MOORE v. ELI LILLY & COMPANY

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JORDAN MOORE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-02254-JRO-KMB
)
ELI LILLY & COMPANY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Pending before the Court are three motions arising from ongoing discovery disputes
between the Parties in this case: (1) pro se Plaintiff Jordan Moore's Motion to Remove Prior
Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff was a Disabled Worker Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, [dkt. 42], which Defendant Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") does not oppose; (2)
Lilly's Motion for Sanctions, [dkt. 44], to which Mr. Moore did not directly respond but instead
addressed through his own motion; and (3) Mr. Moore's Motion to Dismiss all Proposed Claims
for Sanctions and to Compel the Court for the Defendant to Produce a Witness List, [dkt. 47],
which Lilly opposes in its reply brief in support of its Motion for Sanctions, [dkt. 48]. 	These
motions are all now ripe and ready for the Court's rulings.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Mr. Moore was represented by counsel in this case until September 2025, when the Court
granted counsel's Motion to Withdraw following an ex parte status conference. [Dkts. 29; 34.] As
a result, Mr. Moore began proceeding pro se. [Dkt. 34.] In granting counsel's Motion to Withdraw,
the Court directed Mr. Moore to the pro se litigant resources available on the Court's website so
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that he could familiarize himself with the rules all litigants in the Southern District of Indiana must
follow. [Id.]
Following counsel's withdrawal, discovery disputes arose between the Parties. On January
15, 2026, Lilly filed a Motion to Extend Deadlines Regarding Fact Discovery and to Compel
Plaintiff's Deposition. [Dkt. 39.] Lilly asserted that Mr. Moore refused to sit for his deposition
unless certain conditions were met, including that the unidentified "B108 operators" who allegedly
reported him for drug use be made available for deposition or that Eli Lilly provide statements
from those individuals to the Court. [Dkt. 39-1 at 1.] On March 5, 2026, the Court granted Lilly's
Motion to Compel in part and ordered Mr. Moore to work with Lilly's counsel to schedule and
complete his deposition within thirty days. [Dkt. 43 at 4.] The Court also warned Mr. Moore that
failure to cooperate in scheduling or participating in the deposition in good faith could result in
sanctions, including dismissal of the case if appropriate. [Id. at 5.]
While Lilly's Motion to Compel remained pending, Mr. Moore filed the pending Motion
to Remove Prior Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff was a Disabled Worker Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 	[Dkt. 42.] 	In that Motion, Mr. Moore asserts that his former
counsel improperly characterized him as "disabled" under the ADA and asks the Court to prohibit
discovery into his medical history. [Id. at 1-2.] Specifically, Mr. Moore contends that his claims
arise from alleged workplace discrimination and retaliation related to his approved medical leave,
rather than from any alleged disability requiring workplace accommodations. [Id.] Therefore, Mr.
Moore argues that Lilly improperly seeks his medical information in its discovery requests to Mr.
Moore. [Id.] Mr. Moore also raises other discovery-related concerns, including his assertion that
Lilly failed to provide certain witness information that he believes is necessary to pursue his
claims. [Id. at 3-4.]
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After the Court ordered Mr. Moore to sit for his deposition, Lilly filed its pending Motion
for Sanctions and asserts that Mr. Moore has continued to refuse to participate in his deposition as
ordered by the Court. [Dkts. 44; 45.] Lilly now requests that the Court impose sanctions consistent
with its warning, including dismissing his claims with prejudice and ordering Mr. Moore to pay
the fees and costs associated with Lilly's Motion. [Dkt. 45 at 6.]
Rather than file a response to Lilly's Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Moore filed his own Motion
to Dismiss all Proposed Claims for Sanctions and to Compel the Court for the Defendant to
Produce a Witness List. 	[Dkt. 47.] 	In that Motion, Mr. Moore asks the Court to deny Lilly's
requested sanctions and to compel Lilly to provide a witness list identifying the individuals who
allegedly accused him of drug use while employed as a B108 operator or alternatively asks the
undersigned to recuse herself.1 [Id. at 1-3.]
