not allege in this
case—does not address the materiality element of the Brady claim. Instead, it would allow
Defendants to argue that, based on the evidence the defense did have, defense counsel was the
reason Mr. Coones was convicted. But as set forth above, materiality does not turn on whether
the evidence would have allowed Mr. Coones to avoid conviction. Plaintiff must only
demonstrate that the withheld evidence would have put the case in a different light so as to
undermine confidence in the verdict. The Court finds that under Fed. R. Evid. 403, any minimal
probative value of ineffective assistance of counsel on the due process claims is substantially
outweighed by the risk of misleading the jury and shifting the burden that the Constitution places
on the government to produce exculpatory evidence.
Similarly, ineffective assistance is not a defense to Plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution
claim. On that claim, Plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued
8 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). On the
failure-to-preserve claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate materiality in order to avoid a bad faith showing under Arizona
v. Youngblood. See 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). On the fabrication claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the use of the
fabricated evidence deprived Mr. Coones of his liberty. See Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1236 (10th Cir.
2021) (footnotes omitted).
9 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432; see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (“A rule thus declaring
‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants
due process.”).
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confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no
probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the
defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.”10 Plaintiff’s malicious-
prosecution claim is based on allegations that the detectives withheld information and made
knowingly false statements that they knew were false, in order to procure Mr. Coones’ detention
and prosecution.
The malicious-prosecution claims in the Pretrial Order allege that Defendants’ conduct
caused Mr. Coones’ arrest and prosecution. In terms of the arrest, ineffective assistance could
not be a defense because there is no evidence that defense counsel’s failure to investigate or
exploit the investigative inconsistencies occurred prior to his arrest. In terms of the prosecution,
§ 1983 liability attaches so long as Defendants’ conduct proximately caused the harm.11
The requisite causal connection is satisfied if Defendants set in
motion a series of events that Defendants knew or reasonably
should have known would cause others to deprive Plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights. Indeed, section 1983 should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.12
As one district court has noted in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[i]f the City is
found, via municipal customary policy, to have directly caused a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights that then caused Plaintiff’s purported injuries, any failure by [the defense
10 Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 614 (10th Cir. 2022).
11 Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012).
12 Id. (citation modified).
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attorney] to effectively expose those violations does not break the chain of causation.”13 Indeed,
comparative negligence does not apply in § 1983 cases.14
While the Court rules that Defendants cannot defend the due-process and malicious-
prosecution claims by arguing that defense counsel’s ineffectiveness at trial and retrial was the
cause of his wrongful conviction, it stops short of ruling that all evidence about Mr. Coones’
representation at trial and retrial is inadmissible. Evidence about how trial counsel Patricia Kalb
would have used the withheld or unfabricated evidence at trial may be relevant to show causation
or materiality on these claims. The parties may approach the bench to lodge contemporaneous
objections to such evidence.
B. Motion in Limine No. 2 to Bar Reference to Prosecutorial or Judicial
Findings of Probable Cause (Doc. 142)
After Mr. Coones was arrested, the prosecutor, Edmond Brancart, presented the State’s
case to a judge during a preliminary hearing. Based on that presentation, the judge found
probable cause to bind Mr. Coones over for trial. Plaintiff moves to exclude references or
evidence about prosecutorial or judicial findings of probable cause as irrelevant and prejudicial.
Defendants respond that the jury must be permitted to know what evidence existed at three
points in time: (1) Mr. Coones’ original arrest, (2) the preliminary hearing, and (3) at the time of
conviction.
13 Rodriguez v. City of Houston, No. H-06-2650, 2009 WL 10679669, at *20 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2009); see
also Jones v. Cannizzaro, No. 18-503, 2021 WL 217282, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2021) (“It is hardly highly
extraordinary that an attorney deprived of favorable information might perform deficiently.”); Nnodimele v.
Derienzo, No. 13CV3461, 2016 WL 3561708, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2016) (“This court is persuaded by
plaintiff’s argument that the alleged ineffectiveness of plaintiff’s counsel and the alleged rejection of plaintiff’s
defense and testimony were natural and foreseeable consequences—rather than superseding causes—of the injuries
plaintiff claims.”).
14 Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 659 (10th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds
by Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022).
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Again, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim as stated in the Pretrial Order is based on
the detectives’ lack of probable cause at the time of Mr. Coones’ arrest and continued
prosecution. Defendants fail to explain why the jury would need to understand whether there
was probable cause at the time of his conviction. As to the other two points in time, Plaintiff
must convince the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no probable cause. As
the Tenth Circuit explained on appeal, “[p]robable cause exists if facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing
an offense.”15
On summary judgment, Defendants argued that the judge’s probable cause finding after
the preliminary hearing obviated any lack of probable cause prior to that point. This Court
rejected that argument, finding that Plaintiff’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to her, showed that the detectives concealed and misrepresented material facts to the judge at the
preliminary hearing. The judge presiding over the preliminary hearing relied on Detective
Michael’s testimony about the van, the prosecutor’s recitation of Mr. Coones’ motive, and the
autopsy report in finding probable cause for Mr. Coones’ prosecution. Therefore, the
preliminary hearing finding of probable cause does not break the chain of causation because
there are allegations and evidence of knowing misstatements and material omissions by the
detectives in this matter.16 The Court declines to revisit this ruling.
