Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TONI M.,1 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Claimant Toni M. requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner.
I. 	Background
Claimant applied for SSI in April 2022. [Dkt. 10-5 at 2.] Her application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration, [Dkt. 10-4 at 11, 27], and Claimant then requested and was
granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held before ALJ
Jeffrey Ciegel on September 11, 2023. [Dkt. 10-2 at 60.] 	On November 16, 2023, the ALJ
1 In an attempt to protect the privacy interest of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
issued his determination that Claimant was not disabled. Id. at 28. The Appeals Council then
denied Claimant's request for review on December 18, 2024. Id. at 5. After receiving an
extension of time, id. at 2, Claimant timely filed her Complaint on March 24, 2025, seeking
judicial review of ALJ Walker's decision. [Dkt. 1.]
II. 	Legal Standards
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1382c. Disability is defined as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner, as represented by the
ALJ, employs a sequential, five-step analysis: (1) if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, she is not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not have a "severe" impairment, one that
significantly limits her ability to perform basic work activities, she is not disabled; (3) if the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment
appearing in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, App. 1, the claimant is
disabled; (4) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step three, and is able to perform her
past relevant work, she is not disabled; and (5) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step
three, cannot perform her past relevant work, but can perform certain other available work, she is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Before continuing to step four, the ALJ must assess the
claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by "incorporat[ing] all of the claimant's
limitations supported by the medical record." Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015)). If, at any step, the ALJ can make a
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
conclusive finding that the claimant either is or is not disabled, then she need not progress to the
next step of the analysis. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Seventh Circuit recently set forth the proper standard of review in an appeal of the
denial of disability benefits as follows:
[W]e review the ALJ's decision deferentially, affirming if its conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Deborah M. [v. Saul, 994
F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2021)]; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 873 (7th Cir. 2000)
(ALJ's 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	determination 	"must 	be 	supported 	by
substantial evidence in the record"). 	Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019),
quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83
L.Ed. 126 (1938). While we do not reweigh evidence, we conduct a critical review
because a decision "cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate
discussion of the issues." Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th
Cir. 2003). In addition, an ALJ must "build an accurate and logical bridge from
the evidence to his conclusion." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. That logical bridge
can assure a reviewing court that the ALJ considered the important evidence and
applied sound reasoning to it. See Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir.
1999).
Moy v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2025). This is the standard the Court will apply
in this case.2
III. 	ALJ Decision
The ALJ first determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the application date of April 21, 2022. [Dkt. 10-2 at 30.] At step two, the ALJ found that
Claimant had the following severe impairments: "degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive
2 The Commissioner correctly quotes Thorlton v. King, 127 F.4th 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2025), as
saying that "the court 'will reverse only if the record 'compels a contrary result.'" [Dkt. 15 at 2.]
As the Court explained at length in Rachel H. v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1636-MJD-JRS, 2025
WL 2402187, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2025), to the extent that the Commissioner is arguing that
that standard is different than the one set forth in Moy and somehow relieves the Court of its duty
to conduct a "critical review" of the ALJ's decision, the Court rejects that argument.
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
pulmonary disease (COPD), obesity, major depressive disorder (MDD), generalized anxiety
disorder (GAD), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (20 CFR 416.920(c))." Id. At step
three, the ALJ found that Claimant's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment
during the relevant time period. Id. at 31. The ALJ then found that, during the relevant time
period, Claimant had the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a), except occasionally
climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequently reach overhead with the
bilateral upper extremities; no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or
dangerous moving machinery (machinery with moving mechanical parts); no
more than occasional exposure to vibrations; never use foot controls in the
workplace; no exposure to extremes of heat or cold; no more than occasional
exposure to wetness, humidity, and atmospheric conditions (such as fumes, odors,
dust, gases, and poor ventilation); can understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions; can use judgment to make simple work-related decisions; cannot
perform work requiring a specific production rate such as assembly line work or
work that requires hourly quotas, but end of day quotas would be acceptable; can
deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting; can have occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but should have no interaction with
the public; would specifically need to avoid 	team-based activities in the
workplace; and would need to use an assistive device (cane) while ambulating in
the workplace.
Id. at 34.
At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant had no past relevant work during the relevant
time period. Id. at 44. At step five, relying on testimony from a vocational expert ("VE"), the
ALJ determined that Claimant was able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy, such as sorter of small parts, assembler, and inspector. Id. at 45. Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled. Id.
IV. 	Discussion
Claimant raises a single issue for review: whether the ALJ's determination that Claimant
would need a cane to ambulate in the workplace but would not need a cane for balance is
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained. That determination was dispositive
of Claimant's claim, inasmuch as the VE testified at the hearing that the need for a cane for both
balance and ambulation "would eliminate competitive employment." [Dkt. 10-2 at 87.]
With regard to Claimant's use of a cane, the ALJ stated the following:
Finally, I have asserted that the claimant would need to use an assistive device
(cane) while ambulating in the workplace. The above consultants erred in not
articulating a restriction related to assistive device use. Within the framework of
the physical limitations provided in the residual functional capacity assessment of
this decision, I do not see a need to specify a limitation relating to need for a cane
for balancing. It is worth noting that although the claimant alleged having falls,
she had negative Romberg signs during her examinations.
[Dkt. 10-2 at 41.] There is no medical evidence of record that explains the import of "negative
Romberg signs" or whether that test result supports a finding that Claimant is not having falls or
that she needs a cane for ambulating but not for balancing. Neither the ALJ nor the Court is
qualified to make that determination. See, e.g., Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 518 (7th Cir.
2022) (noting it is error for an ALJ to "stray[] beyond his expertise as an adjudicator and into the
forbidden territory of 'play[ing] doctor'").
In her brief, Claimant argues that the ALJ's other observations throughout his decision
relating to the Claimant's need for a cane do not provide the required explanation for the ALJ's
finding that Claimant needs a cane to ambulate but not for balance. See [Dkt. 14]. The Court
agrees. Particularly given the dispositive nature of that finding, the ALJ was required to
articulate a reason for it and point to the substantial evidence that supports it. As noted in Moy,
the ALJ's decision "cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the
issues" and "an ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion." Moy, 142 F.4th at 552 (citations omitted). With regard to whether Claimant
requires a cane for balancing, the ALJ fell short of this requirement.
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
V. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 2 MAR 2026
Distribution:
Service will be made electronically on
all ECF-registered counsel of record via
email generated by the Court's ECF system.
Case 1:25-cv-00559-MJD-RLY Document 18 Filed 03/02/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>