In response to Mr. Moore's Motion and in reply in support of its own Motion for Sanctions,
Lilly reiterates that Mr. Moore cannot condition his participation in a deposition on Lilly providing
additional discovery when the Court already ordered him to sit for a deposition. [Dkt. 48 at 2.]
Lilly also asserts in response to Mr. Moore's request for a complete witness list that it has fully
complied 	with 	its 	discovery 	obligations, 	including 	serving 	initial 	disclosures 	identifying
individuals likely to have discoverable information and serving its preliminary witness and exhibit
list more than a year ago. [Id.] Accordingly, Lilly argues that Mr. Moore already possesses the
1 Mr. Moore alleges in his Motion that "United States Judge Kellie Bar [sic] has participated in a
2 versus 1 battle, in which it is apparent that she has sided with the defendant and has not compelled
nor ordered the defendant to produce a witness list to myself the plaintiff, who is proceeding pro
se." [Dkt. 47 at 2.] The only support Mr. Moore includes in support of this accusation is that the
Court had not yet ruled on his Motion to Remove Prior Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff was
a Disabled Worker. [Id.] In case Mr. Moore is not aware, each judge in this District is assigned a
very large caseload, and all motions are handled in due course. The undersigned remains impartial
in this case, and there is no basis recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or any other applicable
statute.
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witness information he claims to seek. 	Lilly further contends that, by failing to file a direct
response to Lilly's Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Moore has waived any substantive opposition to the
relief Lilly requests. 	[Id.] 	The Court rejects that argument from Lilly. 	Because Mr. Moore
substantively addressed many of Lilly's arguments in his own Motion, [dkt. 47], and because the
Court prefers to resolve disputes on their merits where possible, the Court will not treat Lilly's
Motion for Sanctions as unopposed and instead will address the merits of the Parties' disputes.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
"Discovery is a mechanism to avoid surprise, disclose the nature of the controversy, narrow
the contested issues, and provide the parties a means by which to prepare for trial." Todd v. Ocwen
Loan Servicing, Inc., 2020 WL 1328640, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2020) (citing 8 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2001, at 44-45 (2d ed. 1994)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) outlines the scope of permissible discovery and provides that parties to a civil dispute are
entitled to discover "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) authorizes a district court to sanction a party
that "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 37(a)."
Possible sanctions include the following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as
established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or
defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
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(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit
to a physical or mental examination.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii). Rule 37(d)(3) also directs that in addition to these sanctions,
"the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust."
An order of default judgment under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) requires a "clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct" or a finding of "willfulness, bad faith or fault on the part of the defaulting
party." Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2011). 	In assessing the
appropriateness of default judgment as a discovery sanction, courts consider the disobedient party's
conduct during discovery as a whole and whether less drastic sanctions would prove unavailing.
Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 301 (7th Cir. 2014). 	Ultimately, the court's sanctions under
Rule 37(b)(2)(A) must be proportional to the disobedient party's conduct. Nelson v. Schultz, 878
F.3d 236, 238-39 (7th Cir. 2017).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Motions for Sanctions
The 	Parties' 	competing 	Motions 	regarding 	sanctions 	stem 	from 	a 	fundamental
disagreement about discovery obligations and procedures. Lilly argues that Mr. Moore violated
the Court's Order issued on March 5, 2026, by refusing to participate in his deposition unless Lilly
first provided additional witness information that Mr. Moore believes is necessary to pursue his
claims. [Dkts. 44; 45.] Mr. Moore, in turn, contends that he cannot meaningfully participate in a
deposition without first obtaining the identities of the individuals he believes accused him of drug
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use while employed at Lilly, and asks the Court to compel the same information from Lilly. [Dkt.
47.]
The Court agrees with Lilly that Mr. Moore was not permitted to condition his participation
in a deposition on Lilly providing additional discovery, particularly after the Court expressly
ordered Mr. Moore to sit for a deposition. [Dkt. 43.] Mr. Moore was required to cooperate with
Lilly in scheduling and completing his deposition within the 30-day timeframe ordered by the
Court, which he failed to do. See McInnis v. Duncan, 697 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[E]ven
those who are pro se must follow court rules and directives."). 	Mr. Moore's asserted lack of a
"valid or accurate witness list" does not excuse that noncompliance because it has no bearing on
Mr. Moore's ability to sit for a deposition and answer questions regarding facts personally known
to him. 	[Dkt. 47 at 3.] 	Put another way, at a deposition, Lilly's attorney will ask Mr. Moore
questions under oath, and if he does not know the answer to the question, he should state so in
response. To be clear, however, Mr. Moore's disagreement with Lilly's discovery responses did
not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the Court's clear directive that he sit for a
deposition within 30 days of the Court's Order.