15 Coones v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kansas City, Kan., 166 F.4th 1, 28
(10th Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2022)).
16 See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1288–89 (10th Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649,
655–56 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion in limine to the extent it seeks to exclude
Defendants’ argument that the prosecutor’s or judge’s probable cause determinations obviated
any lack of probable cause before Mr. Coones was bound over for trial. However, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks to exclude reference to the evidence presented in support of the search warrant
and at the preliminary hearing, the motion is denied. Whether probable cause supported the
original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution of Mr. Coones is a jury determination, and
Defendants must be allowed to present evidence on this element of Plaintiff’s claim.
C. Motion in Limine No. 3 to Bar Hearsay Exhibits and Irrelevant “Practice”
Testimony (Doc. 143)
1. Riddle Affidavit
Plaintiff first seeks to exclude Harold Riddle’s affidavit. Riddle is not listed on
Defendants’ witness list, but his affidavit is listed on Defendants’ exhibit list.17 Plaintiff
contends that Riddle has never been disclosed as a witness in this matter and that his affidavit is
inadmissible hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801. Defendants fail to address the hearsay objection.
The Court agrees that Riddle’s affidavit should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay to the extent
it is being offered for the truth of the matters asserted and therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion in
limine.
2. Matthews and Brancart Testimony on Practices in the DA’s Office
Next, Plaintiff moves to limit David Matthews’ and Brancart’s testimony under either
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), or under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and 403. These witnesses are described
on Defendants’ witness list as follows:
24. Ed Brancart – Former Deputy District Attorney will testify to
his prosecution of Olin Coones criminal cases and policies and
17 Doc. 130, Ex. 25.
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practices of the Wyandotte County Kansas District Attorney’s
Office.
25. David Matthews – former assistant district attorney that will
testify to the policies and practices of the Wyandotte County
Kansas District Attorney’s Office as it relates to elder
abuse/financial crimes.18
Plaintiff objects that Defendants failed to previously disclose that these witnesses would
testify about the Wyandotte County Kansas District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) policies
and practices; therefore, they should not be permitted to testify on that issue under Rule 37(c).
Plaintiff maintains that they would have deposed these witnesses on these subjects had they been
properly disclosed. Further, Plaintiff argues that this testimony is not relevant because the DA’s
Office is not a party to this case and is not relevant to the Monell claim. She argues that the risk
of confusing the jury substantially outweighs any probative value this testimony may hold.
Defendants proffer that Matthews and Brancart will testify that they and the DA’s Office “would
not charge a crime in the absence of evidence and probable cause supporting the elements of the
crime(s) charged. Also, that once a case was charged, it was often the case that no further
investigation would be expected absent a request or direction from the DA’s office.”19
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff does not submit Defendants’ initial
disclosures about these prosecutor-witnesses, so the Court cannot determine whether this
proffered testimony is beyond the scope of their designations. As for relevance and Rule 403,
this motion is governed by the Court’s previous ruling on probable cause evidence. Whether
probable cause supported the original arrest or prosecution of Mr. Coones is a jury
determination, and Defendants must be allowed to present the evidence on this element of
18 Id. at 3.
19 Doc. 160 at 6.
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Plaintiff’s claim. However, Defendants cannot argue that the prosecutor’s independent
determination of probable cause cured the detectives’ alleged misconduct. Instead, probable
cause must be evaluated based on the detectives’ knowledge when they presented the case to the
prosecutor for arrest, and to the judge at the preliminary hearing.20 The motion is otherwise
denied without prejudice subject to contemporaneous objection.
D. Motion in Limine No. 4 to Bar Reference to Robert Rupert (Doc. 144)
Robert Rupert was a jailhouse informant who testified at Mr. Coones’ trial that Mr.
Coones confessed to him that he killed the Schrolls. Rupert also testified that Mr. Coones told
him that he fired a bullet before entering the Schroll home in order to throw off investigators,
which was why police found three bullets at the crime scene instead of the four rounds
discharged from the firearm. And Rupert testified that Mr. Coones told him he struck Carl
Schroll in the head during the murders, causing the injury to the left side of his forehead. During
post-conviction proceedings, when the prosecutors re-checked the evidence, they found the
missing fourth bullet in a pillow. According to Plaintiff, Rupert confessed in an affidavit that he
fabricated his trial testimony, and Dr. Erik Mitchell, a pathologist, submitted an affidavit that the
injury to Carl Schroll’s head was a graze wound from the bullet later discovered in the pillow.21
Plaintiff asks the Court to bar evidence or argument relating to Rupert or his claims that
Mr. Coones confessed to him. Defendants argue that the jury should consider all of the evidence
offered at trial in order to determine the materiality of the evidence Plaintiff claims was withheld
or fabricated. At this stage, the Court agrees. Plaintiff offers no specific objection to this
20 See 166 F.4th at 30–31 (evaluating probable cause as it appeared to the detectives; noting that even
Detective Michael admitted during his deposition that they “did not find a single piece of evidence to corroborate”
Kathleen’s hearsay statement to her mother that Mr. Coones was responsible for her and her husband’s murders).
