VILCHUCK v. HAMBLEN et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SETH A. VILCHUCK, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-01190-JPH-TAB
)
TRENT ALLEN Warden, 	)
LISA HAMBLEN HSA Centurion, 	)
BURCH Nurse, Centurion, 	)
CHARTERS Nurse, Centurion, 	)
MAVES ARS, Centurion MAT Program, 	)
NEVERS Nurse, Centurion, 	)
NWANNUNU Dr., Centurion, 	)
KELLY MCCAFFERTY Centurion
Practitioner MAT/MHS,
)
)
GOSMAN Centurion Practitioner
MAT/MHS,
)
)
KENNEDY Centurion Practitioner
MAT/MHS,
)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
SEVERANCE OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff 	Seth 	Vilchuck, 	an 	inmate 	at 	Pendleton 	Correctional 	Facility
("Pendleton"), filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment
retaliation 	and 	Eighth 	Amendment 	deliberate 	indifference 	claims 	against
Defendants. Dkt. 1. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen
the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
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determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Vilchuck has identified the theories he wishes to use—
violations 	of 	the 	First 	Amendment 	through 	retaliation 	and 	of 	the 	Eighth
Amendment 	through 	deliberate 	indifference. 	Where 	a 	pro 	se 	litigant 	has
expressly stated the legal theory or theories he wishes to pursue, the district
court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in the complaint might
state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App'x
413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the Court
analyzes Mr. Vilchuck's claims only under the theories he has identified.
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Mr. Vilchuck's factual allegations are accepted as true at the pleading
stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). The complaint
names as defendants (1) Pendleton Warden Trent Allen; (2) Health Services
Administrator ("HSA") Lisa Hamblen; (3) Nurse Burch; (4) Nurse Charters; (5)
Nurse Nevers; (6) Addiction Recovery Services ("ARS") staff member Mrs. Maves;
(7) Dr. John Nwannunu; (8) Mental Health Specialist ("MHS") Kelly McCafferty;
(9) MHS Mr. Gosman; and (10) MHS Mr. Kennedy.
The overall theme of Mr. Vilchuck's complaint is that all the Defendants
retaliate against him in various ways because he is a frequent filer of grievances
and federal civil rights cases against them and others at Pendleton. Beyond that,
however, there are two distinct allegations of deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs, concerning two different needs, and the defendants do not
entirely overlap between these claims.
First, Mr. Vilchuck alleges that he is hypoglycemic, but over the course of
several months did not receive needed and prescribed glucose tests to monitor
his condition. He puts the number of missed tests at approximately 140. He
states that this has sometimes caused him to experience very low glucose levels,
which can lead to black outs. He accuses Nurses Nevers, Burch, and Charters
of personally and frequently not providing him with the needed glucose tests. He
also states that he has repeatedly and directly advised HSA Hamblen and
Warden Allen of this problem, and neither has taken any action. He also accused
Dr. Nwannunu of "allowing his nurses to be negligent" in not providing the
glucose tests. Dkt. 1 at 15.
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Second, Mr. Vilchuck alleges that he suffers from an opioid addiction. He
states that he has previously tried to take naltrexone to treat his addiction, but
that he is "allergic" to it. Id. at 9. He has requested to take Suboxone or
methadone as an alternative medication to treat his addition. However, Dr.
Nwannunu, Mrs. Mayes, and MHS Kennedy have refused to arrange for any such
alternative medication. He further alleges that Mrs. Mayes, MHS Kennedy, MHS
McCafferty, and MHS Gosman have been entirely ignoring his requests for any
opioid addiction treatment once they learned of Mr. Vilchuck's grievances and
civil lawsuits. And, he claims that he has repeatedly and directly advised HSA
Hamblen and Warden Allen of the lack of adequate opioid addiction treatment,
and neither has taken any action.
Mr. Vilchuck is seeking damages. He also seeks injunctive relief in the
form of a transfer to another prison "outside the State of Indiana, within the
United States Department of Corrections," for the medical defendants to have
their licenses revoked, and that he be provided with Suboxone or methadone. Id.
at 18-19. Mr. Vilchuck has also filed a motion for counsel, dkt. 10, and a motion
for an "emergency transfer" to any other Indiana Department of Correction
facility, dkt. 11.
