Wright v. Sherrod et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHAQUILLE E. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISOPHER SHERROD,
AUSTIN,
ASHLEY,
SUSAN,
MELVIN, and
DARREN D. GALLOWAY,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-01249-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Shaquille Wright, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) who is currently incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center, brings this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights that occurred
while he was housed at Shawnee Correctional Center. The Complaint is now before the
Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, any
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of
a magistrate judge and the Illinois Department of Corrections’ and Wexford’s limited consent to the
exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Illinois Department of Corrections, Wexford, and this Court.
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T HE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges the following: While he was housed at Shawnee Correctional
Center, 	Sergeant 	Sherrod 	threw 	Plaintiff 	from 	his 	wheelchair 	following 	medical
clearance. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Sherrod falsely claimed that Plaintiff had refused housing, and
Plaintiff was issued a disciplinary report for disobeying a direct order. (Id.). Nurses
Ashley and Susan were present when Sherrod used excessive force against Plaintiff and
knew that Plaintiff had an ankle injury, but they did not intervene or provide medical
attention. (Id.).
On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff appeared before the Adjustment Committee on the
disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Lieutenant Austin corroborated the false statement made
by Sergeant Sherrod, even though Austin had not been present when Plaintiff was
thrown from the wheelchair. (Id.). Plaintiff was found guilty and sanctioned with
segregation and demotion to C-grade status. (Id.). Plaintiff informed Warden Galloway
of the incident and requested review of the surveillance footage. (Id.). Warden Galloway
refused Plaintiff’s request stating that “he would not override his staff.” (Id.). According
to Lieutenant Banks, however, the surveillance footage contradicted Sergeant Sherrod’s
account of the events. (Id.).
PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL
Plaintiff lists Defendant Lieutenant Melvin as a defendant but does not assert any
allegations against Melvin in the body of the Complaint. Thus, the Court is unable to
ascertain what claims, if any, Plaintiff has against Melvin, and Melvin is dismissed
without prejudice. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff
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cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the
caption.”).
DISCUSSION
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court
designates the following counts:
Count 1: 	Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Sherrod.
Count 2: 	Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against Ashley
and Susan.
Count 3: 	Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Sherrod, Ashley, and Susan.
Count 4: 	Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Sherrod
and Austin.
Count 5: 	First Amendment retaliation claim against Austin.
Count 6: 	Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against Austin
and Galloway.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly 2 pleading
standard.
Count 1
Plaintiff asserts Sergeant Sherrod threw him from the wheelchair and that at the
time he did not pose any threat or resistance. This allegation is sufficient for Count 1 to
2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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proceed against Sergeant Sherrod. See Wilbron v. Ealy, 881 F. 3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Correctional officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Count 2
Plaintiff claims that Nurses Ashley and Susan witnessed him being thrown to the
ground 	by 	Lieutenant 	Sherrod 	and 	failed 	to 	intervene 	or 	provide 	medical 	care
demonstrating deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (Doc. 1, p. 3).
A prison staff member “can be liable for another officer’s excessive force only if
that [staff member] has a realistic opportunity to intervene and stop the first officer’s
actions. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F. 3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Plaintiff does not assert
any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer the Nurses Ashley and Susan had
reason to anticipate that Sergeant Sherrod would throw Plaintiff to the ground. Thus,
they had “no time to act until after” Sherrod had already used force against Plaintiff, and
by then it was too late to intervene. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
failure to intervene, and Count 2 is dismissed.
Count 3
Plaintiff asserts that after he was thrown from the wheelchair, and he was not
provided medical care, even though he had a preexisting ankle injury. (Doc. 1, p. 2, 3).
To state a claim for the denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, Plaintiff must plead facts suggesting he suffered from an objectively serious
medical need and that each defendant responded with deliberate indifference. Roe v.
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Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). An objectively serious medical condition involves
chronic or substantial pain or significantly impacts a plaintiff’s daily activities. Gutierrez
v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir.
2010). Deliberate indifference is shown by a defendant who knowingly disregards a
serious medical condition or persists in a course of treatment known to be ineffective.
Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2015).
Although Plaintiff had a preexisting ankle injury, he does not make any sort of
allegation that he was injured or reinjured when he was thrown from the wheelchair. He
fails to describe any serious medical need that required attention, and he does not assert
that Sherrod, Ashley, and Susan were aware of a serious medical need that resulted from
the use of excessive force requiring additional treatment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim for deliberate indifference, and Count 3 is dismissed.
Count 4
Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the false disciplinary report that was issued by
Sergeant Sherrod and corroborated by Lieutenant Austin, he was found guilty by the
Adjustment Committee of disobeying a direct order and sanctioned with segregation and
demotion to C-grade status. To the extent Plaintiff is bringing a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim, such claim is dismissed.
A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim challenging a prison disciplinary
proceeding requires a plaintiff to show: (1) a constitutionally protected liberty interest;
and (2) deficient procedures in connection with the deprivation of that interest. Lisle v.
Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (2019); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220-21 (2005). The
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question is “whether a protected liberty interest exists, and if so, whether [Plaintiff]
received adequate process to protect it.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964 (7th Cir. 2024).
A. Protected Liberty Interest
A prisoner’s liberty interest is implicated by prison discipline that “imposes an
‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.’” Ealy, 109 F.4th at 964 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). To
show a hardship sufficient to create a protected liberty interest, an inmate must
demonstrate that his punishment was a dramatic departure from basic conditions of
prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; Lisle, 933 F.3d at 721 (“If the disciplinary measures
do not ‘substantially worsen the conditions of confinement’ of an inmate, then he has not
been deprived of a protected liberty interest.”) (quoting Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 414–
15 (7th Cir. 2011)). When analyzing whether disciplinary segregation implicates a
protected liberty interest, courts consider “the ‘combined import of the duration of the
segregative confinement and the conditions endured.’” Ealy, 109 F.4th at 965 (quoting
Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013)). “[T]he facts matter.” Lisle, 933
F.3d at 721.
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are simply insufficient to trigger any sort of liberty
interest because Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any information about the
amount of time he spent in segregation. Moreover, equally absent from Plaintiff’s
complaint are any sort of allegations that describe the conditions of his confinement in
segregation. Absent this information, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to implicate a liberty
interest.
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B. Process Afforded
But even if the Court were to assume Plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest,
Plaintiff has failed to provide enough information to adequately allege a due process
violation. 	The 	Seventh 	Circuit 	recently 	clarified 	that 	inmates 	facing 	disciplinary
segregation are entitled only to “informal, nonadversarial due process.” Ealy, 109 F.4th at
965 (quoting Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2024)). This requires only “some
notice” of the reasons for the inmate’s placement in segregation, an opportunity to
present his views, and a review by the decision maker of the charges and the available
evidence. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 966 (citing Adams, 91 F.4th at 895); Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d
679, 684, 685 (7th Cir. 2012); Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994).3
Plaintiff claims that Lt. Austin corroborated a “false” statement without firsthand
knowledge and thus “influenced” the Adjustment Committee’s finding of guilt. Plaintiff
also claims that the Adjustment Committee did not review surveillance footage or call
certain witnesses. As the Court understands it, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that he was
given notice of the charge against him and was afforded an opportunity to be heard at
the Adjustment Committee Hearing (See Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff’s issue, however, appears
to be a contention that the Adjustment Committee was not impartial and that it failed to
review all available evidence. But Plaintiff does not expound on how he knows or why
he believes the Adjustment Committee was “influenced” by Lt. Austin. Moreover, the
Adjustment Committee is entitled to credit and discredit evidence it considers at
3“Due process [also] entitles a prisoner to an impartial decisionmaker during a prison disciplinary hearing.”
Adams, 91 F. 4th at 895.
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hearings. And based on Plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that is what happened here in
that the Adjustment Committee simply credited a statement as well as Lt. Austin’s
corroboration of that statement. 4 Although Plaintiff claims the statement is “false”,
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to raise any inference that Lt. Austin affected the
impartiality of the Adjustment Committee.
As to Plaintiff’s allegation that the Adjustment Committee failed to call nurses as
witnesses, this is a non-starter. Plaintiff does not indicate whether or not he requested the
nurses as witnesses, but even so, all that informal due process requires on this point is
that an inmate must be afforded an opportunity to his views at the disciplinary hearing.
See Ealy, 109 F. 4th at 967. There is no suggestion that Plaintiff was unable to do this.
Finally, Plaintiff claims the Adjustment Committee failed to review surveillance
footage of the incident. From the outset, Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain how he
knows or why he believes that surveillance footage of the incident actually exists. Plaintiff
makes a passing reference that Lt. Banks, with Internal Affairs, “reportedly reviewed the
camera footage” and claims that it contradicts the staff’s account. But Plaintiff’s use of the
term “reportedly” is conspicuous as that seems to indicate that Plaintiff does not have
personal knowledge of this information. Plaintiff fails to allege or explain how he knows
that Lt. Banks reviewed the supposed footage. Moreover, there is also no allegation or
information about whether Lt. Banks made a report regarding his review of the camera
footage and whether or not the Adjustment Committee relied on Lt. Banks report or
4 Plaintiff does not provide any details on whose statement Lt. Austin corroborated. It is possible that Plaintiff is
referring to a statement in the disciplinary charge or disciplinary report, but he never connects the dots or provides
any additional details on the statement.
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review of the supposed camera footage in its decision making process. Simply put,
Plaintiff’s allegations are too thin and too conclusory for the Court to conclude or
plausibly infer a due process violation.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to implicate a liberty interest and even if he
did, he has failed to plausibly allege a violation of the process he was afforded. Count 4
is dismissed.
Count 5
Plaintiff asserts that he was engaged in protected speech when he went on a
hunger strike and that Lt. Austin’s “role in supporting or fabricating disciplinary charges
in response constitutes retaliation.” (Doc. 1, p. 3).