21 The affidavits cited in the motion are not attached.
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evidence, and, of course, the jury will be permitted to hear both the substance of Mr. Rupert’s
testimony, and the fact that it was determined to be false. This motion is therefore denied
without prejudice subject to a contemporaneous objection.
E. Motion in Limine No. 5 to Bar Reference to Unproven Allegations Against
Dr. Erik Mitchell (Doc. 145)
Dr. Erik Mitchell is the pathologist who performed the Schrolls’ autopsies in 2008. Dr.
Mitchell concluded that both Carl and Kathleen’s manner of death was homicide. Later, Dr.
Mitchell reviewed evidence uncovered during the post-conviction proceedings and explained
that, based on this new evidence, he would have determined that Kathleen’s death was most
likely caused by suicide.
Plaintiff seeks an in limine ruling barring the parties from suggesting that Dr. Mitchell
committed misconduct in other cases. Defendants respond that they intend to ask Dr. Mitchell
questions about this case (both the underlying criminal case and the post-conviction proceeding)
and about his qualifications to offer expert evidence in criminal trials. Thus, the Court finds this
motion should be granted as unopposed because Defendants do not intend to ask Dr. Mitchell
questions about other cases. Plaintiff may object contemporaneously if Defendants go beyond
the scope of their proffer.
F. Motion in Limine No. 6 to Bar Speculation that Bank Rules Would Have
Prevented Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (Doc. 146)
The summary judgment evidence showed that in 2008, Kathleen worked at Midwest
Regional Credit Union processing checks deposited there so that they could be transmitted to the
Federal Reserve. Thad Jones, Vice President of Accounting and Technology, was her direct
supervisor. When Kathleen did not show up for work on April 7, the day she died, Jones
discovered an irregularity in her accounts and opened an investigation—Kathleen had been
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submitting checks for payment by the credit union that were supposed to be drawn against other
banks once they were submitted to the Federal Reserve. She embezzled over $11,000 from the
credit union before her scheme was uncovered. On April 9, 2008, Jones wrote a Suspicious
Activity Report (“SAR”) documenting his findings regarding Kathleen’s embezzlement. The
detectives interviewed Jones on April 14, 2008. Deputy D.A. Brancart had no knowledge about
Kathleen’s embezzlement until long after Mr. Coones’ conviction. And investigators did not
disclose to Kalb before trial that they discovered Kathleen had been embezzling from Midwest
Credit Union.
Plaintiff alleges as part of her Brady claim that investigators knew about and withheld the
evidence about Kathleen’s embezzlement from the defense. Jones testified in 2020 at the § 60-
1507 hearing that he told the detectives about the embezzlement and gave them a copy of the
report. At his deposition in this case in 2023, Jones stated that he could not recall whether he
told the detectives about the report. Similarly, in 2020, Detective Michael testified that Jones
told him about the embezzlement and gave detectives the SAR, but then in 2023, he testified that
he could not recall whether his previous testimony was correct.
Plaintiff now seeks an in limine ruling that bars the parties from discussing whether
federal banking rules and regulations prevented Jones from disclosing the embezzlement report
to detectives in 2008. Plaintiff cites deposition testimony from Brancart, where he suggested that
SARs are protected and confidential. He testified that he would not have necessarily produced
the report to the defense if he had known about it because of strict confidentiality rules under
federal law that he understood applied to their disclosure. Plaintiff contends that this testimony
is inadmissible lay opinion and that Brancart lacks personal knowledge to testify that he may not
have produced the report under banking rules and regulations. Defendants respond that Jones’
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and Brancart’s understanding of the embezzlement report’s confidentiality under these rules is
necessary to test whether Jones in fact produced the report to detectives in 2008. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Brady claim raises a factual question about whether the detectives knew about and
withheld the SAR and Jones’s report to them about Kathleen’s embezzlement. The jury must
determine the credibility of Jones’s 2020 testimony that he told detectives about Kathleen’s
embezzlement and provided them with the report when they interviewed him in 2008.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 602, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”
The witness’s own testimony can provide evidence of personal knowledge.22 It is not difficult
for a witness to meet the personal knowledge standard in Rule 602.23 And under Rule 701, if a
lay witness offers an opinion, it must be “limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”24
As an initial matter, it is established that Brancart did not know about the existence of the
report or of Kathleen’s embezzlement scheme until well after Mr. Coones’ conviction. At his
2023 deposition, he stated that he had never seen the SAR before. 25 Since he did not know
about it, he obviously did not produce it before trial. The issue on this motion is whether he can
opine about whether he would have produced the SAR if he had known about it. Brancart
answered several questions during his deposition about whether he had worked with SARs