III. Discussion
The Court concludes there are essentially three sets of claims in Mr.
Vilchuck's complaint: (1) that all Defendants retaliate against him; (2) that some
(but not all) Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
need of hypoglycemia; and (3) that some (but not all) Defendants have been
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deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need of opioid addiction. Although
there is some overlap as to Claim (1), Claims (2) and (3) belong in different suits.
See Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Antoine v.
Ramos, 497 F. App'x 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating "district court should have
rejected [plaintiff's] attempt to sue 20 defendants in a single lawsuit raising
claims unique to some but not all of them") (citing Wheeler v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012)); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d
950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011).
Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party
asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many
claims as it has against an opposing party." "Thus multiple claims against a
single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2." George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2007). Joinder of the defendants into one action is proper only "if there is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). In short, the courts do
not allow an inmate to treat a single federal complaint as a sort of general list of
grievances. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Out of
concern 	about 	unwieldy 	litigation 	and 	attempts 	to 	circumvent 	the 	[Prison
Litigation Reform Act's] PLRA's fee requirements, we have urged district courts
and defendants to beware of 'scattershot' pleading strategies.").
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Moreover, a district court may "sever any claims that are 'discrete and
separate' in the interest of judicial economy and to avoid prejudice." Vermillion
v. Levenhagen, 604 F. App'x 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Gaffney v. Riverboat
Servs. of Indiana., Inc., 451 F.3d 424 442 (7th Cir. 2006)). To be "discrete and
separate . . . one claim must be capable of resolution despite the outcome of the
other claim." Gaffney, 451 F.3d at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
is the case here. Specifically, any factual issues regarding whether Mr. Vilchuck's
alleged hypoglycemia is being adequately treated would be entirely distinct from
whether his alleged opioid addiction is being adequately treated.
In this case, the Court will address and screen the claims related to
inadequate treatment of Mr. Vilchuck's alleged hypoglycemia. The claims related
to inadequate treatment of his alleged opioid addiction will be severed into a new
action, if Mr. Vilchuck so chooses, as discussed below.
A. Hypoglycemia
Mr. Vilchuck's case shall proceed with First Amendment retaliation and
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Warden Allen, Nurse
Nevers, Nurse Burch, Nurse Charters, HSA Hamblen, and Dr. Nwannunu, in
relation to his claim that he has regularly and frequently not received needed
monitoring of his hypoglycemia. The Court notes, however, that to the extent Mr.
Vilchuck seeks revocation of any medical provider's state license, the Court
cannot provide such relief. 	D.A.Y. Investments LLC v. Lake County, 106 N.E.3d
500, 	506 	(Ind. 	Ct. 	App. 	2018) 	(Under 	Indiana 	law, 	it 	is 	a 	jurisdictional
prerequisite for a party to first exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking
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judicial review of an agency action.). There is no indication that Mr. Vilchuck has
utilized Indiana's administrative procedures to challenge any medical provider's
licensure.1 So, Mr. Vilchuck will not be allowed to seek revocation of any medical
provider's license in this case.
B. Opioid Addiction Treatment
These claims are misjoined. In such a situation, "[t]he court may . . . sever
any claim against a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The misjoined claims shall either
be severed into new actions or dismissed without prejudice. See Elmore v.
Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff is the master of
his complaint and shall be given the opportunity to determine which course is
followed. Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
the composition and content of the complaint are entirely the responsibility of
the plaintiff, for "even pro se litigants are masters of their own complaints and
may choose who to sue-or not to sue"). If new actions are opened, the plaintiff
will be responsible for the filing fee associated with each new case.2 In addition,
the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) will be triggered for each new
1 Also, to the extent Mr. Vilchuck refers in his complaint to fears that he will be subjected
to a medically-induced heart attack in order to cover up a conspiracy of retaliation
against him, the Court gives no credence to such delusional allegations. See Ezike v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2009 WL 247838, 3 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that
"irrational or delusional" allegations in a suit filed in forma pauperis should be
dismissed).
2 The Court notes that even if Mr. Vilchuck is granted permission to proceed in a case
in forma pauperis without requiring payment of an initial partial filing fee, he is still
indebted to the Court in the amount of $350 for each newly-opened case.
