Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
CARLOS JOSE ANTUNEZ BASTO, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00097-JRS-MKK
)
KRISTI NOEM Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, et al.,
)
)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Noncitizen Carlos Antunez Basto is detained at the Clay County Jail at the direction of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus compelling the
respondents to either release him or grant him a bond hearing. For the reasons discussed below,
the petition is granted to the extent that the Court orders the respondents to afford Mr. Antunez
Basto a bond hearing.
I. Facts
Mr. Antunez Basto, a Venezuelan national, entered the United States in November 2022.
He presented for inspection at a port of entry and claimed asylum.1 Immigration officials
determined 	that 	Mr. Antunez 	Basto 	was 	not 	immediately 	eligible 	for 	admission 	to 	the
United States. However, rather than detain Mr. Antunez Basto, they initiated a removal proceeding,
granted him parole, and permitted him to enter the United States while his removal and asylum
proceedings played out. Dkt. 1-1 at 5; dkt. 9-1 at 6.
1 One government document indicates that Mr. Antunez Basto entered without inspection and was
apprehended by Border Patrol agents, but this appears to be a mistake. Compare dkt. 9-1 at 9–10 with id. at
1, 6.
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Mr. Antunez Basto's parole expired on November 13, 2023, a year after he entered. Dkt. 9-
1 at 10. In May 2024, he received temporary protected status (TPS). Id. However, the government
terminated that status on November 21, 2025. Id.
On December 21, 2025, Noblesville police arrested Mr. Antunez Basto on suspicion of
drunken driving. Dkt. 9-1 a 10. When Mr. Antunez Basto was booked into the Hamilton County
Jail, officers contacted ICE, which lodged an immigration detainer. Id. at 9. At that time, an
immigration official executed an administrative warrant directing that Mr. Antunez Basto be
arrested pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Id. at 14.
Mr. Antunez Basto pled guilty to a misdemeanor on February 4, 2026, and agreed to a
suspended jail sentence. Dkt. 1-1 at 13. However, ICE officers arrested Mr. Antunez Basto
pursuant to the administrative warrant on February 11. Dkt. 9-1 at 9, 14. He has remained in ICE
custody since February 11 and is currently detained at the Clay County Jail.
II. Analysis
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner "is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Mr. Antunez Basto argues that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment and the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). He asks the Court to order that he be released immediately
or, alternatively, that he receive a bond hearing. The respondents answer that the INA not only
allows but requires Mr. Antunez Basto to be detained without bond but adds that, if he is entitled
to any relief, he is entitled to at most a bond hearing.
The Court finds that Mr. Antunez Basto's continued detention without possibility of bond
violates the INA and entitles him to habeas relief in the form of a bond hearing. On this basis, the
Court grants Mr. Antunez Basto's petition in part and denies it in part.
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A. 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which
involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also
known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011).
Section 1226(a) provides:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
[T]he Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole[.]
An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or release the
noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens
detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583 U.S. at
306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the noncitizen
"may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight
risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019) (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.
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2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge
. . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national
security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA
2006)).
Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or
1182(a)(7). Id.
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether
or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens
subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention
while their removal proceedings are pending.
B. 	Mr. Antunez Basto's Detention Is Authorized by § 1226(a)
The record reflects that Mr. Antunez Basto's detention is authorized by § 1226(a). As
discussed further below, this makes him eligible for a bond hearing.
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The Court has previously determined that considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural
meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter the United States rather than
undocumented aliens like Mr. Antunez Basto who have lived in the interior of the United States
for years. Morales Sandoval v. Crowley, No. 2:25-CV-00560-JRS-MKK, 2025 WL 3760760, at
*3–6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2025). As the Court has previously explained, Respondents' interpretation
of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship
between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and
(4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice. Id.
The respondents here cite a smattering of contrary decisions but concede that this Court's
previous analysis "control[s] the result in this case should the Court adhere to the legal reasoning
in those prior decisions." Dkt. 9 at 9. Notably, the respondents cite a recent Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, which upheld the government's interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) in finding that
"seeking admission" is a permissible redundancy for "applicant for admission." Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). The Court is not convinced,
however, that the Seventh Circuit will follow Buenrostro-Mendez and therefore continues to rely
on Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025), as persuasive
precedent. In Castañon-Nava, the Seventh Circuit determined that "seeking admission" cannot be
logically seen as synonymous with "applicant for admission" without violating several established
canons of statutory interpretation. 161 F.4th at 1061. This Court has applied those established
canons of statutory interpretation in its previous cases and has reached the same conclusion.
Because neither Buenrostro-Mendez nor the other cases cited by the respondents are binding on
this Court, the Court declines to depart from its previous reasoning.
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Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Antunez Basto's detention must be
authorized by § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b). Mr. Antunez Basto entered at a port of entry and
claimed asylum. Rather than immediately detain him for the duration of his asylum proceedings,
as the respondents now argue the law required, the government permitted Mr. Antunez Basto to
enter and then remain in the United States, first on parole, then with temporary protected status.
Later, when the government took Mr. Antunez Basto into custody, it did so through an
administrative warrant citing § 1226(a) as the basis for his arrest. The government's actions and its
paperwork reflect that Mr. Antunez Basto's detention is authorized by § 1226(a). It cannot now
maintain that he is subject to § 1225(b)(2) and therefore categorically ineligible for discretionary
release. See Singh v. Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-02101-SEB-TAB, 2025 WL 3029524, at *6 (S.D. Ind.
Oct. 30, 2025) (citing Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-2258, 2023 WL 1990303, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023)).
C. 	Scope of Relief
Mr. Antunez Basto is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a), and he has not received
one. Therefore, his continued detention without a bond hearing violates "the laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The remaining question is the remedy, which should be
"appropriate to the violation." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). Mr. Antunez Basto
requests immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, an individualized bond hearing.
Dkt. 1 at 12. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See Dep't of
Homeland Security v. Thursaissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020) ("Habeas has traditionally been a
means to secure release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008)
(explaining that "the quintessential habeas remedy" is release from custody). However, he
maintains—and the Court agrees—that he is subject to § 1226(a), which allows the government to
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"continue to detain" him. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). Mr. Antunez Basto's custody is not unlawful
because of the very fact that he is detained. Rather, his custody is unlawful because he has not
received the bond hearing that the law requires.
III. Conclusion
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted insofar as the respondents will have
seven days to certify that Mr. Antunez Basto has (1) appeared for a bond hearing before an
immigration judge consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and pertinent regulations, or (2) been
released from detention. The petition is denied to the extent it seeks immediate release from
custody.
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: ____________________
Distribution:
Rachel Dever
Church Church Hittle and Antrim
rdever@cchalaw.com
Kristin A. Hoffman
Gresk & Singleton
khoffman@gslawindy.com
Liberty L. Roberts
Church Church Hittle & Antrim
lroberts@cchalaw.com
Shelese M. Woods
DOJ-USAO
shelese.woods@usdoj.gov
3/13/2026
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