22 See Fed. R. Evid. 602.
23 See United States v. Walker, 85 F.4th 973, 983 (10th Cir. 2023).
24 Fed. R. Evid. 701.
25 Brancart Dep. 31:20–21 (Doc. 146-1 at 31).
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before, how he knew about the confidentiality rules that may apply to them, and what steps he
may have taken if he had known the report existed. He testified that based on “various trainings
over [his] career,” he thought he had to “make a request of—I believe it’s Department of
Treasury, and that there would be strict rules with regard to who could be—who could know
what was in those.”26 When asked who told him he needed to make a request through the
Department of Treasury, he stated: “Good gosh. That would probably go back, sir, to even that
time as a law enforcement officer learning about tools that are available to use in
investigations.”27 He testified that he could not recall a time as a prosecutor in Wyandotte
County or Ford County when he obtained an SAR during a criminal case. And he testified that
when he worked in the Attorney General’s office, he asked his investigators to obtain SARs, but
he did not believe he could use them as evidence in the case. Brancart acknowledged in his
testimony that, in the Coones case, he could have asked the court for guidance on disclosure if he
determined there was a restriction on disclosure under federal banking laws.
The parties appear to agree that the applicable federal regulation does not prohibit a bank
from disclosing a SAR to a local law enforcement agency:
(k) Confidentiality of SARs. A SAR, and any information that
would reveal the existence of a SAR, are confidential, and shall not
be disclosed except . . . .
. . . .
(ii) this paragraph (k)(1) shall not be construed as
prohibiting:
(A) The disclosure by a national bank, or any
director, officer, employee or agent of a national
bank of:
26 Id. 34:16–22.
27 Id. 35:5–8.
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(1) A SAR, or any information that would reveal the
existence of a SAR, to the OCC, FinCEN, or any
Federal, State, or local law enforcement
agency . . . .28
And “[d]espite the prohibition against a bank’s disclosure of the existence or contents of an SAR,
any supporting documentation remains discoverable.”29
But Defendants argue that the jury should be able to hear from Brancart about his
understanding of the federal banking rules and what he would have done had he known about the
embezzlement report and SAR. The Court concludes that Brancart’s testimony fails to establish
a foundation for offering a lay opinion that federal banking laws prohibited him from reviewing
or producing in discovery the SAR Jones completed in 2008. However, Brancart’s testimony
does establish a foundation for testimony that, had he known about the report, he would have
investigated any disclosure restrictions before providing it to the defense, and that he could have
or would have sought a judicial determination on that issue.
Defendants also contend that the jury should be able to hear an explanation about why
Jones completed the SAR on April 9, 2008, yet there was no record of a police report by him or
the bank. But Defendants do not explain why this information is relevant, nor do they proffer the
questions or answers they anticipate from Jones on this topic. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
motion to exclude this line of questioning at trial.
G. Motion in Limine No. 7 to Bar Evidence of State Compensation Settlement
and Other Collateral Source Payments
Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation under the Kansas wrongful conviction
compensation statute,30 and in June 2021, the Estate was awarded $800,000. Plaintiff asks the
28 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k)(ii)(A)(1); see 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g).
29 United States v. Holihan, 248 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
30 K.S.A. § 60-5004.
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Court to bar evidence relating to this settlement at trial, citing the collateral source payment rule
and Rules 401 and 403. Defendants argue that this evidence should be admissible and relevant,
with no further explanation.
Under the Kansas collateral-source rule,
“benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly
independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish
the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Under
this rule, an injured party can “recover full compensatory damages
from a tortfeasor irrespective of the payment of any element of
those damages by a source independent of the tortfeasor.”
However, the collateral source rule is not an absolute one. That is,
evidence of benefits received from a collateral source is admissible
when “such evidence clearly carries probative value on an issue
not inherently related to measurement of damages.”31
Plaintiff’s $800,000 award was from the State, which is independent from the alleged wrongdoer
here, the Unified Government and its employees. And because Defendants fail to identify how
evidence of Plaintiff’s state compensation settlement is probative on an issue other than the
measurement of damages, this evidence must be excluded.
The Court also excludes this evidence under Rule 403. Defendants fail to point to any
specific probative value this evidence would offer; however, the risk of misleading and
confusing the jury is high. Hearing evidence about this settlement could easily cause the jury to
believe that Plaintiff has already sufficiently recovered, despite the fact that her constitutional
claims are separate. Thus, under Rule 403, the Court finds that any nominal probative value of
this evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and jury confusion.
31 Watson v. Taylor, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1134 (D. Kan. 2007) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Gregory
v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Kan. 1990), and then quoting Wentling v. Med. Anesthesia Servs., P.A., 701 P.2d
939, 949 (Kan. 1985)).
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III. Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Doc. 136)
Defendants’ motion in limine seeks to exclude 21 categories of evidence. Plaintiff does
not object to the following: No. 7 re: References to Exclusion of Evidence; No. 8 re: State of
Any Venire Person; No. 9 re: Questioning Attorneys; No. 10 re: Probable Testimony of
Unavailable Witnesses Who Will not be Called by Deposition; No. 12 re: References to Pretrial
Motion or Matters; No. 13 re: Attorneys’ Objections; No. 14 re: Settlements and Settlement
Discussions; No. 15 re: Refusing to Stipulate to any Matter; No. 16 re: References to Anyone
Sitting in the Courtroom; No. 18 re: Alternative Pleadings, Theories, and Requests for Relief;
No. 19 re: Opinions not Disclosed in Expert Report; No. 20 re: Location or Size of any Law
Firm; No. 21 Re: Wealth, Religion, or Political Beliefs or Sexual Preferences of any Party.