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case. As always, the plaintiff should consider whether to file any particular civil
action.
The Court further notes that it is possible that Mr. Vilchuck's claims
related to treatment of his opioid addiction are related to a previously-filed case,
Vilchuck v. Manning, No. 1:25-cv-00021-MPB-MKK (S.D. Ind.). That case alleges
that a Pendleton nurse has been both retaliating against Mr. Vilchuck and been
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by not providing him with
Suboxone to treat his opioid addiction. See id. at dkt. 14, p. 2. If Mr. Vilchuck
elects to sever his opioid claims in this case into a new action, the Court will
need to consider whether it should be consolidated with the Manning case.
Mr. Vilchuck shall have through November 13, 2025, in which to notify
the Court whether he wishes the Court to sever the opioid addiction treatment
claims into a new action. If Mr. Vilchuck fails to so notify the Court, these claims
will be considered abandoned and will be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. Motion for Counsel
Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory
right to court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir.
2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request"
counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a
practical matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a
pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755,
764 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that courts must be careful stewards of the
limited resource of volunteer lawyers); Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th
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Cir. 2014) ("Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision: Almost everyone
would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and
too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.").
"'When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel,
the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff
made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from
doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). These two
questions "must guide" the Court's determination whether to attempt to recruit
counsel. 	Id. 	These 	questions 	require 	an 	individualized 	assessment 	of 	the
plaintiff, the claims, and the stage of litigation. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655-56.
The first question, whether litigants have made a reasonable attempt to
secure private counsel on their own, "is a mandatory, threshold inquiry that
must be determined before moving to the second inquiry." Eagan, 987 F.3d at
682. 	Mr. 	Vilchuck 	has 	contacted 	multiple 	attorneys 	with 	requests 	for
representation 	without 	success. 	The 	Court 	finds 	he 	has 	made 	reasonable
attempts to secure counsel.
"The second inquiry requires consideration of both the factual and legal
complexity of the plaintiff's claims and the competence of the plaintiff to litigate
those claims himself." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).
"The court's competency evaluation should account for 'the plaintiff's literacy,
communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience,' and, to the
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extent that such evidence is before the court, information 'bearing on the
plaintiff's intellectual capacity and psychological history.'" Watts, 42 F.4th at 760
(quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "Specifically, courts should consider 'whether
the difficulty of the case— factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's
capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.'"
Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "This assessment of
the 	plaintiff's 	apparent 	competence 	extends 	beyond 	the 	trial 	stage 	of
proceedings; it must include 'the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence
gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and
trial.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).
The Court granted Mr. Vilchuck's motions to recruit counsel in two other
pending cases: Vilchuck v. Harmon et al., 1:24-cv-00601-JPH-TAB, and Vilchuck
v. Hamblen et al., 1:24cv-01086-JRS-TAB. It requires significant expenditure of
Court resources to identify and appoint recruited counsel. Also, recruitment of
counsel in one case for a particular plaintiff does not necessarily mean the Court
has found the plaintiff to be "incompetent" or completely unable to litigate—only
that assistance for the plaintiff was deemed appropriate in that particular case
or cases. 	Here, in this case, the Court concludes that Mr. Vilchuck does not
require the further assistance of recruited counsel at this time. The Seventh
Circuit has found that "until the defendants respond to the complaint, the
plaintiff's need for assistance of that counsel . . . cannot be gauged." Kadamovas
v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Mapes v. Indiana, 932
F.3d 	968, 	971 	(7th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(acknowledging 	"the 	difficulty 	in 	accurately
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evaluating the need for counsel in the early stages of pro se litigation"). That
statement from Kadamovas is not a "bright-line rule," but in this case, Mr.
Vilchuck has not shown he needed counsel to assist him to "investigate and flesh
out any claim that may exist." Mapes, 932 F.3d at 971-72. Mr. Vilchuck is an
experienced 	litigant. 	Although 	Mr. 	Vilchuck 	complains 	of 	various 	mental
problems, that has stopped him from pursing his multiple cases thus far. His
motion for counsel, dkt. [10], is DENIED without prejudice.
