USA v. LOVE et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cr-00045-JPH-MJD
)
CAMERON LOVE, 	) 	-01
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION
Defendant Cameron Love, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion to
suppress evidence of an identification conducted by the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department. 	Dkt. 148. 	For the reasons below, that motion
is DENIED.
I.
Facts and Background
Mr. Love is charged with committing a January 16, 2025 robbery of a
Burger King in Indianapolis, with brandishing a firearm in relation to that
offense, and with felon in possession of a firearm. 	Dkt. 124 (superseding
indictment).
After the robbery, a victim called 911 and reported that the robber left in
a black Chevrolet Cruze. 	Govt. Ex. 4. 	Less than a half hour later, an IMPD
officer attempted to pull over a car matching that description, spurring a high-
speed chase lasting nearly twenty minutes. 	Govt. Ex. 10 at 0:00–19:45. 	The
car eventually stopped in the center of the road in Carmel, Indiana. 	Id.
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During the police chase, another IMPD officer interviewed two Burger
King employees, who said that the robber wore a white shirt, black coat, and
brown or tan pants. 	Dkt. 183 at 1–2 (Phillips–Stackman aff.); Govt. Ex. 3;
Govt. Ex. 6. 	The officer then brought the witnesses to the end of the high-
speed pursuit in Carmel, telling them that "police had detained some
individuals who may or may not have been involved in the robbery." 	Dkt. 183
at 2.
"Passer-by pedestrians were driving by cheering the police as the victims
were arriving to the middle of the street." 	Dkt. 172 at 3 (Love aff.). 	There, Mr.
Love "was handcuffed, standing in front of a motorcade of multiple police
department vehicles," id. at 1, while the witnesses "had the opportunity to see
his face and examine his appearance," dkt. 183 at 2. 	Mr. Love was wearing a
white shirt, black coat, and tan pants. 	Dkt. 183-1. 	The witnesses both
identified Mr. Love as the robber. 	See id. at 2. 	The witnesses did not review
surveillance footage before the identification. 	Dkt. 172 at 2.
Mr. Love has filed a motion to suppress evidence of this identification.
Dkt. 148.
II.
Analysis
Mr. Love argues that evidence of this identification must be suppressed
because it was "unnecessarily suggestive" and he did not have counsel present.
Dkt. 148 at 1–3. 	The government responds that a prompt identification was
necessary in this situation and that the identifications are reliable. 	Dkt. 155.
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Due process concerns related to an identification "arise only when law
enforcement officers use[ ] an identification procedure that is both suggestive
and unnecessary." 	Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 965–66 (2018). 	"It is
not enough that the procedure may have in some respects fallen short of the
ideal." 	Id. 	Instead, "[t]o be 'impermissibly suggestive,' the procedure must give
rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 	Id.
Whether the Due Process clause requires suppression of an identification thus
follows a two-step analysis. 	United States v. Vines, 9 F.4th 500, 506 (7th Cir.
2021). 	First, the identification procedure must have been unnecessarily
suggestive. 	Id. Second, the identification must be unreliable under several
factors, "creat[ing] a substantial likelihood of misidentification." 	Id.
"The first prong focuses on police conduct—its suggestiveness and
necessity in the specific situation at hand." 	United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d
976, 984 (7th Cir. 2013). 	Here, the government agrees that there was some
suggestiveness in the identification because law enforcement conducted a
"show up" identification by bringing the witnesses to Mr. Love. 	Dkt. 155 at 4.
"A show-up occurs when only one suspect is presented to the witness" and "is
inherently suggestive because the witness is likely to be influenced by the fact
that that the police appear to believe that the person . . . is guilty." 	United
States v. Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir. 1996).
But show-up identifications "are proper and not unduly suggestive under
certain circumstances." 	United States v. Clark, 989 F.2d 1490, 1495 (7th Cir.
1993); accord United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 581 (7th Cir. 2022).