A prison official who takes action in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of a
constitutional right violates the Constitution. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir.
2000). The Seventh Circuit has articulated that for a plaintiff to prevail on a First
Amendment retaliation claim, he must show that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by
the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First
Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was “at least a
motivating factor” in the defendant's decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v.
Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th
Cir. 2008)) (other citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s assertion that Austin retaliated against him for engaging in a hunger
strike by corroborating the false disciplinary report is conclusory and not supported by
the facts in the Complaint. There are no facts indicating that Austin was even aware that
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Plaintiff engaged in a hunger strike. And in fact, it appears that Plaintiff began his hunger
strike after Austin provided corroboration for the disciplinary ticket. See Manuel v. Nalley,
966 F. 3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The motivating factor amounts to a causal link between
the activity and the unlawful retaliation.”). Accordingly, Count 5 is dismissed.
Count 6
Plaintiff asserts that Lt. Austin “had the authority and duty to prevent subordinate
misconduct but took no action,” and that Warden Galloway knew the risks to Plaintiff
and “failed to intervene to redress misconduct.” (Doc. 1, p. 3).
To succeed on a claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant “(1) knew that a constitutional violation was committed; and (2) had a
realistic opportunity to prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir.
2017). However, a failure to intervene claim “depend[s] on proof of an underlying
constitutional violation.” Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019).
The 	only 	constitutional 	claim 	Plaintiff 	has 	successfully 	pled 	is 	an 	Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim against Sergeant Sherrod. According to the Complaint,
Austin and Galloway were informed about the excessive force incident after it occurred.
There are no facts to support the conclusion that Austin and Galloway knew Sherrod was
going to use force that day and had a realistic opportunity to step in and prevent the use
of force by Sherrod against Plaintiff. See Stewardson v. Titus, 126 F. 4th 1264, 1279 (7th Cir.
2025) (“The law does not require officers to act as fortune tellers, anticipating when their
fellow officers might use excessive force in the future…”). Additionally, contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertions, “public officials who know or should know about a wrong have no
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duty to correct the wrong and are responsible for their own misdeeds, but not for anyone
else’s.” Turley v. Hulce, No. 11-1052-MJR, 2013 WL 12204183, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 2013) (citing
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009)). Austin and Galloway cannot be held liable
solely based on the fact they hold supervisory positions. A supervisor must be
“personally involved in the constitutional violation” to held liable. See Gill, 850 F. 3d at
344. Other than failing to respond the way Plaintiff would have liked following the use
of force by Sherrod, he has not presented any facts from which the Court can conclude
that Austin and Galloway violated his constitutional rights. Count 6 is dismissed.
M OTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the Court to recruit counsel to represent him in
this case. (Doc. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney
to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” When faced with a motion for
recruitment of counsel the Court applies a two-part test: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff
made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing
so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to
litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff has not met either requirement for court recruited counsel. He does not
provide the Court with any information on efforts he has made to hire a lawyer himself;
nor does he state why he believes he is incapable of representing himself. Accordingly,
the motion is DENIED. (Doc. 2).
Even setting these deficiencies in Plaintiff’s motion for counsel aside, the Court
believes Plaintiff is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. This case is in the very
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early stages. Defendant Sherrod has not been served, and extensive argument and legal
research are not required. See Kadamovas v. Steven, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of
counsel... cannot be gauged.”). Additionally, Plaintiff has some high school education,
and his pleadings demonstrate an ability to construct coherent sentences and relay
information to the Court. Plaintiff therefore, appears competent to litigate this matter
without representation at this juncture. Once discovery has commenced, if Plaintiff has
significant difficulty, he may refile his motion. Should Plaintiff choose to move for
recruitment of counsel at a later date, the Court directs Plaintiff to: (1) contact at least
three attorneys regarding representation in this case prior to filing another motion; (2)
include in the motion the names and addresses of at least three attorneys he has
contacted; and (3) if available, attach the letters from the attorneys who declined
representation or copies of his payment voucher for postage.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint survives preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. COUNT 1 shall proceed against Christopher Sherrod.
COUNTS 2-6 are DISMISSED without prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims
against Austin, Ashley, Susan, Melvin, and Galloway, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to terminate them as defendants on the docket.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Christopher Sherrod: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a
Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service
of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and
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this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of employment as identified by
Plaintiff. If the defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form
6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on the defendant, and the Court will require the
defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, her last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms
as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the
court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Because this suit includes allegations of physical injuries, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
The defendant is ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, the defendant only needs to
respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs
or give security for the same, the applicant and (if applicable) his or her attorney were
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deemed to have entered into a stipulation that any unpaid costs taxed against the
applicant shall be paid from any recovery secured in this action.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 14, 2026
/s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been
achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint.
It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’
Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the
defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing
important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed
by the Court.
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