Despite Mr. Moore's noncompliance, the Court declines to impose the severe sanction of
default judgment that Lilly requests at this time. Rice v. City of Chi., 333 F. 3d 780, 786 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding the Court must use its dismissal power sparingly, as it is a "harsh sanction" which
should "be employed as a last resort"). The Court believes that some of the present dispute arises
from Mr. Moore's misunderstanding of the discovery process after his counsel withdrew
representation, rather than willful bad faith or intentional disregard of the Court's authority. The
Court reminds Mr. Moore that, when his counsel withdrew, the Court directed him to resources for
pro se litigants available on the Court's website, including materials explaining the discovery
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process. [Dkt. 34.] Among those resources is the United States District Court Southern District
of 	Indiana 	Guide 	to 	Manage 	Your 	Lawsuit 	After 	Filing. 	See
https://www.insd.uscourts.gov/representingyourself-united-states-district-court. 	As explained in
those materials, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide several mechanisms through which
parties may seek relevant information from one another during discovery, including written
discovery such as interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admission, and through
depositions. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-36, 45. 	If a party believes an opposing party has failed to
adequately respond to discovery, objections are first directed to the opposing party, not to the
Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Only after the Parties have attempted in good faith to resolve the
dispute may a party seek Court intervention through a motion to compel discovery. Id.
Here, Lilly represents—and the docket confirms—that it served Rule 26(a) initial
disclosures and a preliminary witness list identifying individuals likely to have discoverable
information in this case. [Dkts 22; 48 at 2.] Given that Mr. Moore was represented by counsel at
that time and is now proceeding pro se, the Court ORDERS Lilly to resend its initial disclosures
and its preliminary witness list to Mr. Moore no later than June 18, 2026. 	To the extent Mr.
Moore seeks additional identifying information regarding specific individuals, he must comply
with the proper discovery procedures set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to get
additional information.
Mr. Moore is again ORDERED to cooperate with Lilly in scheduling and completing his
deposition no later than June 25, 2026. Mr. Moore is advised that failure to comply with this
Order, including by failing to schedule or participate in his deposition in good faith, will likely
result in sanctions up to and including dismissal of this case. To ensure the Parties have sufficient
time to complete any remaining discovery after Mr. Moore's deposition, the Court sua sponte
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EXTENDS the fact and liability discovery deadline to July 24, 2026, and EXTENDS the
dispositive motions deadline to August 24, 2026. It is unlikely that the Court will again extend
these deadlines, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Turning to Lilly's request for attorneys' fees in bringing its Motion for Sanctions, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)(3), "the court must require the party failing to act . . . to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." 	The Court
concludes 	that 	Mr. 	Moore's 	opposition 	was 	not 	substantially 	justified 	and 	there 	are 	no
circumstances present that make an award of expenses unjust. Thus, the Court agrees with Lilly
that it is appropriate in this case to order Mr. Moore to pay Lilly the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, that it incurred in bringing its Motion for Sanctions. The Court GRANTS Lilly's
request for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing its Motion for Sanctions. Lilly
SHALL file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs with supporting documentation no later than
June 18, 2026. Mr. Moore may file a response to Lilly's anticipated motion within fourteen (14)
days of the motion being filed, and Lilly may file a reply in support of its motion within (7) days
of Mr. Moore's response. Mr. Moore's Motion to Dismiss all Proposed Claims for Sanctions and
to Compel the Court for the Defendant to Produce a Witness List, [dkt. 47], is DENIED.