Therefore, the Court grants those motions to exclude. The Court proceeds to consider the
remaining contested motions.
A. Due Process Issues Abandoned by Plaintiff (No. 1)
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges due-process violations against Defendants Michael and
Garrison for withholding, failing to preserve, and fabricating evidence. In the factual contentions
section of the Pretrial Order, Plaintiff provided a list of evidence she claims was withheld in
violation of Mr. Coones’ due-process rights: (1) that Mr. Coones’ children were restrained and
taken into custody during their interviews; (2) handwritten notes and recordings of witness
interviews; (3) an exculpatory written statement by Ross Minks corroborating Mr. Coones’ alibi;
(4) video of the crime scene; (5) a QuikTrip surveillance video disproving Kathleen’s story of
being threatened by Mr. Coones; (6) that Detective Michael’s investigation corroborated Mr.
Coones’ account of where his van was parked (i.e., it had not been used to commit a murder); (7)
that Kathleen and Carl were experiencing marital tension just before the murder; (8) that Robert
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Rupert had been promised leniency for his cooperation; (9) Defendants Michael and Garrison
caused gunshot residue swabs to not be tested by the lab; and (10) that Kathleen’s embezzlement
had been discovered by the credit union that employed her immediately following the murder-
suicide. Defendants separately addressed each of these in their motion for summary judgment on
the due process claim.
In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff focused on three
categories of evidence—Kathleen’s embezzlement, the KBI expert report about Senior’s checks
during the earlier elder abuse investigation, and the QuikTrip surveillance video. Plaintiff also
asserted that Detective Michael fabricated his claim that Mr. Coones’ van was not in his
driveway the morning after the murders. The Court considered each of Plaintiff’s due-process
claims based on these categories of evidence and ultimately denied qualified immunity under all
of the applicable due-process formulations.
Defendants now move to preclude Plaintiff from introducing any evidence other than the
embezzlement, the expert report about the checks, and the QuikTrip video to support her due
process claims, arguing that she abandoned them by not raising them on summary judgment.
Plaintiff responds that she did not abandon her due-process claims referenced in the motion in
limine and that the evidence is relevant and therefore admissible. The Court agrees.
As the Tenth Circuit observed on appeal, the “pretrial order stated the parties’ claims in
general terms,” thus, it “should be liberally construed to cover any of the legal or factual theories
that might be embraced by its language.”32 The language of Count I alleges that the detectives
fabricated and suppressed exculpatory evidence, which resulted in Mr. Coones’ wrongful
conviction and incarceration. Defendants focus on a list of evidence from the section of the
32 166 F.4th 1, 18 (10th Cir. 2026).
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Pretrial Order stating Plaintiff’s factual contentions; the Pretrial Order does not set out separate
and independent due-process claims that were then abandoned at summary judgment.
To be sure, Defendants moved for summary judgment by addressing each category of
evidence separately, but the Court only needed to find evidence of withholding, failure to
preserve, and/or fabricating evidence under the applicable legal standards in order for Plaintiff’s
due process claim to survive summary judgment. In fact, as the Court acknowledged in its
summary-judgment order, in determining the materiality of the evidence at issue on the Brady
claim, the Court is not to “consider each piece of withheld evidence in isolation. Rather [the
Court] review[s] the cumulative impact of the withheld evidence, its utility to the defense as well
as its potentially damaging impact on the prosecution’s case.”33 Plaintiff opted to focus
primarily on the three types of evidence cited above in responding to summary judgment,
although it discussed the other evidence, as well. The Court did not grant Defendants’ summary-
judgment motion as to the other categories of evidence listed in the Pretrial Order. The fact that
the Court did not focus on those other categories of evidence does not preclude their admission
as evidence at trial. To the extent the listed evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s due process claims,
it is admissible.34
B. Speculative Testimony (No. 2.A)
Next, Defendants move to exclude speculative testimony from witnesses who did not
personally observe improper actions by the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department (“KCKPD”)
or its officers. Specifically, Defendants ask the Court to limit the testimony of the following
33 Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982, 1080 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 572
(10th Cir. 2018)).
34 Defendants do not move to exclude this evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 401 or 402, so the Court declines to
separately consider that issue in limine.
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witnesses under Fed. R. Evid. 602: (1) Mr. Coones’ alibi witnesses; (2) Plaintiff’s experts; (3)
members of Mr. Coones’ defense team during his postconviction proceedings; (4) retired
KCKPD officers with knowledge of its practices; and (5) community members. Defendants
argue that all of these witnesses should be excluded or limited for lack of personal knowledge.
Plaintiff does not dispute that witnesses should not be allowed to testify based on speculation,
but disputes that these witnesses will not offer testimony based on their personal knowledge.