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That includes when law enforcement is "confirming that an individual
apprehended close in time and proximity to the scene of a crime is, in fact, the
suspected perpetrator of the crime." 	United States v. Hawkins, 499 F.3d 703,
707 (7th Cir. 2007). 	"Such identifications both protect innocent individuals
from unnecessary arrest and help authorities determine whether they must
continue to search for the actual perpetrator." 	Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708. 	And
they can "allow identification before the suspect has altered his appearance
and while the witness' memory is fresh." 	United States v. Sleet, 54 F.3d 303,
309 (7th Cir. 1995).
So, in Hawkins, the Seventh Circuit held that a show-up identification
was necessary and not unduly suggestive. 	Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708; see
Sanders, 708 F.3d at 986 ("As discussed, a procedure that is suggestive—even
when inherently so—may still be necessary."). Mr. Hawkins had been
apprehended near the robbery and the show-up occurred within an hour after
the crime. 	Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708. And the officers "took no steps other
than the showup itself to suggest that Mr. Hawkins was the robber," such as
having him put on the ski mask found near the robbery or showing the witness
the gun used in the robbery. 	Id.
The same is true here. 	Mr. Love's identification happened shortly after
the robbery, when Mr. Love was detained at the end of a high-speed pursuit.
See dkt. 172. 	While Mr. Love was handcuffed and standing in front of several
police vehicles, id., that is part of the identification process when law
enforcement has found a suspect and needs "to determine whether their
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investigation is on the right track," see Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708. 	The
witnesses did not see surveillance video before the identification, dkt. 172 at 2,
and Mr. Love does not allege any steps officers took to make him appear to be
the person who robbed the Burger King, see Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708.
Instead, officers needed to set up an identification while the witnesses'
memories were strongest and before a suspect could change his appearance.
See Sleet, 54 F.3d at 309. 	And if Mr. Love was not the person who robbed the
Burger King, the officers needed to know that promptly so their investigation
could continue. 	See Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 708. 	So, in this situation, Mr.
Love's "claim falters because he cannot prove that the procedure, [while]
suggestive, was also unnecessary." 	Sanders, 708 F.3d at 986.
Because Mr. Love's motion fails on the first prong, the Court need not
address the reliability of the identification. 	Sanders, 708 F.3d at 984 ("As the
Supreme Court recently reiterated, courts will only consider the second prong if
a challenged procedure does not pass muster under the first."); accord United
States v. Sleet, 54 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1995).1
Finally, Mr. Love was not entitled to have counsel present at the
identification, as he argues. See dkt. 148 at 3 (citing United States v. Wade,
which held that counsel should have been present at a post-indictment lineup,
388 U.S. 218 (1967)). 	Instead, "it has been firmly established that a person's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
1 Mr. Love has not requested a hearing or contested any material facts, so no hearing
is required. See dkt. 148; dkt. 173; United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353
(7th Cir. 2018).
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time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 690 (1972) (explaining that there is no right
to counsel at an identification before the commencement of prosecution).2
The show-up identification of Mr. Love therefore is not subject to
suppression, and whether it is believed is a question for the jury. 	See Sanders,
708 F.3d at 987 ("After we are convinced that no constitutional violation
occurred, the jury, not the judge, determines the reliability of evidence.").
III.
Conclusion
Mr. Love's motion to suppress identification is DENIED. 	Dkt. [148].
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
CAMERON LOVE
USMS# 67207-511
CLARK COUNTY JAIL
CLARK COUNTY JAIL
Inmate Mail/Parcels
501 East Court Avenue
Jeffersonville, IN 47130
All electronically registered counsel
2 Mr. Love also argues that the Court should consider dismissing the indictment
against him because of constitutional violations in the identification, including his not
having counsel present. Because the identification need not be suppressed and
because his constitutional right to counsel was not violated, the Court does not
further address Mr. Love's request that the indictment be dismissed for those reasons.
Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1981) (explaining that "the
remedy characteristically imposed" for a constitutional violation "is not to dismiss the
indictment but to suppress the evidence").
Date: 1/16/2026
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