Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ROBERT A. H.,1 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00060-RLY-TAB
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ENTRY ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Robert H. suffers from coronary artery disease, gout, high blood pressure,
restless leg syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety. He applied
for Social Security Benefits in October 2021. The Social Security Administration
("SSA") denied his claims initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held that Robert is not disabled. Robert then filed
this suit for review of the ALJ's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court affirm the ALJ's decision. For the
1 To protect the privacy of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent with the
recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.
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reasons set forth below, the court OVERRULES the objection and ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
I. 	Background
A. 	ALJ Review
Robert filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits. He also filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging
disability. Robert alleged disability beginning on March 1, 2020, in both applications.
The SSA denied his claims initially and upon reconsideration. Robert then requested a
hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ found that Robert was not disabled.
In concluding that Robert was not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step
sequential evaluation described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ
concluded that Robert had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
onset of his disability. (Dkt. 9-2 at 14). At step two, the ALJ concluded that Robert had
the severe impairment of coronary artery disease, with a history of stenting and gout.
(Id.). The ALJ also found that he had the non-severe impairments of high blood pressure,
restless leg syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety. (Id. at 14–
16).
In finding that Robert's mental impairments were non-severe, the ALJ considered
the "broad functional areas of mental functioning" known as the "paragraph B" criteria.
(Id. at 15). The criteria are (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4)
adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at 15–16). The ALJ held that the criteria did not
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support any limitations. First, there were "no reported difficulties with memory and his
memory was normal on exam." (Id. at 15). Second, although Robert reported not leaving
his home and feeling irritable, the record showed that, on exam, he had "normal mood
and affect" and "unremarkable behavior." (Id.). Third, despite Robert claiming that he
struggled to concentrate, the record showed that Robert had an "unremarkable thought
process," a normal attention span, and normal concentration. (Id.). Fourth, Robert
reported feeling anxious and depressed, but the record evidence showed that he attended
therapy, had fair insight and judgment, and never reported needing assistance to perform
daily activities. (Id.).
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Robert did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments. (Id. at 16–17).
After step three, but before step four, the ALJ assessed Robert's residual functional
capacity (RFC) and his past relevant work. (Id. at 17–20). In making these findings, the
ALJ considered record evidence and the opinions of two impartial medical experts. (Id.).
The record evidence showed that Robert alleged disability due to "coronary artery
disease, angioplasties, stents for blockages, post-traumatic stress disorder, manic
depression, anxiety, gout, high blood pressure, bipolar disorder, and panic attacks." (Id.
at 18). And Robert testified that (1) he "stopped working after he had a nervous
breakdown," (2) "stress triggers his gout," (3) he "feels anxious and depressed," (4) he
has "little energy and find[s] it difficult getting along with others and leaving the home,"
and (5) he "has difficultly finishing tasks and getting out of bed." (Id.).
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Of the two medical experts, Dr. Griffin provided an opinion on Robert's mental
impairments. She "opined that [Robert] ha[d] no limitations in understanding,
remembering or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting
or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing oneself." (Id. at 20). Dr. Griffin also noted
that Robert "can work, but should be encouraged to participate in psychotherapy." (Id.).
The ALJ found Dr. Griffin's opinion persuasive because "it [was] supported by a detailed
explanation and [was] consistent with the overall evidence." (Id.). There were no
medical opinions in the record identifying a more restrictive limitation based on Robert's
mental impairments.
After considering all the medical evidence, the ALJ determined Robert's RFC.
She found that he could perform light work with the following limitations: "[Robert] can
frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. [Robert] can
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds." (Id. at 17). Then at Step 4, the ALJ
asked a vocational expert about Robert's ability to work given his age, education, work
experience, and medical limitations.2 (Id. at 21, 98–99). The vocational expert answered
that Robert could perform his past work as an automated cutting machine operator. (Id.
at 99). In her decision, the ALJ found that Robert could perform his "past relevant work
as an Automated Cutting Machine Operator." (Id. at 21). Because the ALJ found that
Robert could perform his past relevant work, he was not disabled, and the ALJ did not
need to proceed to step five. (Id. at 13).
2 The content of the hypothetical question is not relevant to the disposition of this motion.
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B. 	Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
After receiving an unfavorable decision from the ALJ, Robert filed a Complaint
for Review of the ALJ's decision. (Dkt. 1). Robert raised two issues. First, the ALJ
erred by not considering a line of evidence when analyzing Robert's mental impairments.