The Court recited the personal knowledge standards under Rule 602 and 701 when ruling
on Plaintiff’s motions in limine. With these standards in mind, the Court addresses the specific
witnesses Defendants seek to exclude or limit below. Without a proffer, however, the Court
declines to speculate about how each of these witnesses will testify, and denies the motion in
limine without prejudice subject to contemporaneous objection.
1. Alibi witnesses
Defendants ask the Court to limit Mr. Coones’ alibi witnesses—Deirdre Coones, Melody
Coones, and Ben Coones—to what they “actually knew,” which would not include where Mr.
Coones was between 11:30 p.m. and 6:15 a.m. the night and morning of the Schrolls’ murder.35
There is no indication or proffer that these witnesses will not testify based on their personal
knowledge. The Court therefore denies this objection without prejudice subject to
contemporaneous objection.
2. Plaintiff’s Experts: David Harvey and David Balash
After the parties briefed the motions in limine, the Court denied Defendants’ earlier-filed
motion to exclude Plaintiff’s experts under Rule 702 and Daubert.36 In the motion in limine,
35 Doc. 136 at 5.
36 Doc. 166.
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Defendants reframe and repeat many of their Daubert objections as objections based on
speculation by two of these experts: David Harvey and David Balash. The Court addresses each
expert below, but does not change its earlier rulings that Defendants’ objections go to weight and
not admissibility, and that cross-examination is the appropriate method to address the limitations
Defendants identify with the experts’ opinions.
a. David Harvey
Plaintiff will offer Harvey as an expert on law enforcement procedures. Defendants
argue that the Court should preclude him from testifying on the following topics as speculation:
the investigatory responsibilities of KCKPD officers; Kathleen Schroll’s dominant hand; the use
of jailhouse informants in the investigation into the deaths of the Schrolls; lack of probable cause
to arrest Coones on April 7, 2008; and that the alleged errors in the investigation point towards
the detectives attempting to make the facts fit their theory of Coones’ guilt. Defendants argue
that Harvey’s testimony on these subjects would exceed the scope of his expertise under Rule
703.
But Defendants do not proffer Harvey’s anticipated testimony. In response to
Defendant’s Daubert motion, Plaintiff proffered that Harvey would testify about the accepted
standards of police practice, including the types of evidence that should be preserved and
disclosed, and the circumstances under which a reasonable investigator would question the
presence of probable cause.37 The Court has already determined that Harvey is qualified to
testify about these subjects, and that this anticipated testimony is both reliable and relevant. The
Court declines to revisit these findings. Of course, no witness can testify based on speculation,
37 See Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When an expert offers an opinion
relevant to applying a legal standard such as probable cause, the expert’s role is ‘limited to describing sound
professional standards and identifying departures from them.’” (quoting West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 652 (7th
Cir. 1997))).
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but to the extent Harvey has a basis to testify about the subjects identified by Defendants either
due to his expertise, his review of materials for this case, or his personal knowledge, the Court
declines to rule in limine about the scope of his testimony. To the extent his personal knowledge
on certain topics may be limited, Defendants can address this on cross-examination.
b. David Balash
Plaintiff designated Balash as an expert in ballistics and crime scene reconstruction. He
plans to testify about the processing of the crime scene, the significance of the findings of
gunshot residue and primer gunshot residue at particular locations on each victim’s body, and his
deductions from the crime scene evidence as to the events that led up to and caused the Schrolls’
deaths. Defendants argue that the Court should preclude him from testifying on the following
topics as speculation: that Carl was shot first, where and how Kathleen was standing when she
was shot, the importance of and/or lack of gunshot residue testing, and his conclusions regarding
who was holding the gun and how it was held. Defendants argue that these subjects are outside
the scope of his expertise. As Plaintiff points out, Defendants fail to explain how any of these
topics fall outside of Balash’s expertise. To the contrary, all of them fall squarely within the
scope of his expertise. Defendants’ motion is therefore denied. They can explore any limitations
of Balash’s expertise on cross-examination and raise any relevance objections
contemporaneously.
3. Members of Mr. Coones’ Postconviction Defense Team
Next, Defendants argue that the Court should limit testimony by Branden Bell, Lindsay
Runnels, and Colin Brown. Bell and Runnels were Mr. Coones’ attorneys during his state court
postconviction proceedings; Brown was an investigator. Defendants ask the Court to limit any
testimony by these witnesses to their own personal knowledge. Plaintiff does not dispute that
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their testimony must be based on personal knowledge, but maintains that their personal
knowledge goes beyond what Defendants acknowledge in their motion; they have firsthand
information relevant to Plaintiff’s damages, and evidence they discovered that led to his
exoneration, and statements made by party opponents during the investigation. The Court
therefore denies Defendants’ motion in limine without prejudice to contemporaneous objection
at trial.
4. Retired KCKPD Officers
Next, Defendants ask the Court to limit the scope of testimony by Max Siefert and
Michael Kobe, who are both retired KCKPD officers. They argue that these witnesses do not
have personal knowledge about what others in the department knew about Roger Golubski and
his activities, and that they should not be permitted to testify about rumors in the department.
Plaintiff responds that both witnesses will offer testimony about their own personal experiences
and their understanding of the department’s practices, including whether Golubski’s misconduct
was discussed widely. These issues are relevant to the Monell claim, as discussed more fully in
its discussion of Defendants’ third motion in limine.