B. 	Mr. Moore's Motion Regarding ADA Claim
In his Motion to Remove Prior Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff Was A Disabled
Worker Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, Mr. Moore asserts that his former attorney
improperly characterized him as "disabled" under the ADA and objects to Lilly seeking extensive
discovery related to his medical history. 	[Dkt. 42.] 	Mr. Moore's filing makes it clear that his
claims 	against 	Lilly 	"are 	derived 	from 	workplace 	discrimination 	that 	includes 	racial
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discrimination, and retaliation from management while being out on and returning from approved
medical leaves through their third party examiner Sedgwick. When physically being at work and
cleared from medical leaves, there were never job accommodations put in place by my doctors nor
was I disabled to work." [Id.] Lilly did not respond to Mr. Moore's Motion, and the time to do so
has passed.
Mr. Moore's Complaint in this case sets forth three counts containing legal claims: 1) Title
VII – Race Discrimination (Count I); 2) ADA – Disability Discrimination (Count II); and 3) Title
VII & ADA – Disability Retaliation (Count III). [Dkt. 1.] Mr. Moore's Motion appears to concede
that he does not meet the legal definition of disability under the ADA such that he cannot succeed
on the claims he brought pursuant to that statute. If Mr. Moore would like to voluntarily dismiss
the ADA claims in his case, he shall meet and confer with Lilly's counsel and then file a stipulation
of dismissal with regard to those claims, which must be signed by all Parties pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Court cannot unilaterally dismiss those claims at this
stage of the proceedings based on Mr. Moore's filing alone. Accordingly, Mr. Moore's Motion to
Remove Prior Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff was a Disabled Worker Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, [dkt. 42], is DENIED. Given the representations made in Mr. Moore's filing,
however, the Court encourages Lilly's counsel to promptly confer with him in good faith to reach
agreement on narrowing the claims at issue in this litigation and then tailor its discovery
accordingly.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Lilly's Motion for Sanctions, [dkt. 44], is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court DENIES Lilly's request to dismiss Mr. Moore's claims
or enter default judgment at this time and GRANTS Lilly's request for reasonable attorneys' fees
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and costs incurred in bringing its Motion for Sanctions. Lilly SHALL file a motion for attorneys'
fees and costs with supporting documentation no later than June 18, 2026. Mr. Moore may file
a response to Lilly's anticipated motion within fourteen (14) days of the motion being filed, and
Lilly may file a reply in support of its motion within (7) days of Mr. Moore's response.
Given that Mr. Moore was represented by counsel at that time and is now proceeding pro
se, the Court ORDERS Lilly to resend its initial disclosures and its preliminary witness list to Mr.
Moore no later than June 18, 2026. 	To the extent Mr. Moore seeks additional identifying
information regarding specific individuals, he must comply with the proper discovery procedures
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to get additional information.
Mr. Moore is again ORDERED to cooperate with Lilly in scheduling and completing his
deposition no later than June 25, 2026. Mr. Moore is advised that failure to comply with this
Order, including by failing to schedule or participate in his deposition in good faith, will likely
result in sanctions up to and including dismissal of this case.
To ensure the Parties have sufficient time to complete any remaining discovery after Mr.
Moore's deposition, the Court sua sponte EXTENDS the fact and liability discovery deadline to
July 24, 2026, and EXTENDS the dispositive motions deadline to August 24, 2026. It is unlikely
that the Court will again extend these deadlines, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Mr. Moore's Motion to Dismiss all Proposed Claims for Sanctions and to Compel the Court
for the Defendant to Produce a Witness List, [dkt. 47], is DENIED. 	Mr. Moore's Motion to
Remove Prior Counsel's Declaration that the Plaintiff was a Disabled Worker Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, [dkt. 42], is likewise DENIED. 	If Mr. Moore would like to voluntarily
dismiss the ADA claims in his case, he shall meet and confer with Lilly's counsel and then file a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all Parties regarding those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Court cannot unilaterally dismiss those claims at this stage
of the proceedings based on Mr. Moore's Motion alone. 	Given the representations made in Mr.
Moore's filing, however, the Court encourages Lilly's counsel to promptly confer with him in good
faith to reach agreement on narrowing the claims at issue in this litigation and then tailor its
discovery accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
JORDAN MOORE
907 Harvest Ridge Drive
Avon, IN 46123
Registered counsel of record via Court's CM/ECF System
Date: 6/4/2026
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