Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
SERHAT DEMIR, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00086-JRO-MKK
)
KRISTI NOEM, 	)
TODD LYONS, and 	)
BRANDON CROWLY, 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Immigration and Nationality Act not only authorizes but requires the
Executive to detain certain aliens without a bond hearing pending decisions on
their removability. The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Serhat Demir,
falls into the category of aliens subject to mandatory detention. 	He does under
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 	and 	his 	detention 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	The Court therefore DENIES his Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. 	Dkt. 1.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The following alleged facts are not in dispute and the Court finds that they
are true based on its review of the verified Petition, the answers to the Court’s
Order to Show Cause, and the accompanying documentary evidence. 	See 28
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U.S.C. § 2243 (“The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts . . . .”);
see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2248.
Petitioner is a citizen of Turkey. 	Dkt. 1 at 7. 	In September 2024, he
entered 	the 	United 	States 	without 	inspection 	and 	was 	apprehended 	by
immigration authorities a short time later. 	Id. at 2. 	After a brief period of
detention, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance pending removal
proceedings based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at
any 	time 	or 	place 	other 	than 	as 	designated 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General, 	is
inadmissible.”). 	Dkt. 6-1 at 19.
On February 2, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
officers arrested and detained Petitioner when he reported for a “check-in” at the
Broadview Immigration Facility in Chicago, Illinois. 	Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 6 at 3.
Petitioner remains in detention at the Clay County Justice Center in Brazil,
Indiana. 	Dkt. 1 at 2. 	His removal proceedings are ongoing, and he has applied
for asylum. 	Dkt. 1 at 7; Dkt. 6 at 3.
Petitioner filed the instant habeas action on February 9, 2026. Dkt. 1. He
names 	as 	Respondents 	Kristi 	Noem, 	Secretary 	of 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of
Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; and Brandon Crowley,
Warden of the Clay County Justice Center. 	Id. at 5.
B. 	Statutory Background
As 	amended 	by 	the 	Illegal 	Immigration 	Reform 	and 	Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), two statutory provisions principally govern
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the detention of aliens pending their removal proceedings—8 U.S.C. § 1225 and
8 U.S.C. § 1226. 	While Section 1225 mandates detention in all cases, Section
1226 permits the release of some aliens on bond.
Key to Section 1225 is its definition of “applicant for admission.” 	Section
1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as an alien “who arrives in the
United States” or who is “present in” the country but “has not been admitted.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 	The Supreme Court has explained that “applicants for
admission fall into one of two categories”—“those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and
those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).
Section 1225(b)(1) generally requires the detention and expedited removal of
“arriving” aliens and certain other aliens determined to be inadmissible because
of 	fraud, 	misrepresentation, 	or 	lack 	of 	valid 	documentation. 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1). 	Section 1225(b)(2) “is broader” and “serves as a catchall provision
that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by Section 1225(b)(1).”
Jennings, 	583 	U.S. 	at 	287. 	With 	exceptions 	not 	relevant 	here, 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	(emphasis 	added). 	In 	other 	words, 	detention 	is 	mandatory
pending removal proceedings.
Section 1226(a), by contrast, more generally provides that, “[o]n a warrant
issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending
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a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney
General to release an alien on “bond” or “conditional parole,” unless the alien
“falls into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and
terrorist activities.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E).
For those enumerated categories, detention pending removal is also mandatory.
II.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner 	seeks 	release 	from 	detention 	while 	he 	awaits 	his 	removal
proceedings because he contends he was illegally arrested (or at least he does
not know whether he was legally arrested) and is now detained pursuant to a
recent, unlawful policy shift by Respondents. 	Respondents rely upon Section
1225(b)(2)(A) to detain Petitioner without a bond hearing pending his removal
proceedings because they argue he is an “applicant for admission.”1 	Petitioner
claims that Section 1226(a) governs his detention and that he not only has a
right to a bond hearing but is entitled to immediate release because he alleges
“no factual issue remains for a bond hearing.” Dkt. 11 at 1. He also claims that
his detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court agrees with Respondents that the plain meaning of Section
1225(b)(2)(A) 	requires 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	without 	bond 	pending 	removal
1 Respondents did not raise an exhaustion defense in their Returns to the Court’s Order
to Show Cause. See Dkts. 6 & 9. So, the Court does not address this issue.