To the extent Defendants wish to object to specific testimony by Siefert at trial, this
objection is better suited to contemporaneous objection. Indeed, the Court already overruled this
objection to Siefert’s affidavit on summary judgment, finding Plaintiff established Siefert had
personal knowledge of the statements made therein.38 Kobe has been designated to testify by
deposition, and Defendants have submitted objections to that testimony. The Court will
therefore rule on Defendants’ objections to Kobe’s testimony when it rules on deposition
objections.
38 See Doc. 121-1 at 23 n.43.
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5. Community members
Finally, Defendants object to testimony by several Kansas City, Kansas community
members on Plaintiff’s witness list: Gregory Wilson, Kendra Dean-Martin, Rose Lee McIntyre,
and Tina Peterson. Plaintiff submitted their affidavits with her opposition to summary judgment.
In its summary-judgment order, the Court overruled Defendants’ objections to the affidavits
from victims who attest that Golubski had a pattern of fabricating and suppressing evidence. The
Court reviewed these affidavits and found that they are based on the personal knowledge of
various Kansas City, Kansas citizens who observed and interacted with Golubski during his
many years as a KCKPD officer. In considering the parties’ statements of fact, the Court only
relied on evidence that was based on personal knowledge. Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff
objects that certain statements by these witnesses are not based on personal knowledge, the
motion in limine is denied without prejudice to contemporaneous objection.
C. Hearsay (No. 2.B)
Defendants move to exclude testimony by Gregory Wilson, Kendra Dean-Martin, Rose
Lee McIntyre, and Tina Peterson as either inadmissible hearsay or unduly prejudicial under Rule
403. But Defendants wholly fail to proffer the statements they wish to exclude. Thus, this
motion is denied without prejudice to contemporaneous objection.
D. Monell Evidence (No. 3)
At summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted evidence to support her Monell liability claim
that the Unified Government failed to train or supervise its employees and had a widespread
practice of not disciplining officers’ civil rights violations, which directly caused the
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constitutional violations that led to Mr. Coones’ wrongful conviction.39 As part of this showing,
Plaintiff argued that at the time of the Schroll investigation, the homicide detectives’ supervisor
was Roger Golubski, an officer whose misconduct was openly tolerated and overlooked within
the department at that time. Plaintiff submitted evidence that civil rights complaints were
categorized as “other contacts” complaints so they could be investigated outside of the internal
affairs system without documentation, and that the KCKPD did not welcome reports about
fellow officers. Plaintiff offered evidence that Golubski, the homicide detectives’ supervisor,
had eleven such “other contacts” complaints from 1993 to 2011, without receiving discipline,
and that the KCKPD’s priority of solving homicide cases drove the KCKPD’s failure to
supervise and train detectives to follow formal policies. Specifically to this case, Plaintiff
submitted evidence that Golubski attended a meeting where Detective Bryan Block shared
information with Garrison and Michael about the elder abuse investigation into Mr. Coones’
father, he signed off on the detectives’ reports, and he assigned Block to attend the autopsies.
In their motion in limine, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Monell claims rest on
“second-hand accounts of alleged policy abuses and inconsistent investigative practices,” which
should be excluded under Rule 403.40 Defendants characterize the evidence as “[t]estimony
about the alleged misconduct of a different officer than the ones on trial,” and argue that
Golubski’s conduct in other investigations would only serve to mislead the jury and prejudice
them.41 They contend that “the Defendant officers . . . were not acting under the direction of
Golubski during their investigation.”42
39 See Finch v. Rapp, 38 F.4th 1234, 1244 (10th Cir. 2022) (setting forth elements of a Monell claim,
including that the Plaintiff must show a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation).
40 Doc. 136 at 11.
41 Id. at 13.
42 Id. at 13–14.
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Plaintiff responds that the motion in limine is vague about what evidence it seeks to
exclude, fails to acknowledge Golubski’s involvement in the Schroll investigation, and that
evidence about Golubski’s misconduct and the other officers’ knowledge thereof is relevant to
the KCKPD’s policies and procedures. The Court agrees.
As an initial matter, Defendants fail to identify the specific evidence they seek to exclude.
For this reason alone, the Court can deny the motion. Second, Defendants fail to even
acknowledge that the Monell evidence about Golubski is based on the fact that he was the
defendant detectives’ supervisor during the Schroll investigation. There was evidence that he
met with them and signed off on reports.
Finally, the Court declines at this stage to exclude evidence that goes to the elements of
Plaintiff’s Monell claim under Rule 403. Rule 403 allows the Court to exclude relevant evidence
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
To prove her Monell claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) “a municipal policy or custom—
either an official rule or one so entrenched in practice as to constitute an official policy”; (2)
“that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations that were the
obvious consequence of its policy”; and (3) “that the policy directly caused his constitutional
injury.”43 There are several ways for a plaintiff to establish a municipal policy or custom,
including by showing there was “an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law” or “failure to adequately train or
43 Finch, 38 F.4th at 1244.
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supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries
that may be caused.”44
Evidence that the homicide detectives’ supervisor’s misconduct was openly tolerated or
ignored, and that the department’s priority of solving homicide cases outweighed its interest in
prohibiting such misconduct, is highly relevant to whether the KCKPD had a policy or custom
that encouraged the kind of constitutional violations that occurred in this case. And, Plaintiff
submits that there is evidence that the policymaker in this case—the Chief of Police—was aware
of Golubski’s misconduct.
