Goodwin v. SCA of MO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CORNELL GOODWIN, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCA OF MO,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-01971-JPG
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Cornell Goodwin’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). A federal court may permit an indigent party to proceed without
pre-payment of fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Nevertheless, a court can deny a qualified plaintiff
leave to file in forma pauperis or can dismiss a case if the action is clearly frivolous or malicious
or fails to state a claim. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). The test for determining if an action is
frivolous or without merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or
facts in support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Corgain v. Miller,
708 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1983). An action fails to state a claim if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). When assessing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court should
inquire into the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, and if the court finds them to be frivolous, it
should deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Lucien v. Roegner, 682 F.2d 625, 626 (7th Cir.
1982).
The Court does not have enough information to determine whether Plaintiff is indigent.
In his motion, Plaintiff states that he makes $17.00 per hour. However, he does not provide the
Court with any information about the amount of money that he has in cash or in a bank account
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or about his debts and financial obligations. Due to the limited information provided in the
motion, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee.
In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff’s complaint
appears to assert two claims against Defendant SCA of MO. His first claim alleges that
Defendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621 et seq., by terminating his employment based on age. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under
the ADEA. The Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To state a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege that his
employer instituted an adverse employment action against him because of his age. See Kirley v.
Bd. of Educ. of Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, No 13 C 1706, 2013 WL 6730885, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 2013). The prohibitions in the Act are “limited to individuals who are at least 40
years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Plaintiff’s ADEA claim fails for two reasons. First, in his
statement of facts, Plaintiff alleges that “Emma called [him] and accused [him] of stealing gas
from the company[.] [S]he showed no proof of the accusation that was made and wrongfully
terminated [him].” This statement of facts does not allege that Plaintiff was fired based on his
age. Second, Plaintiff states that he was born in 1992. Accordingly, he is under the age of 40 and
is not covered by the prohibitions in the Act.
His second claim is that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., by terminating his employment based on race and
color. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII. The Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
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employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). For a plaintiff to state a claim under Title VII, he must allege that the
defendant terminated his employment because of his protected characteristic. See Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516,
518 (7th Cir. 1998) (“‘I was turned down for a job because of my race’ is all a complaint has to
say”). As discussed above, Plaintiff’s statement of facts alleges that he was fired because he was
accused of stealing gas. In other words, it does not allege that he was fired because of his race or
color. As such, he has failed to state a claim under Title VII.
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information for the Court to determine that he is
indigent and has failed to state a claim under the ADEA and Title VII. Therefore, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) and DISMIISSES
the Complaint (Doc. 1) without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii). Plaintiff
shall have up to and including December 4, 2025, to file an amended complaint and a new
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to send Plaintiff a
blank employment discrimination complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis along with
this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	November 4, 2025
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge
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