Second, the ALJ failed to properly address his subjective symptoms. The court referred
the matter to the Magistrate Judge, who issued his Report and Recommendation. The
Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial
evidence and therefore recommended that the court affirm the determination that Robert
is not disabled. This matter now comes before the court on Robert's Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 17).
All other facts relevant to the disposition of this objection are addressed in the
discussion section.
II. 	Legal Standard
The court reviews the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation de novo.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition." Id.
The court reviews the ALJ's decision to ensure that it "applies the correct legal
standard and is supported by substantial evidence." Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299,
306 (7th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.
97, 103 (2019). Under the substantial evidence standard, the court reviews the ALJ's
decision to determine if there is a logical and accurate bridge between the evidence and
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the conclusion. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013). In making this
determination, the court must consider the entire administrative record but not "reweigh
the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own
judgment for that of the Commissioner." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000).
III. 	Discussion
Robert objected to the Magistrate Judge finding that the ALJ supported her
decision on his mental impairments with substantial evidence. He then states that he
"reiterates his arguments in the opening and reply brief to assert that the Magistrate's
opinion is not supported." (Dkt. 17 at 3). The Commissioner contends that Robert
waived any objection to the Magistrate Judge's findings on the subjective symptom
analysis. (Dkt. 19 at 1 n.1). The court agrees. Robert failed to raise a specific objection
or develop an argument regarding the Magistrate Judge's subjective symptom analysis,
which amounts to a waiver of any objection to that section of the Report and
Recommendation. See Bramlett v. Schular, No. 11-97-GPM, 2013 WL 193442, *2 (S.D.
Ill. Jan. 17, 2013); see also Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, Ill., 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir.
2023) ("An appellant may waive . . . [an] argument in many ways, such as by . . . failing
to present a developed argument."). Accordingly, the court will review de novo only the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding Robert's mental impairments. The court
will review the subjective symptom recommendation for clear error. Johnson v. Zema
Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999).
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A. 	Mental Impairments Analysis
Robert's main argument is that the ALJ erred in finding that his mental
impairments were not severe because she improperly relied on Dr. Griffin's opinion and
failed to consider contrary evidence. He also argues that, because she found that his
mental impairments were not severe, she erred by failing to account for his mental
impairments in the RFC.
"The claimant bears the burden of submitting medical evidence establishing [his]
impairments and [his] residual functional capacity." Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712
(7th Cir. 2011). But "[e]stablishing the existence of an impairment is not enough. The
claimant must present evidence of limitations affecting their capacity to work." Thorlton
v. King, 127 F.4th 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2025). In considering the evidence, the "ALJ need
not . . . discuss every piece of evidence in the record," but she cannot "ignore[e] an entire
line of evidence that supports a finding of disability." Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785,
788 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Dr. Griffin was an impartial medical expert in the case, and she opined that
Robert's medical record failed to reveal a need for a limitation based on his mental
impairments. (Dkt. 9-9 at 3). Dr. Griffin cited three pages from the record in support,
which were documents from Robert's visits to the doctor for physical ailments, not for his
mental health. (Id.). And two of the cited documents were from before Robert's alleged
onset date. (See Dkt. 9-7 at 174, 390).
True, Dr. Griffin's opinion did not take into account all the evidence in the record
documenting Robert's mental impairments. But after finding Dr. Griffin's opinion
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persuasive, the ALJ noted that "there are no opinions in the record regarding any more
restrictive limitations." (Dkt. 9-2 at 20). So, even if the ALJ incorrectly relied on Dr.
Griffin's opinion, Robert failed to put forth a medical opinion indicating that he needed
work limitations based on his mental impairments.
Robert argues that there were two medical opinions supporting a limitation that the
ALJ failed to consider. Both documents said Robert was totally disabled and that he
could not work for two three-week periods. (Dkt. 9-8 at 12–15, 21–24). Nurse
Practitioner Roy signed both documents and stated that the disability resulted from
anxiety and depression related to COVID-19. (Id.). Neither document identified any
limitation that Robert needed to continue working in the future. (See id.). The
Magistrate Judge found that Nurse Practitioner Roy's statements were not "medical
opinions" as defined by the SSA regulations. The court agrees. They do not qualify as
medical opinions because the documents did not address what Robert could do despite
his impairments or his ability to perform the mental demands of work activities. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (defining medical opinion evidence).