V. Preliminary Injunction Motion
Mr. Vilchuck's motion for preliminary injunction seeks "emergency facility
transfer from PCF to anywhere in the DOC." 	Dkt. 11.
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is
available only when the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp.,
796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff first must show that "(1) without
this relief, [he] will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would
be inadequate; and (3) [he] has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its
claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element by a preponderance of the
evidence. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S.A., Inc., 549
F.3d 	1079, 	1086 	(7th 	Cir. 	2008). 	If 	the 	plaintiff 	meets 	these 	threshold
requirements, "the court then must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary
injunction would cause the plaintiff against the harm to the defendant if the
court were to grant it." Id.
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During 	the 	course 	of 	his 	multiple 	lawsuits, 	Mr. 	Vilchuck 	has 	often
requested, then withdrawn, then re-requested the preliminary injunctive relief of
transfer to a different prison. Most recently, in Vilchuck v. Ballenger et al., No.
1:24-cv-00141-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind.), dkt. 99, the Court denied such a motion.
In part, this Court concluded that the injunctive relief sought was not sufficiently
tied to the claims in the complaint. Id. at 5-6. Here, it may be that Mr. Vilchuck's
preliminary injunction request is adequately tied to the claims in the complaint.
Specifically, he seeks transfer because of alleged ongoing retaliation that has
resulted in his missed glucose tests and being denied adequate opioid addiction
treatment.
But the Court also repeats the other grounds for the denial of preliminary
injunctive relief in Ballenger, which apply with equal force here. Where a prisoner
should be housed is a matter within the expertise of the IDOC in which this
Court is reluctant to interfere, particularly given the limited ability to grant any
form of injunctive relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C.
3626(a)(2); see also Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Prison
officials 	have 	broad 	administrative 	and 	discretionary 	authority 	over 	the
institutions they manage.").
Mr. 	Vilchuck's 	allegations 	of 	not 	receiving 	adequate 	care 	for 	his
hypoglycemia, 	and/or 	for 	his 	opioid 	addiction, 	are 	matters 	that 	could 	be
addressed through a different form of injunctive relief – if he shows adequate
grounds for being entitled to such relief. His current preliminary injunction
motion contains only conclusory, unsworn allegations that he is being deprived
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of needed treatment. 	Thus, he has not currently shown much of a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits. Further, balancing the low likelihood of success against
the 	very 	limited 	ability 	for 	the 	Court 	to 	force 	the 	Indiana 	Department 	of
Correction to move Mr. Vilchuck to a different facility, his current preliminary
injunction motion, dkt. [11], must be DENIED without prejudice.
VI. Conclusion
The 	claims 	that 	are 	proceeding 	in 	this 	action 	are 	First 	Amendment
retaliation and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Warden
Allen, Nurse Nevers, Nurse Burch, Nurse Charters, HSA Hamblen, and Dr.
Nwannunu, in relation to his claim that he has regularly and frequently not
received needed monitoring of his hypoglycemia.
Mr. Vilchuck shall have through November 13, 2025, in which to notify
the Court whether he wishes the Court to sever the opioid addiction treatment
claims into a new action. If Mr. Vilchuck fails to so notify the Court, these claims
will be considered abandoned and will be dismissed without prejudice.
Mr. Vilchuck's motions for counsel and for a preliminary injunction are
DENIED without prejudice. Dkts. [10], [11].
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendants Warden Allen, Nurse Nevers, Nurse Burch, Nurse Charters, HSA
Hamblen, and Dr. Nwannunu in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall
consist of the complaint filed on June 17, 2025, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice
of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service
of Summons), and this Order.
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Defendants Nurse Nevers, Nurse Burch, Nurse Charters, HSA Hamblen,
and Dr. Nwannunu are identified as employees of Centurion. A copy of this Order
and the process documents shall also be served on Centurion electronically.
Centurion is ORDERED to provide the full name and last known home address
of any defendant who does not waive service if they have such information. This
information shall be filed ex parte.
The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction and
Centurion employees electronically.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:
Warden Trent Allen
(At Pendleton Correctional Facility)
Electronic service to Centurion
Nurse Nevers
Nurse Burch
Nurse Charters
Lisa Hamblen
Dr. John Nwannunu
SETH A. VILCHUCK
149912
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Date: 10/28/2025
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