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proceedings. Moreover, Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings does
not violate due process.
A. 	The I-200 Warrant
As a preliminary matter, Petitioner argues that his arrest violated Section
1226(a) if it was executed without a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien. 	He
states that he has not been able to verify whether Respondents issued him a
valid I-200 warrant upon his arrest, and he has requested that the Court compel
the warrant’s production. 	Dkt. 1 at 12. 	In their Return to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause, the Federal Respondents produced an I-200 warrant that they state
is “Petitioner’s Warrant for Arrest” and affirmed that Petitioner was issued the
same. 	Dkt. 6 at 2 n.1; Dkt. 6 at 3; Dkt. 6-2 at 5. 	Petitioner has not objected to
the authenticity or admissibility of this warrant. 	Accordingly, the Court finds
that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to an I-200 warrant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2248
(“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an
order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be
accepted 	as 	true . . . .”). 	Respondents 	did 	not 	violate 	any 	procedural
requirement for Petitioner’s arrest in Section 1226(a), so Petitioner is not entitled
to release on that basis.
B. 	Section 1225 Applies to Petitioner
Section 1225’s plain terms require Petitioner’s detention pending his
removal proceedings. 	When engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court
“start[s] with the text of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning.” United States
v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation and citation
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omitted). 	In determining a statute’s plain meaning, the Court is guided by the
statutory language at issue and the language and design of the statute as a
whole. 	Id. at 852. 	Unless specifically defined, a statute’s words are given their
“ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning by looking at what they meant
when the statute was enacted . . . .” 	Id.
To start, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission.” 	The term is expressly
defined in the statute as follows: “An alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival . . .) shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 	While the definition of “applicant for admission” does
encompass aliens who may have recently arrived at a port of entry or crossed
the border, that definition is broader. 	“[A]pplicant for admission” includes any
unadmitted alien present in the United States no matter when they entered or
how long they have been here. 	See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494,
502 (5th Cir. 2026) (“Presence without admission deems the petitioners to be
applicants for admission.”). 	Though Petitioner says he “is not an applicant for
admission,” dkt. 1 at 12, there is no dispute that Petitioner is an alien who is
present in the United States and has not been admitted. He is therefore deemed
an “applicant for admission” under the statute.
As noted above, the detention of applicants for admission falls into one of
two statutory categories—Section 1225(b)(1) or the “catchall” Section 1225(b)(2).
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. 	All parties agree the former is not at issue in this
case. 	Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires the detention of applicants for admission
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pending removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Petitioner makes no argument that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted” to the country. 	Thus, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates
his detention pending removal proceedings.
Petitioner 	raises 	several 	arguments 	rejecting 	this 	straightforward
application 	of 	Section 	1225. 	The 	Court 	does 	not 	find 	these 	arguments
persuasive.
1. 	“Seeking Admission”
First, 	Petitioner 	argues 	Section 	1225(b)(2)(A)’s 	“seeking 	admission”
language limits its applicability to aliens who, unlike himself, affirmatively seek
lawful entry at a port of entry—i.e., arriving aliens.
The Seventh Circuit—in dicta and an emergency stay posture on a non-
habeas matter—has preliminarily agreed with Petitioner’s reading. See Castanon
v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–63 (7th Cir. 2025). 	So too
have other judges within this District. See, e.g., Alejandro v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-
02027-JPH-MKK, 2025 WL 2896348, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025) (“The phrase
‘seeking admission,’ . . . means that a noncitizen must be actively ‘seeking’
‘lawful entry.’” (internal citation omitted)); Campos Leon v. Forestal, No. 1:25-cv-
01774-SEB-MJD, 	2025 	WL 	2694763, 	at 	*3 	(S.D. 	Ind. 	Sep. 	22, 	2025)
(“Meanwhile, the respondents’ contention that Mr. Campos Leon’s detention is
mandatory under § 1225(b)(2) is, at best, incomplete. Assuming for the sake of
argument that Mr. Campos Leon is an ‘applicant for admission,’ the respondents
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has not explained how he is ‘seeking admission’ such that § 1225(b)(2) applies.”).