Although the statements were not medical opinions, the ALJ was still required to
consider them as part of the medical evidence in the record. Robert argues that the ALJ
"ignored all of the evidence documenting psychological difficulties in favor of
highlighting the normal findings from physical exam visits." (Dkt. 11 at 12). The ALJ's
decision proves the contrary. The ALJ noted that although Robert's impairments could
cause the symptoms he complained of, they were not supported by the objective medical
evidence in the record. (Dkt. 9-2 at 8). The record contains reports documenting
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Robert's symptoms caused by his medical impairments, but the objective evidence in
many of the documents indicated that his impairments were not severe. As the ALJ
pointed out, doctors consistently noted that Robert had normal mood and affect,
unremarkable behavior, normal attention and concentration, and normal memory. (Id. at
10). And some of the ALJ's citations came from Robert's therapy session notes, where
most of Robert's subjective symptoms were documented. (See, e.g., Dkt. 9-8 at 35, 41).
This is not a case where the ALJ failed to consider evidence contrary to her
conclusion. Rather, the ALJ considered the evidence but chose not to walk through every
piece in making her determination. ALJs are subject to a minimal articulation
requirement, see Warnell v. O'Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024), so the ALJ did
not need to discuss all the evidence in making her determination, see Gedatus v. Saul, 994
F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2021). Thus, even though the evidence may have also supported a
decision that Robert's mental impairments were severe, the ALJ's decision that his mental
impairments were not severe was supported by substantial evidence, and the court will
not upend that decision. And because the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial
evidence, she did not err by not including a limitation in his RFC based on his mental
impairments.
Robert also raised two other arguments that the court will briefly address. First,
the ALJ overlooked the fact that he attended his therapy from home, which played a role
in his therapist noting that his mental functioning was normal. Second, the ALJ
improperly relied on Robert's lack of inpatient hospitalization in finding that his mental
impairments were not severe.
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Robert cites Senora W. v. O'Malley, No. 21-cv-4411, 2024 WL 4346613 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2024), in support of his first argument. In Senora W., the record contained
strong evidence that the claimant's symptoms were triggered by interacting with people in
a work environment and that she did not get along with others, but the ALJ discounted
that evidence without adequately explaining why. Id. at *14–16. Instead, the ALJ cited
the claimant's testimony that she was doing well at home, "overlook[ing] the fact that the
more controlled and comfortable environments of home or a therapist's office are quite
different from the work setting." Id. at *16. As in Senora W., the ALJ did not explicitly
address that some of the objective medical evidence came from Robert's telephone
therapy sessions, where he was likely more comfortable than he would be in a work
environment. But unlike in Senora W., this case lacks overwhelming evidence showing
that a work environment would trigger the symptoms of Robert's mental impairments.
Robert noted that he struggles to leave the home and to interact with others, but
the evidence does not show that working in his previous job would trigger the symptoms.
Notably, when the ALJ questioned the vocational expert about the jobs Robert could
perform, Robert's attorney asked the vocational expert what jobs would be available if a
limitation were imposed based on Robert's mental impairments. (Dkt. 9-2 at 101–02).
The vocational expert said he would not change his answer—that Robert could perform
his past work as an automated cutting machine operator—because the job would only
have brief and inconsequential interactions with coworkers, and Robert would not
interact with the general public. (Id. at 102). Thus, this is not a case where there was
overwhelming evidence suggesting that Robert's mental impairments affected his ability
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to work. Instead, the hearing testimony indicated that Robert could do his past work
without an increased burden on his mental impairments. Other evidence in the record did
not indicate otherwise. Accordingly, the fact that Robert attended his therapy over the
phone was not something the ALJ needed to explain away like the ALJ in Senora W.
And as for Robert's second argument, the ALJ did not place too much emphasis on
his lack of inpatient hospitalization. When she identified all the evidence in the record
indicating that Robert did not need a limitation based on his mental impairments, his lack
of inpatient hospitalization was the final point she considered. She did not elaborate and
say it was important in her decision, nor did she say that he needed a history of inpatient
hospitalization to show he needed a limitation. Rather, she said that, taking all the
evidence in the record together, including his lack of inpatient hospitalization, Robert
failed to show that he needed a limitation based on his mental impairments. The ALJ did
not err in conducting that analysis.
B. 	Subjective Symptom Analysis
Because no objection was made to the Magistrate Judge's subjective symptom
analysis, the court reviews it for clear error. Johnson, 170 F.3d at 739. The Report and
Recommendation concluded that the ALJ's subjective symptom analysis was supported
by substantial evidence and recommended that the court deny Robert's remand request.
After reviewing the record, the Report and Recommendation, the parties' motions
and memoranda, and the applicable law, the court finds no clear error in the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons addressed above, the court OVERRULES Robert's objection,
(Dkt. 17), and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate
Judge. (Dkt. 16).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of December 2025.
s/ RLY
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
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