Having found this evidence highly probative on the Monell claim, the Court must next
consider whether it nonetheless must exclude any of the proffered evidence because “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”45 “Unfair prejudice” under the rule means “an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”46 “In engaging in
the requisite balancing, [the Court] ‘give[s] the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force
and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.’”47 And the Court must remain mindful that “it is
not enough that the risk of unfair prejudice be greater than the probative value of the evidence;
44 Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).
45 Fed. R. Evid. 403.
46 Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note.
47 United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 935 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs.,
Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000)).
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the danger of that prejudice must substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value.”48
Exclusion under Rule 403 “is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.”49
The Court cannot find that exclusion under Rule 403 is warranted here given Defendants’
failure to proffer the specific evidence they wish to exclude. The Court declines to find that
evidence about Golubski, insofar as it is tied to the customs and practices alleged in this case, is
so prejudicial that it substantially outweighs the probative value in this matter.
E. Privileged Communications (No. 4) and Questions About Trial Preparation
(No. 5)
Defendants ask that the Court order counsel to refrain from asking questions that may
solicit confidential or privileged communications under Rules 501 and 403, and to preclude
counsel from asking questions about how a witness prepared for trial with their counsel. Plaintiff
responds that she does not intend to ask witnesses to disclose privileged communications, so this
motion (No. 4) is granted. But Plaintiff reserves the right to ask any witness who represents
them and how they prepared for their trial testimony if it goes to bias, or how they may have
refreshed their memory.
The Court grants as unopposed the motion in limine to exclude privileged
communications. But the Court denies Defendants’ motion about trial preparation. There is no
prohibition to asking questions about how a witness prepared for their trial testimony—who they
spoke to and what materials they reviewed. This information is highly probative of witness
credibility and bias, and Defendants fail to identify any prejudice that would substantially
outweigh that probative value so long as Plaintiff does not solicit privileged information.
48 United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1256 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cerno, 529 F.3d at 935).
49 United States v. Silva, 889 F.3d 704, 712 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204,
1211 (10th Cir. 2001)).
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F. References to Filing Motions in Limine (No. 6)
Defendants move to exclude any reference to the filing of motions in limine under Rules
401 through 403. Plaintiff responds that it does not intend to discuss motions in limine before
the jury, but contends that if a party violates a motion in limine, the opposing party must be able
to bring it to the Court’s attention. The Court agrees, but advises the parties to raise such an
objection at the bench, not in the presence of the jury. The motion is otherwise granted as
unopposed.
G. References to Exhibits Not Being Offered (No. 11)
Defendants move to exclude any reference to an exhibit not being offered by any party,
citing Rules 401 through 403. Plaintiff responds that she does not understand the basis of the
motion since a witness could discuss evidence that could be entered as exhibits without them
being offered as exhibits. Both the objection and the response are unclear to the Court. The
parties are directed to follow the Rules of Evidence, particularly the rules that govern admission
of evidence when examining witnesses. It is not appropriate to discuss the merits of, or publish
an exhibit to the jury, before it is identified and admitted. At the same time, references to
documents that may not be in the trial record during a witness’s testimony is not prohibited.
H. Reference to Other Suits (No. 17)
Defendants move to exclude, without further explanation, “[a]ny reference, comment, or
statement by counsel, or by any witness called to testify, regarding any other suit, litigation,
arbitration, or other legal or administrative proceeding.”50 Plaintiff understandably objects that
this wrongful conviction case will require some evidence about other proceedings that are
relevant to the claims to be tried. This case involves a wrongful conviction after two jury trials.
50 Doc. 136 at 16.
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Witnesses obviously need to discuss what happened during those trials and the post-conviction
proceedings. And Plaintiff plans to offer evidence about disciplinary proceedings that are
relevant to the Monell claims. Given Defendants’ failure to identify what evidence exactly they
seek to exclude, the Court denies this motion without prejudice to contemporaneous objection at
trial.
I. Opinions Not Disclosed in Expert Report (No. 19)
Finally, Defendants ask the Court to preclude expert witnesses from offering opinions
outside of their expert reports. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion but notes that there are
several non-retained experts in this case who may appropriately testify about topics identified in
their Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures. With this caveat, the Court grants Defendants’
motion as unopposed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
No. 1 (Doc. 141) is granted; Nos. 2 and 3 (Docs. 142 and 143) are granted in part and denied
in part; No. 4 (Doc. 144) is denied without prejudice; No. 5 (Doc. 145) is granted; No. 6
(Doc. 146) is granted in part and denied in part; No. 7 (Doc. 147) is granted; and Nos. 8
through 11 (Docs. 148–151) are granted as unopposed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendants’ Motion in Limine
(Doc. 136) is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2026
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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