While these decisions warrant serious consideration, they are not binding upon
this Court. 	The Seventh Circuit has emphasized that decisions from motions
panels at the stay stage, even those directly on point, are “not entitled to the
weight of a decision made after plenary submission” because they are “summary
in character” and “made often on a scanty record.” Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d
1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1991). 	And “district court opinions lack precedential force
even vis-à-vis other judges in the same judicial district.” 	Trump v. CASA, Inc.,
606 U.S. 831, 858 n.17 (2025) (citation omitted).
Respectfully, this Court reads Section 1225(b)(2)(A) differently, in line with
the only appellate court to date to have addressed the precise issue on the merits
in a habeas action—Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)—
and other district court judges within the Seventh Circuit.2
The statutory language and context confirm that there is no separate and
independent “seeking admission” element to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Read most
plainly, the term “seeking admission” is simply a synonym for applying for
admission. 	And 	applying 	for 	admission 	is 	a 	participial form 	of 	the 	noun
“applicant for admission.” 	See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502 (“The
2 Rayo v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-2064-BHL, 2026 WL 594079 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2026);
Hernandez v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-1670-BHL, 2026 WL 161509 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 21, 2026);
Rodriguez v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-12961, 2026 WL 63613 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026) (Pacold,
J.); Ugarte-Arenas v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-1721-WCG, 2025 WL 3514451 (E.D. Wis. Dec.
8, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-1023 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026); Rojas v. Olson, No. 2:25-
cv-1437-BHL, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-
3127 (7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025).
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everyday meaning of the statute’s terms confirms that being an ‘applicant for
admission’ is not a condition independent from ‘seeking admission.’”).
This plain language reading that all “applicant[s] for admission” are, by
definition, “seeking admission” does not render superfluous the words “seeking
admission” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Rather, because “applicant for admission”
is expressly defined in the statute, it is best understood to qualify the broader
meaning of “seeking admission.” 	Cf. United States v. Woodward, 376 F.2d 136,
141 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding statutory terms “‘alarm or disturb’ . . . qualify the
broader meaning of ‘breach of the peace’” and are not superfluous). This makes
sense, as one can also “seek[] admission” even when he is not at a port of entry
or present in the United States. 	Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 741
(BIA 2012) (noting, for example, “an alien can ‘again seek[] admission’ . . . by
applying for a visa at a consulate abroad”).
Indeed, other provisions in Section 1225 demonstrate that all “applicant[s]
for admission” are “seeking admission,” not just those who recently arrived.
Take Section 1225(a)(3), which provides that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants
for 	admission 	or 	otherwise 	seeking 	admission . . . 	shall 	be 	inspected 	by
immigration officers.” 	The provision’s 	use of “or 	otherwise” indicates that
“‘applicants 	for 	admission’ 	are 	a 	subset 	of 	those 	‘seeking 	admission.’”
Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 503. 	Consider too Section 1225(a)(5): “An
applicant for admission may be required to state under oath any information
sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and intentions of the
applicant in seeking admission to the United States . . . .” (emphasis added).
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Notably, the provision refers to the purposes and intentions of “the applicant in
seeking admission”—not “the arriving alien in seeking admission.” 	In other
words, all “applicant[s] for admission” are necessarily “seeking admission,”
regardless of when they arrive.
What’s more, Congress knew how to say “arriving alien” when it wanted to
in Section 1225. 	It did not need to qualify “applicant for admission” with a
separate and independent “seeking admission” requirement to achieve that
effect. 	For example, Section 1225(b)(1)(A) explicitly limits its applicability to (1)
“an alien . . . who is arriving,” and (2) certain other unadmitted aliens who do
not have two years of continuous physical presence in the United States.
Tellingly, 	Section 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	contains 	no 	such 	temporal 	limitation. 	See
Negrete Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00206-CMS, 2026 WL 251725, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 30, 2026) (“If Congress intended that an alien no longer is ‘seeking
admission’ after some amount of time in the United States, it could have said
so.”).
Petitioner may find it strange that he could be “seeking admission” if he is
already in the United States. 	But that is a feature of Section 1225, not a bug.
The INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). 	Petitioner never effected a lawful entry into the country. 	He
was not admitted. In the eyes of the INA, he remains an “applicant for admission”
knocking on the proverbial door—that is, “seeking admission.” 	This is not a
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novel or even recent understanding of our immigration laws. In 2012, the Board
of Immigration Appeals explained:
In ordinary parlance, the phrase “seeks admission” connotes a
request for permission to enter . . . . 	The problem, however, is that
Congress has defined the concept of an “applicant for admission” in
an unconventional sense, to include not just those who are expressly
seeking permission to enter, but also those who are present in this
country 	without 	having 	formally 	requested 	or 	received 	such
permission, or who have been brought in against their will under
certain circumstances. . . . In other words, many people who are not
actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the
ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be “seeking admission”
under the immigration laws.
Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743 (emphasis in original). Thus,
the term “seeking admission” does not create an independent pre-requisite
for mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
2. 	“Arriving Aliens”
Second, 	Petitioner 	argues 	he 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention
because, broadly speaking, Section 1225 applies only to aliens “arriving at U.S.
ports of entry or who recently entered” the United States. 	Dkt. 1 at 10.
Petitioner, by contrast, has been in the country for many months. 	Accord
Mohammed v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-02404-TWP-MKK, 2025 WL 3541819, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2025) (“Considering § 1225 as a whole demonstrates that the
most natural meaning of § 1225 is that it applies to ‘arriving’ noncitizens
attempting to enter the United States.”).
General characterizations of a statute’s overall purpose, however, cannot
substitute for its specific and plain words. 	See Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41,
55 n.4 (2012) (“[E]ven the most formidable argument concerning the statute’s
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purposes could not overcome the clarity . . . in the statute’s text.”). Section 1225
concerns “applicant[s] for admission,” which is a clearly defined term that
includes but is not restricted only to arriving aliens or other recent border
crossers.
The Supreme Court did not hold otherwise in Jennings v. Rodriguez. That
decision repeatedly stated that it was summarizing Sections 1225 and 1226 in
“general” terms. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (“That process of decision
generally 	begins 	at 	the 	Nation’s 	borders 	and 	ports 	of 	entry, 	where 	the
Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is
admissible.” (emphasis added)); id. at 288 (“Section 1226 generally governs the
process of arresting and detaining [aliens inside the United States] pending their
removal.” (emphasis added)).
Granted, it is beyond question that Section 1225 applies to “arriving
aliens.” 	Section 1225, however, does not apply only to arriving aliens but to all
non-admitted aliens present in the country, regardless of when they arrived. Any
argument based on how this statute applies in many or even most cases does
not tell us anything about what it means in every case, and specifically, nothing
about what it means when applied to the facts before the Court today.
3. 	1225 Versus 1226
Third, Petitioner argues that Section 1226, not Section 1225(b)(2)(A),
“applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States,
including those who are present without admission or parole.” 	Dkt. 1 at 10.
Petitioner’s argument, however, incorrectly presumes that Sections 1225 and
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1226 are mutually exclusive. 	Other courts in this District have made this
presumption explicit by holding that once the Government has already invoked
its authority under Section 1226(a) by arresting an alien pursuant to an I-200
warrant, the Government is limited to the process described in Section 1226 and
is barred from relying upon Section 1225. 	See, e.g., Mohammed, 2025 WL
3541819, 	at 	*3 	(“[T]he 	Government 	has 	affirmatively 	decided 	to 	treat’ 	the
Petitioner ‘as being detained under Section 1226(a) and it cannot now be heard
to change its position to claim that he is detained under Section 1225(b).”
(quoting Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025)).
But, respectfully, nothing in the plain text of Sections 1225 and 1226
suggests that the mandates and procedures in these sections are mutually
exclusive. 	They merely overlap. 	First, much of Section 1226 applies expressly
to admitted aliens who may be arrested, detained, and removed for various
reasons, 	such 	as 	committing 	certain 	criminal 	acts. 	E.g., 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§
1226(c)(1)(B), (C) (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)). 	When an arrestee is an
admitted alien, Section 1226’s bond provision clearly applies. But this does not
necessarily imply that the bond provision must also apply when an arrestee is
an unadmitted alien who falls squarely within the plain meaning of Section
1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29
I. & N. Dec. 216, 219 (BIA 2025) (“Section [1226] does not purport to overrule
the mandatory detention requirements . . . in section [1225](b)(1) and (2).”).
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“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs
the general[,]” especially when construing comprehensive statutory schemes—
like the INA—that are often interspersed with “specific solutions” to “specific
problems.” 	RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639,
645 (2012) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384
(1992) 	and 	Varity 	Corp. v. Howe, 	516 	U.S. 	489, 	519 	(1996) 	(Thomas, 	J.,
dissenting)). “The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to
statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific
prohibition or permission. 	To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision
is construed as an exception to the general one.” 	RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566
U.S. at 645. 	“[T]he canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a
specific provision that is swallowed by the general one.” 	Id. 	Here, the INA
contains 	a 	general 	provision—the 	Attorney 	General 	may 	release 	most 	ICE
arrestees on bond, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—and a specific provision—every “applicant
for 	admission” 	must 	be 	detained 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	The specific is the exception to the general, and it applies to
Petitioner in this case. 	Accord Rodriguez v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-12961, 2026 WL
63613, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026) (applying general/specific canon to enforce
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) over Section 1226(a)); Ayala v. Harper, No. 1:26-cv-204-
CLM-GMB, 2026 WL 501113, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2026) (same).
Applying the general/specific canon here is consistent with the plain text
and structure of Section 1225 and 1226, as explained above. 	Further, Section
1226(a) is permissive: “[A]n alien may be arrested and detained pending a
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decision 	on 	whether 	the 	alien 	is 	to 	be 	removed 	from 	the 	United 	States.”
(emphasis added). 	In other words, the Government is free to exercise its
discretion in how it executes the provisions of Section 1226 provided it does so
within the bounds of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s clear mandate to detain “applicants
for 	admission” 	pending 	removal 	proceedings 	“if 	the 	examining 	immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted.” Enforcing that more specific mandate of Section
1225(b)(2)(A) 	does 	not 	render 	any 	of 	Section 	1226 	superfluous 	as 	to 	the
Petitioner. 	It harmonizes the two provisions. 	At any rate, a “preference for
avoiding 	surplusage 	constructions 	is 	not 	absolute,” 	especially 	when 	the
general/specific canon better harmonizes the apparently conflicting statutory
provisions. 	Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004); RadLAX Gateway
Hotel, 566 U.S. at 645; see also Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S.
334, 346 (2019) (“Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains
some redundancy.”).
4. 	Past Practice
Petitioner 	also 	highlights 	that 	prior 	administrations 	have 	uniformly
applied Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision only to recent
arrivals and not to unadmitted aliens already in the country like himself.
However, the Court takes seriously its independent duty to interpret the law as
written, regardless of an agency’s past practice. 	And “in cases where [a court’s]
own judgment . . . differ[s] from that of other high functionaries,” the Court is
“not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.’” 	Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
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603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (quoting United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 162
(1841) (Story, J.)). 	Past practice aside, Respondent’s interpretation of “seeking
admission” is not entirely novel. 	See Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. at
743.
* * *
Stepping back to consider the big picture, Petitioner’s perspective on the
meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) necessarily implies that aliens who evade
inspection and detention at a port of entry enjoy the privilege of a bond hearing
while those who submit to inspection upon first arrival do not. 	As the Fifth
Circuit explained, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) aimed to “reduce th[at] incongruity.” 	Buenrostro-Mendez,
166 F.4th at 499; see also Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining IIRIRA “did away with” the “anomaly whereby immigrants who were
attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than
persons who had crossed the border unlawfully”). 	Nothing in the text of the
statute suggests that the privilege of a bond hearing is based upon the arbitrary
standard of avoiding inspection and living in the United States for an unspecified
time.
These 	concerns 	are 	muted 	somewhat 	in 	Petitioner’s 	case: 	his 	arrest
occurred when he faithfully visited ICE for a routine check-in less than two years
after his arrival. 	But granting habeas relief on the premise that ICE does not
have the statutory right to detain him—despite his non-admitted status—still
leads to the same conclusion that the force of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) arbitrarily
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dissipates with time. 	And Petitioner expressly argues this point. 	Dkt. 1 at 10.
That is plainly not what Congress meant when it wrote “seeking admission” in
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or enacted the bond hearing provision in Section 1226(a).
It is also inconsistent with Congress’s IIRIRA amendments and encourages the
“perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location” against
which the Supreme Court has warned. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“Like an alien detained after arriving at a port of entry,
an alien like respondent is ‘on the threshold.’ The rule advocated by respondent
and adopted by the Ninth Circuit would undermine the ‘sovereign prerogative’ of
governing admission to this country and create a perverse incentive to enter at
an unlawful rather than a lawful location.” (citations omitted)).
In sum, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pending removal
proceedings under the plain terms of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 	As he is not eligible
for a discretionary bond hearing, the Court does not address his argument that
a bond hearing is unnecessary.
C. 	Due Process Claim
Finally, 	Petitioner 	argues 	his 	“unjustified” 	detention 	pending 	removal
proceedings violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 	Dkt. 1
at 13. 	The Court disagrees.
The 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	applies 	to 	aliens 	within 	the 	United 	States
"whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). However, the Supreme Court has
held 	that 	“[d]etention 	during 	removal 	proceedings 	is 	a 	constitutionally
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permissible part of that process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). That
holding settles the issue.
Petitioner argues that his case is unique because immigration authorities
already released him once pending removal proceedings, so “the Government
cannot re-detain him . . . without a reasoned explanation or evidence of changed
circumstances.” 	Dkt. 1 at 14. 	But the Supreme Court already anticipated this
objection and rejected it: “[W]hen the Government deals with deportable aliens,
the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome
means to accomplish its goal.” 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. 	Applied to Petitioner,
this means that Respondents do not have to justify mandatory detention on a
case-by-case basis. 	Respondents may enforce the policy Congress already
adopted 	when 	it 	enacted 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	provision 	in 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A) without an individualized bond hearing.
Petitioner 	cites 	Zadvydas to 	support 	his 	argument, 	but 	that 	case 	is
distinguishable. 	There, the Supreme Court addressed whether a post-removal-
period 	detention 	statute 	authorized 	potentially 	indefinite 	detention. 	In
construing the statute to reject that conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically
distinguished the due process issues inherent in the petitioner’s indefinite
detention from “detention pending a determination of removability,” which has
an 	“obvious 	termination 	point.” 	Zadvydas, 	533 	U.S. 	at 	697. 	Petitioner’s
detention here is a detention pending removal proceedings. 	Thus, it does not
implicate the due process concerns addressed in Zadvydas.
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And even in cases like Zadvydas—where the Supreme Court held that
removal is “no longer practically attainable,” id. at 690, thereby eliminating the
premise for detention pending removal—detention for up to six months was
presumptively constitutional, id. at 701. 	Petitioner has been detained pending
his removal proceedings for just over a month. Accordingly, Petitioner’s current
detention does not violate his due process rights.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner Serhat Demir’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DISMISSES this case with prejudice.
Dkt. 1. Consistent with this Order, the Court also VACATES the previous Order
forbidding transfer of the Petitioner during the pendency of the habeas petition.
Dkt. 3 ¶ 5. 	Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: 3/13/2026
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
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